CourtListener 10033905•People v. Thompson CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 8/7/24 P. v. Thompson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B331835
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA023193)
v.
ANTHONY THOMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
Anthony Thompson, who is serving a long prison term,
appeals from an order partially denying his petition for
resentencing pursuant to the recently amended Penal Code
1
sections 1172.75 and 1385. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Current Felony Conviction
1. Residential Burglary
On November 12, 1994, Thompson, age 28, entered a
dwelling inhabited by Janet Doering, age 60, with the intention
of stealing from her. He ransacked several areas of her home
while she was in her bed, stole $54 from her purse, and fled after
she called 911. Doering was distraught by the burglary and
suffered a fatal heart attack while talking to responding officers.
Thompson was arrested nearby with Doering’s money in
his possession, but the district attorney’s office at first declined to
file charges pending further investigation involving fingerprint
and shoe print analysis.
In the meantime, Thompson robbed another home in March
of 1995, and in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BA114822
was convicted of residential robbery and sentenced to a base term
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
of four years in prison plus a consecutive enhancement of five
years.
2. Charges
In 1996, the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles
charged Thompson in a twice-amended information with the
murder of Doering and residential burglary.
a. One-Year Enhancement Allegations
The district attorney alleged that Thompson suffered felony
convictions in 1988 and 1990 within the meaning of subdivision
(b) of section 667.5, which at the time provided a one-year
sentence enhancement for someone who failed to remain free of a
conviction or prison custody for “any felony” for a period of five
years prior to the conviction of the current offense.
b. Five-Year Enhancement Allegations
The district attorney further alleged that Thompson’s 1990
conviction and a conviction in 1993 were for serious or violent
felonies within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of section 667,
which provides a five-year sentence enhancement for each such
conviction.
c. Strike Allegations
Finally, the district attorney alleged that Thompson’s 1990
and 1993 convictions constituted strikes for purposes of the
“Three Strikes” law.
3. Verdict and Sentencing
A jury deadlocked on the murder charge, which the People
thereafter dismissed, but found Thompson guilty of residential
burglary and found the prior convictions allegations true.
The court sentenced Thompson to 25 years to life under the
Three Strikes law plus five years each for the 1990 and 1993
serious felony convictions. The court added one concurrent year
3
each for the 1988 and 1990 prison priors but stayed the
enhancement as to the 1990 prior because it was duplicative of
the five-year enhancement already imposed for the 1990
conviction. (§ 664.)
Thompson’s sentence totaled 35 years to life (including a
concurrent one-year enhancement pursuant to subdivision (b) of
section 667.5), consecutive to the four-year base term in Case No.
BA114822.
B. Resentencing
In 2020, the Legislature changed the scope of the one-year
enhancement prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 667.5,
narrowing its applicability from a current conviction for “any
felony” to a conviction for a “sexually violent offense.” (People v.
Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 669.) In 2022, the
Legislature declared that any enhancement under subdivision (b)
of section 667.5 imposed before 2020 for a non-sexually violent
offense was invalid, and prescribed a resentencing procedure
pursuant to which an inmate serving a now-invalid sentence
could obtain complete resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), added
by Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) The Legislature also gave trial
courts discretion to strike five-year enhancements for prior
serious felony convictions. (Ibid.)
In 2022 and 2023, Thompson filed three petitions for
resentencing, seeking dismissal of the one-year and five-year
enhancements and vacation of the findings that his 1990 and
1993 convictions constituted strikes. The People filed no formal
opposition, but at the hearing opposed vacating the five-year
enhancements and strike findings.
Further facts came out at the June 15, 2023 resentencing
hearing. By the time Thompson was sentenced in 1996, he had
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committed three offenses as a juvenile (two in 1981 and another
in 1983), and seven crimes as an adult: a drug offense in 1986,
burglary in 1987, battery with serious bodily injury in 1990,
burglary in 1993, tampering with a vehicle in 1994, and first
degree robbery and first degree burglary in 1995. In the 1995
residential robbery case, which occurred a few months after the
burglary of Ms. Doering’s home, Thompson entered the residence
of a 71-year-old woman at 9:30 p.m., ransacked her bedroom,
then woke her up with a hand over her mouth, threatened to kill
her if she moved, and demanded to know where her purse was.
The victim fought back, resulting in injuries to both parties.
Thompson took about $2,000 in jewelry.
Thompson’s counsel presented evidence that although early
into his incarceration he was written up for minor infractions, he
had a clean record over the past nine years in prison and he had
completed his GED and programs in anger management,
domestic violence prevention, victims awareness, life skills,
addictive behavior, addiction recovery, and peer health. Counsel
argued that Thompson had had no positive influences as a child
and young man, and although 28 years old when he committed
the instant burglary, was developmentally immature. Counsel
presented several letters indicating Thompson had a support
system outside prison, and argued he was able and eager to
demonstrate he was not the same person who committed serious
crimes almost thirty years prior.
