CourtListener 10015463•People v. Sandoval CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 7/26/24 P. v. Sandoval CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B328032
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA132075)
v.
ALBERT SANDOVAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted petitioner Albert Sandoval of two counts of
first degree murder and two counts of premeditated attempted
murder. The jury also found true a multiple murder special
circumstance. Sandoval unsuccessfully sought resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code1 sections 1172.6 and 1172.1.
We conclude that the resentencing court properly denied
Sandoval’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. The
record of conviction shows as a matter of law Sandoval was
ineligible for resentencing under that statute and thus, the
resentencing court properly dismissed his petition. (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460.) We affirm the resentencing
court’s order.
Sandoval’s challenge to the denial of his section 1172.1
petition is not cognizable on appeal because reference to the order
denying it was not included in his notice of appeal. Accordingly,
we do not address whether the denial of that petition would have
been an appealable order or the merits of the petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
“On February 9, 2014, around 3:00 p.m., [Jose] Rodriguez,
[Ricardo] Garcia, [Jhony] Rodas, and Jose Tlaseca, along with
some other individuals, were gathered in an alley behind an
apartment building on Avalon Boulevard in Los Angeles. Some
of the men were playing cards. . . . Sandoval’s co-defendant [Joel
Ignacio] Ambriz arrived, parked his car, and exited from the
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 The factual background is quoted from Sandoval’s reply
to the People’s opposition to his petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. His counsel filed the reply in support
of his petition for resentencing.
2
driver’s seat. There was at least one other person in the car.
Ambriz approached the men playing cards. Ambriz was either by
himself or was accompanied by Sandoval. Ambriz said, ‘The
terrain is hot.’ The men did not know what Ambriz meant by
this. Ambriz returned to his car in the driver’s seat and, with
Sandoval in the front passenger seat, drove away. The men
continued playing cards.
“At around 5:00 p.m., while it was still light outside,
Ambriz returned, parked in the same spot as before, and got out
from the driver’s side of the car. Sandoval was in the front
passenger seat.
“Ambriz approached the group and yelled, ‘Ciudado,
cabron,’ which loosely translated to English as ‘Careful, son of a
bitch.’ He fired several shots at the men. Ambriz fired two or
three shots from near the passenger side of the car, then moved
and fired three or four shots from the rear of the car. He moved
closer to the men and fired four more shots. When Ambriz first
fired, Rodas heard Sandoval yell from inside the car something
like, ‘You’re not gonna hit anybody’ from that location and to ‘get
closer’ or ‘give it to them.’ Ambriz then moved closer to the other
men and continued to shoot at them. According to Rodas, after
Sandoval shouted those words from inside the car, Ambriz got
more daring in approaching the other men.”
“Rodriguez died in a hospital on August 9, 2014, several
months after this shooting. He had sustained multiple gunshot
wounds that caused injury to his kidney and spine, which
rendered him paraplegic. Rodriguez ultimately died from
pneumonia resulting from complications caused by his gunshot
wounds.”
3
Our background does not include a description of the
murder of Cesar Perea, which occurred on a different day. On
appeal Sandoval does not describe that murder or challenge his
sentence with respect to it.3
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Sandoval and Ambriz of two counts of
murder (Jose Rodriguez and Cesar Perea) and two counts of
attempted murder (Jhony Rodas and Ricardo Garcia). The
People also alleged a multiple murder special circumstance. The
murder of Perea was alleged to have occurred on or about March
21, 2013. The People also alleged firearm enhancements.
Ambriz and Sandoval were tried together. The trial court
did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences theory or the felony murder doctrine.
The trial court instructed the jury that to prove a person
aids and abets a crime, the People must prove: “1. The
perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or
during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND
[¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” The instruction
further provided: “Someone aids and abets a crime if he knows of
the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he specifically intends to,
3 Sandoval states, “[S]ince the section 1172.6 petition
below was focused on the convictions in counts 1 [murder of
Rodriguez], 2 [attempted murder of Rodas], and 3 [attempted
murder of Garcia], only facts related to those counts will be
included.”
4
and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
The court instructed the jury that “malice aforethought”
was an element of murder and that there were two kinds of
malice aforethought—express malice and implied malice. The
court then defined both express and implied malice. The court
instructed the jury that murder based on express or implied
malice was second degree murder.
