Jackson v. Faraday & Future CA2/3

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Testo completo

Filed 7/24/24 Jackson v. Faraday & Future CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MARISSA JACKSON, B328046

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV34852
v.

FARADAY & FUTURE, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

Vedder Price, Sheryl L. Skibbe, Charlie Y. Wang
and Gabrielle Mercurio for Defendant and Appellant.

Diana Gevorkian Law Firm and Diana Gevorkian
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Marissa Jackson sued her employer, Faraday &
Future, Inc. (Faraday), for various employment-related claims.
Faraday moved to compel arbitration under an agreement
Jackson signed as a condition of her employment. The trial
court concluded the agreement is unconscionable and refused
to enforce it. The court found Faraday had wrongly informed
Jackson the agreement was substantially the same as
the parties’ prior arbitration agreement. Contrary to its
representation, Faraday had made significant substantive
changes to the prior agreement, almost all of which worked
to its benefit. The court further concluded the agreement’s
provisions concerning remedies, discovery, and confidentiality
were substantively unconscionable and rendered the entire
agreement unenforceable. On appeal, Faraday argues there
is insufficient procedural and substantive unconscionability
to render the agreement unenforceable. We disagree and
affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The 2016 Agreement
Faraday describes itself as a “start-up technology company”
that develops and manufactures electric vehicles. Faraday
hired Jackson in 2016 as a Systems Administrator in its IT
Department. It required Jackson to sign an at-will employment
contract as a condition of her employment. The employment
contract included an arbitration clause, which we refer to
as the 2016 Agreement.
Under the 2016 Agreement, Jackson agreed to arbitrate
any claims related to her employment, whether brought on
an individual, group, or class basis. In return, Faraday agreed
to arbitrate any disputes it had with Jackson. Arbitration would

2
be administered by the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services
(JAMS), using the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules &
Procedures (the JAMS Rules). Faraday would cover all costs
of the arbitration, except the filing fee up to the amount Jackson
would have had to pay had she filed a complaint in court.
The 2016 Agreement required the arbitrator to conduct
the arbitration in accordance with California substantive
and procedural law, including the California Arbitration Act
(CAA; Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.).1 In the event of a conflict
between the JAMS Rules and California law, California law
would control. The arbitrator would have the power to award
all remedies available under applicable law. In addition, the
prevailing party would be entitled to attorney fees, except as
prohibited by law. The agreement expressly did not prohibit
Jackson from pursuing claims with administrative bodies and
governmental agencies authorized to enforce or administer
employment laws.
2. The 2018 Agreement
In September 2018, Faraday’s Human Resources (HR)
department sent Jackson an email with the subject, “Faraday
Future Employee Handbook.” The email “introduce[d] the
Faraday Future Employee Handbook” containing some of the
company’s policies and procedures. The email also introduced
a “revised version of the Company’s Arbitration Agreement.”
We refer to this arbitration agreement as the 2018 Agreement.
According to the email, the 2018 Agreement “isn’t new, but
simply a revised version of what you’ve likely already signed.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

3
This revised version is a little clearer and is being rolled out
to all current and new employees so that everyone will be on
the same page.”
Like the 2016 Agreement, the 2018 Agreement requires
Jackson and Faraday to arbitrate their claims using JAMS.
However, the 2018 Agreement is significantly longer than
the 2016 Agreement and includes many new terms. Among
other changes, the 2018 Agreement is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), does not incorporate the
CAA, limits Jackson’s right to seek administrative remedies,
requires “[a]ll aspects of the arbitration” be kept confidential,
generally requires the parties to bear their own attorney fees,
and prohibits non-PAGA representative and class actions.
Faraday instructed Jackson to “read through the
Handbook and revised Arbitration Agreement and then sign
the two documents near the end.” It asked Jackson to sign
the documents within 11 days of receiving the email. Faraday
listed a schedule of “short sessions” at which its HR and Legal
departments would “highlight certain policies that may be
of use to you while at work and provide answers to some of
the most commonly asked questions.” Jackson electronically
signed the 2018 Agreement about a week after receiving it.
3. Jackson’s complaint
In November 2022, Jackson filed a complaint against
Faraday in the superior court. She alleged Faraday committed
violations of the Federal Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
including sex discrimination, race/national origin discrimination,
and retaliation. Jackson also alleged Faraday failed to pay
wages, failed to provide meal and rest periods, failed to provide

4
an itemized wage statement, engaged in unfair business
practices, and made intentional misrepresentations.
In response to Jackson’s complaint, Faraday filed
a petition to compel arbitration and stay the court action. It
argued Jackson’s claims were covered by the 2018 Agreement,
which required her to submit them to arbitration.
In support of its petition, Faraday submitted a declaration
from its Vice President of Human Resources, Nan Yang, whom
it hired in 2019. Despite joining the company after the relevant
events, Yang recounted the circumstances under which Jackson
signed both the 2016 and 2018 agreements (as we have
summarized them above).
Jackson opposed Faraday’s petition, primarily on
the ground the 2018 Agreement was unconscionable and
unenforceable. On the issue of procedural unconscionability,
Jackson argued the 2018 Agreement was presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, Faraday misrepresented its implications,
and the 2018 Agreement directed her to a non-JAMS website that
lacked the arbitration rules. As to substantive unconscionability,
Jackson argued the 2018 Agreement excluded claims Faraday
was more likely to bring, imposed costs she would not bear in
court, limited informal and formal discovery, failed to grant
the arbitrator power to compel nonparty discovery, and limited
administrative remedies.
Jackson attached her own declaration to the opposition.
According to the declaration, after reading Faraday’s email,
Jackson believed the 2018 Agreement was a “routine personnel
form” that did not contain new terms. Jackson understood it was
“just a clearer and therefore a better version of the arbitration
agreement” she signed in 2016. Jackson was surprised when

