People v. Stoker CA4/1

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Filed 7/30/24 P. v. Stoker CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081342

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
Super. Ct. No. SCD283673)
RAYMOND LEE STOKER, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Raymond Lee Stoker, Jr. stabbed and killed Kevin Hughes. After trial, a

jury convicted Stoker of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and
found true the special allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, a
knife, to commit the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). On appeal, Stoker contends
(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the first degree murder
conviction, and (2) by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misstatements in
closing argument, his trial counsel provide inadequate assistance. Finding no
merit in these contentions, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of May 27, 2019, Kevin Hughes was stabbed once in the
neck as he sat at a bus stop in downtown San Diego. He stumbled away from
the bus stop and collapsed on the street nearby. First responders took Hughes
to the emergency room, where he died of his injury. There were no
eyewitnesses to the attack.
Dana Jones, an employee of the San Diego District Attorney’s Office,
testified that by splicing and editing video information from cameras in various

locations in downtown San Diego,2 she created a sequential video, together
with a map to show the different locations of the cameras that provided the
video used in her compilation. That video was show to the jury as exhibit 14.
Exhibit 14 shows Stoker in the area of the bus stop both before and after
the attack. Before the attack, Stoker can be seen walking at a leisurely pace,

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Some of the videos were from cameras mounted on streetlights (known
as intelligent cameras) and some were from businesses and residences in the
area. Jones received the various videos from the San Diego Police Department
and District Attorney investigators.

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clad in red pants and a red hoodie, with a black bag slung over his shoulder.
Hughes can be seen leaving a market and passing by a bank on his way to the
bus stop bench. The video becomes grainy at this point, because the camera
distance required Jones to zoom in on the image, but Stoker can be seen across
the street from the bus stop. Stoker then places his bag down behind a utility
box on the sidewalk, and after waiting for traffic to clear, he crosses the street
in the middle of the block and walks directly to the bus stop bench, where he
sits down next to Hughes. Within seconds of sitting down, Stoker stands up
and swings at Hughes. Stoker then leaps back and immediately runs back
across the street, retrieves his bag, and walks quickly away in the opposite
direction from the bus stop. Exhibit 14 follows his progress away from the
scene. Meanwhile, Hughes can be seen as he staggers from the bus stop and
collapses on the street nearby.
UCSD Medical Center surgeon Leslie Kobayashi testified that she was
on duty in the emergency room where Hughes was brought for his injuries. Dr.
Kobayashi testified that the stab wound in Hughes’s neck had irreparably
injured his carotid artery and his vertebral artery, a second artery in the back
of Hughes’s neck, depriving his brain of blood. The trauma team’s efforts to
resuscitate Hughes were unsuccessful and he died.
Steven Campman, San Diego County’s chief medical examiner, testified
that he conducted Hughes’s autopsy. Dr. Campman determined that the cause
of Hughes's death was a single stab wound to the neck and the manner of
death was homicide. He testified that part of the wound was almost
horizontal, and it was seven-eighth of an inch long. The stabbing caused
injury to Hughes’s “carotid artery, jugular vein, and some other smaller
arteries” in Hughes’s neck. The wound was a stab wound, not a slashing
wound.

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The jury found Stoker guilty of first degree murder of Hughes and found
true the special allegation he personally used a knife in the commission of the
offense.
The trial court sentenced Stoker to state prison for one year for the knife
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) plus the statutory term of 25 years to life
for first degree murder (§ 187).
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for First Degree Murder
When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine if there is substantial evidence from which any reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People
v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.) Because it is the exclusive province of
the jury to determine credibility and to resolve evidentiary conflicts or
inconsistencies, we presume the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. (Ibid.; People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175, 1181.) If the circumstances reasonably
justify the jury’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the
circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding.
(Nelson, supra, at p. 210.) We apply the same standard in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish premeditation and deliberation as
elements of first degree murder. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 368.)
Murder is the “unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) A willful, deliberate and premeditated killing
is first degree murder. (§ 189.) “ ‘ “A verdict of deliberate and premeditated
first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.]
‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of
action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance. [Citations.]”