The court instructed the jury on first degree murder as
follows: “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the
People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to
kill. The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts that
caused death.” To reiterate, the court did not instruct on any
other theory of first degree murder.
The court instructed the jury that one element of attempted
murder is that the “defendant intended to kill that person.”
The multiple murder special circumstance instruction
included the following: “In order to prove this special
circumstance[ ] for a defendant who is not the actual killer but
who is guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, the
People must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to
kill.”
The jury found Sandoval guilty of all crimes. Specifically,
the jury found Sandoval guilty of the murders of Rodriguez and
Perea and found both murders to be murder in the first degree.
The jury found Sandoval guilty of the attempted murders of
5
Rodas and Garcia and found that both attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. With respect to all crimes,
the jury found that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that the
offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang. With respect to the
murder of Perea, the jury found Sandoval personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, which caused death to Perea
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The jury
also found the multiple murder special circumstance true.
In December 2018, on direct appeal, we affirmed Sandoval’s
convictions, struck portions of his sentence, and remanded for a
new sentencing hearing. (People v. Ambriz et al. (Dec. 14, 2018,
B279785) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following the appeal, the trial court sentenced Sandoval to
two terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murders
and two terms of life with the possibility of parole for the
attempted murders. The court ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. The court also sentenced Sandoval to a 90-year-
determinate term for the firearm enhancements.
On July 2, 2021, Sandoval filed a pro se section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. He asserted that he was convicted of
first or second degree murder based on the felony murder rule or
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The resentencing
court appointed counsel to represent Sandoval. Sandoval
thereafter substituted private counsel.
The People opposed Sandoval’s petition arguing he was
ineligible for resentencing because the jury was not instructed on
the natural and probable consequences theory or the felony
murder doctrine. The People attached to their opposition this
6
court’s opinion following Sandoval’s direct appeal and the jury
instructions.
Through his private counsel, Sandoval filed a reply to the
People’s opposition. Sandoval acknowledged the jury was not
instructed on felony murder or natural and probable
consequences. He argued, “[T]he jury likely imputed malice to
him based solely on his participation in the crime . . . .” Sandoval
also contended he had established a prima facie case for relief
and that an evidentiary hearing had to be set.
At a hearing, the resentencing court indicated it had read
the petition, the People’s response, and Sandoval’s reply. The
court stated it also considered the transcripts of the trial.
Counsel for Sandoval argued Sandoval was not the shooter
“[a]lthough he was present.” Counsel further argued the
circumstances of this case were “similar” to “felony-murder” and
that this case “falls into . . the natural and probable consequence
doctrine.” For those reasons, counsel argued that Sandoval
established the prima facie prerequisites for resentencing. The
prosecutor countered that the jury verdict shows Sandoval
harbored actual malice and therefore had not established a prima
facie case.
The resentencing court found Sandoval did not make a
prima facie case for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 and
denied his section 1172.6 petition. In its January 13, 2023 order,
the court reiterated that it had read and considered the petition,
opposition, reply, and trial transcripts. The court found, “There
were no instructions given on felony murder nor any theory of
natural and probable consequence and instruction was given to
theories of murder and attempted murder that still exist today;
actual malice; [¶] The court declines to issue an order to show
7
cause as the petitioner has not established a prima facie case that
he is entitled to relief.”
The court also denied defendant’s section 1172.1 petition,
which we describe in our Discussion, post.
Sandoval’s pro se notice of appeal file January 19, 2023
states: “My name is Albert Sandoval. The reason I’m writing
this letter because on 01-13-23 I had a hearing for 11-76 which
was denied. And I am filing a Notice of Appeal. But do [sic] to
the fact I’m currently housed in Los Angeles Men’s Central Jail I
Don’t Have Access to the proper paper to file my Notice of Appeal
so I was requesting the proper paper work or can the clerk of the
court file my Notice of Appeal on record.”
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Properly Denied Sandoval’s 1172.6
Petition for Resentencing
1. Legal background
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173.)
