CourtListener 10005524•People v. McConnell CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 7/17/24 P. v. McConnell CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330776
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA088369)
v.
RONNIE McCONNELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Ronnie McConnell appeals the judgment entered following
a resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal under section 1385
to dismiss a firearm enhancement imposed under section
12022.53, subdivision (d), and to strike a prior serious felony
conviction for purposes of imposition of two five-year
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Specifically,
appellant contends the trial court erred and abused its discretion
in failing to consider the mitigating circumstances which weighed
strongly in favor of dismissal of these enhancements and by
making no finding that dismissal would endanger public safety.
We agree. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand to the
trial court for resentencing under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
BACKGROUND2
On January 18, 2011, around 9:00 p.m., Maurice Harrison
and Darrel Mitchell were walking on South Street in the City of
Long Beach. As they passed a Ford Taurus parked in front of a
driveway, the driver emerged from the vehicle holding a shotgun.
Appellant got out of the front passenger seat of the Taurus and
looked Mitchell “straight” in the face. Mitchell continued walking
and heard someone ask, “Where you from?” He turned around to
see if Harrison was talking to someone and immediately heard a
shotgun blast. Mitchell ran down the street chased by appellant
and was shot in the back. He suffered a “through-and-through”
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The following facts are drawn from this court’s
unpublished decision in appellant’s direct appeal from his
conviction. (People v. McConnell (July 18, 2013, B243017)
[nonpub. opn.] (McConnell).)
2
gunshot wound consistent with the type of wound produced by a
handgun. (McConnell, supra, B243017.)
In the meantime, Harrison heard someone say, “Where you
from, cuz?” which he understood to mean he was being asked
what gang he was from. When he heard the shotgun blast he
started running back in the direction from which he had come
and was struck in the back by shotgun pellets. Harrison hid
behind a tree and looked back to the Taurus where he saw a
person near the driver’s side pointing a shotgun at him. Another
shotgun blast struck Harrison in the arm. He ran toward a fence
to escape and was hit by a third blast that knocked him through
the fence. He managed to crawl away and eventually made his
way to safety. (McConnell, supra, B243017.)
After the shooting appellant returned to the Taurus
whereupon he and the other shooter drove away. (McConnell,
supra, B243017.)
Harrison suffered 15 shotgun pellet wounds to his back and
several more to his left arm. The prosecution firearms expert
opined that three expended shotgun casings recovered from the
scene were fired from a shotgun found in appellant’s garage.
(McConnell, supra, B243017.)
Appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of
attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)) with true findings on
the allegations of personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a))
and personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d)). Appellant admitted the prior strike
(§§ 1170.12, subd. (a)–(d), 667, subd. (b)–(i)), prior prison term
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and prior serious felony allegations (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term
of 53 years to life plus 22 years, as follows:
3
Count 1 (attempted murder of Harrison)⎯seven years to
life, doubled for the strike to 14 years to life, plus 10 years for the
section 12022.5 firearm enhancement, plus five years for the
prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), plus one
year for the prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b));
Count 2 (attempted murder of Mitchell)⎯seven years to
life, doubled for the strike to 14 years to life, plus 25 years to life
for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement,
plus five years for the prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), to run consecutive to the sentence on count 1.
At resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 on May 22,
2023, the trial court recalled appellant’s sentence, struck the two
prior prison term enhancements, and modified the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) to the
midterm of four years instead of the originally imposed upper
term of 10 years. Declining to dismiss or impose a lesser firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c), or to
strike the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1), the trial court sentenced appellant to 53 years to life plus
14 years.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellant Did Not Forfeit His Challenge to the
Trial Court’s Ruling
As a preliminary matter, we reject respondent’s contention
that appellant forfeited his argument that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to consider or make explicit findings on
the applicable mitigating circumstances enumerated in section
1385, subdivision (c)(2), and by making no specific findings as to
4
whether dismissal of any enhancements would endanger public
safety.