5
she learned, during litigation, the 2018 Agreement included
new terms that were less favorable to her.
In its reply brief, Faraday argued there was no procedural
unconscionability because Jackson had ample time to sign the
2018 Agreement, did not try to negotiate its terms, and did not
object to anything within it. Faraday asserted Jackson must
not have read the 2018 Agreement, otherwise she would have
known it included new terms. Faraday seemed to acknowledge
the web address it listed for JAMS was not accurate, but it
argued that point was irrelevant because it provided Jackson
a copy of the JAMS Rules along with the 2018 Agreement.
As to Jackson’s arguments regarding substantive
unconscionability, Faraday asserted the 2018 Agreement was
mutual and fair, and it did not impose any additional costs
on Jackson. Faraday argued the confidentiality provision was
appropriate, the 2018 Agreement allowed adequate discovery
(including nonparty discovery upon agreement by the parties),
and Jackson was free to seek administrative remedies.
The trial court determined the 2018 Agreement was
unenforceable and refused to compel arbitration. The court
explained the 2018 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable
because Jackson “was told that the new agreement was not
different than the first agreement, just clearer. It was not.
She was directed to the wrong web page for arbitration rules.
She did not have the ability, nor was she given the opportunity
to compare the two agreements. Moreover, she was [not] given
the chance to decline to sign the new agreement.” The court
also found the 2018 Agreement was substantively unconscionable
“[g]iven the one-sided injunctive relief, [and the] limits on

6
discovery and remedies detailed in the subject arbitration
agreement.”
Faraday timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
Under both California and federal law, a written
arbitration agreement is “valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any
contract.” (§ 1281; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 [similar].) “California
law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration
agreements.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97 (Armendariz).)
Nevertheless, a trial court may refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement “based on general contract law principles,”
including if the agreement is unconscionable. (Id. at p. 99.)
Unconscionability has a procedural and substantive element,
both of which must be present for a court to refuse to enforce
an agreement. (Id. at p. 114.)
“ ‘On appeal from the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration, “we review the arbitration agreement de novo
to determine whether it is legally enforceable, applying
general principles of California contract law.” ’ [Citation.]
Thus, unconscionability is a question of law we review de novo.”
(Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 74, 82 (Carmona).) However, we review the trial
court’s factual findings supporting its order for substantial
evidence. (Villareal v. LAD-T, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
446, 456.)

7
2. The 2018 Agreement has an extraordinarily
high degree of procedural unconscionability
“[P]rocedural unconscionability requires oppression or
surprise.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market
Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.) A common
form of procedural unconscionability involves the use of a contract
of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is “ ‘a standardized contract,
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
to adhere to the contract or reject it.’ ” (Armendariz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 113.) “Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition
of employment are typically adhesive.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126 (OTO).)
The use of a contract of adhesion establishes only a
minimal degree of procedural unconscionability. (Gatton
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 585.)
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has counseled that, when
an employment contract is adhesive in nature, the court must be
“ ‘particularly attuned’ ” to the employee’s claim of substantive
unconscionability. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1237, 1245–1246 (Baltazar).) Where a contract of adhesion also
involves “ ‘surprise or other sharp practices,’ ” the court must
subject the substantive terms to an even higher degree of
scrutiny. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court concluded the 2018 Agreement is
procedurally unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion,
Faraday misrepresented the extent of the changes to the parties’
existing agreement, and Faraday directed Jackson to the wrong
web address for the arbitration rules. We consider each finding
in turn.

8
a. Contract of adhesion
Faraday does not meaningfully dispute the 2018 Agreement
is a contract of adhesion, nor could it. As Faraday seems to
concede, it presented the 2018 Agreement to Jackson as a
condition of her employment. The record also shows Faraday
directed Jackson to sign the contract without giving her
any indication it was willing to negotiate the terms. Under
these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer the terms were
nonnegotiable. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence
the 2018 Agreement is a contract of adhesion.
b. Faraday’s misrepresentations
According to Jackson’s declaration, at the time she signed
the 2018 Agreement, she understood it to contain essentially
the same terms as the 2016 Agreement, but “just a clearer
and therefore a better version” of it. Jackson’s understanding
was reasonable given the manner in which Faraday presented
the 2018 Agreement to her. Faraday introduced the agreement
through an email in which it described the 2018 Agreement as
not “new.” Instead, according to the email, it is “simply a revised
version” of the existing arbitration agreement Jackson had
already signed. The only revision Faraday identified was that
the 2018 Agreement is a “little clearer.” This strongly implied
any revisions to the parties’ preexisting arbitration agreement
—the 2016 Agreement—were formal, rather than substantive.
It conveyed that, although the language may have changed,
the substance remained the same.
Faraday’s characterization of the 2018 Agreement was
wildly inaccurate and misleading. Apart from the general
subject matter and the use of JAMS, the 2016 Agreement and
2018 Agreement share almost nothing in common. The 2018