Amended section 188 provides that except as stated in the
amended section 189 governing felony murder, “ ‘in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Lee, at p. 1173,
quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).) The bill also added former
8
section 1170.95, now numbered section 1172.6, “which creates a
procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted
under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Relief is potentially available
for “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Petitioners may seek the relief contemplated by the statute
by “fil[ing] a resentencing petition . . . alleging they could not
currently be convicted of murder because of the changes in the
law required by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891.) “If [a] petitioner ma[kes] a prima facie
showing for relief, the trial court [is] required to issue an order to
show cause for an evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid., citing § 1172.6,
subd. (c).) In general, the court must then “hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving,
‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder . . .’ under state law as amended by Senate Bill 1437.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 709.)
If the record of conviction demonstrates that the petitioner
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the resentencing court
may deny the petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972; People v. Cortes (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 198, 206.) The resentencing court found
petitioner ineligible as a matter of law, and we review de novo a
petition denied at the prima facie stage. (People v. Lee, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
9
90, 101.) We may rely on the record of conviction to determine
whether Sandoval established a prima facie case for
resentencing. (Lewis, supra, at p. 971.)
2. As a matter of law, Sandoval is ineligible for
relief
As Sandoval acknowledges, the trial court did not instruct
the jury on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Sandoval, however, argues the jury
instructions permitted him to be convicted on imputed malice
based solely on his participation in a crime. According to him,
“the instruction did not tell the jury . . . that the aider and
abettor must share the perpetrator’s intent to kill or must
himself act with conscious disregard for life. Absent that, it . . .
allowed the jury to apply a vicarious imputation theory without
the requisite intent.” The record of conviction belies Sandoval’s
contention.
With respect to the murder of Rodriguez, the jury
necessarily found Sandoval harbored intent to kill when it found
the multiple murder circumstance true. To find that special
circumstance true, the jury had to have found that the aider and
abettor “acted with the intent to kill.” As set forth in our
Background, ante, there is no merit to Sandoval’s belief that with
respect to the murder, the jury was not instructed an aider and
abettor must have intent to kill.
Turning to the attempted murders, the trial court
instructed the jury that the People must prove “[t]he defendant
intended to kill that person.” Thus, the jury necessarily found
Sandoval harbored the intent to kill as to those murders as well.
In short, the record of conviction shows as a matter of law that
10
Sandoval was not convicted based on a “vicarious imputation
theory.”
We recognize that a petitioner alleging he or she could not
currently be convicted of homicide because of changes to sections
188 and 189 “puts at issue all elements of the offense under a
valid theory.” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.)
Other than the element of intent, Sandoval does not challenge
any other element of his murder and attempted murder
convictions and the record of conviction demonstrates, as a
matter of law, he could not successfully mount such a challenge.
For the jury to have convicted Sandoval of aiding and abetting
murder and attempted murder, it necessarily found he knew
“that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime,” that
Sandoval “intended to aid and abet the perpetrator,” and that he
“did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the
crime.”4 In short, the jury necessarily found all elements of
direct aiding and abetting the murder and attempted murders.
(See Curiel, supra, at p. 466 [describing elements of aiding and
abetting murder].)
4 The facts as described by Sandoval (in his reply brief in
the resentencing court) support that he aided the murder and
attempted murders by telling Ambriz to get “closer” and “give it
to them.” Specifically, Sandoval “yell[ed] from inside the car
something like, ‘You’re not gonna hit anybody’ from that location
and to ‘get closer’ or ‘give it to them.’ Ambriz then moved closer
to the other men and continued to shoot at them.”
11
3. Sandoval’s other appellate arguments do not
show a prima facie case for section 1172.6
resentencing
Sandoval challenges the denial of his section 1172.6
petition on the ground that the resentencing court erred in
relying on the transcript of the trial without notifying the parties
in advance of the hearing. Sandoval forfeited this argument by
failing to object. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider
a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293.) “ ‘The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring
errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be
corrected. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 881.) In any event, we have reviewed de novo
Sandoval’s eligibility for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6
and found him ineligible as a matter of law. Therefore, the
alleged error in failing to provide advance notice that the
resentencing court would consider the trial transcript is moot.
