People v. Cho CA2/7

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Filed 7/22/24 P. v. Cho CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B324509

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA255752)
v.

JAE CHEOL CHO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

In 2006 Jae Cheol Cho was convicted of second degree
murder for the killing of Ki Hong. His codefendant, Kyu Lee, was
convicted of first degree murder. At trial, Cho’s jury was
instructed with CALJIC No. 3.01 on aiding and abetting, which
holds an aider and abettor liable if he acts “[w]ith knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and . . . [with] the intent
or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime.”
In 2022 Cho filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 At the prima facie review hearing, Cho
argued the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted of
second degree murder under a theory of imputed malice because
CALJIC No. 3.01 did not require the jury to find he personally
acted with malice as an aider and abettor. The superior court
denied Cho’s petition, relying on denials of other resentencing
petitions where the petitioners were convicted of murder as an
aider and abettor.
Although the record of conviction demonstrates potential
instructional error, we conclude the superior court did not err in
denying Cho’s petition because the record of conviction
demonstrates he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Cho is
not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because he has not
satisfied the statutory requirement in subdivision (a)(3) of
demonstrating he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . .
because of changes to Section 188 or 189” under Senate Bill
No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, we affirm.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Cho’s 2006 Conviction
In October 2003, while incarcerated at the Los Angeles
County Men’s Central Jail, Cho and Lee assaulted and killed
Hong, another inmate.
Cho and Lee were charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
The information contained special allegations that Cho
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)); the murder was committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); and Cho had three
prior convictions of a serious or violent felony or juvenile
adjudication (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
At Cho’s trial, the jury was instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.30: “Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of
a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator
intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is
insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation.” The jury
also received CALJIC No. 8.31:

“Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of
a human being when:
“1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,
“2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to
human life, and
“3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge
of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.
“When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not
necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act
would result in the death of a human being.”

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The jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 3.01 on
aiding and abetting, which provides as relevant here:

“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
he or she:
“(1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and
“(2) With the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and
“(3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.”

The jury convicted Cho of second degree murder and found
the special allegations true. Lee was convicted of first degree
murder with the same special allegation findings. Cho was
sentenced to a total of 30 years to life plus six years.
This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
(People v. Cho (Apr. 18, 2007, B192389) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Cho’s Section 1172.6 Petitions
In 2019 Cho petitioned for resentencing relief under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2 At the time of Cho’s first
petition, the statute authorized relief only for those convicted
under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707, fn. 1 (Strong).) The superior court denied Cho’s
petition, reasoning, “Per the court records and appellate opinion,

2 Effective June 30, 2022 the Legislature renumbered former
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive change.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, fn. 2.)

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[Cho] personally was involved [in the crime] as one of two actual
killers. [Cho] was not convicted on a natural and probable
consequences theory or on an aiding and abetting theory for
felony murder. [Cho] does not qualify for relief.”
Cho filed a second petition, which is the subject of this
appeal, after the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to expand
relief to any person convicted of murder pursuant to a “theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as
amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) The People opposed Cho’s
petition, arguing Cho was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because the jury “was not instructed on felony murder, natural
and probable consequences[,] or any other theory of culpability
that imputed malice to [Cho]. [Cho] was prosecuted as a
perpetrator who committed this crime with actual malice.” The
People submitted the jury instructions from Cho’s trial, which
included CALJIC No. 8.31 (second degree murder) and CALJIC
No. 3.01 (aiding and abetting).
Through appointed counsel, Cho filed a reply. Comparing
his case to People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi),
Cho argued the jury may have convicted him under a theory of
imputed malice based on his participation in the crime. Cho
argued that “[t]he jury found his co-defendant . . . acted with
deliberate premeditation in convicting him of murder in the first
degree,” but Cho was convicted of second degree murder,
potentially “as an aider and abettor.” Because the jury
instructions at his trial “permitted conviction under an aiding
and abetting theory without an explicit finding of malice, implied
or otherwise, on [Cho’s] part,” Cho argued he had established a
prima facie case for resentencing relief.

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The superior court held a prima facie review hearing on
Cho’s petition. The court stated it reviewed “the [jury]
instructions” and acknowledged the Langi decision, but denied
Cho’s petition based on People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
198 (Cortes), People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539 (Coley),
and People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 (Estrada). The
court observed that Cortes, Coley, and Estrada all involved
“murder charges” where the jury was instructed on aiding and
abetting, but the petitioners in those cases failed to make a prima
facie showing for resentencing relief.
Cho timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Cho asserts the superior court incorrectly denied his
petition because the jury instructions permitted the jury to
convict him of murder through a theory of imputed malice.