9
Agreement is more than twice as long as the 2016 Agreement,
and it appears Faraday drafted it entirely from scratch. And
contrary to Faraday’s suggestions in its email to Jackson, those
additional words do not simply clarify the preexisting agreement.
Instead, Faraday made significant substantive changes to the
parties’ agreement, nearly all of which worked to its benefit.
We highlight some of those changes here.
Administrative remedies. The 2016 Agreement expressly
allowed Jackson to pursue administrative remedies. Faraday
removed that language from the 2018 Agreement. In its place,
the 2018 Agreement expressly prohibits Jackson from receiving
administrative remedies in addition to arbitration remedies,
and it states the arbitrator’s award is the sole remedy for
any covered claim to the extent permitted by law.
Class claims. The 2016 Agreement allowed Jackson
to bring claims on an individual, class, or group basis. With
the exception of PAGA claims, the 2018 Agreement requires
Jackson to bring her claims on an individual basis.
Confidentiality. The 2016 Agreement did not include
a confidentiality clause. The 2018 Agreement, in contrast,
generally requires “[a]ll aspects of the arbitration” be kept
confidential.
Attorney fees. The 2016 Agreement required the arbitrator
to award attorney fees to the prevailing party, except as
prohibited by law. In contrast, the 2018 Agreement provides,
“[u]nless otherwise ordered by the arbitrator, each Party
shall pay its own attorney’s fees . . . .”
Discovery. The 2016 Agreement required the arbitrator
to apply California substantive and procedural law, including
the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the parties were

10
entitled to discovery if “relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action.” (§ 2017.010.) The 2018 Agreement
requires the arbitrator to apply a significantly more limited
standard for discovery. It states the arbitrator must decide
whether discovery is warranted based on the “reasonable need
for the requested information, the availability of other discovery
options, and the burdensomeness of the request on the opposing
Parties and the witness.” Moreover, as we discuss in detail
below, the 2018 Agreement significantly limits the parties’
ability to obtain nonparty discovery.
Provisional relief. The 2016 Agreement expressly
incorporated the CAA, which allows either party to ask a
court for provisional relief related to a claim that is subject
to arbitration. (See § 1281.8.) As we discuss in detail below,
the 2018 Agreement limits such relief to Faraday’s claims
related to its intellectual property and proprietary information.
Filing fees. Both the 2016 Agreement and the 2018
Agreement require Jackson to pay the filing fees for any claims
she initiates in arbitration. The 2016 Agreement capped those
fees at the amount Jackson would have had to pay to file the
claims in court. The 2018 Agreement removed that cap.
Faraday seems to concede it failed explicitly to disclose
these changes to Jackson. Nevertheless, it suggests its failure
to do so does not constitute procedural unconscionability
because the changes would have been obvious to Jackson had
she simply read the 2018 Agreement and compared it to the
2016 Agreement. It contends there is no evidence in the record
to support the trial court’s finding that Jackson “did not have
the ability, nor was she given the opportunity to compare”
the two agreements.

11
Contrary to Faraday’s arguments, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding. Jackson submitted a
declaration asserting she is not a lawyer and did not understand
the 2018 Agreement was less favorable to her. Faraday
presented no evidence to the contrary. Nor did it present
evidence that it provided Jackson a copy of the 2016 Agreement
—either at the time she signed it or when Faraday asked her
to sign the 2018 Agreement—or that it informed her she could
request access to it. On this record, the trial court reasonably
could have found Jackson lacked both the ability and opportunity
to compare the agreements.
Even if Faraday had allowed Jackson to compare
the agreements, it would not have cured the procedural
unconscionability caused by its misrepresentations. Faraday
drafted the agreements using drastically different language
and form. The 2016 Agreement is contained within a much
larger document, incorporates some of its most important
terms from statutory provisions, and is replete with legalese.
In contrast, the 2018 Agreement is a standalone document,
states most of its terms explicitly, and does so in relatively
plain language. These stylistic changes are a welcome
improvement, and we do not mean to criticize Faraday
in any way for adopting them. However, they also work to
mask the significant differences between the two agreements.
Even for a trained lawyer, it would be difficult to appreciate
the differences simply by reading the documents. For someone
like Jackson, who lacks any legal training, it would be nearly
impossible. (See Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443,
471 (Gentry) [even “ ‘ “experienced but legally unsophisticated

12
businessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconscionable
contract terms” ’ ”].)
Nor was it enough for Faraday to give Jackson 11 days
to sign the 2018 Agreement and make its staff available to
answer questions about the contract’s terms. Again, we do not
mean to criticize Faraday’s efforts in this regard. The problem,
however, is that Faraday effectively rendered those efforts
meaningless when it implied the 2018 Agreement simply
clarified the terms of the 2016 Agreement. By doing so, Faraday
led Jackson to believe erroneously the 2018 Agreement was
substantially the same as the 2016 Agreement. Based on that
belief, Jackson had no reason to take advantage of the resources
Faraday provided to her. Nor did she have any reason to seek
advice on her own. (See Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 471
[“it is unrealistic to expect anyone other than higher echelon
employees to hire an attorney to review what appears to be
a routine personnel document”].)
c. The wrong JAMS web address
The 2018 Agreement asserts “the arbitration will be
conducted in accordance with the employment Arbitration Rules
of JAMS in effect at the time the demand is submitted to JAMS.”
It states the applicable rules “are provided here for reference”
and are also available at “www.jamsadr.org.” However, the
website at www.jamsadr.org has no apparent connection to JAMS
or to arbitration. The JAMS website is instead available at
www.jamsadr.com.
Faraday seems to concede its error. Nevertheless, it
argues the error does not reflect procedural unconscionability
because the undisputed evidence shows it attached a copy of the
JAMS Rules to the 2018 Agreement. Therefore, Faraday argues,