In his motion for full resentencing, appellant argued that
as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 721, § 1), section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) requires the
trial court to “ ‘consider and afford great weight’ ” to enumerated
mitigating circumstances in determining whether to dismiss an
enhancement, and that “proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement,’ unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” Applying the
relevant mitigating factors to the instant case, appellant argued
that the firearm and prior serious felony enhancements should be
dismissed under section 1385 in the interests of justice.
We conclude these and other arguments in appellant’s
motion were sufficient to preserve the issues for appeal that he
now raises. Moreover, because appellant had specifically argued
in the motion that the trial court was required to give great
weight to the mitigating circumstances enumerated in section
1385, subdivision (c)(2), in the face of the trial court’s unequivocal
ruling, we find any objection at the hearing would have been
futile. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547 [trial
court’s “sufficiently definite and express ruling” on a motion may
preserve claim for appeal; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th
543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”].)
5
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by
Making No Finding that Dismissal of the
Enhancements Would Endanger Public Safety,
and Then Failing to Consider Any of the
Mitigating Circumstances Under Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)
A. Relevant background
After the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the superior court that
appellant’s sentence contained a now-invalid prior prison term
enhancement under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), the court appointed counsel and set the
matter for a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75.
Prior to the hearing, appellant filed a motion for full resentencing
in which he requested that the court resentence him to 10 years
to life.3 Appellant argued that several ameliorative changes in
the law gave the court new discretion to significantly reduce his
sentence:
3 In addition to striking the two one-year prior prison terms
enhancements originally imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), appellant asked the court to strike the prior
serious felony enhancements and the prior strike conviction, and
resentence him as follows: on count 1, seven years to life for
attempted premeditated murder, plus three years for the true
finding on the gun use enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), and a concurrent sentence on count 2 of seven
years to life plus three years for the gun use enhancement
pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a) instead of the 25
years to life firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d).
6
⎯ Senate Bill No. 81, amending section 1385, granted the
court discretion to dismiss an enhancement or its punishment
after giving “great weight” to the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in subdivision (c), unless the court finds dismissal
would endanger public safety;
⎯ Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017,
ch. 682, §§ 1 & 2), amending sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, gave
the court discretion to strike personal gun use enhancements;
and
⎯ Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2018, ch. 1013, § 2) gave the court discretion to strike the five-
year prior serious felony conviction enhancement under section
667, subdivision (a)(1).
Appellant identified several mitigating circumstances,
which, he argued, weighed greatly in favor of dismissal or
reduction of the enhancements “ ‘in furtherance of justice’ ” under
the new sentencing regime. These included the circumstances
that (1) multiple enhancements were applied in appellant’s case
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) the application of these
enhancements resulted in a sentence of over 20 years (§1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C)); (3) “[t]he current offense [was] connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma” (§1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)); and
(4) “[t]he enhancement [was] based on a prior conviction that
[was] over five years old” (§1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)). Appellant
added that although he was not a juvenile at the time he
committed the robbery which qualified for the prior serious felony
enhancement, he was only 18 years and 5 months old. Had he
been just six months younger when he committed that crime, he
argued, that circumstance would weigh heavily in favor of
7
dismissing the prior serious felony enhancement under section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(G).
In support of resentencing, appellant also submitted a
statement in mitigation, which included numerous letters of
support, a job offer from a café in Oregon, a relapse prevention
plan, and the 2020 application packet for commutation of his
sentence.
The trial court conducted the resentencing hearing on
May 22, 2023. The court stated it had read appellant’s statement
of mitigation and his CDCR file. After the court vacated the
previous sentence, defense counsel and the prosecutor submitted,
and appellant made a statement to the court expressing remorse
for his choices and gratitude for his appearance in court.
The court stated it was troubled by two representations in
appellant’s mitigation materials. The first was appellant’s
statement in the commutation packet that his father had been
absent as a role model, which seemed to conflict with the letters
from family members that stated appellant and his father had a
good relationship and described appellant’s father as a loving dad
who was always proud of his children. Defense counsel
responded to the apparent conflict by pointing out that “both
things could be true.” What others observed about appellant’s
father and his relationship with his children could be “completely
different” from the way the father had treated appellant in
private. The court also questioned the relevance of appellant’s
purported job offer from an employer in Oregon in light of the fact
that if appellant were paroled, he would have to be supervised in
California for at least three years. Defense counsel countered
that the job offer showed appellant could be a contributing
8
member of society upon his release, a point on which the court
agreed.
