Weinstein v. Hines CA2/8

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Filed 7/23/24 Weinstein v. Hines CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

STEVEN WEINSTEIN, B318163

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 19CHCV00400

OSCAR JOE HINES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from order and judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Stephen Pfahler, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Glenn Stern Law, Glenn E. Stern and Frederick H.
Alschuler for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, Dean A. Bochner, Lacey L. Estudillo;
David Weiss Law, David J. Weiss and Nicholas A. Weiss for
Defendants and Respondents.
___________________________________________
This appeal is from a judgment entered for defendants and
respondents Oscar Joe Hines and Kit M. Song after the trial
court sustained their demurrer without leave to amend the
second amended complaint (SAC) of plaintiff and appellant
Steven Weinstein. Also named as a defendant in the SAC is The
Regents of the University of California (The Regents). The
Regents is not a party to this appeal and our references to
“defendants” are to defendants Hines and Song only.
We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part. We
remand with directions to enter a new order (1) overruling the
demurrer as to plaintiff’s causes of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and negligence; (2) sustaining the demurrer
with leave to amend the cause of action under Labor Code
sections 1050 and 1054 for misrepresentation preventing a
former employee from obtaining employment; and (3) sustaining
without leave to amend all other causes of action.
BACKGROUND
1. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff and appellant Steven Weinstein has been a
licensed physician and surgeon since 1984. Defendants and
respondents Oscar Joe Hines and Kit M. Song are also
physicians. For a time beginning in 2015, the three doctors
worked together at the Northridge Hospital Medical Center.
They worked within the UCLA Health system and were
employees of The Regents through The Regents’ UCLA Medical
Group.
In June 2016, a 41-year-old female patient presented to
plaintiff for a preoperative consultation about possible gall
bladder surgery. She was accompanied at the appointment by
her eight-year-old son. The patient was overweight and had a

2
family history of breast cancer. She also had various mental
health issues for which she was prescribed numerous
medications. In performing his history and physical
examination, plaintiff performed a breast exam on the patient, to
which she did not object.
Plaintiff alleges this examination was part of his custom
and practice, as well as The Regents’ guidelines. Plaintiff had
expertise in matters of breast health. He held breast health
leadership positions with his former employer and was
“knowledgeable about and skilled and experienced in the
performance of breast examinations and the importance of same
in early detection of breast cancer.”
Following his examination of the patient, plaintiff
discussed her biliary tract disease and related symptoms as well
as the surgical procedure for treating them. The patient stated
she wished to proceed with the surgery and signed a consent form
for it.
However, shortly after the appointment, the patient
contacted her referring physician and asked for a
recommendation for another surgeon. She said she did not like
plaintiff and did not feel comfortable going to him. The following
day, after plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to contact her, the patient
messaged her referring physician, explaining: “ ‘[plaintiff] was
very rude to my son, who is a very sweet [sic]. You’ve met him;
he’s a good boy. Also, he did a breast exam which really took [sic]
aback. Seems inappropriate. He was a jerk and a creep . . . .’ ”
The patient also called plaintiff and stated she was unhappy he
had done a breast exam and about his interaction with her son at
the appointment. She said she was going to a different surgeon
for her operation.

3
Immediately after his call with the patient, plaintiff
reported the interaction to the director of operations for his
practice group, Annette Mosley, and suggested she report the
matter to risk management. He also voluntarily told his office
staff that he would have a female nurse present for any future
breast exam and that he would refrain from performing breast
exams during preoperative history and physical examinations
unless specifically medically indicated.
The next day, Ms. Mosley spoke with defendant Song,
medical director of Surgical Services, about the patient
complaint. According to Ms. Mosley’s notes, “ ‘Dr. Song agrees
[the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations] encourages surgeons to complete History and
Physicals [(H&P)] as a routine step in patient pre-op care. He
agrees that breast exam is a routine step in the H&P.’ ”
The patient, while satisfied with being rescheduled with
another surgeon, remained concerned about her interaction with
plaintiff. She submitted an online complaint to The Regents, via
UCLA Health, that she did not feel the breast exam performed by
plaintiff was necessary. She also alleged for the first time that
plaintiff told her he needed to perform pelvic and rectal exams,
but she “ ‘made it clear he would not be doing either.’ ” A week
later, she submitted another online complaint stating that
plaintiff asked her to remove her bra in his presence and warned
her there would be fines if she did not submit to breast, pelvic
and rectal examinations. (Plaintiff alleges what he actually said
was that, if he performed incomplete or inappropriate
treatments, it could negatively affect the Medicare
reimbursement rates for the hospital.)

4
A patient liaison nurse for The Regents forwarded these
complaints to plaintiff a few days later as part of a notice that the
patient had filed a grievance against him. Also copied was
defendant Hines, chief of the Division of General Surgery.
Dr. Hines contacted Dr. Song, who in turn contacted plaintiff to
advise that Dr. Hines would be getting in touch with him.
Dr. Hines called plaintiff two days later and they discussed the
patient complaint but did not delve into its substance. In the
ensuing weeks, neither Drs. Song nor Hines conducted any
further investigation of the patient’s complaints.
In early August 2016, Dr. Hines e-mailed Dr. Song and the
patient liaison nurse to state that he and Dr. Song both
interviewed plaintiff, and “ ‘[g]oing forward all female patients
will be examined by [plaintiff] with a member of the clinic staff in
the patient room, [plaintiff] will limit components of the physical
exam to those that are specific to the patient’s condition . . . , a
letter of concern was sent to [plaintiff] from UCLA Health, [and
plaintiff’s] practice will be audited every 3 months for
compliance . . . .’ ” Plaintiff disputes that Drs. Song and Hines
ever interviewed him or that his practice was subject to audits.
He alleges he “was never advised of these ‘conditions’ . . . and
never agreed to them.” A letter signed by Dr. Hines listing these
conditions was mailed to the patient. Plaintiff was not notified of
the letter at the time.
According to plaintiff, if the conditions recited in the letter
had been imposed, it would have triggered obligations on
defendants under Business and Professions Code section 805,
subdivisions (a)(7) and (b)(3) to notify the California Medical
Board. Defendants made no such report at the time.