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“ ‘Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. “The test is not
time, but reflection. ‘Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and
cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1069 (Mendoza).)
The Supreme Court has identified “three types of evidence—evidence of
planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of killing—that assist in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting findings of premeditation
and deliberation.” (Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069, citing People v.
Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15,
26–27.) This is not an exhaustive list and does not “ ‘ “exclude all other types
and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and
deliberation.” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, at p. 1069, quoting Solomon, supra, at
p. 812.)
As discussed below, although there was no evidence of any motive for
Stoker’s killing of Hughes, the evidence of Stoker’s planning and his manner of
killing Hughes support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation.
Here, exhibit 14 shows that Stoker placed his bag behind a utility box,
crossed the street mid-block, and walked directly to the bus stop and sat down
next to Hughes. In seconds, he was back on his feet, swinging his arm as he
inflicted the deadly blow to Hughes’s neck. He then ran directly back across
the street to retrieve his bag and leave the scene. From the evidence, the jury
could conclude that Stoker formed the plan to kill Hughes when he set down
his bag. Stoker’s conduct in walking directly over to Hughes and almost
immediately stabbing him, without any sort of provocation or hesitation,
confirmed Stoker had resolved to kill Hughes before he struck the single fatal
blow. (See Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1071 [none of the evidence

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suggested that defendant’s actions in positioning himself and shooting officer
were rash or panicked].)
Appellant argues that the fact Stoker left his bag across the street
suggested that he had not planned to kill Hughes, because “he had to run back
to the backpack before making an escape.” But if he had planned to sit at the
bus stop to wait for a bus, he would not have left his bag behind. In fact, it is
more readily inferred that when Stoker left the bag and then crossed the
street, he planned to kill Hughes. The jury could have reasonably inferred
that Stoker must have determined that he needed his arms to be unimpeded
when he stabbed Hughes. Stoker’s plan to kill Hughes was made clear with
his direct approach to the bus stop and the immediacy with which he stabbed
Hughes once he was next to him. There was no other reason for Stoker to sit at
the bus stop bench.
Stoker’s uninterrupted pointed actions in setting down his bag, crossing
the street, walking directly to the bus stop, sitting beside Hughes, and then
almost immediately stabbing Hughes in the throat, indicate deliberation, not
impulsiveness. (Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1071 [manner of killing was
not rushed or panicked but reflected stealth and precision]; People v. Halvorsen
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422 [shooting of victims in head or neck from within feet
is “a method of killing sufficiently ‘ “particular and exacting” ’ to permit an
inference that defendant was ‘acting according to a preconceived design’ ”];
People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081–1082 [shooting a vital area of
the body at close range indicates preconceived design to kill].) We conclude
there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of first degree murder.
B. Closing Argument
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “Any person when crossing
the street, it’s a green light. You have the walk sign. You look left. You look
right. There’s [sic] no cars here that can kill me. I made the decision. I

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contemplated life and death, and I’ve made a decision.” The prosecutor then
explained that, “It can happen in an instant. It’s not time sensitive. It’s choice
sensitive.” Stoker argues that this comment “lowered the requirements for
[premeditation] and removed the distinction between first and second degree
murder,” because the mental processes of premeditation and deliberation
cannot happen instantaneously.
While it is true that first degree murder requires “ ‘ “careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action” ’ ” and a plan “ ‘ “thought over in
advance” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069), it is likewise the case that
“ ‘ “cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to the prosecution’s argument that the decision to proceed through
an intersection after a yellow light is an example of the decision-making for
premeditation and deliberation. The court concluded that the argument was
not misconduct: “Rather, the prosecutor used the example of assessing one’s
distance from a traffic light, and the location of surrounding vehicles, when it
appears the light will soon turn yellow and then red, and then determining
based on this information whether to proceed through the intersection when
the light does turn yellow, as an example of a ‘quick judgment’ that is
nonetheless ‘cold’ and ‘calculated.’ ” (Id. at p. 715.) So too here: the
prosecution described the decision to proceed to cross the street as such an
example.
Stoker’s jury was instructed in accordance with CALCRIM 521:
“The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed
the considerations for and against his choice and,
knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant
acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before
completing the act that caused death. [¶] The length of
time the person spends considering whether to kill does

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not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and
premeditated. The amount of time required for
deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to
person and according to the circumstances. [¶] A decision
to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful
consideration is not deliberate or premeditated. On the
other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be
reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection,
not the length of time.”

The jury was further instructed that the arguments of counsel are not
evidence.
Thus, considered in context with the jury instructions and the
prosecutor’s accurate statement that, “It’s not time sensitive. It’s choice
sensitive,” we conclude that the prosecution’s statement that premeditation
and deliberation “can happen in an instant” was not inaccurate and did not
constitute misconduct. Accordingly, we do not address Stoker’s argument
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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