CourtListener 10013471•Hari Hara v. Team Enterprises CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 7/24/24 Hari Hara v. Team Enterprises CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
HARI HARA, LLC, B326440
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. PC058126)
TEAM ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Paladin Law Group, Bret A. Stone, and Kirk M. Tracy for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, Steven S. Fleischman, Scott P. Dixler;
Greben Law Office and Jan A. Greben for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff Hari Hara, LLC (Hari Hara) purchased
commercial property previously occupied for decades by a series
of dry cleaning tenants. Years after the purchase, Hari Hara
sued one of those tenants, Team Enterprises, LLC (Team),
seeking damages for environmental contamination of the
property. In a prior appeal, this court reversed summary
judgment in Team’s favor, which the trial court entered based on
a prior landlord’s purported release of claims for environmental
contamination.1 On remand, the trial court granted summary
judgment based on additional evidence of the parties’ intent with
respect to the release and on the alternative ground that Hari
Hara’s claims are time-barred. We consider two issues: whether
Team has demonstrated the release is binding upon Hari Hara
and whether, and to what extent, Hari Hara’s claims are time-
barred.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Hari Hara commenced this action in 2017. The operative
first amended complaint, filed in 2018, alleges Hari Hara was the
owner of commercial property in Santa Clarita, California, at
which Team operated a dry cleaning business from 1967 through
1995. The gist of the complaint is that Team released hazardous
substances and waste into the environment, which caused Hari
Hara to incur “monitoring, investigation, remediation, and
response costs in determining the scope of the contamination in
the indoor air, soil, soil vapor, and groundwater.” The operative
1
Hari Hara, LLC v. Team Enterprises, LLC (Sept. 29, 2021,
B306217) [nonpub. opn.] (Hari Hara I).
2
complaint alleges causes of action for contribution under the
Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA),2 equitable
contribution, abatement of a public nuisance, abatement of a
private nuisance, negligence, continuing trespass, and
declaratory relief.3
B. Team’s First Motion for Summary Judgment
In April 2019, Team moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Hari Hara is bound by a settlement agreement the
property’s former owner, Mark Weinstein (Weinstein), signed to
resolve a federal lawsuit.4 Alternatively, Team contended all of
Hari Hara’s causes of action—save the HSAA cause of action—
are time-barred.
With respect to its release-based defense, Team submitted
evidence of the history of environmental contamination on the
property and efforts to resolve it.
2
The Hazardous Substance Account Act is presently codified
at Health and Safety Code section 78000 et seq. At the time Hari
Hara filed its complaint, it was codified at Health and Safety
Code section 25300 et seq.
3
Hari Hara alleged the same causes of action, plus a seventh
cause of action for breach of contract, against Hueng Kyu Jang
(Jang), who operated a dry cleaning business at the property
from 1999 through the date of the operative complaint. Hari
Hara later dismissed Jang, and he is not a party to this appeal.
As we shall discuss, Jang was a party to the purported release
and signed a declaration in support of Team’s second motion for
summary judgment.
4
Weinstein executed the agreement as trustee of the
Weinstein Family Trust Dated March 20, 1997.
3
Weinstein discovered perchloroethylene (PCE)
contamination at the property in 1998. The Los Angeles County
Fire Department and Regional Water Quality Control Board
(Control Board) took charge of investigating the contamination in
the soil and groundwater. In 1999, Weinstein’s environmental
consultant requested the Control Board “grant site closure”
because soil remediation would only be required if the
commercial space were to be remodeled. The Control Board
granted the request on the condition that Weinstein record a
deed restriction. The Control Board also maintained the
“removal of contaminated soil (soil remediation) will be required
during any future construction, demolition, or use change”
affecting the dry cleaner unit of the property.
Weinstein would not accept the deed restriction. His
consultants thereafter excavated parts of the property and
removed soil containing certain levels of PCE. However, they left
in place bedrock that was “difficult to remove with conventional
excavation equipment.” The Control Board thereafter granted
site closure, concluding in a “No Further Action” letter issued in
November 2000 that the residual PCE in the bedrock was
“relatively immobile, and d[id] not pose a threat to groundwater
quality.” The Control Board did not address in the No Further
Action letter the deed restriction it earlier proposed, and there is
no evidence in the record indicating any deed restriction was
recorded.