5
In October 2016, The Regents and defendants renewed
plaintiff’s employment agreement.
In February 2017, the patient filed a police report
concerning her interaction with plaintiff. The police interviewed
plaintiff but took no further action against him. The police also
notified The Regents they received a report about plaintiff from
the patient. “After learning of the patient’s police report,
[defendants] immediately went into ‘self-protection’ and ‘self-
survival’ mode, fearing for their own jobs and protecting their
own pecuniary interests for potentially being viewed by The
Regents as not taking any action against [plaintiff], even though
they had already determined six to seven months earlier that
there was no basis for taking any action against [plaintiff]. The
only new factor in the equation was the patient filing a police
report, prompting [defendants] to corruptly and maliciously move
forward to ‘scapegoat’ [plaintiff] and do whatever they could to
ensure that they were not accused of mishandling the patient
complaint and save their own jobs.”
The first step Dr. Hines took in the alleged scheme was to
send a letter to plaintiff, on February 9, 2017, purporting to
document defendants’ response to the complaint. Plaintiff calls
this “the ‘CYA’ letter.” It stated—falsely, according to plaintiff—
that defendants reviewed the patient’s written complaints and
concluded the breast examination was not within the standard of
care and that, as a result of the complaint, plaintiff had agreed to
restrictions imposed on his practice (a chaperone for all
examinations of female patients; no breast, pelvic, or rectal
examinations unless specifically related to the patient’s
complaint; and quarterly audits to ensure his compliance). The
letter further stated defendants intended to make a report to the

6
California Medical Board about the complaint pursuant to
Business and Professions Code sections 805 and 805.01 because
their review constituted “peer review activity.”
Plaintiff alleges any review by Drs. Hines and Song could
not have constituted peer review activity because fewer than all
persons required under applicable bylaws of The Regents and the
hospital where they worked had been involved. He further
alleges the misrepresentations in the February 9, 2017 letter
“were known to be completely false and made with the conscious
intent to deceive and cause harm to [plaintiff’s] position with The
Regents for the sole purpose of saving [defendants’] jobs.”
The letter advised plaintiff of his right to request a hearing
on the imposition of restrictions and notified him that he was
suspended from his position. Plaintiff retained counsel and
requested a hearing. The hearing was initially set for the end of
May 2017 but was repeatedly postponed.
In June 2017, The Regents threatened to fire plaintiff and
told him he should resign instead. He resigned.
About two months later, defendants filed a report with the
California Medical Board pursuant to Business and Professions
Code section 805. It included statements plaintiff alleges are
false, including that restrictions had been placed on his practice;
that he had voluntarily accepted the restrictions; that he
resigned following notice of an impending investigation; and that
an investigation had been initiated in July 2017. Plaintiff,
through counsel, disputed the contentions in the report with The
Regents.
A few days later, The Regents, through Dr. Hines,
furnished plaintiff with an amended notice of charges to be
considered at his hearing. These charges largely reiterated the

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issues raised in the February 2017 letter but added that pelvic
and rectal examinations were also medically unnecessary in the
context of plaintiff’s evaluation of the patient. The notice further
advised The Regents would be reporting the restrictions to the
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) pursuant to
section 11133(a)(1)(B)(i) of title 42 of the United States Code.
Such a report was made on August 30, 2017. Plaintiff alleges
this report falsely stated there was an investigation pending
against him in June 2017.
After numerous delays caused by The Regents, the
administrative review hearing went forward in March 2018.
Dr. Song and Ms. Mosley each testified. Dr. Song testified he had
no knowledge of the standard of care applicable to plaintiff’s
interaction with the patient. He further admitted neither he nor
Dr. Hines interviewed anyone about plaintiff’s interaction with
the patient; that he (Dr. Song) was unaware of restrictions ever
having been communicated to plaintiff; and that plaintiff did not
violate any policies or procedures in his interaction with the
patient.
Ms. Mosley similarly testified she did not believe plaintiff
had violated any policy, procedure, or standard of care in his
interaction with the patient.
Plaintiff next sought testimony from Dr. Hines. However,
Dr. Hines was unavailable for several weeks. Based on, among
other things, delays and other claimed violations of the internal
procedures governing the hearing process, plaintiff asked the
hearing officer to dismiss the action. “With [defendant] Hines’[s]
testimony pending, and in light of the testimony favorable to
[plaintiff’s] position provided by [Dr.] Song and [Ms.] Mosley, . . .

8
[d]efendants agreed to dismiss the allegations against [plaintiff]
and ended the hearing proceeding.”
Two months later, the California Medical Board notified
plaintiff it “ ‘did not find a departure from the standard of care’ ”
in his interaction with the patient but suggested he offer to use a
chaperone in any future breast examination.
Nevertheless, The Regents and defendants “refused to file
supplemental and/or corrective reports to the [California] Medical
Board and/or the [NPDB] advising that the hearing against
[plaintiff] had been dismissed, leaving the false and damaging
accusations and adverse actions taken against [plaintiff] on
record at both the [California Medical Board] and the [NPDB],
rendering it impossible for [plaintiff] to obtain employment as a
Physician and Surgeon and causing him to lose his Board
certification with the American Board of Surgery.”
2. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this action against defendants and The
Regents in 2019. The original complaint included all of the
causes of action asserted in the SAC, plus two more that are
irrelevant for present purposes. The Regents responded with a
motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) as to, in relevant
part, plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to perform mandatory
duties (Gov. Code, § 815.6); intentional misrepresentation;
intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of due
process rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983); use of fabricated evidence
(42 U.S.C. § 1983); negligence; and negligence per se. The trial
court granted The Regents’ MJOP with leave to amend as to all
these causes of action. Defendants also filed a MJOP but later
withdrew it.