13
Jackson was able to review the applicable rules and understand
the full ramifications of her decision to agree to arbitration.
There are several problems with Faraday’s argument.
First, it is not clear whether Faraday actually attached the
JAMS Rules to the 2018 Agreement. The 2018 Agreement states
the JAMS Rules are “provided here for reference,” and Yang
asserted Faraday gave Jackson “the Arbitration Agreement with
the 2014 JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures.”
However, the version of the 2018 Agreement Faraday submitted
in support of its petition to compel arbitration did not include
those rules. Nor did Faraday submit a copy of the rules after
Jackson raised the issue in her opposition brief.
Even assuming Faraday attached the JAMS Rules to
the 2018 Agreement, it would not have cured the procedural
unconscionability. The 2018 Agreement states both that the
JAMS Rules are “provided here for reference,” and also that
the applicable rules will be determined at the time a demand for
arbitration is submitted. Absent a clarification that the attached
rules were subject to change, these provisions seem to contradict
each other. Regardless, because Faraday directed Jackson
to the wrong web address for JAMS, it failed to provide her
any way to determine whether the rules it attached remained
effective.
Faraday asserts any procedural unconscionability
related to the JAMS Rules is irrelevant because Jackson does
not complain about the substance of those rules. It points to
Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1237, in which the Supreme Court
declined to find an arbitration agreement was unconscionable
because it did not include the applicable arbitration rules.
The court explained the failure to attach the rules “might have

14
force if [the plaintiff’s] unconscionability challenge concerned
some element of the [arbitration] rules of which she had been
unaware when she signed the arbitration agreement. But her
challenge . . . has nothing to do with the [arbitration] rules.”
(Id. at p. 1246.)
Like the plaintiff in Baltazar, Jackson does not directly
challenge the substance of the JAMS Rules. However, unlike the
agreement at issue in that case, the procedural unconscionability
here goes beyond a simple failure to attach the applicable rules.
As discussed above, the 2018 Agreement contains contradictory
language concerning which rules would actually apply to an
arbitration. It then compounds the confusion by directing
Jackson to a wholly unrelated and irrelevant website to find
those rules. These aspects substantially increase the oppression
and distinguish this case from Baltazar. (See Carbajal v.
CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 245 [the “level of
oppression is increased” when an employer fails to identify
clearly which rules govern]; see also Harper v. Ultimo (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1406 [a contract is oppressive when
the weaker party “is forced to go to another source to find out
the full import of what he or she is about to sign—and must
go to that effort prior to signing”].)
3. The 2018 Agreement contains substantively
unconscionable terms
The trial court found the 2018 Agreement is substantively
unconscionable because it contains unfair and one-sided
limitations on remedies, injunctive relief, and discovery. In
particular, the court noted the 2018 Agreement limits Jackson’s
administrative remedies, allows Faraday to seek injunctive relief
in court, deprives the arbitrator of authority to compel nonparty

15
discovery, and includes a strict confidentiality clause that limits
informal discovery. Faraday argues none of those aspects of
the 2018 Agreement constitute substantive unconscionability.
We consider each in turn.
a. Limits on administrative remedies
The 2016 Agreement expressly did not “prohibit [Jackson]
from pursuing an administrative claim with a local, state, or
federal administrative body or government agency . . . .” The
2018 Agreement mentions administrative claims, but it does
not expressly allow Jackson to pursue them. Instead, it states
if an administrative claim is filed, either party has the right to
obtain a stay of the arbitration pending the agency’s resolution
of the claim. It then clarifies that “under no circumstances can
there be a duplicative award from the administrative agency and
the arbitrator. To the extent permitted by law, the arbitrator’s
award is the sole remedy for any covered claim.”
The parties seem to agree these provisions severely
restrict Jackson’s right to file administrative claims or seek
administrative remedies. According to Faraday, the 2018
Agreement allows Jackson to file an administrative claim “that
she is required to exhaust before bringing the claim in court.”
However, if “an agency determination is not required, the [2018]
Agreement provides that arbitration will be the sole forum
for resolution of any covered claim.”
As Faraday also seems to concede, the 2018 Agreement’s
limitation on administrative claims precludes Jackson from
pursuing a Berman hearing.2 A so-called Berman hearing is

2 For the first time in its reply brief, Faraday argues the
2018 Agreement does not require Jackson to waive her right to
a Berman hearing or other administrative remedies. Faraday

16
an administrative procedure available to employees to redress
an employer’s failure to pay wages. (See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc.
v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1127–1128 (Sonic).) The
procedure “include[s] various features designed to lower the
costs and risks for employees in pursuing wage claims, including
procedural informality, assistance of a translator, use of an expert
adjudicator who is authorized to help the parties by questioning
witnesses and explaining issues and terms, and provisions on
fee shifting, mandatory undertaking, and assistance of the Labor
Commissioner as counsel to help employees defend and enforce
any award on appeal.” (Id. at p. 1146.)
The waiver of a Berman hearing “does not necessarily
render an arbitration agreement unenforceable, nor does it render
an arbitration agreement unconscionable per se. But waiver of
these protections in the context of an agreement that does not
provide an employee with an accessible and affordable arbitral

asserts Jackson quotes out of context language from the
2018 Agreement to support her claim that arbitration is the
“ ‘sole forum’ ” for the resolution of disputes. However, in its
opening brief on appeal, Faraday itself asserted, if “an agency
determination is not required, the [2018] Agreement provides
that arbitration will be the sole forum for resolution of any
covered claim.” To the extent Faraday argues otherwise in its
reply brief, we consider the argument forfeited. (See Varjabedian
v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [“Obvious
reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue
raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant.”]; Nordstrom
Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583 [“points raised for
the first time in a reply brief on appeal will not be considered”].)
In any event, we agree with the interpretation Faraday proposed
in its opening brief.