Weinstein sued Team and others in federal court to recover
costs of the cleanup and the associated diminution in the value of
the property. In 2002, the parties executed a “MUTUAL
RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT” (the Settlement
4
Agreement). A section entitled “RELEASE OF ALL PARTIES
BY WEINSTEIN” provided, among other things, that:
“[i]n consideration for the monies paid to
WEINSTEIN in accordance with [another section of
the Settlement Agreement], WEINSTEIN, for himself
and his agents, affiliates, predecessors, successors
and assigns, hereby agrees to execute and file with
the court, a Stipulation and Order signed by all
parties and attached hereto as Exhibit ‘1’, dismissing
the Complaint and all other related pleadings in this
litigation with prejudice and releasing and forever
discharging the parties to the WEINSTEIN
LITIGATION . . . from all matters related to any
environmental contamination of the premises and
including all environmental matters related to the
WEINSTEIN LITIGATION that were or could have
been asserted in that litigation . . . . This [Settlement
Agreement] specifically includes, but is not limited to,
any release of PCE . . . at or from, the PROPERTY.
WEINSTEIN shall file the above noted Stipulation
and Order with the Court no later than five (5)
business days after the receipt of all for [sic]
monetary payments to be made to WEINSTEIN . . . .”
The Settlement Agreement further provided that Team would
pay Weinstein $65,000.
Team’s motion for summary judgment did not include a
copy of “Exhibit 1” mentioned in the Settlement Agreement. Hari
Hara opposed Team’s summary judgment motion and argued it
was not bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Hari
Hara further argued that Team waived its separate statute of
5
limitations defense because it did not plead the specific
subdivisions of the relevant statutes that, according to Team,
operated to bar the action.
The trial court granted summary judgment, finding the
Settlement Agreement was binding on Hari Hara as Weinstein’s
successor. The court did not address Team’s statute of
limitations defense.
C. Reversal and Remand
Hari Hara appealed the summary judgment ruling and this
court reversed. As to the Settlement Agreement—the only basis
for the trial court’s order granting summary judgment—the panel
reasoned that “[b]ecause Team did not furnish a copy of Exhibit 1
[to the Settlement Agreement] with its moving papers—or proffer
other evidence that would explain the omission of the exhibit or
otherwise establish no triable issue of fact exists on the question
of whether Team was effectively released from liability—we can
only guess at whether liability is precluded on contractual
grounds.” As to Team’s statute of limitations argument, the
panel determined the trial court should address that issue “in the
first instance.”
The panel’s disposition remanded “for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.” The opinion emphasized “the
parties may choose if and when to raise in the trial court the
statute of limitations and related pleading defects, as well as any
additional evidence bearing on the existence of a consummated
settlement and valid contractual release.” The panel recognized
Team could present additional evidence of a valid contractual
release “by inclusion of Exhibit 1 or otherwise.”
6
D. Team’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer
On remand, Team moved for leave to file an amended
answer citing applicable statutes of limitation and adding
supporting facts.5 Hari Hara opposed the motion, arguing Team
did not promptly move for leave to amend in good faith, Hari
Hara would be prejudiced by permitting Team to assert a defense
“Hari Hara long ago understood Team to have waived,” Team had
not shown it would be prejudiced if not given leave to amend its
answer, and Team failed to comply with certain requirements for
motions for leave to amend.
The trial court granted Team’s motion to file an amended
answer. It determined, among other things, that Team promptly
filed its motion after the case was remanded, procedural defects
in the motion did not warrant denying it, and the proposed
amendments cured technical defects in the original answer
(which, in any event, was sufficient to put Hari Hara on notice
that Team was asserting a statute of limitations defense).
E. Team’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Team subsequently filed a second motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication. The motion was based on
essentially the same two theories asserted in the original motion
for summary judgment: Hari Hara was bound by Weinstein’s
release of claims against Team and all of Hari Hara’s causes of
action are time-barred (a change from its earlier position that all
but the HSAA claim were barred).
5
Team also sought leave to file an amended cross-complaint,
which is not relevant to this appeal.
7
1. Settlement Agreement
Team submitted evidence reflecting the parties’
understanding of the effect of the Settlement Agreement and
explaining why the contemplated Exhibit 1 was never finalized.
Among other things, Team submitted declarations by Perry
Hughes (Hughes) (Weinstein’s attorney in the federal lawsuit),
Thomas Jones (Jones) (Team’s president in 2002, who executed
the Settlement Agreement), Jonathan Kassel (Kassel) (a co-
defendant in the federal lawsuit), and Jang (a co-defendant in
this case and the federal lawsuit). Team also submitted a draft
Exhibit 1 circulated among the parties in 2002 that does not
include any release language.6 In broad strokes, Team contended
the evidence demonstrated the parties to the Settlement
Agreement intended that document to release Weinstein’s claims
and its effectiveness was not conditioned on the filing of Exhibit
1.
