CourtListener 10014350•People v. Olague CA3
Testo completo
Filed 7/25/24 P. v. Olague CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, C092670
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR20035627)
v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
JAMES JOSEPH OLAGUE,
Defendant and Appellant.
In May 2006, a jury found defendant James Joseph Olague and two codefendants,
Ernesto Duran Arrellano and Oscar Hurtado Cervantes, guilty of the “first-degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187; undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) of Robert
Stepper and Eric Folsom, and attempted murder of Vicki Folsom and Jessica Valdez on
Halloween 2002.” (People v. Olague et al. (Apr. 7, 2009, C053372) [nonpub. opn.]
(Olague).) The jury also found true enhancements that these crimes were committed for
the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)) and a principal personally
1
discharged a firearm causing death or bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)), as well as the
special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and intentional
killings as participants in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). (Olague, supra,
C053372.) We affirmed defendant’s convictions, enhancements, and special
circumstance findings in an unpublished decision issued April 7, 2009. (Ibid.)
Defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing based on the elimination of
the natural and probable consequences doctrine under Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg. Sess.
2017-2018) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019) (Senate Bill 1437). Following
the appointment of counsel, extensive briefing, and a hearing, the trial court denied
defendant’s petition in a written ruling. The court explained that the jury had been
instructed that to find the special circumstances true, they had to determine, as to each
defendant, that “he acted with the intent to kill, either as the actual killer or as a direct
aider and abettor or co-conspirator who with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer.” Accordingly,
when the jury found the special circumstances were true, the jury determined defendant
had an “actual intent to kill,” thus “making [defendant] ineligible for relief under the
resentencing statute.”
Defendant appealed contending his resentencing petition and associated filings
“raised a reasonable doubt that the jury found” he had “intended to kill,” thus requiring
the trial court to issue an order to show cause. We disagreed with defendant’s arguments
in an unpublished opinion issued January 24, 2022. Nonetheless, because of legislative
changes occurring following the close of briefing, we ordered the matter remanded to
allow the trial court to determine whether defendant could demonstrate a prima facie case
for relief as to his attempted murder convictions. We otherwise affirmed the trial court’s
order.
Defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and on April 24,
2024, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to us with directions to vacate our
2
previous decision and reconsidered the matter in light of People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 (Curiel). Having done so, we conclude the jury instructions and associated
findings preclude defendant from making a prima facie case for relief as to his two
murder convictions. The briefing on transfer has not addressed defendant’s two
attempted murder convictions, and we accept the parties’ previous concession that
remand is required as to the two attempted murder convictions to allow the trial court to
determine whether defendant can state a prima facie case for relief under amended
section 1172.6 relevant to these convictions. We will otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying First Degree Murder and Attempted Murder Convictions
We take certain facts and procedural history from the unpublished opinion we
issued in 2009 affirming defendant’s convictions in Olague, supra, C053372:
“On September 21, 2003, an indictment was filed alleging that defendants and
others—Christina Marie Marten, Nathaniel Easlon, Richard Betancourt, and (later added)
Gilberto Lopez—committed the following crimes:
“Count 1: First-degree murder of Robert Stepper (§ 187, subd. (a)), with
enhancements alleging the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)), Cervantes used a firearm which caused death or bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (a), (d)), and a principal personally discharged a firearm causing
death or bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)). Count 2: First-degree murder of
Eric Folsom, with enhancements as above. Count 3: Attempted murder of Vicki Folsom
(§§ 187, subd. (a); 664, subd. (a)), with enhancements as above. Count 4: Attempted
murder of Jessica Valdez, with enhancements as above.
“The indictment also alleged special circumstances for multiple murder and
intentional killings as participants in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3),
(a)(22)[)]. The prosecutor sought the death penalty against Arellano and Cervantes only,
not against Olague.