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Following the trial court’s ruling on The Regents’ MJOP,
plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC), to which The
Regents and defendants each demurred. The trial court decided
The Regents’ demurrer to the FAC but declined to rule on
defendants’, explaining its ruling on The Regents’ demurrer
rendered a ruling on the defendants’ demurrer “substantially
moot” due to overlap in the parties’ arguments. The trial court
largely sustained, with leave to amend, The Regents’ demurrer
but overruled the demurrer as to plaintiff’s cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. And, because plaintiff
agreed to withdraw the cause of action for misrepresentation
preventing a former employee from obtaining employment (Lab.
Code, §§ 1050, 1054) against The Regents only, the trial court
sustained The Regents’ demurrer to that cause of action without
leave to amend.
Plaintiff filed the SAC and defendants again demurred.
The trial court sustained their demurrer without leave to amend
as to each cause of action, largely on the basis of unspecified
statutory immunities.
Plaintiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Demurrer and Standard of Review
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We
review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For purposes of review,
we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
“[W]e review the trial court’s result for error, and not its
legal reasoning.” (Davies v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (2008)

10
168 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1090.) Thus, we may affirm a judgment of
dismissal if it is correct on any ground proffered in the demurrer.
(Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967
(Aubry).)
When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Plaintiff has the burden to show a
reasonable possibility the complaint can be amended to state a
cause of action. (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
a. Immunities
“[I]n governmental tort cases ‘the rule is liability, immunity
is the exception.’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] ‘Accordingly, courts
should not casually decree governmental immunity [.] . . .’
[Citation.] Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for
immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured
parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must
prevail.” (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692
(Ramos).)
Here, defendants’ grounds for immunity argued in their
demurrer were spare, spanning just a few lines with no citation
to authority beyond recitation of the statutory language. In
adopting defendants’ undeveloped theories of immunity, the trial
court did not clearly specify which immunity it was relying on to
dismiss. We review the claimed grounds for immunity with
greater rigor.

11
i. Discretionary Act Immunity under
Government Code section 820.2
Government Code section 820.2 immunizes a public
employee from liability for injuries “resulting from his act or
omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise
of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion
was abused.” (Ibid.)
There is no bright line test for when an act is discretionary
as opposed to ministerial. In Johnson v. State of California
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 (Johnson), our Supreme Court rejected a
literal interpretation of “discretionary”—i.e., any act which can
be performed in more than one way—in favor of a flexible
approach informed by the purposes of the immunity. (Id. at
p. 789.) Government Code section 820.2 is intended to insulate
policymaking from judicial oversight. (Johnson, at p. 793.)
“Courts and commentators have therefore centered their
attention on an assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which
the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to
coordinate branches of government.” (Ibid.)
To help identify what constitutes a “basic policy decision,”
the court offered the distinction “between the ‘planning’ and
‘operational’ levels of decision-making.” (Johnson, supra,
69 Cal.2d at p. 794.) Assessing whether a decision rises to the
level of “planning” exempt from judicial oversight “requires
sensitivity to the considerations that enter into it and an
appreciation of the limitations on the court’s ability to reexamine
it.” (Ibid.) Courts must “find and isolate those areas of
quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to
justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action
alleging that careless conduct contributed to the government

12
decision.” (Ibid.) These areas contrast with “routine duties
incident to . . . normal operations,” which are ministerial in
nature. (See Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 685.)
The burden lies with the person claiming immunity under
Government Code section 820.2 to prove “a policy decision,
consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place. The fact
that an employee normally engages in ‘discretionary activity’ is
irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a
considered decision.” (Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 794, fn. 8.)
Plaintiff contends defendants’ course of conduct alleged in
the SAC does not qualify for discretionary immunity because it
implicates no policy making. Defendants did not balance the
risks and advantages of a particular course of action in
furtherance of a particular governmental objective; rather, they
acted reflexively to the prospect of losing their jobs and entirely
out of self-interest.
Defendants argue they are immune because plaintiff
challenges their decisions “to impose restrictions on [plaintiff’s]
medical practice, suspend his employment, and initiate a peer
review proceeding.” They contend these are “basic policy
decisions” subject to immunity pursuant to caselaw that
“decisions of public employees to institute disciplinary
proceedings to terminate a plaintiff’s employment” are covered by
Government Code section 820.2.
We begin by noting plaintiff’s primary theory of harm is
that he can no longer work as a physician because defendants
failed to fulfill their mandatory obligations to update their
reports to the California Medical Board and the NPDB when the
internal proceedings against plaintiff were dismissed. He also
alleges the way defendants treated him after restricting his

13
practice and suspending his employment violated The
Regents’/Northridge Hospital Medical Center’s Staff Bylaws and
The Regents’/UCLA Medical Group’s Fair Process Procedure.
While defendants identify a few allegations faulting the
imposition of restrictions, those allegations are incidental and
nonessential to the causes of action—intentional infliction of
emotional distress and violations of his due process rights—to
which the allegations relate. Plaintiff also supports these causes
of action with allegations of misconduct after the initial decisions
to discipline plaintiff, such as mishandling his hearing process,
falsifying evidence, and wrongfully and otherwise improperly
reporting his conduct.
We agree with plaintiff that the SAC does not establish a
right to immunity under Government Code section 820.2.
Plaintiff alleges a comprehensive framework of policies, rules,
statutes, regulations and bylaws governed the handling of the
patient’s complaint, through and including the reporting and
failure to file supplemental reports that are at the core of the
SAC. In Ramos, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pages 693–695, our Supreme
Court denied immunity under section 820.2 for a public entity’s
implementation of public aid programs because the eligibility
criteria were comprehensively established by statute. The court
in Toney v. State of California (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 779 used the
same rationale to find no section 820.2 immunity for a state
college against claims by a professor that the college mishandled
disciplinary proceedings against him: “The manner of carrying
out the disciplinary proceedings against [the professor] pursuant
to [the] executive order [governing academic personnel
discipline], which carefully detailed all procedures to be followed,
is . . . ministerial and operational rather than discretionary,

14
including the failure to dismiss those proceedings and permitting
the proceedings to remain pending for some eight months.”
(Toney, at p. 793.)
Defendants fail to identify how their actions against
plaintiff amounted to “quasi-legislative policy making.” To the
contrary, it appears from the SAC that their course of conduct
was heavily regulated by existing policies. “[T]here is no basis for
immunizing lower level decisions that merely implement a basic
policy already formulated.” (Barner v. Leeds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 685.)
Defendants rely on two cases as purportedly establishing
Government Code section 820.2 immunity for decisions to
institute disciplinary proceedings and terminate a plaintiff’s
employment. Even if plaintiff’s theory of liability were based on
the decisions to restrict his practice and suspend him, we would
still be unpersuaded that, on the face of the SAC, defendants
would be entitled to immunity under the authorities cited.
Defendants’ first case is Caldwell v. Montoya (1995)
10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell). Caldwell concerned claims against
members of a school board for allegedly terminating a school
superintendent in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act. (Caldwell, at p. 977.) The court found that immunity was
appropriate under Johnson’s separation of powers rationale
because of statutes “plac[ing] the superintendent’s employment
within the sole authority and discretion of the [school] district’s
governing board.” (Caldwell, at p. 982.) Decisions concerning the
employment of school superintendents were “therefore ‘expressly
entrusted to a coordinate branch of government’ at its highest
level.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the court observed a superintendent is
“the district’s foremost appointed official, with primary

