People v. Hernandez CA6

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Filed 8/7/24 P. v. Hernandez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H050269
(San Benito County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. CR-19-00487)

v.

SERGIO URIEL HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Sergio Uriel Hernandez was convicted of forcible sodomy of a minor. He
challenges this conviction, arguing that he believed the minor had consented and, even if
this belief was mistaken, it precluded conviction because the prosecution failed to present
substantial evidence that his belief was either insincere or unreasonable. For the reasons
explained below, we conclude that the minor’s testimony provided sufficient evidence
that Hernandez’s belief was unreasonable. We therefore uphold the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Hernandez was charged with sodomy by force on a minor over 14 years of age in
violation of Penal Code section 286, subdivision (c)(2)(C), as well as two counts of oral
copulation of a person under 16 years of age (Pen. Code § 287, subd. (b)(2)), three counts
of lewd acts on a child (id., § 288, subd. (c)(1)), and one count of forcible oral copulation
with a minor over 14 years of age (id., § 287, subd (c)(2)(C)). Four of these counts were
dismissed, leaving only the forcible sodomy and two lewd act counts for trial. Hernandez
waived his right to a jury trial. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court acquitted
Hernandez of one of the lewd acts counts but convicted him of sodomy and the other
lewd acts count. Hernandez was sentenced to nine years for sodomy and two years, to be
served concurrently, for lewd acts.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
At trial, the prosecution’s primary witness was the victim, I.D. (The victim’s
initials are used, consistent with rule 8.90(b)(4) of the California Rules of Court, to
protect his privacy.) I.D. testified that his mother was a social event photographer, and at
such events she sometimes used I.D. as her assistant and Hernandez as her videographer.
Hernandez was on good terms with I.D.’s parents, and after several events, he
accompanied I.D. home to socialize with them, sometimes staying the night and sleeping
on the living room couch before leaving in the morning.
I.D. testified that he engaged in consensual sexual relations with Hernandez. The
first incident occurred in the summer of 2016 when I.D. was 14 years old. While
Hernandez drove I.D. home from a social event, I.D. asked Hernandez, whom I.D. knew
was gay, about his sexuality. Their conversation eventually touched on the subject of
oral sex, which Hernandez offered to perform on I.D. I.D. consented, and Hernandez
pulled onto the side of the road. Later, I.D. consented to additional sexual relations with
Hernandez, including performing oral and anal sex on Hernandez.
In November 2017, the incident at issue in the sodomy charge occurred. I.D.
testified that, following a social event, Hernandez again came to I.D.’s home to socialize
with his parents. After I.D.’s parents went to bed, Hernandez came to I.D.’s room and
offered to perform oral sex on I.D. I.D. initially told Hernandez that he was not
interested, but eventually relented and accompanied Hernandez to the laundry room,
where Hernandez performed oral sex on I.D.
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I.D. testified that Hernandez then bent him over and sodomized him, despite
repeated refusals and an express request to stop: “[H]e bent me over and started to thrust
against me. I told him that I was not in the mood. He said, ‘It’s okay, it’s your first
time.’ And then I kept saying no. After that, he pulled down my pants and forced me
against the dryer. Put one hand on my left shoulder, and put one hand over my mouth as
I continued to say, ‘ow, ow, stop,’ and he didn’t.”
In his defense, Hernandez attacked I.D.’s credibility. Hernandez presented
testimony from one of the police officers who initially interviewed I.D., showing that,
contrary to his testimony at trial, I.D. initially described only three incidents of sexual
conduct and did not say that he consented to any of them. In closing argument,
Hernandez highlighted these and other inconsistencies in I.D.’s testimony and argued I.D.
was not credible.
The trial court found much of I.D.’s testimony credible and convicted Hernandez
of sodomy and of one count of lewd acts. After sentencing, Hernandez filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Hernandez challenges his sodomy conviction. He does not dispute that there was
sufficient evidence that he committed sodomy on a minor or that he did so without the
minor’s consent. (Penal Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Instead, Hernandez argues that he
mistakenly believed that I.D. consented and that the prosecution failed to present
substantial evidence that this belief was either insincere or unreasonable. We are not
persuaded. Hernandez certainly had reason in advance to believe that I.D. might consent
and even that he would do so after initially refusing. But I.D. testified that, when the
conduct in question occurred, he repeatedly said that he did not want to engage in anal
sex and that he expressly told Hernandez to stop. This testimony was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that any mistaken belief Hernandez may have had was
unreasonable, and in reviewing the verdict on appeal, we must credit that testimony.
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(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118 [in reviewing sufficiency of the
evidence, “ ‘[w]e do not . . . reevaluate a witness’ credibility’ ”].)
As Hernandez points out, a defendant may not be convicted of rape or other
offenses requiring nonconsensual sexual relations if the defendant had a reasonable but
mistaken belief that the victim consented. The mistaken belief defense was recognized
by the Supreme Court in People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 (Mayberry).
Mayberry held that a defendant’s reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding
consent negates the wrongful intent required for rape. (Id. at p. 155.) This defense has
both subjective and objective components. (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354,
360-361.) The subjective component “asks whether the defendant honestly and in good
faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.” (Ibid.)
The objective component “asks whether the defendant’s mistake regarding consent was
reasonable under the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 361.) Where a defendant has adduced
evidence of equivocal conduct supporting a mistaken belief, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s belief in the victim’s
consent was either insincere or unreasonable. (Mayberry, supra, at p. 157; see also
CALCRIM No. 1030 [“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman
consented.”].) Because sodomy by force requires lack of consent, the Mayberry defense
applies to that offense. (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 641-642.)
In this case, I.D.’s testimony provided substantial evidence that any mistaken
belief was unreasonable. I.D. testified that, when Hernandez began to engage in anal sex
by thrusting against him, he said “no” repeatedly. I.D. testified that at first he told
Hernandez “I am not in the mood.” When Hernandez continued, I.D. “kept saying no.”
And, when Hernandez pulled down I.D.’s pants and pushed him against the dryer, I.D.
said “ow, ow, stop.” Moreover, I.D. did not testify that he did anything later to indicate
that he had changed his mind and consented. To the contrary, according to I.D.,
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Hernandez put his hand over I.D.’s mouth and continued to sodomize him. In light of
I.D.’s testimony that he repeatedly said no and explicitly told Hernandez to stop, as well
as the absence of any conduct suggesting a change of mind, it was not objectively
reasonable to believe that I.D. consented to engage in anal sex.
Hernandez argues that he reasonably believed that I.D. consented based on I.D.’s
initial agreement to join Hernandez in the laundry room and his consent to engage in oral
sex despite initial reluctance. It is true that I.D. testified that he initially said that he was
uncomfortable meeting Hernandez in the laundry room, but then agreed to join him.
And, once in the laundry room, I.D. objected to Hernandez kissing him, but did not object
to Hernandez performing oral sex on him. However, the sodomy at issue was a separate
act, one which Hernandez does not appear to have performed on I.D. before. As a
consequence, it was not objectively reasonable to infer from I.D.’s consent to oral sex
that he consented to this new and different act in the face of I.D.’s repeated refusals and
explicit request to stop.
Hernandez also argues that it was objectively reasonable to infer that I.D.
consented because I.D. did not try to push Hernandez off him or otherwise physically
manifest a lack of consent. We are not persuaded. It is not reasonable to believe that an
individual, after repeatedly objecting to sexual relations and making an explicit request to
stop, has subsequently consented simply because the individual does not fight or
otherwise physically resist. Where, as here, an individual has verbally refused consent,
the absence of physical resistance does not create an objectively reasonable belief in
consent. (See, e.g., People v. Duarte-Lara (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 332, 340 [“[T]he fact
that the victim did not . . . earlier move away from defendant is not substantial evidence
of equivocal behavior that would lead a reasonable person to belief she was consenting to
his conduct.”]; see also People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303 [“Nor may lack of
resistance be employed by courts . . . to support a finding of insufficient evidence of