3
“At trial, the prosecution presented evidence supporting its theory that, although
the Norteño and Sureño gangs were rivals, their members cooperated in committing these
crimes because Arellano (a Norteño leader or ‘shot caller’) and nonparty
Candelario Garza (a Sureño leader) cooperated in the sale of drugs in Woodland.
Arellano (a Norteño) ordered the hit because victim Stepper (a Norteño) owed him
money for drugs, and Arellano wanted to send a message to others who owed money and
re-instill fear in the community. Christina Marten (a Norteño) brought Stepper to the
place of attack. The shooter was Cervantes, who was not a gang member but who
associated with Norteños, Sureños, and Crips. Stepper was the target, and the other
victims were shot either because they were in the ‘kill zone’ or because Cervantes
intentionally shot them in an attempt to eliminate witnesses. Easlon (a Crips gang
member) acted as lookout. Arellano’s neighbor, Gilberto Lopez (a Sureño), was the
getaway driver. Olague (a Sureño) was on the street at the time of the shooting to ensure
that all participants did what they were supposed to do.
“Evidence adduced at trial included the following:
“Easlon and Betancourt (Norteño) testified about a gathering at Arellano’s
apartment before Halloween 2002. Arellano asked Easlon and Betancourt to ‘fuck up’
(beat up) Robert Stepper, who owed Arellano about $500 to $800 and was not doing what
he was supposed to be doing to help the drug trade. Easlon (who owed Arellano [$1],600
for drugs) and Betancourt refused to do the actual deed, because Stepper was their friend.
Arellano asked Cervantes, who was also there, to ‘handle it.’ Cervantes agreed and was
given some drugs. Easlon, to pay off his debt, agreed to Arellano’s request to station
himself at the end of the street on Halloween and ‘make sure nobody we know goes down
that street . . . .’ Lopez came to the door and was told by Arellano, ‘[i]t’s going to go
down,’ and Lopez was needed as the getaway driver. (Though Lopez had a ‘beef’ with
Cervantes, who impregnated Lopez’s girlfriend, there was evidence that Lopez did not
know Cervantes would be involved.) Arellano took a phone call, then said ‘Jaime’ and
4
Garza were on the way over with the gun and told Easlon and Betancourt to leave.
Easlon testified he knows three ‘Jaimes,’ one of which is Olague. Easlon did not stay and
therefore did not know if it was Olague who showed up. However, Easlon testified it was
Olague who showed up when the crime took place.
“On Halloween, around 10:00 p.m., as planned, Easlon concealed himself at the
end of Oak Avenue to stand watch. Marten walked Stepper down Oak Avenue and then
left. Stepper began chatting with the other victims near a pickup truck in victim Valdez’s
driveway. Olague, whose job was to make sure others did their job, walked Cervantes
partway down the street.
“As related by the surviving victims, a man approached the victims, ‘kind of’
grinned, pulled out a gun, aimed the gun at Stepper’s head, and fired from a distance of
two feet (killing Stepper). The shooter then pointed the gun at the others and fired
multiple times (killing 17-year-old Eric Folsom and injuring 14-year-olds Vicki Folsom
and Jessica Valdez). At trial, one of the survivors identified Cervantes as the shooter,
though she had not identified him [in] a photo lineup.
“As Lopez drove the getaway car, Cervantes hit the dashboard and said, ‘I got
‘em, I got ‘em.’ Lopez had not expected any shooting. He later told Garza that
Veronica Lugo (girlfriend of Guillermo Ramirez, who had been with Lopez) was in an
alley and heard the gunshots. Lugo testified she was summoned to an apartment the next
day where several people, including Cervantes and Olague, were present. Garza, Lopez,
and Ramirez led her into a bedroom and told her to keep her mouth shut or she and her
children would be killed.
“An expert in criminal gangs, Sergeant Steven Gill, said rival gangs do work
together in drug activity and will commit a crime such as murder together to further their
criminal enterprise, enhance both gangs’ reputations, and further instill fear and
intimidation in the community and other gang members. A non-gang member’s
participation would be a way to be accepted by the gangs.