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responsibility for representing, guiding, and administering it.
[Citation.] The governing board’s choice about who should occupy
this crucial post is therefore a peculiarly sensitive and subjective
one, with fundamental policy implications.” (Id. at p. 983.)
We agree with plaintiff that these considerations do not
apply to the relationship between him and defendants. There are
no allegations in the SAC that defendants have broad discretion
over the employment of physicians at The Regents or the UCLA
Medical Group. We presume Dr. Hines, by signing a letter
restricting plaintiff’s practice and suspending his employment,
had authority to do so, but plaintiff alleges his authority is
subject to oversight by a hearing board with the power to override
his decision if proven unwarranted. Unlike the school board
members in Caldwell, defendants cite no statutes vesting them
with sole authority and discretion over plaintiff’s employment.
Further, unlike the plaintiff in Caldwell, the SAC does not allege
plaintiff held a leadership position in implementing The Regents’
policies. The allegations are that plaintiff was a rank-and-file
surgeon working on annual contracts.
In Caldwell, it was also important to the court that the
complaint alleged “an actual, conscious and considered collective
policy decision to replace plaintiff as superintendent,” and
“admit[ted] . . . no theory that the Board acted unconsciously or
failed to weigh pros and cons.” (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 984.) Plaintiff alleges defendants did not take policy into
account when suspending him but rather acted exclusively in
self-interest to preserve their own jobs.
Defendants’ second case is Kemmerer v. County of Fresno
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426 (Kemmerer), disapproved on another
ground in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019)

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7 Cal.5th 798, 815, footnote 8. That case found government
employees immune from claims of a subordinate based on their
decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him,
resulting in his termination. The court held the decision to
initiate the proceedings was a policy decision because it was
“entirely within” the discretion of the defendant’s office and
“involve[d] the exercise of analysis and judgment as to what is
just and proper under the circumstances and is not a purely
ministerial act.” (Kemmerer, at p. 1438.)
Kemmerer is difficult to reconcile with our Supreme Court’s
opinion in Johnson. First, Kemmerer relied on the pre-Johnson
decision in Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 443, 448,
449 to deem “discretionary” actions requiring consideration of
“what is just and proper under the circumstances.” (See
Kemmerer, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1437, 1438.) This
interpretation of “discretionary” is no longer good law after
Johnson. (See Wheeler v. County of San Bernardino (1978)
76 Cal.App.3d 841, 849 [Burgdorf definition of discretion “no
longer a correct statement of the law”]; Sanborn v. Chronicle
Publishing Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 414 [“The broad rule of
discretionary immunity suggested by . . . Burgdorf must be
reexamined in the light of [Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782].”].)
Second, the Kemmerer court justified immunity out of an
outdated concern that liability for subjecting coworkers to
discipline would “bode ill for the continuing efficiency and morale
of the civil service system” and, without immunity, “[s]upervisors
within the civil service system would not be able to fulfill their
function without the overhanging threat of legal action from
employees who become subject to discipline.” (Kemmerer, supra,
200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1439.) But Johnson held “[t]he danger that

17
public employees will be insufficiently zealous in their official
duties does not serve as a basis for immunity in California.”
(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 790.)
Whatever value Kemmerer may have, we find it is
distinguishable on its facts. In granting Government Code
section 820.2 immunity, the Kemmerer court emphasized that the
discipline followed a thorough investigation that uncovered
wrongdoing, and the finding of wrongdoing was later validated by
a civil service commission that reviewed the matter. (Kemmerer,
supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1439–1440.) While we acknowledge
that a decision need not be correct to be entitled to protection, the
Kemmerer facts indicate a considered and informed decision to
discipline the plaintiff based on the governmental interests at
stake. Plaintiff alleges the discipline he faced was administered
with no such consideration.
For these reasons, we conclude the demurrer was not
properly sustained on the basis of Government Code section 820.2
immunity.
ii. Prosecutorial immunity under
Government Code section 821.6
Government Code section 821.6 immunizes a public
employee from liability for injuries “caused by his instituting or
prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without
probable cause.” (Ibid.)
The statute applies to “claims of injury arising from a
public employee’s initiation or prosecution of an official
proceeding, whether the act was allegedly done with malice and
without probable cause, as required for a malicious prosecution
action, or was allegedly tortious for other reasons.” (Leon v.

18
County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 929.) Though
traditionally associated with immunity from claims for malicious
prosecution, it also applies to “claims of injury based on tortious
or wrongful prosecution. The immunity is narrow in the sense
that it applies only if the conduct that allegedly caused the
plaintiff’s injuries was the institution or prosecution of an official
proceeding. But this immunity is broad in the sense that it
applies to every such tort claim, whether formally labeled as a
claim for malicious prosecution or not.” (Id. at p. 922.)
Defendants claim they are immune from liability for the
initiation and prosecution of the administrative proceeding
regarding the restrictions they imposed on his medical practice.
Plaintiff does not dispute this.
However, plaintiff contends “the crux” of his complaint was
that defendants “failed and refused to provide the mandatory
corrections to the California Medical Board and the [NPDB].”
The SAC alleges this failure took place after the administrative
proceedings against him had been dismissed. We agree with
plaintiff that no immunity under Government Code section 821.6
applies to harms resulting from defendants’ postdismissal
conduct. (Cf. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d
710, 719 [§ 821.6 immunity applies to acts to institute and
prosecute; not those taken after conclusion of proceedings].)
iii. Misrepresentation immunity under
Government Code section 822.2
Government Code section 822.2 immunizes a public
employee from liability for injuries “caused by his
misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be
negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud,
corruption or actual malice.” (Ibid.) Misrepresentation