After declaring it had reviewed the case in its entirety, the
trial court “decline[d] to strike the prior 211 . . . strike and the
weapon enhancement,” noting that the prior strike was less than
10 years old at the time of the attempted murders.
Finding “no basis to strike the gun enhancement,” the court
explained, “[Appellant], in cold blood, shot the back of unarmed
male Blacks after echoing the famous mating call, ‘Where are you
from?’ Moreover, after shooting both of them, he chased the most
vulnerable victim, the one that got shot with buckshot in the
back, to attempt to inflict further injuries. So there is no
justification to shoot those unprovoked victims.”
The trial court then declared that in the exercise of its
discretion, it would decline to strike the five-year “nickel”
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court
also found consecutive terms were warranted because the
attempted murders involved multiple victims. Finally, the court
struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancements in accordance with Senate Bill No. 483. The court
then imposed a sentence of 53 years to life plus 14 years as
follows:
⎯On count 1, seven years to life, doubled to 14 years to life
for the prior strike (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)–(d)), plus a consecutive
midterm of four years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) gun
enhancement, and another consecutive five-year term for the
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement;
⎯On count 2, a consecutive term of seven years to life,
doubled to 14 years to life for the prior strike (§ 1170.12, subd.
(a)–(d)), plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the section
9
12022.53, subdivision (d) gun enhancement, and another
consecutive five-year term for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement.
Before pronouncing the total sentence, the trial court noted
appellant’s prison records reflected that on April 19, 2020, after
his commutation application was denied, “he was found guilty as
charged of disrespecting or potentially creating violence or
disruption in the prison system.” Therefore, the court concluded,
“he is not fully recovered and rehabilitated at this time.”
B. Applicable law
Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 amended
sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to permit a trial court, in the
interest of justice pursuant to section 1385, to strike or dismiss a
personal gun use enhancement required to be imposed under
those sections. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h); People
v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 696 (Tirado).) Courts have
recognized this change in the law allows a trial court, after
striking or dismissing a 25-year to life enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), to impose a lesser included,
uncharged enhancement authorized under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) or (c) or under a law other than section 12022.53,
as long as the facts supporting such an enhancement have been
alleged and found true. (People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1015, 1020–1021, 1030 (McDavid); Tirado, at pp. 696–697, 700.)
A year later, the Legislature amended sections 667,
subdivision (a) and 1385, subdivision (b) “to permit a trial court
to exercise discretion to strike or dismiss prior serious felony
enhancements [imposed under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)] ‘in
the furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th
10
722, 769; § 1385, subd. (b)(1), as amended by Stats. 2018,
ch. 1013, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 added
subdivision (c) to section 1385 to provide: “Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.”4 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see People v. Sek (2022) 74
4 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) identifies nine mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) through (I):
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
11
Cal.App.5th 657, 674 [Sen. Bill No. 81 “amended section 1385 to
specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements . . . in the interest of justice”].)
The statute specifically defines “endanger public safety” to mean
“there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 721.)
C. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to
make any finding that dismissal of the enhancements
would endanger public safety, and then failing to
consider the applicable mitigating circumstances
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
Appellant contends that two5 of the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.”