The resentencing court applauded Thompson for his efforts
and discussed relevant changes in sentencing law since his
conviction. It observed, “Now many things have changed the way
we look at things (since the original Romero motion in 1996),
aggravating factors, mitigating factors . . . .” The court stated it
“need[ed] to look at Mr. Thompson as a whole person, not just
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numbers on a page,” and noted there were “a lot of mitigating
factors since that 19[9]6 Romero motion. [Section] 1385 has
changed significantly since then and I think that the court has to
look at what he has done since then.” Ultimately, the court
concluded that Thompson’s efforts and changes in the law
merited dismissal of the sentence enhancements but not the two
strike findings.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the one- and five-year
sentence enhancements but declined to vacate the strike findings.
The resulting sentence was 25 years to life, of which Thompson
had already served 28 years.
DISCUSSION
Thompson contends the resentencing court abused its
discretion in declining to vacate the strike findings either in the
furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385 or as a matter of
recent legislative mandate. (Neither Thompson nor Respondent
contests the court’s dismissal of the one- and five-year sentence
enhancements.)
I. Vacating Strike Findings in the Furtherance of
Justice
A. Legal Principles
As noted, in 2020 and 2022 the Legislature changed the
law regarding sentencing enhancements, invalidating the one-
year section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement except for
sexually violent offenses and giving trial courts discretion to
strike the five-year enhancements for prior serious felony
convictions. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Under the new regime, a
prisoner whose judgment of conviction was final could obtain
6
retroactive resentencing because of the recent changes to the
sentencing law. (Ibid.)
Such resentencing is not limited merely to vacating now-
invalid enhancements. Instead, at resentencing “[t]he court shall
apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing. [¶] . . . The court may
consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) & (3).)
In other words, an inmate who is entitled to retroactive
resentencing because of recent changes to the sentencing law is
entitled to a complete reexamination of his or her sentence.
Such a reexamination may include application of section
1385.
Under section 1385, subdivision (a) the trial court “may, . . .
in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This
authority includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or
finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has
previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . .”
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)
The “furtherance of justice” requires consideration of both
the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of
society represented by the prosecution. (People v. Orin (1975) 13
7
Cal.3d 937, 945.) Thus, in deciding whether to vacate a strike
finding in the furtherance of justice, a trial court must consider
the nature and circumstances of the present felonies as well as
the prior serious felony convictions. (People v. Williams, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The court must further consider the
particulars of the defendant’s background, character, and
prospects. (Ibid.) From this consideration, the court must decide
whether the defendant “may be deemed” to be outside the “spirit,
in whole or in part,’’ of the Three Strikes law. (Ibid.)
“[T]he spirit of the law is informed, guided, and limited by
its letter, lest an unanchored spirit escape its legislative
receptacle and take[s] on an unenacted shape. [¶] [T]he Three
Strikes law expressly declares that its purpose is ‘to ensure
longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who
commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious
and/or violent felony offenses.’ ” (People v. Strong (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 328, 337.)
In other words, the spirit of the Three Strikes law is to
punish recidivism. Thus, only “extraordinary circumstances”
may demonstrate that the life sentence imposed on a repeat
criminal falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (People
v. Anderson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 780, 786.) “At the very least,
the reason for [vacating a strike finding] must be ‘that which
would motivate a reasonable judge.’ ” (People v. Orin, supra, 13
Cal.3d at p. 945.)
B. Standard of Review
We review for abuse of discretion an order declining to
vacate a strike finding in furtherance of justice pursuant to
section 1385. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.)
“This standard is deferential. [Citations.] But it is not empty.”
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(Ibid.) The question is whether the ruling “ ‘falls outside the
bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant
facts.” (Ibid.) An appellant must demonstrate on appeal that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 378.) The Three Strikes law
“creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to
these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Ibid.)
C. Application
Here, Thompson committed three offenses as a juvenile and
seven crimes as an adult, culminating in two residential
burglaries, the former of which resulted in the distraught 60-
year-old female victim suffering a fatal heart attack and the
latter of which escalated to a robbery when Thompson held down
the 71-year-old female victim and threatened to kill her.
Thompson committed no new crimes since 1996, but he has
been incarcerated since that time, which significantly attenuates
any mitigating value of the remoteness of his priors. (People v.
Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) These circumstances
alone support the resentencing court’s conclusion that Thompson
falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes laws, which is to limit
the court’s discretion in sentencing repeat offenders. Little in the
record suggests Thompson is not the sort of repeat offender
encompassed within that spirit.
Thompson relies heavily on his success in prison: He has
obtained his GED and completed several classes, and he has
friends outside prison and plans for the future. The resentencing
court acknowledged these efforts, even applauding Thompson’s
progress. Thompson also emphasizes his relative youth when
committing the instant felony and the lack of positive influences
in his life. He argues that he is has gained insight into the
9
crimes of his youth and is “much less likely—or able—at his age
(57) to run the risks of even unintentionally harming others that
he indulged as a young man.”
But these circumstances fail to show that the resentencing
court’s decision was irrational or arbitrary. On the contrary, the
court duly considered the nature and circumstances of the
present felony as well as Thompson’s prior serious felony
convictions, and further considered the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects before concluding
Thompson falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The
court took special note that Thompson had chosen elderly victims
for his crimes, and although he was now approaching an age
where he may have a greater appreciation for the vulnerability of
such victims, the court did not believe it appropriate to strike
either of his priors.