5
“All three defendants testified at trial and denied any involvement. Arellano (age
34 at trial) said he was a Norteño for 10 years but was not a shot caller. He denied any
pre-Halloween meeting, denied ordering or suggesting that anyone kill Stepper, and said
he did not even know Cervantes or Olague before Halloween 2002, except for an incident
where he almost got into a fight with Olague (whom he pegged as a Sureño). Arellano
admitted that on one occasion he told Cervantes to ‘handle it’ but testified he was telling
Cervantes to go get a pipe to smoke drugs. Stepper was Arellano’s friend, did not buy
drugs from him, and did not owe him money. On Halloween, Arellano was on his way
home, saw Stepper, said hello, and noticed a car full of people wearing blue (a Sureño
color). Arellano said his only prior crimes were spousal abuse, selling drugs, and
participating in a prison riot in which he was just following gang orders, though he was in
front of his cohorts.
“Cervantes (age 28 at trial) testified he has never belonged to a gang, though he
knew gang members. He knew Olague before Halloween, but not Arellano. When
arrested, Cervantes said he ‘knew this day was coming,’ but he thought he was being
arrested for violating probation. Cervantes denied telling his cellmate . . . about the case
and denied tampering with his handcuffs (evidence of which was adduced as an escape
attempt). Cervantes had a prior felony conviction for selling drugs and a drug-related
misdemeanor. Alibi witnesses testified Cervantes was with them that night.
“Olague (age 29 at trial) testified he was a gang member when he lived in Los
Angeles (he equivocated on whether it was Sureño) and associated with ‘southerners’
when he moved to Woodland. He was friendly with Cervantes. Olague did not know or
have any contact with Arellano, except Olague ran from a brief confrontation with
Arellano as a member of a rival gang in a parking lot about a month before the crimes.
Olague denied any involvement in the crimes. He came upon the crime scene after a
friend dropped him off and he was walking to a friend’s house. Olague admitted two
prior felony convictions, for auto theft and verbally threatening his ex-wife.
6
“To advance the defense theory that the police pressured the accomplices to make
false confessions consistent with the prosecution’s theory, the defense hammered at
inconsistencies in the accomplices’ statements, and a defense expert testified about how
police interrogations can elicit false confessions.
“In May 2006, the jury returned verdicts finding all three defendants guilty on all
counts and finding true all enhancement allegations.
“In June 2006, the jury set the sentence for Arellano and Cervantes at life without
the possibility of parole on the two counts of first degree murder.
“The trial court denied defense motions for new trial.
“On July 28, 2006, the trial court sentenced Arellano to prison for life without
possibility of parole on Counts 1 and 2 (first degree murder). The court sentenced
Arellano to nine years on Count 4 (attempted murder) and a consecutive term of two
years, four months on Count 3 (attempted murder). The court imposed three 25-years-to-
life terms for the section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e), enhancements on Counts 1
through 3 and a 20-year term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (c), enhancement on
Count 4.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Olague received the same sentence as Arellano, except Olague received the
midterm sentence of seven years (rather than the upper term of nine years) for the Count
4 attempted murder.” (Olague, supra, C053372, fns. omitted.)
On appeal, among other findings, we specifically upheld the substantiality of the
evidence supporting the enhancement finding that all defendants had individually acted
with the intent to kill Eric Folsom, as well as the denial of Olague’s acquittal motion,
which had argued insufficient evidence supported “that he knew Cervantes planned to kill
Stepper and shoot the others.” (Olague, supra, C053372.) In support of these
conclusions, the prior opinion identified evidence establishing that the murder of any
witnesses was part of the plan, which intended to “make a big statement to instill fear in
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the community.” (Ibid.) Defendants elected to do the shooting on Halloween, when
people would be outside, and the shooter’s act of seeing the witnesses with the intended
victim and then shooting all victims at close range demonstrated express malice. (Ibid.)