More specifically, Team maintained that in December 2001,
after the parties in the federal matter notified the district court
they had reached a settlement, the district court dismissed the
action without prejudice to any party reopening the action if the
settlement was not consummated within 60 days. In February
2002, the district court issued an order extending the 60-day
period by 45 days because although “the parties ha[d] negotiated
and finalized the terms of the Settlement Agreement,” it had not
yet been signed by all parties and the defendants had not yet
made the contemplated payments to Weinstein. Team paid
6
The draft Exhibit 1 states in pertinent part that the parties
“do hereby each stipulate and agree to dismiss with prejudice all
pleadings that have been filed by any party in this action.”
8
Weinstein the $65,000 it owed under the Settlement Agreement
in March 2002. In April 2002, the district court issued an order
extending the period to reopen the action by an additional 30
days because although the parties had now “entered into a
Settlement Agreement,” two of the defendants still had not paid
Weinstein. The Settlement Agreement was attached as an
exhibit to the April 2002 order. Hughes (Weinstein’s attorney)
eventually received payment from all of the defendants and,
because “the district court had already dismissed the case, the
time to set aside the dismissal had passed, and the parties
completed the settlement obligations (e.g., paying the settlement
sums in exchange for a complete release),” he believed all “parties
understood that filing ‘Exhibit 1’ would be redundant and
unnecessary.”
Team argued that Hari Hara was bound by the Settlement
Agreement as Weinstein’s “successor” and consented to the
agreement by “knowingly accept[ing] the benefits of the
transaction . . . .”7 Alternatively, Team argued Hari Hara had
constructive notice of the Settlement Agreement.
Team submitted a declaration by Peter Krasnoff (Krasnoff),
an engineer, who faulted Hari Hara’s environmental due
diligence in various respects. Krasnoff averred that a reasonable
inquiry would have conformed to the American Society for
Testing and Materials, International (ASTM) Standard Practice
for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Site Assessment
7
Hari Hara did not purchase the property directly from
Weinstein. Weinstein sold the property in 2001, and it was sold
again in 2004. A company called Durga Sai, Inc. (Durga Sai),
purchased the property on an “as-is” basis in 2013 and Durga Sai
subsequently assigned its interest in the property to Hari Hara.
9
Process. Krasnoff opined that a Phase I investigation, costing
about $5,000 and including interviews with past and present
owners and operators, would have revealed the federal matter
and the Settlement Agreement. (Jang, a party to the Settlement
Agreement who was still operating a dry cleaning business at the
property when Hari Hara purchased it in 2013, stated in a
declaration that if he had been asked about environmental issues
at the property, he would have disclosed “that [he] was a party to
the Weinstein Litigation and was fully and forever discharged
under the [Settlement] Agreement.”) Krasnoff suggested Hari
Hara’s reliance in 2013 on a Phase I assessment completed in
2004 without a concurrent investigation of conditions on the
property was deficient.
2. Statute of limitations
In addition to contending the Settlement Agreement’s
release warranted summary judgment, Team also argued
summary judgment was warranted because each of Hari Hara’s
causes of action is subject to a limitations period of three years or
less, the causes of action accrued either in 1995 (when Team
ceased operations at the property) or 1998 (when Weinstein
discovered PCE contamination at the property), and the
persistence of the contamination did not toll the statute of
limitations. Team’s statute of limitations defense relied on its
amended answer asserting Hari Hara’s causes of action were
barred by the statutes of limitations codified at Code of Civil
Procedure sections “337, 337(a), 337(1) [sic], 337.1, 337.15, 338,
338(a), 338(b), 338(i), 338(l), 340 and 343.”
10
F. Hari Hara’s Opposition
Hari Hara objected to much of Team’s new evidence and
argued, in any case, that the evidence did not demonstrate the
Settlement Agreement was intended to effect a release of
Weinstein’s claims in the absence of Exhibit 1.8 Hari Hara
further argued that even if the release bound Weinstein, it did
not bind Hari Hara. With respect to the latter point, Hari Hara
contended it is not a “successor” or “assign” of Weinstein as
provided in the Settlement Agreement, it did not consent to be
bound by the Settlement Agreement, and, to the extent the
purported release runs with the land, Hari Hara is not a bona
fide purchaser for value and lacked notice. As to notice, Hari
Hara argued it was reasonable to forgo a Phase I assessment
based on its review of other materials.
Hari Hara submitted a declaration by Paul Wisniewski
(Wisniewski), an environmental consultant, geologist, and real
estate broker. Among other things, Wisniewski opined that
Krasnoff (Team’s expert) was mistaken about the reliability of a
2004 Phase I report under the controlling ASTM standards and,
8
Among the evidence we have described, Hari Hara objected
to a letter documenting Team’s settlement payment to Weinstein
and enclosing the draft Exhibit 1 because it violated the parol
evidence rule and because Team did not produce it in discovery.
Hari Hara objected to Kassel, Jones, and Jang’s declarations
concerning their understanding of the Settlement Agreement as
impermissible legal opinions and inadmissible parol evidence.
