In re William R. CA2/4

CourtListener 10004698Calctapp16 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/16/24 In re William R. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re WILLIAM R., JR., B321977

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01687)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Y.B.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirm lower court’s order; deny DCFS’s motion to
dismiss.
Liana Serobian, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
minor William R., Jr.

INTRODUCTION
Y.B.L. (mother) and W.R. (father) have one child together, William R.
(born August 2020). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition on behalf of William,
which was sustained by the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).1 Mother appeals certain
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made by the juvenile court.
Because mother does not challenge the jurisdictional finding as to count b-1,
we decline to exercise our discretion to review the remaining jurisdictional
findings. We further conclude that the challenged dispositional orders are
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the orders below.
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.

2
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition claiming
jurisdiction over William pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).
Count b-1 alleged mother had physically abused William’s paternal half-
sister, K.R., including pulling K.R.’s hair and striking her, leaving bruises.
Count b-2 alleged mother emotionally abused K.R. by threatening to poison
her, destroying her belongings, and demonstrating aggressive behavior
toward her which caused K.R. to exhibit symptoms of anxiety, depression,
and self-harm behaviors. Counts b-3 and b-6 alleged a history of domestic
violence between mother and father, including an incident in 2020 in which
mother was arrested and/or convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a
cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5) and battery (Pen. Code, § 242).2 Count b-5
alleged mother has unstable housing and reported on numerous occasions
that she is unable to safely care for William. Counts j-1, j-2, and j-3 all
related to prior dependency actions involving the paternal half-sibling, K.R.
On December 17, 2021, the Orange County juvenile court conducted the
initial hearing. The court detained William from mother, placed him in
father’s custody, and ordered supervised visitation with the child. The
jurisdiction hearing was held on April 28 and 29, 2022, in Orange County
juvenile court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court struck counts b-5
and j-2 from the petition, as well as the checked boxes on the form petition
asserting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C).
The juvenile court also ordered the case transferred to Los Angeles County
for disposition.

2 Count b-4 was alleged against father only and is not relevant to this
appeal.
3
The Los Angeles County juvenile court conducted the disposition
hearing on July 21, 2022. The juvenile court declared William a dependent of
the court, removed him from mother’s custody, placed him with father, and
ordered DCFS to provide the family with services and the parents to
participate in services. The juvenile court also ordered a case plan for mother
which included a requirement that she undergo a mental health evaluation.
The court also ordered that the evaluator be provided with the documents
supporting any true findings made in the instant case or the companion case
concerning paternal-half sibling K.R.
On March 1, 2023, the juvenile court filed a custody order granting
father sole physical and legal custody of the child, and granting mother
monitored visits. The court terminated jurisdiction over William that same
day.

DISCUSSION
A. Mootness
The parties agree that the trial court’s termination of jurisdiction on
March 1, 2023, renders this case moot and our review is discretionary under
In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 (D.P.). Several factors may be considered in
deciding whether to review jurisdictional findings in an otherwise moot
appeal. (Id. at pp. 283, 285–286.) These factors include whether the finding
“‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current
or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or . . . “could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 283; see
also In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431–1432 [holding the Court of
Appeal has discretion to consider an appeal of jurisdictional findings where
they could impact future proceedings].) Other factors include whether the

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jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct and the reason why the appeal became moot. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 285–286.) “The factors above are not exhaustive, and no single
factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
As we find the findings against mother are stigmatizing and may play a
role in future court proceedings regarding custody and visitation, we will
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of her appeal.

B. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting some of
the jurisdictional findings made by the juvenile court. Mother does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction under count
b-1. Instead, mother’s counsel repeatedly claims the juvenile court dismissed
count b-1 of the petition at the jurisdictional hearing. This claim is a
misrepresentation of the record.
The form used for section 300 petitions contains four potential bases for
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) which correspond to
statutory subdivisions (b)(1)(A) through (b)(1)(D). The form contains empty
boxes next to each of these bases for jurisdiction. A party filing the form
petition can check one or more of these boxes to indicate which basis for
jurisdiction is being asserted under section (b)(1). The original petition filed
in this action contains checked boxes indicating jurisdiction was being
asserted under subdivisions (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C). At the
jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court noted there did not appear to be any
basis for jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1)(B) and no party had any
objection to this checked box being stricken on the form petition. The

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juvenile court then proceeded to strike the checked box asserting jurisdiction
under subdivision (b)(1)(C) as well, stating, “The Court will strike—as the
Court kind of questioned about the first page of (b)(1), the last two boxes,
both the boxes that relate to the willful or negligent failure, those prongs will
be struck.” The court then proceeded to strike counts b-5 and j-2 of the
petition in their entirety. The juvenile court did not strike or otherwise
dismiss count b-1. These amendments are reflected on the interlineated
petition attached to the June 13, 2022, disposition report. The interlineated
petition clearly shows count b-1 was not struck either in whole or in part.
There is no question that the juvenile court and all parties understood
that jurisdiction had been sustained under count b-1. At the July 21, 2022,
dispositional hearing, the juvenile court expressly noted, “we’ve already got a
true finding made on the b-1 count.” No party objected to or corrected this
statement.
Mother cites to three documents in support of her claim that count b-1
was dismissed: (1) the original section 300 petition, (2) pages 108 through 113
of the transcript of the dispositional hearing, and (3) the juvenile court’s April
29, 2022, minute order memorializing the jurisdictional hearing. None of
these materials suggest the juvenile court dismissed count b-1. The original
petition merely establishes that count b-1 was asserted against mother.
Pages 108 through 113 of the dispositional hearing transcript do not mention
or relate to count b-1 in any way. Instead, those pages contain argument by
mother’s counsel concerning the recommendation that mother undergo a
psychological evaluation, as well as the juvenile court’s ultimate dispositional
orders. Nothing in these pages indicates or suggests that count b-1 was
dismissed.

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This leaves the April 29, 2022, minute order as the sole basis for
mother’s claim that count b-1 was dismissed. The minute order states, in
pertinent part: “Court will strike portions of Petition as stated on the
record—parts of B1, B5 and J2.” In stating that parts of “B1” were stricken,
the juvenile court was referring to the striking of the two checked boxes
asserting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and was not
referring to count b-1. Any potential ambiguity in this order can be
immediately resolved by reference to the transcript from the jurisdictional
hearing and the amended interlineated petition. Even if we were to interpret
the order as referring to count b-1, the order indicates only that “portions” of
the count were stricken. Nothing in this order suggests count b-1 was
“expressly dismissed” in its entirety as mother now claims on appeal.
We note that at the time mother filed her opening brief, the record did
not yet include the transcript from the second day of the jurisdictional
hearing, which expressly explained what claims were being struck from the
petition. However, the interlineated amended petition and disposition
hearing transcripts were available to mother’s counsel and directly contradict
any claim that count b-1 was dismissed or stricken.
Moreover, the relevant transcript from the jurisdictional hearing was
included in a supplemental volume of reporter’s transcripts filed in this court
on October 17, 2023. This transcript was available to counsel at the time
mother’s reply brief was filed in March 2024. Yet mother’s reply brief simply
ignores the transcript and claims instead that “The record is confusing as to
what and how the Orange County Juvenile Court sustained or dismissed in
all or in part count b-1 of the petition, given that the matter was heard in two
different counties and transferred to Los Angeles County after the
jurisdictional hearing.” This assertion is made without any citation to the