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forum for resolving wage disputes may support a finding of
unconscionability.” (Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1146.) The
“arbitral scheme must offer employees an effective means to
pursue claims for unpaid wages, and not impose unfair costs
or risks on them or erect other barriers to the vindication of
their statutory rights.” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 133–134.)
OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th 111, is instructive. In that case,
the Supreme Court considered whether an arbitration agreement
that waived an employee’s right to a Berman hearing was
unconscionable. To decide the issue, the court explained,
it needed to compare what the employee gave up with what
he received in return. (Id. at p. 136.) By waiving his right to
a Berman hearing, the employee gave up a speedy, informal,
and affordable method for resolving wage disputes, something
he could have completed without hiring an attorney. (Id. at
pp. 132, 134.) In return, he received “access to a formal and
highly structured arbitration process that closely resembled
civil litigation,” which likely would be more complicated and
costly for the employee. (Id. at pp. 135–136.) The court noted,
unlike a Berman hearing, arbitration would require a formal
complaint, responses to discovery and dispositive motions,
compliance with the rules of evidence, and a court petition
to reduce the award to an enforceable judgment. (See id. at
pp. 131–132.)
The court then considered whether this trade-off rendered
the agreement unenforceable, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which the employee agreed to it. The court
noted the employer presented the agreement to the employee as
a condition of his employment, but without explaining its terms
or providing sufficient time to review it. (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th

18
at p. 127.) Under those circumstances, the court observed, it is
“virtually impossible to conclude that [the employee] knew he
was giving up his Berman rights and voluntarily agreeing to
arbitration instead.” (Id. at p. 129.) Because of the “unusually
coercive setting in which this bargain was entered,” the court
concluded the waiver of a Berman hearing was “sufficiently
one[-]sided as to render the agreement unenforceable.” (Id.
at pp. 136–137.)
Like the employee in OTO, Jackson gave up her right to
a speedy, informal, and affordable method for resolving wage
disputes. In return, she received an arbitration procedure that is
likely to be more complicated and costly. Although the procedure
contemplated by the 2018 Agreement is not as complicated as in
OTO, it is nevertheless significantly more complicated than a
Berman hearing. Unlike a Berman hearing, the 2018 Agreement
may require Jackson to respond to dispositive motions, comply
with discovery orders, and seek enforcement of an award in court.
Given the relative complexity of these procedures, Jackson would
be at a significant disadvantage if she were to represent herself.
Arbitration also is likely to be significantly more costly
for Jackson than a Berman hearing. The agreement in OTO
incorporated section 218.5, subdivision (a), which awards
reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing employee.
The Supreme Court held, although this provision may have
mitigated some financial burden, it is still less favorable for
an employee than a Berman hearing. (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th
at pp. 135–136.) The 2018 Agreement seems to be even less
favorable for Jackson, as it requires her to bear her own attorney
fees unless “otherwise ordered by the arbitrator.” Under this
provision, it would seem Jackson would not be entitled to her

19
attorney fees, even if she were to prevail on her claims. At the
very least, her entitlement to attorney fees is more uncertain
than in OTO and would likely require additional litigation
to resolve.
Although the trade-off in this case is similar to the one in
OTO, that fact alone does not render the limit on administrative
remedies unenforceable. (See Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1146.)
Instead, we must determine whether the trade-off is sufficiently
one-sided in light of the circumstances under which Jackson
agreed to it. (Ibid.) We address that issue later in the opinion.
b. Limits on injunctive relief
The 2018 Agreement states, “if either party has a
reasonable basis to believe the other party has breached any of
the obligations to each other concerning” proprietary information
and intellectual property, “either Party may, in addition to
pursuing arbitration of the claims for such breach, also seek
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction . . .
in any state or federal court . . . to protect such information.”
Faraday argues the trial court wrongly believed this
provision allowed it to litigate some of its claims in federal court,
rather than in arbitration. Faraday also argues the trial court
erroneously characterized the provision as one-sided. Instead,
Faraday asserts, the provision grants both parties the same
right to seek provisional relief related to certain types of claims.
Contrary to Faraday’s contentions, it is not apparent
the trial court misinterpreted the 2018 Agreement. While
summarizing Jackson’s arguments, the court noted the 2018
Agreement “allows Faraday to bring injunctive relief claims
in federal court.” Although lacking certain details, the court’s
statement is nevertheless accurate. The 2018 Agreement plainly

20
states, “in addition to pursuing arbitration” of certain claims,
either party may “seek a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction . . . in any state or federal court . . . .”
The court also correctly determined the provision is
unfairly one-sided. “Although parties are free to contract for
asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope,
. . . the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which
a stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose
the arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting
that forum for itself.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 118.)
Here, although the preliminary relief provision facially
applies to both parties, in practice, it benefits only Faraday.
When Faraday hired Jackson, she signed a document stating
she did not own or have an interest in any “proprietary
information or intellectual property rights.” There is nothing
in the record to suggest Jackson’s disclosure was inaccurate, or
that she acquired proprietary information or intellectual property
at some point after she signed the document. In contrast,
Faraday concedes it possess valuable intellectual property rights.
Given this disparity, the 2018 Agreement effectively
exempts from arbitration certain aspects of claims Faraday
might bring against Jackson, while mandating Jackson arbitrate
all aspects of every claim she might bring against Faraday.
Courts “have repeatedly found this type of one-sided provision
—where the employer exempts claims only it would bring from
arbitration while restricting any employee claims to arbitration
—to be substantively unconscionable.” (Carmona, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) We do the same.
Faraday’s reliance on Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1237,
is misplaced. In Baltazar, the California Supreme Court rejected