Hari Hara raised the same objections to Hughes’s declaration and
added hearsay and foundational objections (contending that, as
counsel to only one of the parties, he lacked personal knowledge
to opine on all parties’ understanding of the Settlement
Agreement).
11
even if Hari Hara had undertaken a new Phase I assessment in
2013, it was unlikely to uncover the Settlement Agreement.
As to the statute of limitations defense, Hari Hara
maintained Team waived it by failing to properly plead the
defense in its original answer. Further, assuming the defense
was not waived, Hari Hara argued none of its causes of action
accrued before it discovered in 2017 that PCE contamination
persisted at excessive levels. The company additionally argued
its HSAA cause of action did not accrue until it incurred
remediation costs, and a statute of limitations defense “does not
apply to the continuing nuisance and trespass claims at issue
here.”
G. Team’s Reply
In addition to reiterating its arguments on the merits,
Team submitted a supplemental declaration by Krasnoff
elaborating on why Hari Hara could not rely on a 2004 Phase I
report in 2013 and, among other things, emphasizing that a
Phase I assessment in 2013 would have included an interview
with Jang, who would have disclosed the federal matter and
Settlement Agreement. Team also objected to portions of
Wisniewski’s declaration. The challenged statements included
Wisniewski’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and
discussion of whether Hari Hara would have discovered the
Settlement Agreement in the course of a Phase I assessment
conducted in 2013.
12
H. The Trial Court’s Order Granting Summary
Judgment
The trial court overruled all of Hari Hara’s evidentiary
objections. It sustained Team’s objections to Wisniewski’s
declaration and certain other evidence submitted by Hari Hara.
The trial court determined the Settlement Agreement
effected a release of Weinstein’s claims against Team even
though Exhibit 1 was never executed or filed in the federal
matter. The trial court reasoned the settling parties did not file
Exhibit 1 because the Settlement Agreement “was fully executed
and the action was already dismissed by the federal court.”
Additionally, the evidence showed the settling parties
“understood that, and acted as if, the Agreement was in full force
and effect.”
The trial court found Hari Hara was a successor and assign
of Weinstein under the terms of the Settlement Agreement
because Hari Hara “came after Weinstein in the chain of title”
and because “it assumed the lease agreements for the property.”
The Settlement Agreement was binding on Hari Hara despite a
lack of notice because it “voluntarily accepted the benefits of the
transaction by succeeding to the interest of the ownership and
control of the subject property, including the leases.” The trial
court further found that Hari Hara did “not comply with its due
diligence obligations” and “cannot now speculate that additional
due diligence measures would not have revealed the [federal]
[l]itigation and the [Settlement] Agreement.”
Alternatively, the trial court determined Hari Hara’s
causes of action are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations.
These, in the court’s view, began to run when Weinstein
discovered the contamination in 1998 and did not re-start each
13
time the property changed hands. The contamination constituted
a permanent nuisance (as opposed to a continuing nuisance) and
its persistence did not toll the relevant statutes.
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court’s ruling is partially, but not entirely, correct,
and we will accordingly reverse the grant of summary judgment
and remand solely for further proceedings on the HSAA cause of
action.
The trial court did not exceed the scope of this court’s
remittitur or abuse its discretion when permitting Team to file its
amended answer. The trial court also correctly determined that
most of Hari Hara’s causes of action are time-barred: except for
the cause of action for contribution under the HSAA, Hari Hara’s
causes of action accrued more than 20 years ago. Hari Hara’s
argument characterizing the contamination as a continuing as
opposed to a permanent nuisance—such that each repetition re-
starts the clock on its nuisance and trespass causes of action—
lacks merit in light of uncontroverted evidence that the
contamination is not abatable. Nonetheless, because the HSAA
cause of action did not accrue until Hari Hara incurred costs
relating to the contamination, that cause of action was timely
brought.
Team, however, is not entitled to summary adjudication of
the HSAA claim on the theory that it is barred by the Settlement
Agreement. Assuming the Settlement Agreement was effective to
release Weinstein’s claims against Team and assuming the
parties to the Settlement Agreement intended it would bind
Weinstein’s successors in interest, Team nonetheless has not
demonstrated—as a matter of law—that the release is binding on
14
Hari Hara. Because Team expressly disavows any argument that
the release runs with the land, it is left only to argue that Hari
Hara is bound by the release because the company’s voluntary
acceptance of the benefits of the Settlement Agreement implies
consent to obligations arising under it. Summary judgment is not
warranted on this theory because it is not clear the Settlement
Agreement benefited Hari Hara.9
A. Almost All of Hari Hara’s Causes of Action Are Time-
barred
1. The trial court did not err in allowing Team to
amend its answer on remand
Hari Hara contends the trial court improperly permitted
Team to amend its answer because this was beyond the scope of
the remand in the first appeal and because the amendment was
not in the interest of justice. Neither argument has merit.
