People v. Lopez CA2/1

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Testo completo

Filed 7/19/24 P. v. Lopez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B329792

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA054272)
v.

MICHAEL SANTILLAN
LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Michael Santillan Lopez appeals from the
denial of his resentencing petition under Penal Code1
section 1172.6. We affirm. Defendant’s jury was not instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine when it
convicted him of attempted murder, and thus he is ineligible for
relief under the plain language of the statute. Additionally, the
record of conviction establishes the jury did not convict defendant
under any theory of imputed malice.

BACKGROUND
In 2008, a jury convicted defendant of willful, deliberate
and premediated attempted murder of a peace officer, along with
several nonhomicide offenses. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 114 years to life. Edward Alcala, defendant’s
codefendant, pleaded guilty before trial.
In 2021, defendant petitioned for resentencing under
former section 1170.95, since renumbered 1172.6. The
resentencing court appointed counsel for defendant, received
briefing, and held a hearing as to whether defendant made a
prima facie showing for relief.
At the hearing, the parties confirmed defendant’s jury
had not been instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The resentencing court then denied the
petition, finding that in the case of attempted murder,
section 1172.6 applies only to convictions under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. In support, the court cited the
statutory language and People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539
(Coley). Defendant timely appealed.

1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6 allows defendants retroactively to seek
resentencing for certain homicide offenses in light of changes
enacted in 2018 to the Penal Code. (People v. Lee (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173.) The resentencing court may deny
relief without holding an evidentiary hearing if “the record of
conviction or the court’s own documents indicate the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 1174.)
We review de novo the resentencing court’s finding that a
defendant has not made the requisite prima facie showing for
relief. (Ibid.)
The resentencing court did not err in denying defendant’s
petition. To qualify for relief, a defendant must show, inter alia,
“A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
As the resentencing court correctly observed, this language
limits the statute’s application in the case of attempted murder to
convictions under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [§ 1172.6
“applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine”]; accord, People v.
Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865.) The parties confirmed
to the resentencing court that defendant’s jury was not instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine when it

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convicted him of attempted murder. Defendant is ineligible for
relief.
Defendant argues relief under section 1172.6 is not limited
to convictions under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, but extends to convictions “based on any theory which
allowed malice to be ‘imputed’ ” to the defendant. Under the
plain language of the statute, section 1172.6 applies to murders if
the prosecution proceeded on any “theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime,” but that same language is not extended to cases of
attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.)
Assuming arguendo, despite the plain language,
section 1172.6 applies more broadly to attempted murder
convictions obtained under imputed malice theories other than
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, defendant fails
to show the jury could have imputed malice to him in this case.
Defendant argues the jury may have been misled by CALCRIM
No. 400, which as read at defendant’s trial provided, “A person
may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have
directly committed the crime. I will call that person the
perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a
perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. A person is
equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed
it.”
Since the time of defendant’s trial, courts have criticized
the version of CALCRIM No. 400 given to defendant’s jury as
suggesting an aider and abettor may not be convicted of a lesser
crime than the direct perpetrator based on the aider and abettor’s

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own mens rea. (See, e.g., People v. Samaniego (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1164–1165.) In 2010, the Judicial Council
revised the instruction to remove the word “equally” from the
phrase “equally guilty.” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600,
640 (Johnson).)
In Johnson, however, our Supreme Court held that any
ambiguity created by CALCRIM No. 400 is rectified if the jury is
also instructed with CALCRIM No. 401. (Johnson, supra,
62 Cal.4th at pp. 640–641.) As summarized in Johnson, that
instruction provides that to prove guilt for murder as an aider
and abettor, “the prosecution must prove that defendant knew
[the perpetrator] intended to kill [the victim], that he intended to
aid and abet [the perpetrator] in committing the killing, and that
he did in fact aid him in that killing.” (Id. at p. 641.) The
Supreme Court concluded that this additional instruction “would
have cleared up any ambiguity arguably presented by CALCRIM
former No. 400’s reference to principals being ‘equally guilty.’ ”
(Johnson, at p. 641.) Therefore, “there was no reasonable
likelihood the jurors would have understood the ‘equally guilty’
language in CALCRIM former No. 400 to allow them to base
defendant’s liability for first degree murder on the mental state of
the actual shooter, rather than on defendant’s own mental state
in aiding and abetting the killing.” (Johnson, at p. 641.)
Defendant’s jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 401,
specifically that to find defendant guilty as an aider and abettor,
the jury had to find “defendant knew that the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime,” that “defendant intended to aid
and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime,” and
“defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” The instruction further

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provided, “Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of
the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically
intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”
In the case of attempted murder, the perpetrator’s
“unlawful purpose” is to kill someone. (See People v. Lee (2003)
31 Cal.4th 613, 623 [attempted murder requires specific intent to
kill].) Under CALCRIM No. 401, the jury could not have
convicted defendant as an aider and abettor without finding
defendant knew his accomplice intended to kill someone, and
defendant intended to aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate that killing—that is, that defendant also intended to
kill. As in Johnson, CALCRIM No. 401 removes the ambiguity
arguably created by CALCRIM No. 400, and the instructions
would not have misled the jury to convict defendant based on the
mental state of the perpetrator rather than his own mental state.
Defendant argues CALCRIM No. 401 “does not state that
an aider and abettor must harbor an intent to kill to support a
finding of attempted murder, nor does it even require that the
aider and abettor share the unlawful intent or purpose of the
direct perpetrator.” This assertion is refuted by the plain
language of CALCRIM No. 401, which requires the aider and
abettor to know the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and intend to
assist in that purpose. The intent to kill requirement is supplied
not by CALCRIM No. 401 but the attempted murder instruction
itself. Although the attempted murder instruction given to
defendant’s jury is not included in the limited record before us,
defendant concedes in his briefing “the jury in [defendant’s] case
was aware the crime of attempted murder required an intent to
kill.” Thus, the combination of the attempted murder instruction

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and CALCRIM No. 401 informed the jury that defendant could
not be convicted as an aider and abettor to attempted murder
without a finding that he personally intended to kill.
In his reply brief, defendant contends he “is not arguing
that . . . CALCRIM No. 400 permitted [defendant] to be found
guilty based on the intent (state of mind) of the direct
perpetrator. The claim is that such instruction [allowed
defendant] to be found guilty based on his own state of mind,
even if it was not shown that he harbored the intent to kill.” We
do not understand this argument—the problem with the former
version of CALCRIM No. 400 identified in the case law is the
possibility an aider or abettor will be convicted based on the mens
rea of the direct perpetrator. (See Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 641.) In any event, as we have explained, CALCRIM No. 401
made clear to the jury it could not convict defendant as an aider
and abettor without finding he harbored an intent to kill.
Defendant argues that to the extent he made the required
prima facie showing, the denial of his petition without an
evidentiary hearing violated his constitutional rights. Because
we conclude defendant did not make the required prima facie
showing, we do not reach this argument.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

KELLEY, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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