21
an employee’s argument that an arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable because it expressly permitted
the parties to seek injunctive relief during the pendency of
the arbitration. (Id. at pp. 1246–1247.) The employee argued
the provision improperly favored the employer because it
had a greater interest in protecting trade secrets and other
confidential information. (Ibid.) The high court disagreed,
explaining the provision did nothing more than recite the
procedural protections already secured by section 1281.8,
subdivision (b) (section 1281.8(b)). (Baltazar, at p. 1247.) As
the court noted, “an arbitration agreement is not substantively
unconscionable simply because it confirms the parties’ ability
to invoke undisputed statutory rights.” (Id. at pp. 1247–1248.)
Here, unlike in Baltazar, the parties’ agreement does not
simply confirm section 1281.8(b). To the contrary, it significantly
limits their respective rights under it. Section 1281.8(b) states
a “party to an arbitration agreement may file in [ ] court . . .
an application for a provisional remedy in connection with an
arbitrable controversy.” (§ 1281.8, subd. (b).) In other words,
it allows any party to seek preliminary relief in court related
to any arbitrable claim. The 2018 Agreement, in contrast,
limits that right to claims related to proprietary information
and intellectual property. Moreover, because Jackson does not
possess any proprietary information or intellectual property,
only Faraday may exercise that right.
Faraday contends, because of the significance of intellectual
property to its core business operations, it should be entitled to
an “ ‘extra margin of safety based on legitimate business needs.’ ”
(See Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1250.) We acknowledge
Faraday has a legitimate business need to protect its intellectual

22
property, including by allowing itself to seek preliminary relief
in court. However, Faraday fails to explain what business need
required it simultaneously to remove Jackson’s right to seek such
relief related to her claims. The 2016 Agreement incorporated
section 1281.8(b), which allowed both parties to seek injunctive
relief related to all their claims. Faraday has not provided
any explanation for why it removed that provision from the
2018 Agreement. Nor has it suggested any comparable benefit
Jackson received in return for giving up her right to seek
preliminary relief in court.
c. Limits on nonparty discovery
The 2016 Agreement granted the parties the right to
obtain discovery from nonparties and granted the arbitrator the
power to enforce that right. It did so by expressly incorporating
the CAA. Under section 1283.05, subdivision (a) of the CAA,
parties to arbitration have the right to obtain discovery as
provided in the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.), which
includes the right to obtain discovery from nonparties. (Berglund
v. Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (2008)
44 Cal.4th 528, 535.) The statute also grants arbitrators the
power to enforce discovery orders that are generally comparable
to those of a judge in a civil action in superior court. (Ibid.;
see § 1283.05, subd. (b).)
Faraday seems to concede it declined to incorporate any
part of the CAA into the 2018 Agreement, either explicitly or
implicitly. By failing to do so, Faraday removed the arbitrator’s
authority under section 1283.05 to compel nonparties to comply
with its discovery orders, severely limiting the parties’ ability to
conduct that type of discovery. (See § 1283.1, subd. (b) [generally,
the provisions in section 1283.05 apply only if the parties agree

23
to them]; Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 360, 396 (Aixtron) [“to determine whether the
arbitrator had the authority to order discovery under the CAA,
we must determine whether [the parties] provided that authority
through their arbitration agreement”].) This limitation on
nonparty discovery would severely hinder Jackson’s ability to
arbitrate FEHA claims. (See Murrey v. Superior Court (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1249 [“ ‘Employment disputes are factually
complex, and their outcomes “are often determined by the
testimony of multiple percipient witnesses, as well as written
information about the disputed employment practice.” ’ ”].)
As such, it is substantively unconscionable. (See Ramirez
v. Charter Communications, Inc. (July 15, 2024, S273802)
__ Cal.4th __ [2024 WL 3405593, at *11] (Ramirez) [“an
arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment
must generally permit employees sufficient discovery to
adequately arbitrate any statutory claims”].)
Faraday argues “[n]othing in the [2018] Agreement
prohibits the arbitrator from compelling third party discovery.”
While true, it does not follow that the parties must have intended
to grant the arbitrator such power. At most, the absence of
an explicit grant or prohibition creates an ambiguity. That
ambiguity is largely resolved by the fact Faraday removed from
the 2018 Agreement language incorporating section 1283.05
and failed to replace it with anything comparable. Faraday’s
editorial choices provide strong evidence it intended to limit the
arbitrator’s authority to compel nonparty discovery. (See Brown
v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432 [courts may look to
extrinsic evidence to interpret an agreement when a material

24
term is ambiguous].) Faraday offers no evidence to suggest
otherwise.
Faraday alternatively argues the 2018 Agreement
granted the arbitrator the authority to compel nonparty discovery
by incorporating the JAMS Rules.3 It points to rule 17(e) of the
current version of those rules, which went into effect in 2021.
Rule 17(e) states the “Parties may take discovery of third parties
with the approval of the arbitrator.”
Because rule 17(e) went into effect after Jackson signed the
2018 Agreement, it does not help Faraday. (See Subcontracting
Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 201, 212
[when considering substantive unconscionability, “we review the
arbitration clause for substantive unconscionability at the time
the agreement was made”].) In fact, to the extent rule 17(e)
has any relevance, it does the opposite. As Faraday concedes,
neither rule 17(e) nor anything comparable to it existed at
the time Jackson signed the 2018 Agreement. That Faraday
nevertheless elected not to include a provision related to
nonparty discovery provides strong support for our conclusion
that Faraday did not intend for the 2018 Agreement to grant
the parties or the arbitrator such power.
Faraday’s reliance on the JAMS Rules fails for another
reason. Although rule 17(e) grants the parties the right to
take nonparty discovery, it does not grant the arbitrator any
meaningful power to enforce that right. As the court in Aixtron,
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th 360, explained when it rejected a similar

3 At Faraday’s request, we take judicial notice of the
current version of the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules
& Procedures. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)