19
immunity under section 822.2 cannot apply as a matter of law to
any of plaintiff’s causes of action other than intentional
misrepresentation. (See City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio
Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 383 [immunity
limited to common law deceit torts; does not extend to causes of
action based on allegations defendant caused harm by
“provid[ing] inaccurate information to third parties”].) We need
not consider whether defendants are entitled to immunity from
plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation cause of action because,
as discussed post, the underlying misrepresentations cannot
support a cause of action as a matter of law.
b. Causes of Action
i. First cause of action (failure to perform
mandatory duties)
Government Code section 815.6 provides: “Where a public
entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that
is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of
injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind
proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the
public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to
discharge the duty.” (Ibid.)
Defendants argue they cannot be liable under this
provision because neither is a “public entity.” Plaintiff objects
that they did not raise this argument below. However, “[w]e can
reach a ground for demurrer that was not raised below if it
presents a pure question of law.” (Woods v. Fox Broadcasting
Sub., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 344, 357.)
Government Code section 815.6, by its plain language, does
not impose liability on individuals like Drs. Hines and Song.
“Public entity” is defined for purposes of the Government Claims

20
Act (Gov. Code, §§ 810–996.6) as including “the state, the Regents
of the University of California, the Trustees of the California
State University and the California State University, a county,
city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other
political subdivision or public corporation in the State.” (§ 811.2.)
“Public employee,” on the other hand, is defined as “an employee
of a public entity.” (§ 811.4.) The act “clearly differentiates
between entity liability (Gov. Code, § 815 et seq.) and employee
liability (Gov. Code, § 820 et seq.).” (Bradford v. State of
California (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 16, 19.) Section 815.6 is within
the provisions addressing public entity liability and speaks only
of liability of public entities. It cannot impose liability on
individual defendants.
The cases plaintiff cites for the proposition that “[a]n action
under Government Code section 815.6 may include public
employees” does not persuade us otherwise. None of the cases
holds a public employee may be liable under section 815.6. “A
case is not authority for a proposition not even mentioned, much
less discussed, in it.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
v. County of Los Angeles (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 327, 342.)
The trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to this
cause of action without leave to amend.
ii. Second cause of action (intentional
misrepresentation)
The SAC alleges that Drs. Hines and Song made numerous
misrepresentations in the letters that Dr. Hines sent to plaintiff
in February 2017 and August 2017. These allegations do not
state a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation, and
plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden of showing a reasonable
possibility he could amend to cure his pleading deficiencies.

21
The elements of intentional misrepresentation are: “(1) a
misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce
reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting
damage.” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217,
230–231.) “Actual reliance occurs when a misrepresentation is
‘ “an immediate cause of [a plaintiff’s] conduct, which alters his
legal relations,” ’ and when, absent such representation, ‘ “he
would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the
contract or other transaction.” ’ ” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 976 (Engalla).)
The trial court found the allegations of actual and
justifiable reliance lacking from the SAC. In his opening brief,
the only citation plaintiff provides to an allegation of reasonable
reliance is paragraph 120 of the SAC, where plaintiff alleges
“[plaintiff] reasonably relied on Hines’[s] and Song’s
representations.” In conducting our de novo review, “we must
disregard any ‘contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law alleged . . . .’ ” (People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co.
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 957.) Plaintiff’s citation to a single
boilerplate allegation does not show error.
On reply, plaintiff asserts he is excused from alleging
reliance because he alleged that the misrepresentations were
material. For this proposition, he relies on Engalla, supra,
15 Cal.4th 951 for the proposition that “a presumption, or at least
an inference, of reliance arises wherever there is a showing that a
misrepresentation was material.” (Id. at p. 977.) A
misrepresentation is material if “ ‘a reasonable man would attach
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question.’ ” (Ibid.) Plaintiff
fails to identify which misrepresentations he contends were

22
material. The SAC’s primary allegations supporting this cause of
action are purported misrepresentations made to plaintiff about
plaintiff—that his encounter with the patient did not comply with
the standard of care; that he was subjected to restrictions in his
practice at the time of the patient’s complaint; that he agreed to
those restrictions; and that he admitted proposing a pelvic and
rectal exam to the patient. To the extent these statements were
false, plaintiff necessarily knew this when they were made as
they were about things that he did or experienced firsthand.
Moreover, plaintiff does not identify how these
misrepresentations might have affected his course of action in a
transaction.
Plaintiff offers in his reply that he could amend his
allegations to show he relied on defendants’ representations to
him that they would comply with their own obligations and
generally treat him fairly. Plaintiff does not explain, and it is
unclear to us, what he might have done in reliance on these
purported misrepresentations. (See Rakestraw v. California
Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 (Rakestraw) [to
show entitlement to leave to amend “a plaintiff ‘must show in
what manner he can amend his complaint and how that
amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading’ ”].)
Finally, plaintiff contends he could amend to allege
defendants told him there was no finding he failed to meet the
standard of care in his interaction with the patient, and that no
action would be taken against him. As a result, plaintiff asserts,
he made no investigation into the patient’s complaint, took no
steps to protect himself, and entered into a new employment
agreement with The Regents in November 2016. But his existing

23
allegations show these proposed allegations about pre-November
2016 representations are not actionable misrepresentations.
“To maintain an action for deceit based on a false promise,
one must specifically allege . . . the promisor did not intend to
perform at the time he or she made the promise and that it was
intended to deceive or induce the promisee to do or not do a
particular thing.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.) Plaintiff alleges there was no
finding of substandard care until defendants falsely asserted
there was in defendant Hines’s February 2017 letter, prompted
by the patient’s police report filed earlier that month. Plaintiff
alleges no further action would have been taken against him but
for the patient’s February 2017 police report. He says defendants
“had already determined six to seven months earlier that there
was no basis for taking any action against [plaintiff]” and that
only “the patient filing a police report[] prompt[ed] [defendants]
to corruptly and maliciously move forward to ‘scapegoat’
[plaintiff] and do whatever they could to ensure that they were
not accused of mishandling the patient complaint and save their
own jobs.” Thus, any pre-February 2017 statement that there
was no finding plaintiff failed to meet the standard of care in his
interaction with the patient, and that no action would be taken
against him, could not have been false when made. To the
contrary, plaintiff’s allegations are that defendants believed their
statements were true when they made them.
Plaintiff fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend. (See Rakestraw, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th
at p. 44.)