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record and is expressly contradicted by the jurisdictional hearing transcript.
The claims made by mother’s counsel regarding count b-1 are simply
inaccurate and devoid of any support in the record.
“An attorney is an officer of the court and owes the court a duty of
candor.” (Levine v. Berschneider (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 916, 921.) “‘“Honesty
in dealing with the courts is of paramount importance, and misleading a
judge is, regardless of motives, a serious offense.”’ [Citation.] ‘Counsel
should not forget that they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty
to protect and defend the interests of their clients, the obligation is equally
imperative to aid the court in avoiding error and in determining the cause in
accordance with justice and the established rules of practice.’ [Citations.]”
(Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1095–1096
(Perry); see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d); State Bar Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1).) Parties may be deemed to forfeit an issue where
they have misrepresented the record or failed to provide a complete summary
of the relevant facts. (Perry, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1095–1096.)
As a by-product of counsel’s refusal to acknowledge that the court
sustained jurisdiction under count b-1, mother does not challenge this
jurisdictional finding on appeal. As the court sustained jurisdiction over
William under count b-1, we need not determine whether substantial
evidence supported jurisdiction under other counts asserted in the petition.
“As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial
that another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 968, 979.) “[A]n appellate court may decline to address the
evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single
finding has been found to be supported by the evidence. [Citations.]” (In re
I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.) As the juvenile court had

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jurisdiction over William under count b-1, we decline to address the
sufficiency of the juvenile court’s other jurisdictional findings.

C. Dispositional Findings
Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional orders.
Specifically, mother contends removal of William from her custody was not
supported by substantial evidence. Mother also contends the court erred in
ordering her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and in ordering that case
files from the prior proceedings concerning K.R. be provided to the evaluator.
Additionally, mother argues the juvenile court failed to make findings on the
record in support of its dispositional orders as required by section 361,
subdivision (c). We address these arguments separately.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of the dependency law “is to provide maximum safety and
protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or
emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are
at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2, subd. (a); see In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
283, 289; In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599.)
We review challenges to a juvenile court’s dispositional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “‘In reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional
findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders
of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to

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the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are
the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence
or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the order is appropriate. (Ibid.;
accord, In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.)

2. Mental Health Evaluation
Mother challenges the court’s dispositional order requiring her to
undergo a mental health evaluation. In particular, mother objects to the
court’s order directing that the evaluator be provided with the materials on
which the sustained findings in K.R.’s case were based. Mother claims the
juvenile court’s orders violated her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. While mother quotes the text of these Amendments in
full, she does not provide any legal authority discussing these Amendments
or showing how they were violated by the juvenile court. “When an appellant
fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].” (Badie
v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785; see also People v.
Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 616, fn. 8 [“We need not consider . . . a
perfunctory assertion unaccompanied by supporting argument”]; Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) We conclude mother has forfeited her argument
regarding the constitutionality of the court’s dispositional order by failing to

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adequately develop it on appeal.3 (See Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 671, 687; Trinkle v. California State Lottery (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413; see also Bunzl Distribution USA, Inc. v. Franchise
Tax Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 986, 998.) Accordingly, we do not reach the
merits of mother’s argument on this point.
Mother also contends a mental health evaluation was inappropriate in
this case because mother’s mental health was not an “underlying allegation”
in any of the counts in the petition. “At the dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court must order child welfare services for the minor and the minor’s
parents to facilitate reunification of the family. [Citations.] The court has
broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s
interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.
[Citations.]” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) “At
disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained
petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in the best
interests of the children. [Citations.] Instead, the court may consider the
evidence as a whole.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.)
There is ample evidence in the record supporting the need for mother to
undergo a mental health evaluation in this case. On December 14, 2021, a
social worker noted there were “concerns for the mother’s possible mental
health, in that the mother has called the LA County child abuse hot line on
ten different occasions reporting she cannot care for William.” Mother had a
history of anger issues, including an arrest for domestic violence in 2020, and
sustained findings that she physically and emotionally abused William’s half-
sibling. These issues continued to be a concern, as evidenced by social worker