5 Appellant also asserts that the mitigating circumstance
set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A) requires dismissal
of the enhancements: appellant is Black, and imposition of the
12
weighed greatly in favor of the dismissal of the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement or imposition of a lesser
included firearm enhancement in this case: (1) four sentencing
enhancements were alleged and imposed in this case (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(B)); and (2) the application of the firearm
enhancement would result in a “sentence over [20] years” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C)). Appellant further asserts that these mitigating
circumstances plus the fact that the enhancement under section
667, subdivision (a)(1) was based on a prior conviction that was
over five years old at the time of the original sentence weighed
greatly in favor of dismissal of the two five-year prior serious
felony enhancements. He contends the trial court failed to even
consider, much less “ ‘afford great weight’ ” to any of these
mitigating circumstances, and it made no finding that dismissal
of any of the enhancements would endanger public safety. We
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
make a specific finding that dismissal of any enhancements
would pose a danger to public safety. In the absence of such a
finding, the trial court erred in failing to consider the applicable
mitigating circumstances under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
enhancement had a discriminatory racial impact as described in
paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of section 745. Appellant did not
raise this claim in the trial court, and his opening brief contains
no argument beyond a bare assertion. Rather, appellant
attempts to support this claim with argument for the first time
on appeal in his reply brief. His assertion that imposition of any
of the enhancements had a discriminatory racial impact is thus
forfeited. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 408 [arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are
forfeited].)
13
We independently review questions regarding the statutory
interpretation of section 1385. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63
Cal.4th 91, 95 [questions of statutory construction reviewed de
novo].) In People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, review
granted March 22, 2023, S278309, we considered the words of the
Legislature’s mandate in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), that the
presence of any of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (A) through (I) “must be ‘afford[ed] great weight’
and ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement . . .
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” (Walker, at p. 398.) Our examination
led us to conclude that “[i]n the context of section 1385, . . . the
term ‘great weight’ places a thumb on the scale that balances the
mitigating circumstances favoring dismissal against whether
dismissal would endanger public safety, and tips that balance in
favor of dismissal unless rebutted by the court’s finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety.” (Walker, at pp. 399–
400.) In other words, a trial court’s finding that one or more
mitigating circumstances exist does not automatically require
dismissal of an enhancement. Rather, the “shall be dismissed”
language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (B)
and (C), “applies only if the court does not find that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296 (Mendoza); Walker,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 397, rev.gr.) Indeed, “if the court
finds that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public
safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed mitigating
circumstances” under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
subparagraphs (A) through (I). (Mendoza, at p. 296.)
14
We review the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373–374.) A defendant is
“entitled to sentencing decisions made through the exercise of
informed discretion. [Citation.] A court acting while unaware of
the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.”
(McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1023; Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 694.) An abuse of discretion may occur where the trial court
is not aware of its discretion, considers impermissible factors,
fails to consider relevant factors, or where the decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it. (Carmony, at pp. 377–378.)
The trial court in this case made no finding that dismissal
of any enhancement⎯with a resultingly shorter sentence⎯would
endanger public safety. And in declining to dismiss any of the
enhancements, the court also gave no indication that it had
considered the mitigating circumstances identified in appellant’s
motion for full sentencing. Rather, finding “no basis to strike the
gun enhancement,” the court misstated appellant’s role in the
crime: “[Appellant], in cold blood, shot the back of [the] unarmed
[victims] after echoing the famous mating call, ‘Where are you
from?’ Moreover, after shooting both of them, he chased the most
vulnerable victim, the one that got shot with buckshot in the
back, to attempt to inflict further injuries. So there is no
justification to shoot those unprovoked victims.” The court gave
no reason at all for declining to dismiss the five-year
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
15
Not only did the trial court get the underlying facts
completely wrong as they concerned appellant’s actions,6 but by
focusing on the facts of the crime, the court applied an erroneous
legal standard to the question of whether dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.
“Determining whether resentencing a defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to society is necessarily a forward-
looking inquiry. When determining whether resentencing poses
an unreasonable risk of danger, the trial court must look to when
a defendant would be released if the petition is granted and the
defendant is resentenced. A defendant who would obtain
immediate release if the petition is granted poses a different
6 The probation report in this case reflects the same
underlying facts of the crime as our unpublished decision in
appellant’s direct appeal from his conviction:
“On 1-18-2011, the two victims . . . were walking past the
front of a large apartment complex. A vehicle stopped in front of
the complex and the passenger McConnell [appellant] and the
unknown driver stepped out of the vehicle and asked the victims
where they were from, meaning gang/neighborhood. The two
victims turned to run and [appellant] chased one of the victims
[whom] he managed to shoot through the lower back area. The
driver, armed with a shotgun chased the other victim. The driver
saw his victim hiding behind a tree and fired at him. The victim
was partially struck, but was able to run a short distance before
getting caught in a fence. While he was struggling to get through
the fence, the driver fired the shotgun riddling him with pellet
holes. The force of the shotgun pellets pushed the victim through
the fence. The shotgun used in the shooting was found at
[appellant’s] residence along with .22 caliber bullets. The .22
caliber handgun used by [appellant] was never found. (The above
information was obtained verbally from the DA in this case.)”