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rape . . . .”].) To establish a reasonable belief, there must be some affirmative
manifestation of consent.
Hernandez also points to his past sexual encounters with I.D., arguing that they led
him to believe that I.D. had consented to the sodomy. Those past encounters, however,
involved oral sex or I.D.’s anal penetration of Hernandez. None of them involved
Hernandez penetrating I.D. As a consequence, in the face of I.D.’s repeated refusal to
engage in this new conduct and his expressly request to stop, it was not reasonable to
infer from past encounters that I.D. had consented. Hernandez also argues based on
I.D.’s prior refusals to participate in sexual conduct that he believed I.D. could and would
decline to participate when he did not wish to do so. This prior conduct does not help
Hernandez because in the incident in question he ignored I.D.’s repeated refusals and
request to stop.
Finally, Hernandez argues that the trial court’s decision, despite the absence of a
request by either party, to utilize an instruction on the Mayberry mistaken belief defense
shows that there was substantial evidence that Hernandez’s belief that I.D. consented was
both sincere and reasonable. We agree. However, it does not follow that the trier of fact
could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hernandez’ belief was reasonable.
While Hernandez’s past experiences with I.D. as well as I.D.’s agreement on the day of
the incident to engage in oral sex supported the belief that I.D. also would consent to
engage in sodomy, that belief would have been reasonable only if I.D.’s testimony
concerning his repeated refusals and request to stop were rejected. There were grounds
for questioning I.D.’s credibility, which Hernandez raised in his closing argument, and
which persuaded the trial court to acquit Hernandez on one of the lewd act counts.
However, those grounds did not compel the trial court to reject all of I.D.’s testimony,
and we conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision
to credit I.D.’s testimony concerning the sodomy incident.

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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

____________________________________
DANNER, J.

People v. Hernandez
H050269

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