“The order of the reviewing court is contained in its
remittitur, which defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the court
to which the matter is returned.” (Griset v. Fair Political
Practices Comm. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.) Hari Hara I
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate
opinion. “The phrase ‘reversed and remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion’ is not a phrase of art with only a
single meaning. It must be read with the appellate opinion as a
9
Because our analysis does not rely on challenged evidence
concerning the parties’ intent in executing the Settlement
Agreement, we do not address Hari Hara’s arguments concerning
the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
15
whole. In context, the phrase may be no more than a statement
that . . . the trial court is to apply the law of the case, and in that
situation the phrase is surplusage. [Citations.] In context, the
phrase may be a ‘summary method of incorporating by reference
directions . . . specifically indicated in the body of the opinion.’
[Citation.]” (Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977) 76
Cal.App.3d 140, 147-148.)
Hari Hara contends the prior opinion “instructed the trial
court to consider the statute of limitations issues based on the
pleadings as they were” and the trial court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to grant Team’s motion for leave to amend. That
misunderstands Hari Hara I. The prior opinion left Team’s
statute of limitations defense to the trial court to decide “in the
first instance,” but it did not suggest the trial court must decide
the issue as presented only in Team’s first motion for summary
judgment or foreclose an amended answer. Rather, the opinion
emphasized “the parties may choose if and when to raise in the
trial court the statute of limitations and related pleading
defects . . . .” (Italics added.)
The trial court’s decision to allow Team to file an amended
answer was also a permissible exercise of its discretion under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473. That statute provides a trial
court “may . . . , in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party,
allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any
pleading . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) “Ordinarily,
courts should ‘exercise liberality’ in permitting amendments at
any stage of the proceeding. [Citations.] In particular, liberality
should be displayed in allowing amendments to answers, for a
defendant denied leave to amend is permanently deprived of a
defense. [Citations.]” (Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d
16
1150, 1159.) Factors weighing against granting a defendant
leave to amend an answer include unexplained delay, lack of
diligence, and prejudice to the opposing party. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court granted Team’s motion for leave to
amend because the proposed amendments “merely cure[d] a
technical defect as the original [a]nswer put [Hari Hara] on
notice that Team was asserting an affirmative defense based on
[the] statute of limitations and Team’s prior discovery responses
provided the factual bases for the defense.” In other words, the
trial court determined Team had acted diligently, Team
adequately explained the delay in seeking leave to amend, and
Hari Hara would not be prejudiced by granting leave to amend.10
These factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and
it was within the trial court’s discretion to conclude they
supported granting Team’s motion for leave to amend.
Hari Hara’s principal counterargument is that Team did
not establish the absence of prejudice to Hari Hara if the motion
were granted (or prejudice to Team if the motion were denied).
Hari Hara’s argument that it was prejudiced “by permitting
Team to assert [a defense that] Hari Hara long ago understood
Team to have waived through insufficient pleading” boils down to
a complaint that it was denied a windfall. That is insufficient.
(Landis v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 548, 557 [“it
seems unreasonable to deny a party the right to amend where the
only apparent hardship to the defendants is that they will have to
defend”]; see also Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56
10
Hari Hara’s assertion that the trial court improperly
considered Team’s “good faith” in ruling on its motion for leave to
amend its answer has no basis in the record.
17
Cal.App.5th 728, 739 [“Prejudice exists where the proposed
amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added
costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens”].)
Additionally, Team was not required to show that it would be
prejudiced by denial of its motion. (Hulsey, supra, 218
Cal.App.3d at 1159 [identifying “prejudice to the other party”—
but not prejudice to the moving party—among the factors
weighing against leave to amend].)
2. Hari Hara’s first cause of action for
contribution under the HSAA is not time-barred
The parties agree that Hari Hara’s first cause of action for
contribution under the HSAA is subject to the three-year statute
of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338,
subdivision (b) for “[a]n action for trespass upon or injury to real
property.” They dispute, however, the date on which this cause of
action accrued.
In Otay Land Company, LLC v. U.E. Limited, L.P. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 806, the Court of Appeal considered whether the
plaintiffs’ claim for contribution under the HSAA accrued (1)
when they knew or should have known about environmental
issues at their property or (2) when “they paid remedial action
costs.” (Id. at 851.) Focusing on the text of former Health and
Safety Code section 25363, subdivision (e), which entitled “[a]ny
person who has incurred removal or remedial action costs in
accordance with this chapter . . . [to] seek contribution or
indemnity from any person who is liable pursuant to this
chapter” (emphasis added), the Court of Appeal held the claim
did not accrue until the plaintiffs incurred removal or remedial
action costs. (Ibid.)