25
argument, “arbitration and the application of JAMS Rules obtain
their legal force based on party consent as reflected in the terms
of the arbitration agreement or statutes that authorize limited
discovery in arbitration.” (Id. at p. 404.) Because nonparties
have not consented to be bound by the JAMS Rules, absent
some sort of statutory provision making the rules effective, they
have no power over nonparties. (Ibid.) Here, Faraday fails to
point to any statutory authority that would require nonparties
to comply with the JAMS Rules. Accordingly, an arbitrator
would be powerless to enforce rule 17(e) against them.
We reject Faraday’s contention that Jackson failed to
submit admissible evidence showing she needs third party
discovery to arbitrate her current claims. As the California
Supreme Court recently clarified, the “assessment of whether
a discovery clause is unconscionable should focus on general
factors that can be examined without relying on subsequent
developments. Those factors include the types of claims covered
by the agreement, the amount of discovery allowed, the degree
to which that amount may differ from the amount available
in conventional litigation, any asymmetries between the parties
with regard to discovery, and the arbitrator’s authority to order
additional discovery.” (Ramirez, supra, 2024 WL 3405593,
at *12.) Post-contract formation circumstances—such as whether
the 2018 Agreement permits sufficient discovery to arbitrate
Jackson’s current claims—are irrelevant. (See id. at *11–12.)
We also reject Faraday’s passing contention that any
limitation on nonparty discovery is not unconscionable because
it is mutual. Faraday forfeited this argument by failing to
support it with meaningful analysis or citations to relevant
authority. (See Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp.

26
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) In any event, even a seemingly
neutral limitation on discovery is unconscionable if it does not
permit the employee sufficient discovery to arbitrate statutory
claims. (See Ramirez, supra, 2024 WL 3405593, at *11.) Here,
the 2018 Agreement’s limitation on third party discovery severely
limits Jackson’s ability to arbitrate FEHA claims, which renders
it unconscionable.
d. Expansive confidentiality
Unlike the 2016 Agreement—which had no confidentiality
provision—the 2018 Agreement states “[a]ll aspects of the
arbitration, including the hearing and record, are confidential
and shall not be open to the public.”4
The court in Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 1042 (Ramos) held a similar confidentiality provision
was substantively unconscionable. In that case, the parties’
agreement required “ ‘all aspects of the arbitration shall
be maintained by the parties and the arbitrators in strict
confidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 1065.) The court explained the provision
would have a negative practical effect on the employee’s ability
to pursue her claims because she “would be in violation [of it] if
she attempted to informally contact or interview any witnesses
outside the formal discovery process. Further, such a limitation
would not only increase [the employee’s] costs unnecessarily
by requiring her to conduct depositions rather than informal
interviews, it also defeats the purpose of using arbitration

4 The 2018 Agreement provides four exceptions to the
confidentiality rule: (1) by written agreement of the parties;
(2) as appropriate in subsequent proceedings; (3) as appropriate
in response to a governmental agency or legal process; or
(4) as otherwise required by law.

27
as a simpler, more time-effective forum for resolving disputes.
In addition, requiring discrimination cases be kept secret
unreasonably favors the employer to the detriment of employees
seeking to vindicate unwaivable statutory rights and may
discourage potential plaintiffs from filing discrimination cases.”
(Id. at pp. 1066–1067.)
Faraday argues the 2018 Agreement’s confidentiality
provision instead more closely resembles the provision at issue
in Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 398 (Sanchez). The agreement in that case
required “the arbitration (including the hearing and record of
the proceeding) be confidential and not open to the public . . . .”
(Id. at p. 408.) The court rejected the employee’s argument
the provision was unconscionable, noting it saw nothing
unreasonable or prejudicial about it. (Ibid.)
Although the 2018 Agreement’s confidentiality provision
bears some resemblance to the provision in Sanchez, we conclude
it more closely resembles the provision in Ramos.5 Like the
Ramos provision, the 2018 Agreement uses exceptionally

5 Even if we were to conclude the confidentiality provision is
comparable to the one in Sanchez, we nevertheless would decline
to follow that case. The Sanchez court stated there was nothing
improper about the provision in the parties’ agreement, but it
did not provide meaningful analysis to support that conclusion.
(See Sanchez, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Nor did the
court discuss the provision’s impact on the employee’s ability
to conduct informal discovery. In fact, it is not apparent
the employee raised the issue or the court even considered it.
(See Wishnev v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. (2019)
8 Cal.5th 199, 217 [“ ‘a decision does not stand for a proposition
not considered by the court’ ”].)

28
broad language, requiring “all aspects” of the arbitration be
held confidential. As in Ramos, such sweeping language would
preclude Jackson from disclosing or discussing her claims with
nonparties, which would effectively prohibit informal discovery.
That limitation may severely hamper Jackson’s ability to
vindicate her statutory rights, especially in light of the other
limitations on formal discovery from nonparties.
Faraday urges us to interpret the confidentiality provision
much more narrowly. It argues the “most reasonable”
interpretation is that “only the arbitration proceedings
themselves are ‘confidential,’ such that the public may not
attend and the record of the hearing may not be used in further
proceedings with some exceptions.”
Although we strive to read contracts in a way that renders
them enforceable, Faraday’s proposed interpretation is simply
not reasonable. (See Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, 682 [courts should interpret
contractual provisions, if reasonable, in a manner that renders
them lawful].) Had Faraday intended to keep confidential
only the proceedings—i.e., the hearing and the record—it easily
could have said so explicitly. Indeed, in one of the cases Faraday
relies on, the parties’ agreement did precisely that, stating
“ ‘the arbitration proceedings, and each and every aspect thereof,
including the decision of the arbitrator, shall be and remain
confidential.’ ” (See King v. Hausfeld (N.D.Cal. Apr. 9, 2013,
No. C-13-0237 EMC) 2013 WL 1435288, at *15.) The 2018
Agreement does not reference “proceedings” and instead extends
confidentiality to “[a]ll aspects of the arbitration, including the
hearing and record.” The word “including” signifies the hearing
and record are merely examples of what is to remain confidential,

