CourtListener 10013455•People v. Carpio CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Carpio CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B328636
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA073936)
v.
MICHAEL STEVEN CARPIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Martin L. Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Michael Steven Carpio (defendant), who with his brother
and codefendant Anthony Carpio was convicted of second degree
murder, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for relief
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Following an evidentiary
hearing, the court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder.
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support that finding. Instead, he argues the trial court was
required to consider the fact that he was only 19 years old at the
time of the offense. Given the evolving developments of law in
this area, we agree the court erred in not considering this factor.
However, any such error was harmless in light of the evidence
and circumstances of the murder. We accordingly affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The underlying crime
One afternoon in April 2013 after school let out,
defendant—then age 19—and his younger brother Anthony
walked onto the campus of Cleveland High School in Reseda,
California. The brothers “went up” to Kevin Orellana (Orellana),
who was standing on one of the handball courts. Defendant made
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.
2
the archetypical gang challenge—demanding to know, “Where
you from?” Defendant admitted he was “hitting up” and “banging
on” Orellana. Orellana said something in response that led
defendant to believe Orellana was associated with a rival street
gang. Defendant threw a punch, and Anthony soon joined in the
three-way fistfight. Orellana fought back, taking on both
brothers for a time and, as he gained the upper hand,
concentrating first on defendant, then Anthony. At some point
when Orellana was fighting defendant and his back was to
Anthony, Anthony pulled a knife and stabbed Orellana multiple
times in the head, neck, and left and right torso. As the brothers
fled, Anthony dropped the knife. Defendant picked it up, cleaned
it off, and then tossed it away before the brothers ran to a waiting
“getaway” minivan.
B. Charging, conviction, and appeal
The People charged defendant with first degree murder (§
187, subd. (a)), and further alleged that the murder was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
Following trial, a jury convicted defendant of second degree
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 15
years to life.2
We affirmed the conviction on appeal. (People v. Carpio et
al. (Oct. 27, 2016, B261698) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Procedural Background
On December 23, 2020, defendant filed a petition seeking
resentencing under section 1172.6. After the trial court
2 Anthony was also convicted of second degree murder and
received a sentence of 16 years to life, which included one year for
a weapon-use enhancement.
3
appointed counsel for defendant, the People filed an opposition,
and defendant filed a brief in support of his petition.
On December 9, 2022, the trial court—the same judge who
presided over the original trial—held an evidentiary hearing on
defendant’s petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the court
admitted into evidence the record from defendant’s direct appeal,
which included the trial transcripts, a conversation between the
brothers in the getaway minivan that was inadvertently recorded
as a voicemail, and defendant’s statement to the police. The
People did not present any new evidence. Defendant testified on
his own behalf. He testified that there was no plan to attack
Orellana that day; his recollection of events is unclear because he
was “dazed” from being hit by Orellana; he was on “meth” and
had not slept for days and was not thinking “straight”; he did not
know Orellana had been stabbed until he got back to the car; and
he does not remember what he told the police.
After entertaining oral argument, the court denied
defendant’s petition, finding defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of second degree murder under the theory that
he directly aided and abetted Anthony’s implied malice murder.
