People v. Toledo CA2/8

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Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Toledo CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B328177

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA058177)
v.

ROBERTO JOSE TOLEDO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed.
Sabrina R. Damast, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Roberto Jose Toledo pleaded guilty to a drug offense in
2000. More than twenty years later, he moved to withdraw his
plea, arguing he would not have made it had he meaningfully
understood its adverse immigration consequences. The trial
court denied Toledo’s motion. We affirm because Toledo failed to
demonstrate prejudice. Undesignated statutory citations are to
the Penal Code.
I
In February 2000, an informant set up a drug deal in an
undercover operation. Detectives watched Toledo and others
take part in the deal, arrested them, and found a “large quantity”
of cocaine at the scene. Toledo has not disputed these facts.
A March 2000 information charged Toledo and three co-
defendants with two counts: possessing a controlled substance
(cocaine) in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350,
subdivision (a), and selling/transporting/offering to sell a
controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code
section 11352, subdivision (a). The information alleged Toledo
had a prior felony conviction from October 1999 for violating
section 245, subdivision (c) (assaulting a peace officer with a
deadly weapon).
In April 2000, Toledo pleaded guilty to the first count. The
second count was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
Toledo’s plea form shows the maximum punishment for the
first count, plus the strike enhancement, was six years. The form
shows Toledo agreed to a term of 32 months in state prison,
which was the low term of 16 months doubled due to the strike.
Toledo initialed a box on the form saying: “I understand that if I
am not a citizen of the United States, the conviction for the
offense charged may have the consequences of deportation,

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exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Above
the crossed out word “may” was the handwritten word “will.”
Toledo signed and dated the form under a paragraph saying he
had initialed the boxes on the form and had discussed them with
his attorney, he understood the rights listed, and he waived them
to enter his plea.
Toledo’s attorney also signed the plea form saying he had
explained these rights to Toledo and concurred in his client’s
decision to waive them.
The plea hearing transcript shows Toledo entered his plea
in court with his three co-defendants. Each defendant had
separate counsel and the assistance of a Spanish language
interpreter. The court asked each defendant to confirm that he
had had the opportunity to go over the plea form with his
attorney, line by line; that he read and understood the form; and
that he signed and initialed it, knowing he was giving up
constitutional rights. Toledo confirmed.
The prosecutor warned the defendants if they were not
citizens, “you will be deported, denied citizenship, denied re-entry
into this country as a result of your plea.” The prosecutor asked
if anyone had questions, and a co-defendant asked a question
related to deportation. Toledo had no questions.
Toledo entered a guilty plea and admitted the prior strike
conviction, which resulted from an earlier plea (in case No.
VA055574). Counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the current
plea. The trial court accepted this plea and found counsel had
“fully advised” Toledo of the possible consequences of the plea.
The court sentenced Toledo to the agreed 32 months in prison.

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More than two decades later, in September 2022, Toledo
filed a motion to withdraw his plea under section 1473.7.
Apparently, Toledo also separately moved for this relief in his
other case. This other motion is not in our record.
Toledo’s section 1473.7 motion in this case argued his
counsel did not advise him properly regarding the adverse
immigration consequences of both his plea and his strike
admission, and Toledo did not meaningfully understand these
consequences. The motion explained that admitting the strike
allegation made Toledo’s conviction qualify as an aggravated
felony for immigration purposes. It appears Toledo discovered
this after he received an Intent to Deny his green card petition in
2019.
Toledo supported his motion with his declaration. This
declaration is brief: one page and a few lines. Toledo declares a
Spanish language interpreter had assisted him and had
translated the plea form and the proceedings in 2000. Toledo
maintains that, when completing the plea form, he lacked
information regarding admitting his prior conviction. Regarding
immigration issues, Toledo declares: “My defense attorney did
not ask me about my immigration status.” “I did not understand
that entering a guilty plea to Health & Safety Code section
11350(a) and admitting the prior conviction would make me
deportable.” “Had I known that this plea agreement would cause
me to be deported, I would not have entered the plea of guilty,
would have sought an immigration neutral resolution, moved to
strike the prior conviction or taken the case to trial.” Toledo says
he came to the United States when he was 19 and has lived here
for the past 30 years. Then he discusses his life here after his
plea: he married a U.S. citizen and had three kids, one of whom