16
potential danger to society than a defendant who could be
released only in his or her 70’s.” (People v. Williams (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063.) Williams concluded that a “trial court’s
failure to consider when, if ever, [a] defendant would be release if
the [resentencing] petition was granted” constituted an abuse of
discretion under section 1170.126, subdivision (g). (Id. at
p. 1064.)
Here, the trial court’s reference to the underlying facts of
the crime to support its refusal to dismiss or reduce the
enhancements in this case suggests not a forward-looking
inquiry, but one that relies on the immutable facts of the past to
determine present dangerousness. And while present
dangerousness is an appropriate factor to consider, “a crucial part
of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will
impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently
dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a
short time frame might be found by the trial court to pose a
greater danger to the public than a defendant who is currently
dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison until he
is elderly.” (People v. Gonzalez (June 27, 2024, No. D082058) __
Cal.App.5th __ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis 409, at *16–*17] (Gonzalez);
see Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [affirming trial
court’s finding of danger to the public under § 1385, subd. (c)(2)
where “ ‘dismissal of the enhancement would result in a sentence
of less than six years in prison, which would require [the
defendant’s] immediate release’ ”].)
The record here contains no indication that future
dangerousness entered the trial court’s consideration at all. Even
if the court had dismissed the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) as well as the five-year prior
17
serious felony enhancements, appellant would not be subject to
release any time soon⎯he would still be serving a term of 40
years to life, with no prospect for release from prison until he is
67 years old. Even then, appellant’s release would be “contingent
on review by the Board of Parole Hearings . . . who will have the
opportunity to assess [appellant’s] dangerousness at that time.”
(Gonzalez, supra, __ Cal.App.5th __ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis 409, at
*17].)
The Attorney General argues the general rule that “where
a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a
reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis
for a particular finding or order.” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1107, 1114; People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310 [in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary, a
court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in
the exercise of its discretion].) But the record here is not silent.
The trial court’s findings affirmatively show that the court was
focused on whether appellant has been rehabilitated and
currently poses a danger to public safety rather than considering
whether appellant’s eventual release⎯if the enhancements were
dismissed⎯would endanger the public.
We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by applying an erroneous legal standard, failing to
consider relevant mitigating factors as mandated by the
Legislature, and relying on a materially incorrect account of
appellant’s role and actions during the offense to find his release
would pose a danger to public safety. Because even a full
dismissal of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) gun
18
enhancement7 and the two five-year prior serious felony
enhancements would result in a potential release from prison
well into the future when appellant is nearly 70 years old, and
appellant’s eventual release will be subject to review by the
Board of Parole Hearings, it is conceivable the trial court would
exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
differently if it did not limit its consideration to appellant’s
current dangerousness.
Accordingly, we find the trial court’s error to be prejudicial,
requiring remand for resentencing to afford the trial court the
opportunity to consider whether dismissal of any enhancement
would endanger public safety at the time of appellant’s eventual
release based on the resultingly shorter sentence. Should the
court find dismissal of the enhancements would pose no danger to
the public, it must then consider the applicability of the
mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (A) through (I). We express no
view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion on
remand.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter remanded to the
trial court with directions to reconsider the sentence under Penal
7 Dismissal of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement is not the trial court’s only option. After striking
the enhancement, the court retains discretion to impose a lesser
included enhancement under subdivision (b) or (c) of section
12022.53, or a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a
different law. (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.)
19
Code section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
20
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.