The court made specific factual findings supporting its
determination that defendant personally acted with reckless
indifference to human life (and hence acted with implied malice),
including that (1) defendant issued a gang challenge to Orellana;
(2) defendant threw the first punch; (3) defendant punched
Orellana with such force that he “broke [his] hand”; (4) although
defendant was feeling weak at that time, he was willing to
initiate this fight with Orellana because he knew Anthony was
nearby and sometimes carried a knife; (5) when Orellana knocked
defendant down, Anthony rushed in to join the fight; (6)
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defendant re-joined the fight to “deliberately distract[] Orellana
and mak[e] it impossible for [Orellana] to defend himself while
being stabbed by Anthony”; and (7) defendant grabbed the knife
that Anthony discarded, cleaned it, and then disposed of it.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in not considering his relative youth (age 19) at the time of
the crime in making its finding that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Because defendant does not otherwise
contest the substantiality of the evidence underlying the trial
court’s ultimate finding of recklessness or its subsidiary factual
findings in support of that ultimate finding, we review the trial
court’s application of the law de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
At this point in time, trial courts are obligated to consider a
defendant’s relative youth (that is, whether the defendant is 26
years old or younger) as one of many circumstances in assessing
whether a defendant has acted with reckless indifference and
hence acted with implied malice. (People v. Jones (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091-1093 & 1088, fn. 7; People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488-489 (Oliver); People v. Pittman
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416-417 (Pittman).) Although there is
no requirement that a trial court expressly identify the
circumstances it considers when making findings regarding a
defendant’s intent, and although appellate courts generally
presume that trial courts follow the law in the absence of
affirmative evidence to the contrary (In re Julian R. (2009) 47
Cal.4th 487, 499), the law at the time of the evidentiary hearing
in this case labeled relative youth an “appropriate” or “relevant”
5
factor—but not a mandatory one (People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558 [“relevant”]; In re Harper (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 450, 466-470 [“appropriate” but declining to decide
whether youth “must be considered”]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 987, 990-991 [“relevant”]; In re Moore (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 434, 453-454 [“relevant”]; see also People v. Harris
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 944-945 [relevant to major
participation element]). Because we cannot presume that the
trial court here followed a mandatory obligation to consider
relative youth that did not exist at the time of the hearing in this
case, and because the parties and the court otherwise did not
mention defendant’s youth, we are required to conclude that the
court did not consider defendant’s relative youth and erred in
failing to do so. (Accord, Jones, at p. 1092.)
However, this error is subject to harmless error analysis,
which requires us to ask whether there is a “‘reasonable
probability’” that, had the trial court considered defendant’s
youth, it would have made a different factual finding regarding
his implied malice under the “specific [and uncontested]
circumstances of this case.” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 417-418; Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 488-489 & fn. 8.)
Relative youth is pertinent to recklessness because persons under
the age of 26 are (1) “relative[ly] impulsiv[e]” and (2)
“vulnerabl[e] to peer pressure.” (Oliver, at p. 489.) Where there
is “no evidence that” a defendant’s “criminal behavior was
motivated by either of these two factors,” the trial court’s failure
to consider relative youth is harmless. (Ibid.) Here, although
defendant came upon Orellana serendipitously (and thus did not
seek him out with premeditation), the trial court nevertheless
found that defendant intentionally initiated the confrontation,
6
intentionally initiated the fight, knew he had his sometimes-
armed younger brother as “backup,” intentionally distracted
Orellana so Anthony could punch or stab him, and intentionally
destroyed evidence of the crime afterwards. In light of these
findings and the level of intentionality they entail, it is not
reasonably probable that consideration of defendant’s relative
youth would have altered the court’s finding that defendant acted
in a manner that was not recklessly impulsive and hence in a
manner consistent with being recklessly indifferent. (Cf.
Pittman, at p. 418 [remand warranted where “the trial evidence
indicates that [the defendant] and his peers acted impulsively”].)
Further, because defendant was the eldest aggressor involved in
the altercation and initiated the entire incident himself, there is
no evidence suggesting that his involvement was the product of
peer pressure; thus, consideration of defendant’s relative youth is
also not reasonably likely to alter the court’s finding due to the
danger of peer pressure. More broadly, it is well settled that
“[t]he fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other factors” (People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595), and our analysis
indicates that defendant’s relative youth in this case would not
reasonably likely overwhelm the trial court’s other findings
regarding recklessness to such a degree that consideration of
defendant’s relative youth would lead to a different finding
regarding recklessness.
Defendant responds that the trial court’s error
automatically entitles him to reversal. He is wrong. For support,
he chiefly cites People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431. But
Salazar announced the harmless error test applies when a trial
court has been granted newfound sentencing discretion and a
reviewing court is trying to assess whether remand is necessary
7
for the trial court to exercise that discretion; Salazar held that
remand is required “‘unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that
the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it
had been aware that it had such discretion.”’” (Id. at p. 431;
accord, People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457-458
[addressing whether to remand to trial court to exercise newly
conferred sentencing discretion].) Salazar did not purport to
displace the general test requiring a reasonable probability of a
different outcome when it comes to the erroneous exclusion of
pertinent considerations or evidence.3
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, P. J.
LUI
_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
3 In light of our finding that the trial court’s error was not
prejudicial, defendant’s alternative argument that his counsel at
the section 1172.6 hearing was constitutionally ineffective also
fails because any ineffectiveness in failing to raise the issue of
relative youth was equally not prejudicial. (See Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 688, 697.)
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