24
iii. Fourth and fifth causes of action
(intentional interference with contractual
relations and prospective economic
relations)
These causes of action are predicated on defendants’
alleged interference with plaintiff’s relationship with The
Regents—the counterparty to plaintiff’s employment contract.
Defendants argue they cannot be liable under these theories
because they are not “strangers” to the relationship. In support,
they cite plaintiff’s allegations that defendants acted as “agents”
of The Regents, and they cite authority that agents of contract
parties cannot be liable for interference. (Redfearn v. Trader
Joe’s Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 999–1000, disapproved on
another ground in Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 1130, 1148.)
Plaintiff responds that his allegation defendants acted
“individually, and as employees, agents, and/or servants” was
“generalized and in-the-alternative” and, in reality, defendants
were just “employees of The Regents . . . and nothing further.”
He then explains that “[a]gency and employment are distinct
relationships[, and] [o]ne may be an employee but not an agent of
the employer with regard to any given transaction. [(]Wallace v.
Sinclair (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 220, 230.[)]” He asserts, without
citation to the SAC, that defendants “had no role in the
contractual transaction between [plaintiff] and The Regents and
had no authority pursuant to the contract to represent The
Regents.”
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff’s efforts to argue
defendants were non-agent employees with “no role” in plaintiff’s
contractual relationship with The Regents is belied by the SAC.

25
For example, in alleging his employment contract was renewed in
2016, plaintiff says it was The Regents and defendants who
approved it. He also alleged it was The Regents and
“[d]efendants” who threatened to fire him. As a public
corporation (see Gomez v. Regents of University of
California (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 386, 399), The Regents can act
only through its agents (see Arnold v. San Jose (1889) 81 Cal.
618, 619). As no other individuals are alleged to have approved
plaintiff’s employment contract or threatened to terminate it, it is
difficult to see how defendants did not act as The Regents’ agents
by these allegations.
In any event, whether defendants were “agents” or
“employees” is a distinction without a difference for these
purposes. In Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, our
Supreme Court observed “that corporate agents and employees
acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for
inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract.” (Id. at p. 24,
italics added.) In that case, the plaintiff sought recovery from his
“supervisors: agents of the employer who are vested with the
power to act for the employer (rightly or wrongly) in terminating
plaintiff’s employment. For the purposes of [his] cause of action
[for interference with prospective economic advantage], then,
these defendants stand in the place of the employer, because the
employer—the other party to the supposed contract—cannot act
except through such agents. [¶] Thus, there is no viable
‘inducement of breach of contract’ or ‘interference with economic
advantage’ that is distinguishable from a cause of action for
breach of contract.” (Id. at p. 25.)
There was no error in the trial court denying plaintiff leave
to amend these causes of action.

26
iv. Sixth cause of action (intentional
infliction of emotional distress)
The trial court relied exclusively on defendants’ claimed
immunities in sustaining their demurrer to plaintiff’s cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In light of
our discussion about the claimed immunities, ante, the question
before us is whether, disregarding his allegations about initiating
and prosecuting the administrative hearing against him,1
plaintiff adequately pled the elements of the cause of action. We
conclude he did.
To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: “ ‘ “(1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme
emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .”
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’
[Citation.] The defendant must have engaged in ‘conduct
intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that

1 At oral argument, counsel for defendants suggested the
allegations supporting plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress were covered by prosecutorial
immunity, Government Code section 821.6. We disagree.
Plaintiff’s allegations are that defendants’ investigation into the
patient’s complaint, if any, concluded not later than June 2016
and, following their February 2017 letter, they actively sought to
deny plaintiff a bona fide administrative proceeding even after he
demanded one. In considering this cause of action, we rely on
allegations about defendants’ conduct in the intervening period.

27
injury will result.’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991)
54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)
Here, the only issue in dispute is whether plaintiff pled
conduct that is “outrageous.” Conduct is “extreme and
outrageous” when it is “ ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of
that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” (Christensen v.
Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903.) “ ‘ “[T]he extreme
and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse
by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives
him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to
affect his interests.” ’ ” (McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
363, 372.) Whether conduct is “outrageous” is ordinarily a
question of fact. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 672.)
Defendants argue their actions amount to mere “personnel
management decisions.” For this proposition, they rely on
Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55,
which held that “[a] simple pleading of personnel management
activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.”
(Id. at p. 80.) Janken does not support the proposition that
superiors and employers who make employment decisions are
incapable of engaging in outrageous conduct.
Other cases have held an employee stated a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
employer and certain supervisors. (See, e.g., Lagies v.
Copley (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 958, 974 [the defendants
intentionally humiliated the plaintiff, singled him out for denial
of merit raises, demoted and blackballed him, thus precluding
other employment], disapproved on another ground in Brown v.
Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 738; see also Rulon-

28
Miller v. International Business Machines Corp. (1984)
162 Cal.App.3d 241 [supervisor was deceitful in claiming recent
discovery of employee’s personal relationship with a competitor’s
employee, acted in violation of company policy, and
condescendingly offered and then rescinded the chance to choose
between the relationship and the employee’s job], overruled on
another ground in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 351.) The Rulon-Miller court found the “statements and
conduct would under any reasoned view tend to humiliate and
degrade” the employee, and communicated to the employee she
was “powerless” in the situation. (Rulon-Miller, at p. 255.) It
considered “such powerlessness [to be] one of the most
debilitating kinds of human oppression.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff alleges defendants lied to him and The Regents
when they belatedly assessed his interaction with the patient as
not within the standard of care. He alleges they did this because
they were afraid of losing their jobs when the patient’s police
report might have suggested to defendants’ superiors her
concerns warranted more attention than defendants had given
them months earlier. To carry out their plan of “scapegoat[ing]”
plaintiff, defendants falsely asserted plaintiff had been subject,
and agreed, to restrictions which he had not, and made
admissions which he had not. They also asserted the patient
interaction was reportable to the California Medical Board. In
sum, plaintiff’s superiors with direct authority over his
employment were allegedly gaslighting him and threatening
actions that would adversely affect his ability to continue in his
profession. The sense of powerlessness this might impart would
have been amplified by defendants’ alleged attempt to deny
plaintiff the administrative hearing to which he was entitled,