Further, Olague was implicated not only by accomplice testimony and his presence at the
shooting. He also ran from the scene and threatened the jailhouse informant associated
with the case. Substantial evidence supported the judgment against him. (Ibid.)
B. Defendant’s Petition for Relief
On April 4, 2019, defendant filed a pro per petition for relief under Senate Bill
1437 arguing he was eligible for resentencing because he was not the actual killer, did not
with intent to kill aid and abet the actual killer, and was not a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant alternatively argued he was entitled
to relief under the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Chiu (2014)
59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), because it could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury had convicted him on a legally valid ground and that the trial court had failed to
adequately instruct the jury with all elements necessary for a first-degree murder
conviction.
On April 24, 2019, the trial court appointed counsel for defendant and transferred
the matter so that it could be coordinated with the proceedings concerning an earlier
petition filed by defendant’s prior co-defendant Ernesto Arellano. Ultimately, the parties
briefed whether defendant was precluded from making a prima facie showing by virtue of
his gang special circumstance that had required the jury to determine that he aided and
abetted with the intent to kill. Defendant’s brief on this issue acknowledged: (1) he had
been tried under alternate direct aider and abettor and natural and probable consequences
theories, and (2) that the jury had found the special circumstance gang finding true, but
nonetheless argued he was still eligible for resentencing. Defendant reasoned that post-
judgment changes to the natural and probable consequences theory had eliminated first
degree liability for that theory, and that in accordance with People v. Brown (2016)
8
247 Cal.App.4th 211 (Brown), the court could not use his gang special circumstance
finding to conclude as a matter of law that he had been convicted of first degree murder
on the direct aiding and abetting theory. Under Brown, the gang special circumstance
was not dispositive, requiring the court consider “the totality of the circumstances” in
light of the entire record to determine defendant’s eligibility for resentencing. Defendant
indicated the record would be further addressed in later prima facie briefing.
In contrast, the People argued, in pertinent part, that the gang special circumstance
finding required the jury to determine that defendant had the intent to kill. Both CALJIC
No. 8.80.1 (the generalized special circumstance instruction) and CALJIC No. 8.81.22
(the gang special circumstance instruction) required the jury to determine that defendant
individually held an intent to kill. Because the jury found the gang special circumstance
true, defendant was therefore prevented from establishing his prima facie eligibility for
resentencing. Brown was distinguishable because of the unique circumstances of that
case,1 and even Brown acknowledged the possibility that a court could conclude any error
in giving the natural and probable consequence instruction was harmless where a jury
convicted a defendant of first degree murder with a true gang special circumstance
finding. This was true, “ ‘because the special circumstance required finding the
defendant intentionally killed. In such a situation, it might be concluded the jury
necessarily rejected the natural and probable consequences theory of aider and abettor
liability and instead found the defendant was either the actual killer or aided and abetted
1 The Brown court was unable to conclude, in that matter, that the special circumstance
was dispositive regarding the harmlessness of defendant’s asserted error under Chiu,
supra, 59 Cal.4th 155. Included among the reasons for this conclusion were irregularities
concerning the taking of the verdicts (including the trial court’s reading of a guilty verdict
on the murder count, while ignoring an executed and dated not-guilty verdict on that
count), as well as the jury’s question shortly before verdicts were rendered concerning the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the relatively weak case against Brown.
(See Brown, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 226-227, 232-233.)
9
the actual killer while sharing the killer’s intent to kill.’ ” Further, and more
fundamentally, the People argued that the court was not required to analyze whether it
was harmless error to give the natural and probable consequence instruction. Rather, the
court had to determine whether defendant had established that he could not now be
convicted of murder. Given the prior direct aiding and abetting instruction and the
special circumstance finding, defendant could not make this showing.
