CourtListener 10007877•People v. Cervantez CA2/6
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Filed 7/19/24 P. v. Cervantez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B327570
(Super. Ct. No. 2020008715)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
RENE RAY CERVANTEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Rene Ray Cervantez1 appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of several counts of possessing narcotics for
sale, possessing ammunition and firearms as a convicted felon,
and two counts of cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced
him to 15 years in state prison. Cervantez contends the trial
court erred when it did not instruct the jury regarding criminal
negligence for the animal cruelty counts (Pen. Code, § 597, subd.
(b)). He also contends the trial court erred when it denied his
1 Appellant’s last name is spelled “Cervantes” in the
abstract of judgment and in some other parts of the record.
motion to dismiss the prior strike allegation pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We
reverse the animal cruelty convictions and in all other respects
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2020, Cervantez sold an undercover informant 0.96
grams of heroin through a window at Cervantez’s house. Two
days later, detectives searched the house and found 16.43 grams
of heroin, scales, baggies, and $1,100 in cash. A loaded handgun
was near the drugs even though Cervantez was prohibited from
possessing firearms or ammunition. More ammunition was
under the driver’s seat of his car.
Police searched Cervantez’s house again in 2021. In a
locked safe were 18.19 grams of fentanyl. Nearby were four
digital scales and $1,800 in cash.2
Cervantez shared the home with his wife and children. He
used a walker and a shower chair, and had difficulty walking
from one room to another. His wife, R.C., was his caregiver. She
bathed and dressed him and walked him inside the house.
During the 2021 search, officers saw two dogs—a husky
and a pit bull—in the backyard. The dogs were “very thin” with
their ribcages and spines showing. Their skin was hanging loose
and they had no muscle tone. They were also covered in fleas,
and the pit bull had a rash on her stomach and scars on her body.
The dogs appeared to be suffering.
Officers did not see a doghouse or dog beds. No bowls for
food or water were in the yard, and officers could not find one in
2 The 2020 violations were originally charged in case
2020008715, and the 2021 violations in case 2021025223. The
cases were consolidated for trial.
2
the house. An officer gave the dogs a crock pot with water, and
they ran to it and drank as much as they could. When officers
found dog food, the dogs ran to it and ate it quickly. Both dogs
immediately vomited and ate their vomit, then repeated the
process several times.
A veterinarian described the dogs as dirty, dehydrated, and
emaciated. The pit bull had muscle wasting (atrophy), which can
be caused by chronic malnutrition. She also had hair loss caused
by the flea infestation. The dogs were not “picky eaters” at the
shelter but gained weight.3
Cervantez’s brother, A.V., testified the dogs “belonged to”
Cervantez and were “outside dogs.” A.V. cared for the dogs when
Cervantez was previously hospitalized. A.V. had difficulty
getting the dogs to eat. During A.V.’s care, the husky was thin
with ribs showing. The pit bull had some ribs showing but looked
worse after he returned the dogs to Cervantez.
R.C. testified she was responsible for taking care of the
dogs in September 2021. She fed them dry dog food every
morning and gave them water in plastic bowls. She checked their
food and water throughout the day. She also bathed the dogs
once or twice a month using a shampoo “for people” and believed
“[y]ou can use it for the dog, too.” R.C. also said that “at times
there was a little shack in the backyard,” and they put cushions
in it for the dogs to lie on when it rained. She testified the dogs
were happy and did not see fleas on them.
R.C. testified that Cervantez previously fed the dogs
expensive wet food. But after Cervantez was in an accident, they
3 Six weeks after being removed from Cervantez’s home,
the husky died of an infection. There was no testimony that
Cervantez’s conduct contributed to the infection.
3
could only afford dry food the dogs didn’t like. They wouldn’t eat
consistently because they were “picky eaters.”
The jury found Cervantez guilty of possession of heroin and
fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351, counts 1 and 8),
possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a), count 2), felon in possession of
ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1), counts 4 and 6),
felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1),
count 5), sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a),
count 7), and cruelty to animals (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b),
counts 9 and 10). The jury also found true an allegation that
Cervantez was armed with a firearm in the commission of count 1
(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)). He admitted he had suffered a
prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1),
1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)), and that he committed the offenses
while released on bail (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced Cervantez to 15 years in state prison,
consisting of consecutive sentences of: six years for count 1
(midterm of three years, doubled for strike); low term of three
years for the firearm enhancement for count 1; two years, eight
months for count 7 (one-third of midterm of four years, doubled
for strike); two years for count 8 (one-third of mid-term of three
years, doubled for strike); and one year, four months for count 10
(one-third of midterm of two years, doubled for strike). The court
imposed concurrent sentences for counts 4 and 9, and stayed
sentences pursuant to Penal Code section 654 for counts 2, 5, and
6. The court dismissed the on-bail allegations pursuant to Penal
4
Code section 1385.4
DISCUSSION
Jury instructions
Cervantez contends the jury instruction for animal cruelty
was inadequate because it did not include the requirement of
criminal negligence. We agree.
Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to advise the jury of
every element of the charged offenses. (People v. Mil (2012) 53
Cal.4th 400, 409.) We “review independently the legal adequacy
of a jury instruction.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1211.)
Here, the prosecution charged Cervantez with violating
Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b), by “unlawfully
depriv[ing] food, water, shelter and care to the . . . dog[s].” But
the court instructed the jury with a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 2953, the instruction for a violation of Penal Code
section 597, subdivision (a):
“The defendant is charged in Counts 9 and 10 with cruelty
to animals in violation of Penal Code section 597(b).
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that:
“1. The defendant had the charge or custody,
either as an owner or otherwise, of a living animal;
“AND
“2. The animal was either:
“a) subjected to needless suffering;
“b) subjected to un-necessary [sic] cruelty; or
4 The court also imposed a consecutive sentence of one year,
four months for a violation of Health and Safety Code section
11378 in case 2017011288.
5
“c) not provided with proper food, drink,
shelter, or protection from the weather.
“You all must unanimously agree on at least one of the
options listed in element 2.”
The court erred in giving this instruction because it omits
the mens rea requirement for cruelty to animals necessary to
convict pursuant to Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b): that
the defendant acted or failed to act with criminal negligence.
(People v. Tom (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 250, 256; People v. Speegle
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1413 (Speegle).) Speegle held the
mental state for failure of a person with custody of an animal to
provide proper food, drink, or shelter (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b))
was the same as an animal’s owner or possessor permitting it to
be without proper care and attention (Pen. Code, former § 597f)—
both require criminal negligence. (Speegle, at pp. 1412-1416.)
The court reasoned that mistreatment of animals is not a
regulatory offense for which ordinary negligence would suffice.
(Id. at p. 1415.) Instead, criminal negligence is required because
“those who mistreat animals are the deserved object of obloquy,
and their conduct is wrongful of itself and not just as a matter of
legislative declaration.” (Ibid.)
Speegle was followed in People v. Brunette (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 268, 284 (Brunette), which held that “criminal
negligence is the minimum, i.e., least culpable mental state for
convictions under subdivision (b) of section 597.”
“Criminal negligence” is synonymous with “gross
negligence,” and requires an act that “ ‘would cause a high degree
of risk of death or great bodily harm.’ ” (People v. Mehserle (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1140-1141; Brunette, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 285.) “ ‘ “[T]he conduct of the accused must be
6
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to
be incompatible with a proper regard for . . . life.’ ” ” (Mehserle, at
p. 1140; Brunette, at p. 285.)
Contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, the court’s
instruction’s references to “needless” suffering, “unnecessary”
cruelty, and “proper” food, drink, or shelter did not incorporate
the requirement of criminal negligence. “[T]he terms ‘necessary,’
‘needless,’ and ‘proper’ all give fair notice of an objective standard
of reasonableness in the provision of sustenance, drink, and
shelter, and in the avoidance of infliction of suffering.” (Speegle,
supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411, italics added.) But more is
required. The prosecution must also prove the required mental
state of criminal negligence. (See Brunette, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 284; see also Speegle, at pp. 1412-1413
[approving instruction requiring an “act or omission inherently
dangerous to animal life or safety” committed “in a grossly
negligent manner”].) Ordinary negligence does not establish the
“high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm” required for
criminal negligence. (People v. Mehserle, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1141.)
In People v. Brian (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3, the
defendant arranged for others to care for her animals when she
left town, but they stopped doing so. The appellate department
concluded the instruction on ordinary negligence was inadequate
and reversed the conviction. (Id. at Supp. 5 & fn. 3.) “Penal Code
section 597, subdivision (b) is not a strict liability offense.” (Id. at
Supp. 5.) Similarly here, there was evidence Cervantez owned
the dogs, but his wife testified she was responsible for their care.
The Attorney General quotes from CALCRIM No. 592,
7
which includes a definition of “gross negligence.” But the trial
court did not give this instruction. Instead, the jury was
instructed that the animal cruelty counts “require general
criminal intent.” The jury was told Cervantez “must not only
commit the prohibited act, but must do so with wrongful intent.