Sandoval argues that if the resentencing court relied on
this court’s prior appellate opinion for anything other than the
procedural history, then the trial court would have erred. Even if
arguendo, the trial court relied on the prior opinion for more than
procedural context, Sandoval forfeited any such objection by not
raising it in the trial court. (See People v. Vance (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714.) Also, Sandoval would not be able to
demonstrate prejudice because the jury instructions and jury
verdict standing alone show as a matter of law that Sandoval is
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. As we have
explained above, the jury instructions demonstrate the jury could
not have convicted Sandoval of special circumstance murder or
12
attempted murder without finding that he intended to kill the
victims.
Sandoval appears to contend the resentencing court
incorrectly applied a substantial evidence standard to evaluate
the evidence at an order to show cause hearing. This argument is
based on the incorrect premise that the resentencing court held
an order to show cause hearing. Instead, the court’s order made
clear that it “declines to issue an order to show cause as the
petitioner has not established a prima facie case that he is
entitled to relief.”
Finally, Sandoval relies on inapposite authority where, in
contrast to this case, the jury did not necessarily find the
petitioner harbored intent to kill. For example, in People v.
Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, the court held that a petitioner
convicted of second degree murder may have been convicted based
on a theory of imputed malice where the instructions allowed the
jury to find the petitioner could have intended only to encourage
punching but not killing the victim. (Id. at p. 983.) Here, in
contrast, the jury could not have concluded Sandoval encouraged
only a punching, or any other crime. As explained above, the jury
necessarily found that he intended to kill Rodriguez, Rodas, and
Garcia.
In People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, the
appellate court concluded a jury could have found first degree
murder based on a lying-in-wait instruction without necessarily
finding the petitioner harbored the intent to kill. (Id. at p. 1264.)
Maldonado distinguished the lying-in-wait instruction given in
that case from the “first degree premeditated murder” instruction
given in the case before us, which the Maldonado court
recognized requires intent to kill. (Id. at p. 1262.) Put
13
differently, that Maldonado found potential imputed malice
based on instructions not given in the present case does not assist
Sandoval.
B. Sandoval Did Not Appeal From the Denial of His
Section 1172.1 Petition
On December 12, 2022, defendant filed a petition pursuant
to 1172.1 requesting that the court reduce his life without the
possibility of parole sentence to a parole eligible sentence. As it
existed in December 2022, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1)
provided: “When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony
offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or to the custody of
the county correctional administrator pursuant to subdivision (h)
of Section 1170, the court may, within 120 days of the date of
commitment on its own motion, at any time upon the
recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings
in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state prison, the county
correctional administrator in the case of a defendant incarcerated
in county jail, the district attorney of the county in which the
defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the
Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case, recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and
provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.” (Former § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
By order dated December 15, 2022, the resentencing court
denied the section 1172.1 petition for resentencing. The court’s
order denying the petition stated that it had no jurisdiction to act
14
beyond 120 days of sentencing and that a defendant lacks
standing to bring a section 1172.1 petition.
Sandoval’s appellate challenge to the December 15, 2022
denial of his section 1172.1 petition is not cognizable because the
order was not identified in his notice of appeal, which referenced
only the trial court’s January 13, 2023 order denying his section
1172.6 petition. “ ‘ “Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope
to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.”
[Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned
in the notice of appeal.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.F. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75.) “ ‘[I]t is well “beyond liberal construction”
to view an appeal from one order as an appeal from a “further
and different order.” [Citation.] “Despite the rule favoring
liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will
not be considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to
the judgment being appealed.” [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (Id.
at p. 76.)
Because the court’s December 15, 2022 order was not
included in any notice of appeal, we do not consider Sandoval’s
argument that the denial of a section 1171.2 is an appealable
order nor do we consider Sandoval’s challenges on the merits of
his 1171.2 petition.5
5 Even if Sandoval had properly preserved his appeal as to
the denial of his 1172.1 petition, he demonstrates no error in the
denial of his petition. The current version of section 1172.1,
which Sandoval requests this court apply, expressly states a
defendant may not petition for resentencing under section 1172.1.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“A defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant
requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is
not required to respond.]”) The former version of the statute also
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
KELLEY, J.*
did not grant a defendant standing under section 1172.1 to
petition for resentencing. (Former § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)
[identifying the persons who may petition for resentencing and
not including a criminal defendant].) Sandoval further requests
review of an as-applied equal protection challenge to his sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Sandoval did not raise
this challenge in the trial court and for that additional reason,
has not preserved it for our review.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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