At the January 23, 2020 hearing, the court elected to defer ruling on the preclusive
effect of the special circumstance finding. Thereafter, the parties engaged in further
briefing and argument regarding the prima facie showing, including defendant’s belated
request for relief on the attempted murder counts. In the end, the court announced its
decision to deny the petition at the September 1, 2020 hearing and then issued a written
order concluding defendant had not made a prima facie showing that he was eligible for
relief. Defendant was ineligible for relief by virtue of the jury’s enhancement findings
that had required a determination that “he acted with the intent to kill, either as the actual
killer or as a direct aider and abettor or co-conspirator who with the intent to kill aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer.” Brown was distinguishable because of its unique facts.
Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background
Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019, limited accomplice
liability under the felony murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure that a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his or her individual criminal culpability. (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842-844 (Gentile).) As relevant to this appeal, natural and probable
consequences and direct aiding and abetting were two different forms of aider and abettor
liability. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 158; People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
10
663, 682-683.) Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a person who
knowingly aided and abetted a crime, the natural and probable consequence of which was
murder, could be convicted of not only the target crime, but also of the resulting murder,
irrespective of whether he or she harbored malice aforethought. (Gentile, supra, at
p. 845.) In Chiu, the Supreme Court “held that the natural and probable consequences
doctrine cannot support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder.” (Ibid; see
Chiu, supra, at p. 167.) Senate Bill 1437 went further, amending section 188 to now
provide that “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted
of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; Gentile, supra, at p. 846.)
The criminal liability of direct aiders and abettors did not change under Senate Bill
1437. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588,
595-596.) Such persons who by act or advice aid, promote, encourage, or instigate the
commission of murder, with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s criminal purpose and
with intent to commit, encourage or facilitate the commission of murder, remain
criminally liable for murder. (Offley, supra, at pp. 595-596; see Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at pp. 158, 161, 166-167.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6),2 “which
created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief’ where the two substantive
changes described above affect a defendant’s conviction.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section
1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute.
Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite to current
section 1172.6 throughout the rest of this opinion.
11
p. 449.) The Legislature has since “amended the statute to expand the population of
eligible offenders, codify certain aspects of [the Supreme Court’s] decision in [People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis)], and clarify the procedure and burden of proof at
the evidentiary hearing stage of proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)” (Ibid.)
Section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c) create a two-step process for evaluating a
petitioner’s eligibility for relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 960-962.) First, the trial
court must determine whether the petition is facially sufficient under section 1172.6,
subdivision (b). (Lewis, supra, at p. 960.) If the petition is facially sufficient, the court
follows section 1172.6, subdivision (c), appointing counsel (if requested) and following
the briefing schedule set forth in the statute. (Lewis, supra, at p. 966.) Following the
completion of this briefing, the court determines whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (Ibid.)
“While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of
counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section
117[2.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the
analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court
should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
We independently review the trial court’s decision to deny a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
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B. The First Degree Murder Convictions
Defendant contends the jury instructions and associated verdicts do not prevent
him from making a prima facie case for relief. First, defendant argues the jury
instructions in his case did not actually require the jury find he had the intent to kill.
Second, he contends under Curiel, the jury’s finding that he had an intent to kill is not
enough to establish current liability for aider and abettor murder. We find the record of
conviction still affirmatively demonstrates defendant’s ineligibility for relief as to his two
murder convictions.
A trial court properly denies a section 1172.6 petition if the jury made a true
finding on a special circumstance that renders the defendant ineligible for relief. (See,
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) However, as our high court recently explained in
Curiel, a finding of intent to kill alone is not enough to refute a defendant’s allegations in
a section 1172.6 petition. (Curiel, supra, at p. 463.) Rather, the jury’s findings would
only preclude a prima facie showing where those findings establish all elements
necessary to “conclusively refute a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not be
convicted of murder under current law.” (Ibid.)
Relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, defendant’s jury was instructed with
CALJIC 8.80.1 on special circumstances generally. This instruction provided in pertinent
part: “If you find a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must
then determine as to that defendant, if one or more of the following special circumstances
are true or not true . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer
of a human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual
killer or an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, you cannot find the special circumstance
to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the first
degree. [¶] You must decide separately as to each of the defendants, the existence or
13
nonexistence of each special circumstance alleged in this case.” (Italics added.) Thus, in
order to find any of the special circumstances true, this instruction required the jury to
find each defendant acted with the intent to kill when performing any of several listed
actions (including aiding and abetting) “in the commission of the murder in the first
degree.” (CALJIC 8.80.1.)