A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
In 2018 the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437,
narrowing accomplice liability for murder by amending
sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis); People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
762, 768.) The legislation eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and amended the felony murder rule “to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.)
For those convicted of murder who could not presently be

6
convicted after these amendments, Senate Bill No. 1437
authorized a petition for resentencing through section 1172.6.
(See People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 655, review
granted June 28, 2023, S279670.)
In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature
expanded murder resentencing relief to include “not only those
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, but also those convicted of
murder under any ‘other theory under which malice is imputed to
a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.’”
(People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931
(Berry-Vierwinden).)
Under section 1172.6, a petitioner convicted of murder may
file a petition in superior court declaring he is eligible for
resentencing relief and requesting the appointment of counsel.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).) A petitioner is eligible for relief “when all
of the following conditions apply:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
“(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted
of murder or attempted murder.
“(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or

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189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), italics
added.)
“After the parties have had an opportunity to submit
briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the court “determines that the petition for
resentencing establishes a prima facie case for relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and then conduct a hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.” (People v.
Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 966-967.)
Our Supreme Court has described the prima facie inquiry
as “limited” and emphasized that “‘the prima facie bar was
intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-972.) At the prima facie stage, “‘“the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.”’”
(Id. at p. 971.) The court may also “look at the record of
conviction,” and “‘if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,”’” the court may rule against the petitioner. (Ibid.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at
p. 972.)
“We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

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B. Cho Did Not Meet His Burden To Establish a Prima Facie
Case for Resentencing Relief
Cho argues he established a prima facie showing for relief
because the jury instructions at his trial allowed the jury to
convict him of second degree murder under a theory of imputed
malice, which he contends is impermissible under section 1172.6.
Although Cho has demonstrated instructional error, he has not
demonstrated he is entitled to resentencing relief.
“Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought . . . . [Citation.] Malice may be express or implied.”
(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 600.) “Implied malice
requires proof of both a physical act and a mental state.
Physically, a defendant must perform an act whose natural
consequences are dangerous to life . . . . [Citations.] To establish
the mental state required for implied malice, the defendant must
deliberately perform the act with a conscious disregard for life,
knowing the act endangers another’s life.” (Ibid.)
As noted, Senate Bill No. 1437 limited accomplice liability
for murder, including second degree murder. “[N]otwithstanding
Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and
abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be
convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or
her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious
disregard for life.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v.
Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 370; accord, Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 979 [after Senate Bill No. 1437, an “actual
killer, or a direct aider and abettor of the killing who knew that
his (or her) conduct endangered the life of another and acted with

9
conscious disregard for life, may be guilty of second degree
murder”].)
Cho relies heavily on Langi. In that case, Division Four of
the First Appellate District considered whether a petitioner
convicted of second degree murder established a prima facie case
for relief based on “ambiguous” jury instructions allowing a jury
to convict on a theory of imputed malice. (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) Like Cho’s jury, Langi’s jury was
instructed with CALJIC Nos. 8.31 (second degree murder) and
3.01 (aiding and abetting). (Id. at p. 981.) Langi observed that
People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) “clarifie[d]”
that an “untailored, standard aiding-and-abetting instruction
fails to convey” the necessary elements of aiding and abetting
second degree implied-malice murder.3 (Langi, at p. 982, fn. 10.)
Langi explained that “[a]lthough the definition of second degree
murder in CALJIC No. 8.31 states that the perpetrator must
have acted with conscious disregard for human life, the definition
of an aider and abettor in CALJIC No. 3.01 does not include the
same requirement.” (Id. at p. 983.)
Langi concluded that these two jury instructions allowed
“the jury to find [the petitioner] guilty of murder if it found that
(1) the killing resulted from the actual killer’s intentional act;
(2) appellant aided and abetted that intentional act; and (3) the
killer ‘deliberately performed [the act] with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life’—
whether or not appellant knew of or consciously disregarded the
danger to human life. The instructions thus permitted the jury to
impute malice to appellant based solely on his participation in a

3 Powell did not involve section 1172.6.

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crime, without having to find that he personally acted with
malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
Langi acknowledged that “Senate Bill No. 1437 did not
alter the law regarding direct aiding and abetting of second
degree murder.” But it reasoned that the petitioner was still
entitled to relief because “before the enactment of Senate Bill
No. 1437, there was ‘a dearth of decisional law on aiding and
abetting implied malice murder,’ attributable to ‘the heretofore
availability of the natural and probable consequences doctrine for
second degree murder’ . . . . [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] Thus,
while Senate Bill No. 1437 did not alter the law regarding direct
aiding and abetting of second degree murder, it did bring out the
inadequacy of standard aiding-and-abetting instructions” in the
context of implied-malice murder. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at p. 982, fn. 10.)
The Courts of Appeal are divided on whether to follow the
approach outlined in Langi. (See, e.g., People v. Maldonado
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1265-1269 (Maldonado) [extending
Langi to first degree murder by means of lying in wait]; but see
Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 932-937
[disagreeing with Langi] and People v. Flores (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174 [same].) The California Supreme
Court has granted review of a related issue in People v. Antonelli
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 712, review granted October 18, 2023
(S281599). Antonelli will provide guidance on whether
section 1172.6 relief extends to petitioners convicted on a theory
of murder unaffected by Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments but