This is exactly the procedure the California Supreme Court
has prescribed. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
The court weighed the proper aspects of Thompson’s record,
exercised its discretion to strike the five year enhancements for
prior felonies, but exercised that same informed discretion in
deciding not to strike either of the strike priors. Nothing
indicates the court disregarded or undervalued any of the
mitigating factors Thompson presented, and no principle or
authority compelled it to draw any particular conclusion. The
court’s conclusion after duly weighing the circumstances of
Thompson’s felonies against the particulars of his background,
character and prospects was thus an appropriate exercise of
discretion.
Thompson argues that underlying felony sentencing is
evolving to place more emphasis on rehabilitation than on
10
lengthy incarceration, and from these sentencing trends he
contends it is clear that the definition of “the furtherance of
justice” is changing, as are the relevant factors regarding what it
means to be outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
This argument, made without citation to case authority,
provides no basis for finding an abuse of discretion in this case.
At the resentencing hearing it was clear the trial court was
aware of what it considered relevant changes in sentencing law
since Thompson’s conviction.
In any case, as Thompson concedes, in determining
whether a particular defendant may be deemed outside the spirit
of the Three Strikes law, the court must still consider the nature
and circumstances of the present felony as well as the prior
serious felony convictions. It was thus proper for the trial court
to consider the “extremely aggravated” circumstances of
Thompson’s prior felony convictions, which included residential
burglaries where one elderly victim died, and another was
attacked.
But the trial court did not stop there. It also considered
other factors such as Thompson’s good conduct while in prison
and evidence of his rehabilitation. Indeed, much of the hearing
was taken up with the trial court’s colloquy with counsel about
such factors.
After considering all of these factors, the trial court
exercised its discretion to strike the two five-year priors but not
the prior strikes. To the extent Thompson invokes “changing and
evolving” sentencing trends as a basis for us to reweigh the
11
evidence relevant to sentencing and reach a different conclusion,
we decline to do so.
The resentencing court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Thompson’s petition to vacate the strike findings.
II. Senate Bill 81
Thompson argues that under recent amendments to section
1385, the resentencing court was required to vacate at least one
strike finding. We disagree.
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81),
amended section 1385 “to guide sentencing courts in deciding
whether to dismiss an enhancement. [Citation] Under new
section 1385(c), a court ‘shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’
(§ 1385(c)(1).) In deciding whether to strike the enhancement,
‘the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence . . .
that any of [nine enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . are
present.’ [Fn.] (§ 1385(c)(2).) ‘Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (Ibid.) Alongside
two of the enumerated circumstances, the Legislature included
additional, mandatory language: when multiple enhancements
are alleged, ‘all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall
be dismissed’ (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)), and when an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years, ‘the enhancement shall be
dismissed’ (§ 1385(c)(2)(C)).” (People v. McDowell (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1147, 1152-1153.)
Whether Senate Bill 81 applies to Thompson’s sentence is a
question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
12
(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.) “ ‘[I]n construing a
statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so
as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In
determining that intent, we first examine the words of the
respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of
the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant
what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ ”
(People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.) “If, however, the
terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may
resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved and the legislative history.” (Ibid.)
As noted above, section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 thus
expressly applies to the dismissal only of an “enhancement.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
Our appellate courts have routinely rejected the argument
that the Three Strikes law constitutes an enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c), concluding it is well established that
the law is instead “an alternative sentencing scheme for the
current offense.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237,
243; see also People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, rev.
granted May 29, 2024 (S283924) [Senate Bill 81 does not apply to
prior strike convictions]; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60,
67 [same]; People v. McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1155;
People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335.)
Thompson argues these cases were incorrectly decided, the
meaning of the word “enhancement” is ambiguous, the legislative
13
history of Senate Bill 81 indicates it was meant to apply to both
enhancements and alternative sentencing schemes, and the rule
of lenity requires that we adopt a definition of the statute that
favors him.
We disagree. “ ‘Ordinarily words used in a statute are
presumed to be used in accordance with their established legal or
technical meaning.’ [Citation.] The term ‘enhancement’ has a
well-established technical meaning in California law. [Citation.]
‘A sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment
added to the base term.” ’ [Citations.] It is equally well
established that the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement; it
is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense.
[Citations.] We presume the Legislature was aware of, and
acquiesced in, both this established judicial definition of
enhancement and the distinction between an enhancement and
an alternative sentencing scheme such as the Three Strikes law.”
(People v. Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243-244.)
Because the term “enhancement” has a well-established
technical meaning which we presume the Legislature accepted,
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. We therefore
follow its plain meaning, and may not consult legislative history
or the rule of lenity to give the term a different meaning. (People
v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 151 [“ ‘courts will not
“interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does
not exist” ’ ”].) Accordingly, the resentencing court did not err in
declining to vacate Thompson’s strike findings pursuant to
subdivision (c) of section 1385.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
*
KELLEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
*
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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