3 We note mother’s argument relies in large part on the incorrect
assertion that count b-1 was dismissed at the jurisdictional hearing.
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reports that mother was repeatedly harassing William’s pediatrician and
office staff by calling them multiple times a day in May and June 2022 to
demand that they file reports of child abuse and threatening to sue them
when they refused. Mother’s behavior was so disruptive that the pediatrician
refused to continue to treat William. Additionally, the pediatrician reported
that the interpreter he employed resigned from her position because mother
was so difficult. Finally, and most persuasively, mother’s therapist wrote a
letter to DCFS recommending that mother undergo a mental health
evaluation, stating “It is my recommendation that [mother] and [father] have
a psychiatric evaluation to discard mental illness issues, because it seems
that it has been challenging for [mother] to communicate with her son’s
father, and the assessment may benefit both parties and the safety of their
son.” Mother ignores this significant history of mental health concerns in her
briefing. As there is substantial evidence in the record of mental health
concerns regarding mother, the juvenile court did not err in requiring mother
to undergo a mental health evaluation as part of her dispositional case plan.

3. Removal Order
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides the juvenile court may remove a
child from the custody of a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” The court must also “make a
determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)

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“‘A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental
inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to
the minor if he or she remains with the parent.’ [Citations.] It is not
required that the parent be dangerous or that the child have been harmed
before removal is appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the statute is on
averting harm to the child.’” (In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996.)
The juvenile court must consider “‘not only the parent’s past conduct, but also
current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that gave
rise to juvenile court intervention.’” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944,
967.) “The jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence the minor cannot
safely remain in the home.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135,
citing § 361, subd. (c)(1).)
We affirm the removal order if it is supported by substantial evidence.
(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) When conducting a substantial
evidence review of a finding made under the clear and convincing evidence
standard: “[A]n appellate court must account for the clear and convincing
standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support
a finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and
give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)

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Substantial evidence shows that removal from the mother’s custody
was necessary to protect William’s physical and emotional well-being, and
there were no other reasonable means by which his well-being could be
protected without removal. The record shows mother physically and
emotionally abused William’s half-sibling when mother shared a home with
father and the half-sibling. Mother’s history of explosive behavior persisted
despite having previously completed anger management training. As
discussed above, these anger issues, while apparently not directed at
William, nonetheless threatened William’s ability to obtain medical care and,
therefore, posed a danger to his well-being.
Mother argues there is no substantial evidence establishing that
reasonable efforts had been made to prevent William’s removal. She claims
other alternatives were available, including returning William to her custody
with DCFS to perform unannounced check-ins at the mother’s home. We
disagree. The record establishes that returning William to mother’s custody
would have posed a substantial danger to William’s emotional and physical
well-being. Further, unannounced visits would be of limited protective value,
as those services “can only assess the situation . . . at the time of the visit[,]”
and would detect abuse only after it had occurred. (In re A.F., supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at p. 293.)
We note the evidence supporting removal is so clear and convincing
that mother did not object to the removal order at the dispositional hearing
below. Instead, mother only challenged the dispositional order of monitored
visitation and the psychiatric evaluation. On this basis alone we could find
mother forfeited any challenge to the removal order. (In re T.G. (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“‘[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for
reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial

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court’”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court
ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have
been but was not made in the trial court”].) However, we have elected
instead to reach the merits of mother’s claim and find that the juvenile
court’s removal order was supported by substantial evidence.
Mother also argues the juvenile court failed to state the facts
supporting its dispositional orders. Section 361, subdivision (e) provides:
“The court shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is
based.” It is undisputed that the juvenile court did not state the facts which
supported its dispositional orders. However, as mother and DCFS
acknowledge, such findings can be implied where the evidence is clear. (See
In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825; accord, In re Isayah C.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 699.)
The evidence here is sufficiently clear to deem the juvenile court’s
findings implied. The record establishes the court’s dispositional orders were
based on the potential harm to William stemming from mother’s physical and
emotional abuse of William’s half-sibling, mother’s history of violence toward
father, mother’s ongoing anger issues, and ongoing concerns regarding
mother’s mental health. As the required findings under subdivision (e) can
be implied from the record, the juvenile court’s failure to state these findings
on the record does not warrant reversal of the court’s dispositional orders.
//
//
//
//

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders are
affirmed. The motion to dismiss filed by DCFS is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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