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earned college scholarships and all of whom are U.S. citizens.
Toledo also discusses his current (and recent) employment and
his role as financial provider for his family. Toledo’s declaration
says nothing about his home country.
Toledo’s immigration attorney also provided a brief
declaration. The attorney states “Mr. Jose Norberto Toledo
Casillas” has been in the United States since 1993 and currently
is working on becoming a legal permanent resident; a conviction
like Toledo’s would hinder his immigration case because the
charge is categorized as a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude and
an Aggravated Felony, due to the 32-month prison sentence; and
the conviction would bar him from adjusting his status to become
a Legal Permanent Resident. The attorney discusses Toledo’s
eligibility to have his conviction vacated and possible
consequences of vacating—and not vacating—the conviction. The
attorney does not identify any immigration-neutral alternative to
which Toledo could have pleaded.
Various documents are attached to the attorney’s
declaration, including an immigration document for Toledo, a
naturalization document for his father, Toledo’s license showing
he married in 2017, and his wife’s and children’s birth
certificates. One document appears to show Toledo was born in
Mexico.
The prosecution orally opposed Toledo’s motion at a
hearing in November 2022, which addressed both of Toledo’s
cases. Toledo was present at the hearing with counsel and an
interpreter. Both sides argued; neither side called witnesses.
In response to prosecution concessions, the trial court set
aside Toledo’s plea in his other case (VA055574) and dismissed

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the case. The court emphasized the plea was valid at the time it
was made, however.
In this case, the court struck the strike prior allegation and
reduced Toledo’s drug conviction to a misdemeanor under section
1170.18, subdivision (g) (referred to as Proposition 47). The court
then denied the section 1473.7 motion. It determined Toledo’s
plea continued to be valid, as Toledo had been “adequately
advised of the immigration consequences at the time of the plea
based on the plea form and the plea transcript.”
Toledo’s counsel asked the court to consider “allowing Mr.
Toledo to be sentenced to a deferred entry of judgment on the
11350 nunc pro tunc” and otherwise phrased the relief sought as
“diversion under P.C. 1000 on that 11350.” The court denied the
request: “[Y]ou’re asking me to grant a prejudgment relief on a
case that’s final.”
Toledo appealed.
II
Toledo had the burden of establishing his entitlement to
relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (See § 1473.7, subd.
(e)(1); People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316 (Espinoza).)
He did not carry this burden.
Specifically, Toledo’s motion did not show prejudice, which
ends the matter. (See § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); see also People v.
Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528 (Vivar) [petitioners seeking to
withdraw a plea under this provision must show error is
prejudicial].)
We independently review the section 1473.7 ruling,
according no deference to the trial court’s factual findings, which
arose from a cold record. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319–
320; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 528 & 534.)

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To establish prejudice, petitioners like Toledo must
demonstrate it is reasonably probable they would have rejected a
plea if they correctly had understood the actual or potential
immigration consequences, and they must corroborate such
assertions with objective evidence. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 316 & 321.) In assessing prejudice, we consider the totality
of the circumstances, including the petitioner’s ties to the United
States, the importance he placed on avoiding deportation, his
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, whether he had reason to
believe an immigration-neutral disposition was possible, his
probability of getting a more favorable outcome had he rejected
the plea, and the difference between the bargained-for term and
the likely term after trial. (Id. at p. 320.) Also relevant are the
petitioner’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s
case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes
involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies
concerning immigration consequences, and the existence of
similar offenses without these consequences. (Id. at p. 323.)
Both before and after Espinoza, analyzing prejudice has
required a case-by-case examination of the record, but no specific
kind of evidence. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 321 &
325.)
Little in Toledo’s declaration—and in his appellate
briefing—concerns prejudice. As noted above, the declaration
states: “Had I known that this plea agreement would cause me to
be deported, I would not have entered the plea of guilty, would
have sought an immigration neutral resolution, moved to strike
the prior conviction or taken the case to trial.”
Objective evidence supporting this statement is lacking.