18
Team suggests we should not follow the Court of Appeal’s
reasoning in Otay because that case “did not involve a successor
landowner, like Hari Hara, seeking to recoup costs after a
predecessor landowner, like Weinstein, already sued for the same
remediation costs and settled.” That Weinstein’s remediation
efforts addressed the same type of contamination at the same
property does not establish Hari Hara is seeking “the same
remediation costs.” As Hari Hara’s complaint and interrogatory
responses make clear, it is seeking to recover, among other
things, costs related to monitoring and investigating the current
scope of the contamination.
Team’s further contention that this case is unlike Otay
because Hari Hara “incurred investigation costs rather than
remediation costs” is also unpersuasive. At the time Otay was
decided, former Health and Safety Code section 25322,
subdivision (b) defined “remedy” or “remedial action” to include
“[t]hose actions that are necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate a release or a threatened release of a hazardous
substance.” (Italics added.) Although the relevant phrasing had
changed by the time Hari Hara filed the operative complaint in
2018 (former Health and Safety Code section 25363, subdivision
(d) provided for recovery of “response or corrective action costs” as
opposed to “removal or remedial action costs”) the statute still
applied to costs associated with monitoring hazardous
substances.11 (Fmr. Health & Saf. Code, § 25323.3.)
11
Further amendments effective in 2024 do not change this,
as the parties concede. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 79670, subd. (a)
[“A person who has incurred response or corrective action costs in
accordance with [the HSAA] may seek contribution or indemnity
19
Hari Hara did not incur response costs until 2017, and its
HSAA cause of action did not accrue until then. Hari Hara
timely asserted this cause of action in 2018.
3. Hari Hara’s remaining causes of action are
time-barred
Hari Hara’s second cause of action for equitable
contribution is subject to a two-year limitations period under
Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision (1).12 (American
from any person who is liable pursuant to this part”]; 78140
[defining “response”].)
12
Hari Hara contends Team waived its defense under this
statute because its amended answer does not cite Code of Civil
Procedure section 339 or any of its subdivisions. Hari Hara
raised the issue for the first time in its reply brief on appeal.
“According to long-standing case law, the failure to allege the
appropriate subdivision of the statute of limitations waives the
defense. [Citation.]” (Richard B. LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 566, 573, fn. 4; Code Civ. Proc., § 458.)
“‘Enforcement of that rule, however, depends upon the diligence
with which the opposing party objects to the pleading defect by
way of demurrer or otherwise.’ [Citations.]” (Southern California
Edison Co. v. Severns (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 815, 827; accord Coy
v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1086, fn. 5.)
Hari Hara did not object to Team’s pleading of the defense in the
trial court, either through a demurrer or in opposition to the
second motion for summary judgment, and its presentation of the
issue on appeal is also too late. Under these circumstances, Hari
Hara forfeited any argument challenging Team’s failure to cite
Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision (1) in its
amended answer. Team’s motion to strike portions of Hari
Hara’s reply brief is denied.
20
States Ins. Co. v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 692, 699.) Its third cause of action for abatement of
a public nuisance, fourth cause of action for abatement of a
private nuisance, fifth cause of action for negligence, and sixth
cause of action for trespass are all subject to the three-year
statute of limitations for “[a]n action for trespass upon or injury
to real property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (b).) Its eighth
cause of action for declaratory relief is subject to the same three-
year statute of limitations. (Bank of New York Mellon v.
Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943 [“A claim for
declaratory relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as
the legal or equitable claim on which it is based”].)
“In an action involving tortious injury to property, the
injury is considered to be to the property itself rather than to the
property owner, and thus the running of the statute of limitations
against a claim bars the owner and all subsequent owners of the
property. [Citations.] In other words, the statute of limitations
does not commence to run anew every time the ownership of the
property changes hands.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1216.)
Here, Hari Hara’s causes of action (except that under the HSAA)
accrued no later than 1998, when Weinstein discovered the
property was contaminated.
Hari Hara nevertheless contends its causes of action for
nuisance and trespass are not time-barred because the
contamination is a continuing (as opposed to a permanent)
nuisance. “In general, a permanent nuisance is considered to be
a permanent injury to property for which damages are assessed
once and for all, while a continuing nuisance is considered to be a
series of successive injuries for which the plaintiff must bring
21
successive actions. . . . With respect to a permanent nuisance, the
statute of limitations begins to run on the creation of the
nuisance and bars all claims after its passage, while each
repetition of a continuing nuisance is considered a separate
wrong which commences a new period in which to bring an action
for recovery based upon the new injury.” (Beck Development,
supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at 1216-1217, citations omitted.)