29
and, once that hearing was dismissed, refusal to file corrective
reports with the California Medical Board and NPDB. Whether
this conduct is outrageous is a question of fact.
The trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer to
plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
v. Seventh cause of action (deprivation of
due process rights; 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Plaintiff’s cause of action for deprivation of due process
rights is based on defendants “violating his inalienable and
fundamental rights to pursue employment as a physician and
surgeon and/or to make a contract to work as a physician and
surgeon.” They did this, plaintiff explains, by “fail[ing] and
refus[ing] to file the mandatory supplemental reports correcting
their false [Business and Professions Code section] 805 Reports.”
A cause of action under section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code exists where a person acting under color of
state law violates “ ‘a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States.’ ” (Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1472.) We “ ‘ “look to federal law to
determine what conduct will support an action under
section 1983.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Plaintiff here relies on the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits
states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”
One liberty interest embraced by the Fourteenth
Amendment is an individual’s right to pursue an occupation or
profession of his choosing. (Dittman v. California (9th Cir. 1999)
191 F.3d 1020, 1029.) A liberty interest is implicated in the
employment termination context where the government makes

30
stigmatizing statements that have the effect of completely
excluding the terminated employee from his chosen profession.
(Blantz v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (9th Cir.
2013) 727 F.3d 917, 925.) Statements suggesting only
incompetence or lack of ability are inadequately stigmatizing to
implicate a liberty interest. (Id. at p. 925, fn. 6.) Further,
stigmatizing statements must be publicized by the employer to
implicate a liberty interest. (Perez v. City of Roseville (9th Cir.
2019) 926 F.3d 511, 523.)
Defendants contend plaintiff failed to plead adequately
stigmatizing statements to support his due process cause of
action. The SAC alleges the Business and Professions Code
section 805 report forming the basis of the cause of action stated
plaintiff was subject to restrictions “ ‘for a medical disciplinary
cause or reason.’ ” Similarly, the report to the NPDB reflected
plaintiff had resigned in relation to an investigation into his
“professional competence or conduct.” These statements go only
to plaintiff’s competence as a practitioner of medicine.
Plaintiff responds that he pled defendants falsely accused
him of “conduct[ing] unnecessary breast and rectal exams on a
patient, in essence accusing him of assault and battery, as well as
perverse and/or abusive conduct toward a patient.” Plaintiff fails
to point to allegations that defendants publicized these
statements. Plaintiff proposes no amendment that would cure
this pleading deficiency. Plaintiff therefore fails to show the trial
court erred in sustaining the demurrer to his cause of action
without leave to amend. (Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Henderson (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 465, 477 [“[f]atal to [the
plaintiff’s] claim that [the defendant] deprived him of a protected
liberty interest is . . . that none of the public pronouncements for

31
which [the defendant] was responsible can be said to impugn [the
plaintiff’s] morality or question his honesty” (italics added)].)
vi. Eighth cause of action (use of fabricated
evidence; 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
A cause of action for use of fabricated evidence under
section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code arises when the
defendant provides evidence, knowing it to be false, causing the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s life, liberty, or property.
(CACI No. 3052; Costanich v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs. (9th
Cir. 2009) 627 F.3d 1101, 1110 (Costanich).) To establish the
causation element, “the plaintiff must show that (a) the act was
the cause in fact of the deprivation of [the protected interest],
meaning that the injury would not have occurred in the absence
of the conduct; and (b) the act was the ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal
cause’ of the injury, meaning that the injury is of a type that a
reasonable person would see as a likely result of the conduct in
question.” (Spencer v. Peters (9th Cir. 2017) 857 F.3d 789, 798.)
Citing Costanich, plaintiff contends he adequately alleged
this cause of action because he alleged fabrication of evidence.
Plaintiff misreads Costanich. For the cause of action to arise, the
fabrication must “result in the deprivation of protected liberty or
property interests . . . .” (Costanich, supra, 627 F.3d at p. 1115.)
In Costanich, the plaintiff alleged social workers fabricated
evidence, resulting in her loss of a property interest in her foster
care license and a liberty interest in the guardianship of her
foster children. (Id. at p. 1110.) The act of fabrication is not
independently actionable without the deprivation of the protected
substantive right. (Ibid.; see also Zahrey v. Coffey (2d Cir. 2000)
221 F.3d 342, 348 [“The manufacture of false evidence, ‘in and of

32
itself,’ . . . does not impair anyone’s liberty, and therefore does not
impair anyone’s constitutional right.”])
Plaintiff alleges defendants fabricated evidence in letters
they sent him. He then alleges this fabrication resulted in loss of
“his employment, past and future.” Plaintiff does not argue he
had a property interest in his past employment with The
Regents. Indeed, he appears to concede he did not. The only
constitutionally protected interest he claims relating to his
employment is a liberty interest in his ability to practice
medicine elsewhere. We have already determined this liberty
interest was not implicated by the public reports made to the
California Medical Board and NPDB. The allegations defendants
allegedly made privately to plaintiff likewise do not implicate his
ability to practice medicine.
Thus, like the trial court did, we conclude plaintiff’s failure
to establish loss of a federally protected interest defeats his cause
of action for fabrication of evidence. And because plaintiff does
not offer curative amendments to establish loss of a protected
interest, he fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in
denying him leave to amend.
vii. Ninth cause of action (misrepresentation
preventing former employee from
obtaining employment)
Labor Code section 1050 provides: “Any person, or agent or
officer thereof, who, after having discharged an employee from
the service of such person or after an employee has voluntarily
left such service, by any misrepresentation prevents or attempts
to prevent the former employee from obtaining employment, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.” Section 1054 provides for civil liability
(treble damages) for violations of section 1050. Section 1050

33
applies only to misrepresentations made to prospective employers
other than the defendant. (Kelly v. General Telephone Co. (1982)
136 Cal.App.3d 278, 288.)
Plaintiff’s primary allegations in support of this cause of
action are that defendants failed to file corrective reports with
the California Medical Board and NPDB. He also alleges
defendants have “misrepresented to prospective employers of
[plaintiff] that the accusations against him are valid and remain
in effect.”
The trial court dismissed the cause of action because the
SAC “lack[ed] facts regarding any report to an actual third party
employer.” On appeal, plaintiff points to his allegation that
defendants did make misrepresentations to prospective
employers. Defendants respond that the SAC lacks allegations
that any misrepresentation by either defendant prevented
plaintiff from obtaining employment with any particular
employer.
Nothing on the face of the SAC shows plaintiff cannot add
factual allegations and prove this cause of action. Plaintiff
should have the opportunity to amend this cause of action to
allege specific prospective employers to whom defendants
allegedly communicated derogatory information about plaintiff
and how such communication was intended to or did prevent
plaintiff from obtaining employment. (See Aubry, supra,
2 Cal.4th at pp. 970–971 [leave to amend should be liberally
granted where court perceives reasonable possibility defect can
be cured by amendment].)