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Nothing in the record suggests immigration consequences
mattered to Toledo at the time of his plea. The only thing Toledo
tells us about his life before this plea is that he came to the
United States when he was 19 (in 1993), roughly seven years
before pleading guilty. Toledo does not discuss family members,
close friends, employment, community involvement, or any other
connection to the United States as of his plea. (Nor does Toledo
identify his home country or say anything about his connections
to that country then.)
After the prosecution’s response brief raised Toledo’s lack of
pre-plea community ties, Toledo did not return to this topic in his
reply brief.
Toledo’s lack of significant ties to the United States at the
time of his plea distinguishes this case from Espinoza, where our
high court recognized a defendant’s return to his community after
a plea can corroborate the significance of strong community ties
established before the plea. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 322–323 [outlining the defendant’s deep, pre-plea ties to
California from 23 years of residence there, which supported his
statement that “ ‘[e]verything important in his life’ at the time he
entered his plea ‘was in the United States’ ”]; see also Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531 [prejudicial error shown where
Vivar repeatedly emphasized immigration interests and, “[a]t the
time of his plea, he had two children, two grandchildren, and a
wife, all of whom are citizens and all of whom resided in
California”].)
Apart from claiming he had sufficient ties to this country,
Toledo argues prejudice exists because he had a substantial
likelihood of getting an immigration-neutral plea instead of the
problematic plea he made.

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Toledo’s motion talks about exploring alternative plea
agreements or taking the case to trial. But neither the motion
nor the supporting declarations point to any possible
immigration-safe options available to Toledo at the time of his
plea. (Cf. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 321 & 324
[immigration law expert explained Espinosa could have pleaded
to alternative, immigration-safe dispositions and identified these
offenses].)
On appeal, Toledo speculates he “may have been able” to
get pretrial diversion instead of the plea deal he reached in 2000.
Toledo’s section 245 conviction from 1999 makes this doubtful.
This conviction was recent, seemingly violent, and valid in
2000—facts that Toledo ignores. And the diversion statute
Toledo identified excludes from eligibility any defendant with a
prior felony conviction within five years of the charged offense.
(See § 1000, subd. (a)(4) & (b).) (Toledo also had a burglary
conviction from 1994.)
Toledo points to nothing suggesting he had reason in 2000
to believe the prosecution would have entertained diversion
instead of a conviction plus prison time, or would have dispensed
with his strike conviction. No expert or other witness identified
these as possible alternatives back then. No evidence provides a
window into the prosecution’s charging policies back then.
Moreover, nothing suggests the prosecution had proof
problems afflicting its drug case against Toledo. Detectives
apparently observed Toledo’s direct involvement in this
coordinated crime. There was no reason to believe Toledo stood a
chance of acquittal had he gone to trial—where he faced the same
adverse immigration consequences he now protests.

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On the other hand, Toledo’s plea deal was favorable: it
gave him the low term on one count and the dismissal of his other
count. This favorable plea suggests a priority of Toledo’s at the
time was avoiding considerable prison time.
In short, assuming Toledo erred in entering his plea, he
failed to establish the error was prejudicial under section 1473.7.
(See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316; see also id. at p. 323
[contrasting and citing with approval People v. Bravo (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 1063]; Bravo, at pp. 1076–1077 [no prejudice where
the defendant did not address the consequences of rejecting the
plea or the probability of an alternate disposition].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Toledo’s motion.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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