A plaintiff may not “simply allege that a nuisance is
continuing in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations,”
and “[t]here is no short and all-inclusive rule for distinguishing
between permanent and continuing nuisances.” (Beck
Development, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at 1217.) “Pollution cases
may present peculiar problems” because they are often not
amenable to a “continuing-use” test that asks whether a nuisance
may be abated by the defendant discontinuing an ongoing use of
the land. (Id. at 1218.) The test “most often” applied in
contamination cases is “whether the nuisance can be abated at
any time.” (Id. at 1219.)
Abatability is not a question of whether decontamination is
physically possible. (Beck Development, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at
1220 [“Since a defendant could literally be ordered to move
mountains to abate a nuisance, virtually everything can be said
to be abatable if all other considerations are disregarded”];
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1087, 1099
[“we do not agree that mere technological feasibility proves
abatability”].) Rather, abatability is “‘a convenient shorthand’”
for considerations including “the feasible means of, and
alternatives to, abatement, the time and expense involved,
legitimate competing interests, and the benefits and detriments
to be gained by abatement or suffered if abatement is denied.”
22
(Beck Development, supra, at 1220; Mangini, supra, at 1103
[“‘abatable’ means that the nuisance can be remedied at a
reasonable cost by reasonable means”].)
Here, the Control Board’s No Further Action letter
indicated the contamination was stable in 2000, with high
concentrations of PCE confined to “very hard, low permeability
bedrock” that would be “very difficult to remove with
conventional excavation equipment.” A Phase I assessment
performed for an entity affiliated with Weinstein in 2004
“recommend[ed] no further investigations at this time.” In
deposition testimony discussing the clean-up efforts leading to
the No Further Action letter, Weinstein explained the work “was
extensive, and whatever the consultants told us to do, it was
aggravating, it was drawn out, and I remember doing whatever
they told us to do.” He elaborated that the work was
“aggravating” in the sense that “there seemed to be a lot of
requirements that the [Control Board] and others had, and we
wanted to make sure that we did everything that we were asked
to do.” This evidence indicates the PCE contamination could not
be removed at a reasonable cost and by reasonable means. (See,
e.g., Beck Development, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at 1221-1222
[emphasizing a regional water quality control board’s “position
that nothing further need be done and it is satisfied with leaving
the contaminated soil in place” to support the conclusion that
contemplated remediation “would be significantly burdensome”].)
Against this evidence that the remaining contamination
was not abatable, Hari Hara points to a letter from the Los
Angeles County Fire Department approving Hari Hara’s “soil
vapor extraction expansion, interior excavation, and soft
23
demolition workplan.”13 The letter does not address the extent of
the contamination, the associated risks, or the costs involved.
Indeed, with no information regarding the criteria considered in
the workplan approval process, the letter is not even probative of
technological feasibility.
Hari Hara identifies no evidence to support its repeated
assertion that “the contamination . . . spread and required
further response.” The only remotely pertinent items it cites are
its own interrogatory responses that explain how it learned of the
environmental contamination (through an environmental
assessment conducted as part of an application to refinance a
loan), that state the assessment “revealed the presence of [PCE]
and other hazardous substances in the soil and soil vapor,” and
that list investigative efforts not otherwise reflected in the
record. There is no indication that conditions have materially
changed since the No Further Action letter was issued. And
again, there is no discussion of the extent of the contamination,
the associated risks, or the costs involved. On this record, there
is no triable issue as to abatability.
Because Hari Hara commenced this action long after the
two- and three-year statutes of limitations governing its second,
third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action expired,
summary adjudication of these causes of action was proper.
13
We assume for the sake of argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in sustaining Team’s objections to this
letter.
24
B. Team Did Not Demonstrate, as a Matter of Law, That
Hari Hara Consented to be Bound by the Settlement
Agreement
Team contends summary adjudication of Hari Hara’s
HSAA cause of action was warranted in light of the Settlement
Agreement’s release even if the claim was brought within the
statute of limitations. For purposes of our analysis of this issue,
we assume that all parties to the Settlement Agreement intended
it to release Weinstein’s claims against the defendants in the
federal matter notwithstanding the failure to execute and file the
contemplated Exhibit 1. We also assume the parties intended the
Settlement Agreement’s references to Weinstein’s “successors” to
include his successors in interest. These assumptions combine to
establish that a non-party successor in interest could be bound by
the Settlement Agreement. Whether any particular successor in
interest is bound is a separate question.
Consent is an essential element of any contract. (Civ. Code,
§ 1550; Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
789.) Team suggests Hari Hara gave its implied consent to be
bound by the Settlement Agreement through its voluntary
acceptance of the benefits of that agreement. Civil Code section
1589 (Section 1589) provides that “[a] voluntary acceptance of the
benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the
obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought
to be known, to the person accepting.”