The jury was also instructed with CALJIC 8.81.22, which provided in pertinent
part: “To find that the special circumstance ‘intentional killing by an active street gang
member’ . . . it must be proved: [¶] 1. A defendant intentionally killed the victim or, with
the intent to kill, aided or abetted in the killing.” Defendant’s jury had also been
instructed with CALJIC 3.01 on aiding and abetting generally, which explained: “A
person aids and abets the commission or attempted commission of the crime when he: [¶]
(1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent
or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and
[¶] (3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the
crime.”
Thus, when read together, CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 8.80.1, and 8.81.22 show defendant
cannot state a prima facie case for resentencing relief on his convictions to which the
gang special circumstances applied. First, there is no question that defendant was not the
actual killer; therefore, when the jury found the gang special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(22)) true, it necessarily determined that “defendant . . . with the intent to kill, aided or
abetted in the killing.” (CALJIC No. 8.81.22; Olague, supra, C053372.) Moreover, the
findings required to make this determination in light of CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 8.80.1
show the jury necessarily found defendant aided and abetted a murder in the first degree,
including the mens rea and actus reus necessary to aid and abet murder. (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
Unlike Curiel, where the jury instructions on the special circumstance had no
mention of aiding and abetting or other findings establishing that the jury determined all
14
elements necessary to find that the defendant was still guilty of aiding and abetting
murder, (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 447, 462-471) here defendant’s jury was
instructed on aiding and abetting principles, and when read together, the jury necessarily
found defendant aided and abetted a murder in the first degree when it found the gang
special circumstance true. (CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 8.80.1, and 8.81.22.)
Nor are we persuaded that these findings should not be given preclusive effect.
Defendant has not shown that the changes Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
made to the laws regarding criminal street gangs (see, e.g., People v. Clark (2024) 15
Cal.5th 743, 752) alters the jury determinations, that defendant with intent to kill aided
and abetted first degree murder. The Curiel court has already acknowledged and rejected
the argument that changes to the definition of criminal street gang justified the
application of the exercise of equitable discretion against issue preclusion for an intent to
kill finding derived from a gang special circumstance. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
458, fn. 4 [this change did not alter “the substantive definition of intent to kill, so it has
no bearing on the preclusive effect of the latter finding”].) We see no reason other parts
of the same legislation should be afforded different treatment where none of them speak
to the jury’s intent to kill finding. Accordingly, we conclude defendant cannot establish a
prima facie case for relief from his murder convictions under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law.
C. The Attempted Murder Convictions
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition did not
expressly deny his supplemental argument requesting resentencing on his attempted
murder convictions. Nonetheless, defendant has challenged the trial court’s implicit
rejection of this request.
Prior to the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg Sess.) (Senate Bill
775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551), courts reviewing its applicability to final judgments had
15
determined that former section 1170.95 did not apply to final attempted murder
convictions. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 436.)
However, Senate Bill 775 amended subdivision (a) of former section 1170.95
(now section 1172.6) to read, in pertinent part: “A person convicted of . . . attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with
the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 2.) This legislation took effect on January 1, 2022. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8;
Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
In light of this legislation, at the January 19, 2022 oral argument, the parties
conceded that this matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to determine
whether defendant can state a prima facie case for relief under amended section 1172.6
relevant to his attempted murder convictions. The parties have not expressed a different
position following transfer from the California Supreme Court for reconsideration in light
of Curiel. We accept the parties’ earlier concession and will remand the matter for this
purpose.
16
III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s
section 1172.6 request concerning his attempted murder convictions in light of the
changes brought about by Senate Bill 775. The court’s order denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition concerning his convictions for murder is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
17
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