29
rather than being exhaustive. Faraday suggests no other
reasonable interpretation of the phrase “all aspects of
arbitration” that would be consistent with its limited view
of the confidentiality provision.
Faraday alternatively argues Jackson’s right to informal
discovery is preserved by the provision stating, “[d]iscovery will
be available to both Parties.” Faraday contends its interpretation
finds additional support in the fact the arbitrator is required to
consider “other discovery options” when deciding whether to
grant a request for discovery.
Once again, we are not persuaded. The relevant section
of the 2018 Agreement lists three types of discovery—information
exchange, written discovery, and depositions—and states the
arbitrator shall determine the necessity of each. Read in context,
it is apparent the phrase “[d]iscovery will be available” refers
to those specific types of discovery, each of which would be
considered formal. Context also makes clear “other discovery
options” refers to formal discovery methods other than what the
party requests. For example, if the party requests a deposition,
“other discovery options” would include information exchange
and written discovery. It does not extend to informal discovery.
We also reject Faraday’s brief contention that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts the holding in Ramos. Faraday argues,
because confidentiality is one of the hallmark features of
arbitration, any state law that prohibits it is hostile to arbitration
and, therefore, preempted by federal law. Contrary to Faraday’s
suggestions, Ramos does not prohibit all confidentiality
provisions in arbitration agreements. Rather, it prohibits
overly broad provisions that would severely hamper an
employee’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. (Ramos,

30
supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1065–1067.) The 2018 Agreement’s
confidentiality provision falls within that category.
4. The 2018 Agreement is unenforceable
Although we have determined the 2018 Agreement
contains several provisions that are substantively
unconscionable, that fact alone does not render them
unenforceable. Instead, to decide that issue, we apply a
sliding scale approach. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vice versa.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)
“Substantive terms that, in the abstract, might not support an
unconscionability finding take on greater weight when imposed
by a procedure that is demonstrably oppressive.” (OTO, supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 130.) Where there is substantial procedural
unconscionability, “even a relatively low degree of substantive
unconscionability may suffice to render the agreement
unenforceable.” (Ibid.) “The ultimate issue in every case
is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair,
in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should
withhold enforcement.” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 912.)
Applying the sliding scale approach here, and considering
all the relevant circumstances, we conclude the 2018 Agreement
is sufficiently unfair as to be unenforceable.
When Faraday hired Jackson, it required her to enter
into an arbitration agreement. That agreement—the 2016
Agreement—was generally fair to both parties, despite being a
contract of adhesion. Two years later, Faraday presented a new
agreement to Jackson—the 2018 Agreement—which is decidedly

31
less fair. Faraday made significant substantive changes to
the parties’ agreement, nearly all of which work to its benefit.
Among other changes, Faraday removed Jackson’s right to seek
administrative remedies, effectively removed her right to seek
preliminary relief, limited nonparty discovery, added a strict
confidentiality clause, removed a cap on filing fees, prohibited
non-PAGA representative and class claims, and newly required
the parties to bear their own attorney fees.
Faraday has never offered a compelling justification
for those changes. It told Jackson the 2018 Agreement was a
“little clearer” than the 2016 Agreement. While certainly true
—and a welcome change—that explanation does not address
the numerous substantive changes. Faraday just as easily
could have rewritten the terms of the 2016 Agreement using
the same plain language it employed in the 2018 Agreement.
The only other rationale Faraday suggested was that it wanted
all its employees to “be on the same page.” Again, although
a reasonable desire, this does not explain the significant
substantive changes Faraday made to the parties’ existing
agreement. Under these circumstances, it appears Faraday’s
stated justifications for altering the parties’ agreement were
pretextual. Instead, Faraday seems to have been motivated
primarily by a desire to extract a significantly better deal
for itself.
While Faraday was generally free to pursue a better deal,
it was not free to do so using oppression and surprise. The record
shows Faraday did precisely that, and to an exceptional degree.
Rather than alert Jackson to the significant new terms in the
2018 Agreement—so she could make an informed decision about
whether to sign it—Faraday wrongly implied it made changes

32
only to the agreement’s form. This was misleading, at best,
and deceptive, at worst. It also effectively negated Faraday’s
other efforts to make the process fair. Under these
circumstances, it is virtually impossible to conclude Jackson
realized what she was giving up in return for signing the
2018 Agreement.
Because of the extraordinarily high degree of
procedural unconscionability surrounding the execution of the
2018 Agreement, a lesser degree of substantive unconscionability
is required to render its terms unenforceable. That standard
is easily met with respect to the provisions concerning
administrative remedies, injunctive relief, nonparty discovery,
and confidentiality. In addition to being unfairly one-sided,
each provision substantially limited Jackson’s rights under the
2016 Agreement, but without giving her anything significant
in return. While those same terms might pass muster under
some circumstances, in light of the exceptional surprise and
oppression surrounding their execution, they are sufficiently
one-sided as to be unenforceable here.
Finally, we decline Faraday’s request to sever the
unenforceable terms. The relevant provisions concern key
aspects of the arbitration process, including discovery, remedies,
and confidentiality. It would be impossible to remove the
offending terms without rewriting substantial parts of the
parties’ agreement. The unconscionability permeates the entire
2018 Agreement, rendering it unenforceable. (See Armendariz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 122 [a court may decline to enforce an
agreement if it is “ ‘permeated’ by unconscionability”].)6

6 Because we conclude the 2018 Agreement is unconscionable
and unenforceable, we need not consider Jackson’s arguments

33
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Marissa Jackson is awarded her
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

concerning Labor Code section 229 and the federal Ending
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act (9 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.).

34

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