As a general matter, Section 1589 provides a mechanism to
bind the original parties to a contract and those to whom they
have assigned their rights under that contract. (Matthau v.
Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 593, 603 [holding that
Section 1589’s “principal application is to the parties to the
25
original transaction, and to cases of assignment where the
assignee’s assumption of liability may be implied from his
acceptance of rights and privileges under the contract”]; accord
Recorded Picture Co. v. Nelson Entertainment, Inc. (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 350, 362.) Team’s suggestion that “Hari Hara
is . . . Weinstein’s assignee under the [S]ettlement [A]greement”
because it is “the assignee of the property” conflates multiple
transactions. But even if we assume Section 1589 may apply
under the circumstances of this case, Team has not shown there
is no triable issue as to whether Hari Hara received any benefit
under the Settlement Agreement.
Team contends the Settlement Agreement necessarily
benefited Hari Hara because “the settlement monies included (at
least partially) monies to reimburse Weinstein for the
remediation efforts that led to the ‘No Further Action’ letter and
thus benefitted Hari Hara as the successor property owner.”
Assuming Hari Hara benefited from Weinstein’s remediation
efforts, however, it does not follow that Hari Hara benefited from
Team and others’ payments reimbursing Weinstein for those
efforts. So far as the appellate record reveals, Weinstein’s
remediation activities were completed before the parties reached
a settlement in the federal matter. 14 From the perspective of any
subsequent owner of the property, it makes no difference whether
14
The No Further Action letter is dated November 29, 2000.
A minute order indicates the parties reached a settlement in the
federal matter at a settlement conference held on August 16,
2001.
26
Weinstein was reimbursed for this work—it matters only that it
was done.15
To the extent that Team suggests Hari Hara is bound by
the Settlement Agreement because it voluntarily accepted the
benefits of a different transaction—i.e., its purchase of the
property—this argument is foreclosed by Team’s concession that
the release does not run with the land.16 The release is only an
“obligation[ ] arising from” Hari Hara’s land purchase if it runs
with the land. If merely enjoying the benefits of land ownership
were sufficient to bind a landowner to its predecessors’ promises,
the requirements for a covenant to run with the land would serve
no purpose. (See generally Civ. Code, § 1468 [listing
requirements].)
Team’s further argument that Weinstein could not transfer
more than he owned also relies on the disavowed assumption that
the release burdens the land. Weinstein’s rights vis-à-vis Team
have no bearing on what he transferred to the next owner and
what Hari Hara ultimately acquired unless the restrictions to
which Weinstein agreed run with the land or Hari Hara
consented to those same restrictions. Team’s discussion of cases
involving the assignment of contractual rights and duties has no
15
The same analysis applies to Team’s invocation of Civil
Code section 3521, which codifies the maxim that “[h]e who takes
the benefit must bear the burden.”
16
The trial court appears to have identified Hari Hara’s land
purchase, rather than the Settlement Agreement, as the relevant
transaction in its reasoning that “[Hari Hara] . . . voluntarily
accepted the benefits of the transaction by succeeding to the
interest of the ownership and control of the subject property . . . .”
27
application to the series of real property transactions by which
Hari Hara came to acquire title to the property. (Drake v. Martin
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 984, 994-995 [contrasting “assignment of a
contractual right” with “the conveyance of title to real property by
grant deed” and emphasizing the lack of authority “holding the
transfer of title to real property also transfers [contract] rights
the seller may have had”].) Team cites Veterans of Foreign Wars
v. City of El Paso de Robles (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1077 for the
proposition that “[a]s a general rule, the grantee of a quitclaim
deed takes subject to all equities that could have been asserted
against the grantor,” but that reliance is unpersuasive given the
Court of Appeal’s emphasis that “the property [at issue in that
case] had a burden.” (Id. at 1080-1081.)
Regardless of whether the Settlement Agreement released
Weinstein’s claims against Team and regardless of whether the
parties to the Settlement Agreement intended for it to be binding
on Weinstein’s successors in interest, Team has not shown, for
purposes of summary judgment, that Hari Hara consented to be
bound.17
17
Naturally, we do not hold that Team’s theory of consent
advanced in this appeal (voluntary acceptance of benefits) is the
only theoretical means by which a settlement of environmental
claims may be binding on a successive landowner. (See, e.g., Civ.
Code, § 854, subds. (c), (d)(3) [subdivisions of the Environmental
Responsibility Acceptance Act authorizing a party to commit to
remediating contamination in exchange for a release of certain
claims that runs with the land and bind “the owner of the site
[and] the owner’s successors, heirs, and assigns”].)
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to enter a new and different
summary adjudication order consistent with the views expressed
in this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
KIM, J.
LEE, J.*
*
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
29
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