11
which involved imputed malice.4 Until the court resolves this
issue, we follow the approach in Berry-Vierwinden.
In Berry-Vierwinden, a petitioner convicted of first degree
lying-in-wait murder argued he established a prima facie case for
relief under Langi and Maldonado because the aiding and
abetting jury instruction permitted the jury to impute malice to
him solely based on his participation in the crime. (See
Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 929-930.)
Division One of the Fourth Appellate District held that the
petitioner was ineligible for resentencing relief because “[o]ne of
the requirements for the prima facie showing is that the
petitioner ‘could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189’
made by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Id. at p. 931, quoting § 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) Berry-Vierwinden reasoned that “a court may deny
the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that the petitioner was convicted on a
theory not affected by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Ibid.) And because
“Senate Bill No. 1437 did not change the law to prohibit direct
aider and abettor liability on an imputed malice theory,” the

4 Specifically, the high court will consider whether a
petitioner may seek resentencing “on the ground that malice
could be imputed to the defendant under the provocative act
theory of murder,” which was not expressly amended by Senate
Bill No. 1437. (See Antonelli, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 721
[petitioner ineligible for relief because Senate Bill No. 1437 “did
not change the law to prohibit the conviction of provocative act
murder”]; but see People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1185
[petitioner is eligible for relief because Senate Bill No. 1437’s “bar
on imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime would
prohibit conviction for provocative act murder”].)

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petitioner could not make the threshold showing under
subdivision (a)(3) of section 1172.6. (Id. at p. 936.)
Berry-Vierwinden distinguished Langi because that case
“did not consider the language of section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(3) requiring that defendants show they can no
longer be convicted of murder ‘because of changes’ made by
Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 936; accord, People v. Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1174.) Indeed, the high court has explained that “the ‘changes’
described in section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) plainly refer to the
substantive amendments to sections 188 and 189 that were
enacted along with the resentencing provisions in Senate
Bill 1437.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 461; accord,
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 712 [construing subdivision (a)(3)’s
“‘because of changes” language to mean “that the 2019 changes
supply a basis for the claim”].) Berry-Vierwinden reasoned that
“the instructional errors [petitioner] asserts have nothing to do
with these 2019 legislative changes” (Berry-Vierwinden, at
p. 935) and instead “amount[] to ‘a routine claim of instructional
error’ that ‘could have been raised on appeal from the judgment
of conviction.’”5 (Id. at p. 936.)

5 Berry-Vierwinden observed that in People v. McCoy (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy), the California Supreme Court clarified
that “‘outside of the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
an aider and abettor’s mental state must be at least that required
of the direct perpetrator.’” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 935, quoting McCoy at p. 1118.) Thus, at the
time of the petitioner’s 2010 trial in Berry-Vierwinden, and by the
time of Cho’s trial in 2006, “‘[t]he Supreme Court’s McCoy
decision . . . [had] made clear that [a] direct perpetrator’s mental

13
Cho argues that Langi is factually similar to his case. As
in Langi, the jury at Cho’s trial received an unmodified,
incomplete aiding-and-abetting instruction that did not require
the jury to find that Cho personally acted with a mental state of
implied malice. (See Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983;
accord, Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1266-1267;
Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) The jury did not make
any other findings from which it could be inferred that it found
Cho possessed implied or express malice. Nor did the jury receive
instructions on any lesser-included crimes that might have
clarified the implied malice requirement for an aider and abettor
of second degree murder. But Cho essentially raises a claim of
instructional error, rather than demonstrating that he could not
presently be convicted of second degree murder because of
changes made to sections 188 or 189.
As such, Cho is ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because his conviction was not impacted by Senate Bill No. 1437’s
changes to the Penal Code. As noted above, section 1172.6
authorizes a resentencing petition when “[t]he petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective

state could not be imputed to an aider and abettor, whose mental
state had to be independently evaluated.’” (Berry-Vierwinden, at
p. 935; see People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 868.)
Powell relied on McCoy to find fault with the standard aiding and
abetting instructions in the context of implied malice murder.
(See Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-714.) As in Berry-
Vierwinden, Cho could have raised the issue of imputed malice in
his direct appeal by arguing under McCoy that he was convicted
without a personal finding of implied malice. (See Berry-
Vierwinden, at pp. 935-936.)

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January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Thus, even if Cho’s
jury was erroneously instructed on the malice personally required
for direct aiders and abettors (see Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
at p. 714), Cho has not demonstrated he is eligible for
resentencing relief because of the amendments made by Senate
Bill No. 1437.6 (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); Berry-Vierwinden,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 936-937; People v. Burns (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 862, 869; id. at p. 865 [denying resentencing relief
for instructional error because “the alleged error he identifies has
nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that
gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process”].) Although Cho is
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, he is free to file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.7

6 At oral argument, Cho argued that Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th 698, recognized a broader scope of relief was available
under section 1172.6 because changes in decisional law can
authorize resentencing. (See id. at p. 712 [“[S]ection 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(3)’s ‘because of’ language does not require a
showing that a claim to relief under Senate Bill 1437 arises from
no other cause—only that the 2019 changes supply a basis for the
claim and so are a cause.”]; see also Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at p. 982, fn. 10.) Even assuming that Cho’s reading of Strong is
correct, that would not help Cho because he could have raised his
instructional error claim on direct appeal based on McCoy, supra,
25 Cal.4th 1111, as previously noted.
7 Should Cho file such a petition, we take no position on
whether it should be brought under McCoy or Powell.

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Cho’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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