A person acts with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally
does a prohibited act; however, it is not required that he or she
intend to break the law.” (CALCRIM No. 252, modified.) This
instruction was inadequate because it did not incorporate the
requirement that Cervantez harbored criminal negligence or a
disregard for life.
“ ‘A crime is characterized as a “general intent” crime when
the required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that
causes the harm; a crime is characterized as a “specific intent”
crime when the required mental state entails an intent to cause
the resulting harm.’ ” (People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
1165, 1172-1173.) “Criminal negligence is a separate mental
state that is distinct from either general or specific intent.” (Id.
at p. 1173.) “Accordingly, when the prosecution is charging a
crime of criminal negligence, the trial court should instruct the
jury on the union between the act and a defendant’s criminal
negligence.” (Ibid.) The trial court here erred in not doing so.
Harmless error
We assess the prejudicial effect of the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on the required element of criminal negligence
pursuant to the harmless error test of Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 409.) We must reverse unless “it appears beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” (Id.
at p. 417.) “[I]nstructional error is harmless ‘where a reviewing
8
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming
evidence,’ ” but not where “ ‘the record contains evidence that
could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the
omitted element.’ ” (Ibid.)
The condition of the dogs was deplorable. But the evidence
of Cervantez’s criminal negligence was neither uncontested nor
overwhelming beyond a reasonable doubt. Cervantez’s brother
testified he had difficulty getting the dogs to eat. There was
evidence the dogs “belonged to” Cervantez, but his wife, R.C.,
testified she had the responsibility for their care. She fed and
watered the dogs daily, bathed them, and did not see fleas on
them. She testified she fed them dry food because they could not
afford wet food. If properly instructed, the jury could have
rationally determined that offering the wrong kind of food or
failing to eradicate the fleas did not constitute criminal
negligence.
There was also evidence Cervantez had health problems
that limited his ability to walk or stand. Jurors could reasonably
conclude that these problems limited his ability to care for the
dogs or supervise their care. Even if the jurors believed R.C. was
grossly negligent, they could have rationally concluded that
Cervantez’s reliance on his wife to care for the dogs was not “such
a departure from . . . an ordinarily prudent or careful [person]
under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a
proper regard for . . . life.” (Brunette, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 285.) Accordingly, we reverse the convictions for counts 9 and
10.
Romero motion
A trial court has the discretion to dismiss a prior violent or
9
serious felony conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes Law.
(Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) We review the trial court’s
denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
Dismissal is warranted if “in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
161.) These factors did not require dismissal of the strike here.
The prior strike offense was a robbery committed in 2010.
Cervantez stole power tools from a home improvement store, left
through an emergency exit, and struggled with the loss
prevention officer. In the same case, Cervantez was convicted of
felony burglary and misdemeanor shoplifting based on his theft of
thousands of dollars of merchandise from a sporting goods store
and an electronics store.
In a Romero motion, the court may consider the age of the
prior offenses. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134,
1141.) Cervantez’s adult record before his 2011 strike included
narcotics offenses, grand thefts, resisting arrest, and violations of
probation. After the strike, Cervantez was convicted in 2012 of
shoplifting and he failed to successfully complete probation in
2016 based on three probation violations. And Cervantez was
later convicted of a 2017 violation of possessing controlled
substances for sale. He was on bail in that case when he
committed the current offenses.
In our view, the remoteness of the 2011 strike was an
10
insufficient basis to dismiss the strike because Cervantez did not
have “a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v.
Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing dismissal of
20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740,
749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old properly imposed].)
At the hearing on the Romero motion, Cervantez contended
he was first given heroin at the age of 11, witnessed a fatal
shooting at 15, and was stabbed in the back at 19. He completed
a substance abuse course while in custody. Although the trial
court considered Cervantez’s drug addiction, dismissal of the
strike was not warranted given his criminal history and current
convictions for selling narcotics and being a felon in possession of
ammunition and firearms at his home with children living there.
(See People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [error to
dismiss strike, defendant “did not follow through in efforts to
bring his substance abuse problem under control”].)
People v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, relied upon by
Cervantez, does not compel a different result. The defendant
there committed his prior strike offenses 26 to 28 years earlier
when he was under the age of 21, and he committed only minor
offenses in the seven years before the current offenses. (Id. at pp.
1141, 1143.) That is not the case here. “[T]here is simply
nothing mitigating” about the age of the prior strike. (People v.
Humphrey, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 813.) There was no abuse
of discretion.
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s convictions on counts 9 and 10 are reversed,
and the sentences attributable to those counts are stricken. The
clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward
a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In
11
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
YEGAN, J.
12
Nancy L. Ayers, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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