People v. Tate CA2/4

CourtListener 10011917Calctapp23 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/23/24 P. v. Tate CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B332620
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. A645237)

v.

CHRISTOPHER TATE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, and Noah P. Hill,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Christopher Tate (Tate) appeals from an order denying his
motion for a hearing under Penal Code section 1203.011 and People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). After Tate submitted his opening
brief, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Hardin (2024) 15
Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). That decision controls the outcome here. We affirm
the trial court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tate was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances in
1988. He was 19. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
In November 2022, Tate filed a motion for a hearing under section
1203.01 and Franklin, seeking an opportunity to place information on the
record for an eventual youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied
the motion, finding that Tate was not entitled to a youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051.
Tate timely appeals.

DISCUSSION
Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1) provides that the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) must hold a hearing “for the purpose of reviewing the
parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at
the time of the controlling offense.” At that hearing, the Board’s decision
“will be informed by youth-related factors, such as his cognitive ability,
character, and social and family background at the time of the offense.”

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
stated.

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(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 269.) However, prisoners convicted before
2013, when section 3051 was enacted, may not have had a chance to make a
record about those factors at their sentencing hearing. (Ibid.) Therefore,
they may be entitled to a separate hearing where they have the opportunity
to place information in the record for eventual use by the Board. (Ibid.)
Not all prisoners are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing.
Section 3051, subdivision (h) specifically excludes “cases in which an
individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years
of age.” Tate is covered by this exclusion. He argues that the exclusion
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution.
The California Supreme Court rejected that argument in Hardin. The
appellant in that case was “serving a life without parole sentence for a special
circumstance murder he committed at age 25.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
p. 839.) He filed a postjudgment motion to develop and preserve evidence for
later use in a youth offender parole hearing. (Id. at p. 840.) The motion was
denied because the appellant was ineligible for such a hearing under section
3051, subdivision (h). (Ibid.) The appellant argued on appeal that the
exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause in two ways: (1) it irrationally
distinguishes between juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole and
young adult offenders who receive the same sentence, and (2) it irrationally
distinguishes between young adults who had committed murder with a
special circumstance and those who had committed murder with no special
circumstance. (Id. at pp. 840–841.)
The Court of Appeal accepted the second argument. (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 840–841.) The California Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at p.
839.) The Court held that, although the primary purpose of section 3051 was

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to give “young persons the opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated growth and rehabilitation,” the Legislature balanced that
objective with “concerns about culpability and the appropriate level of
punishment for certain very serious crimes.” (Id. at p. 854.) “It was not
irrational for the Legislature to exclude from youth offender parole eligibility
those young adults who have committed special circumstance murder, an
offense deemed sufficiently culpable that it merits society’s most stringent
sanctions.” (Id. at p. 864.)
Tate’s situation is the same. He is a young adult offender convicted of
special circumstance murder and is not eligible for a youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051. Under Hardin, that ineligibility does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.

DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

MORI, J.

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