34
viii. Tenth and eleventh causes of action
(negligence and negligence per se)
Plaintiff bases these causes of action on defendants’ alleged
failure to make supplemental filings with the California Medical
Board and the NPDB and to comply with internal procedures
relating to his administrative hearing. The trial court concluded
the SAC “sufficiently articulate[d] negligence” based on the filing
failures but found defendants were entitled to immunity.
On appeal, plaintiff contends defendants’ immunities do
not apply to this cause of action. As discussed ante, we agree to
the extent plaintiff’s causes of action do not rely on allegations
concerning the conduct of the hearing, for which plaintiff does not
dispute defendants are entitled to immunity under Government
Code section 821.6. Plaintiff contends he otherwise states causes
of action for negligence and negligence per se.
As a preliminary matter, negligence per se is not a cause of
action separate and apart from the cause of action of negligence.
“Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an
independent cause of action.” (Jones v. Awad (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1210.) On this basis, we affirm the trial
court’s order on plaintiff’s negligence per se cause of action,
without prejudice to plaintiff’s ability to establish negligence by
resort to the doctrine of negligence per se, codified at Evidence
Code section 669.
Turning to substance, we agree with the trial court that
plaintiff adequately alleged negligence based on defendants’
breach of their duty to file corrective reports with the California
Medical Board and the NPDB.
A cause of action for negligence arises when a defendant
(1) has a legal duty to use due care; (2) breaches that duty; and

35
(3) such breach is the proximate or legal cause of injury to the
plaintiff. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913,
917.) Evidence Code section 669 creates a presumption that the
defendant failed to exercise due care where: “(1) He violated a
statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; [¶] (2) The
violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property; [¶] (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence
of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was
designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) The person suffering the death
or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of
persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation
was adopted.” (§ 669.)
Defendants contend plaintiff cannot establish their
negligence in reliance on the physician reporting schemes
embodied in Business and Professions Code section 805 and
regulations pertaining to the NPDB as these schemes were
designed to protect patients, not physicians. Any benefit to
physicians, defendants argue, is therefore incidental. (See
Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 429, 439–440 [“a benefit that is incidental to the
enactment’s purpose does not support tort liability under . . .
Evidence Code section 669”].)
It is undoubtedly true that the overall purpose of the
reporting schemes is to protect the public from unqualified
physicians. (See Stiger v. Flippin (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 646,
655–656; 42 U.S.C. § 11101.) However, it is also clear these
schemes contain protections for physicians about whom
derogatory information has been reported. Business and
Professions Code section 805, subdivision (f)(3) requires filing of a
supplemental report after the subject of a section 805 report “is

36
deemed to have satisfied any terms, conditions, or sanctions
imposed as disciplinary action by the reporting peer review body.”
45 Code of Federal Regulations part 60.6(a) similarly requires a
person or entity who reported incorrect or incomplete information
to the NPDB to file a correction to any “errors or omissions,” and
to update reports when a reported action has been reversed.
While correcting or updating negative disclosures about a
physician may have an incremental public benefit by increasing
the number of qualified doctors available to provide care, the
primary benefit inures to the physician whose ability to practice
may be severely curtailed by an erroneous or outdated filing.
Defendants argue they had no duty to correct the prior
filings under Business and Professions Code section 805 or
45 Code of Federal Regulations part 60.6 because the
supplemental or corrective filing conditions were unmet as a
matter of law. Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, we cannot
agree. Plaintiff alleges defendants reported to the California
Medical Board that he was subject to restrictions in his practice.
He alleges these sanctions were based on allegations against him
relating to the patient’s complaint. He further alleges that, in
terminating the administrative hearing against him,
“[d]efendants agreed to dismiss the allegations against [him].”
As the sanctions imposed against plaintiff were based on those
allegations, we find it difficult to understand how plaintiff was
not “deemed to have satisfied” the sanctions against him when
the allegations were dismissed. (§ 805, subd. (f)(3).) If the
allegations were dismissed, there could be no basis for
continuation of the restrictions.
Likewise, the NPDB report references “restrictions upon
[plaintiff’s] practice.” Reporting persons must report “reversal” of

37
a previously reported “professional review action”—which
includes an action of a health care entity taken through
professional review activity based on the subject’s professional
competence or conduct implicating patient welfare which
“adversely affects or may adversely affect the clinical privileges”
of the subject. (45 C.F.R. § 60.3.) To the extent defendants
dismissed the allegations against plaintiff, they should have
reported there were no longer grounds for restrictions. (Cf. Van
Boven v. Freshour (Tex. 2022) 659 S.W.3d 396, 403–404 [failure
to prove misconduct against physician rendered reported
sanctions against him “error” such that supplemental reporting
to NPDB was necessary].)
The trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer to
the negligence cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
trial court’s order sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the entire
SAC is vacated. The trial court is instructed to enter a new order
(i) sustaining, without leave to amend, defendants’ demurrer as
to plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to perform mandatory
duties, intentional misrepresentation, intentional interference
with contractual relations, intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, deprivation of due process rights,
use of fabricated evidence, and negligence per se (without
prejudice to plaintiff’s right to rely on the evidentiary doctrine of
negligence per se in pursuing his negligence cause of action);
(ii) sustaining, with leave to amend, defendants’ demurrer as to
plaintiff’s cause of action for misrepresentation preventing former
employee from obtaining employment; and (iii) overruling
defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s causes of action for intentional

38
infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Plaintiff to
recover costs.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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