In re S.H. CA2/6

CourtListener 10004509Calctapp16 lug 2024

Testo completo

Filed 7/16/24 In re S.H. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re S.H., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B333723
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 22JV00362)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

T.L. (mother) appeals from the orders of the juvenile court
terminating her parental rights to her five-year-old daughter,
S.H., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 Mother contends the juvenile court erred
when it found she failed to prove the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception to adoption. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
We incorporate by reference our prior nonpublished opinion
denying mother’s petition for extraordinary writ. (T.L. v.
Superior Court (Aug. 14, 2023, B326173) [nonpub. opn.]; see also
In re Bella L. (May 13, 2024, B331973) [nonpub. opn.].)2 We
summarize only those facts necessary to resolve this appeal.
In November 2022, Santa Barbara County Child Welfare
Services (CWS) secured a protective custody warrant and
detained four-year-old S.H. and her newborn baby sister Bella
after Bella tested positive for amphetamine at birth.3 CWS filed
a dependency petition alleging, among other things, Bella’s
positive drug test, mother’s drug use, mother’s “substantial” child
welfare history, including the removal and subsequent adoptions
of mother’s two older children, and mother’s criminal history.
In January 2023, at the contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in
the amended petition to be true, bypassed reunification services
for mother, and granted mother supervised visitation with S.H.
By the six-month status review hearing, mother was
receiving two hours of visitation with S.H. per month. Although

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior
opinions and the record in the prior matters. (See Evid. Code, §§
452, subd. (d), 459.)

3 Bella’s status is not the subject of this appeal.

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the visits “went well,” the resource parents reported that S.H.
had “a lot of anxiety” after visits with mother, including “tears
and emotional dysregulation.” It generally took “about a day or
two for [S.H.] to become herself after visitation.” The juvenile
court adopted the department’s recommended findings and orders
and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
In November 2023, the Court Appointed Special Advocate
and the department each prepared reports, recommending the
juvenile court terminate parental rights and select adoption as
the permanent plan. The department reported that mother
visited S.H. in July and October, but no visit occurred in August
or September.4 Mother arrived on time to the visits and brought
snacks to share, books to read, and games to play. S.H. enjoyed
the visits and cried when they ended. She clung to mother, and
mother kissed and hugged her goodbye. S.H. continued to cry but
stopped after she was comforted by resource mother.
In December 2023, the juvenile court conducted a contested
section 366.26 hearing. The department social worker and
mother testified. After listening to testimony and considering the
evidence presented, the juvenile court found that S.H. was likely
to be adopted and mother had not proven the parental-benefit
exception applied. The juvenile court terminated mother’s
parental rights.
Discussion
Mother contends the juvenile court committed reversible
error when it terminated her parental rights in light of the
beneficial parent-child relationship S.H. shared with mother and
the detriment severing that relationship would cause S.H.

4 The department social worker testified that mother also
had a visit in November 2023.

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“‘At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds that the child is
adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless a statutory
exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
One exception to this rule is the parental-benefit exception,
which allows the juvenile court to avoid termination if it “finds a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).)
To avoid termination of parental rights under this
exception, a parent must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, three things: (1) regular visitation and contact with the
child, (2) the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and (3)
termination of the attachment would be detrimental to the child.
“When the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit
exception applies such that it would not be in the best interest of
the child to terminate parental rights, and the court should select
a permanent plan other than adoption.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 636-637 (Caden C.).)
Our review of the juvenile court’s ruling on whether the
parental-benefit exception applies incorporates two standards of
review. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) We apply

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the substantial evidence standard to the first two prongs of the
exception and abuse of discretion to the third prong. (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court assumed, for purposes of its decision,
that mother had regular visitation and contact with S.H., “although”
the juvenile court opined, “it appears she hasn’t.” CWS disagrees with
the juvenile court’s assumption, noting that mother missed four out of
11 monthly visits. We need not determine whether mother satisfied
this first element because her failure to satisfy the second and third
elements is dispositive.
Beneficial Relationship
In determining whether the “‘child would benefit from
continuing the relationship,’” the focus is on the child. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The exception must be examined on
a case-by-case basis, taking into account “a slew of factors” which
affect a parent/child bond such as, “‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632, quoting In
re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
Here, the juvenile court acknowledged that S.H. “knows
who her mother is, likes her mother, loves her mother. She sees
her, she runs to her, is happy, loves her, and cries when the
visitation ends, but there’s not much more to that relationship,
and nothing there that would imply that the child would benefit
from continuing that relationship over and above the permanency
that adoption would confer on the child.”
We agree. S.H. was only four years old when she was
removed from mother’s care. By the time of the section 366.26
hearing, S.H. had lived with her prospective adoptive parents for
a little over one year. Although visits went “very well,” and S.H.
was happy and excited to see mother, S.H. suffered “a lot of

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anxiety” and “emotional dysregulation” afterward. Additionally,
the social worker testified there was no indication that S.H.
asked for mother when visits were missed.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding as to this element.
Detriment Caused by Termination
“When [the juvenile court] weighs whether termination
would be detrimental, . . . the question is just whether losing the
relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent
not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) “‘If severing the
natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a
substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even
considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination
would ‘harm[]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental
rights.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Here, the juvenile court properly weighed the benefits of
adoption and found no evidence of detriment. As the juvenile
court explained, “I cannot make a finding at this time on the
basis of this evidence that there’s a relationship the continuation
of which would benefit the child; that it’s a substantial emotional
attachment, the termination of which would be detrimental to the
child.”
Indeed, the social worker testified that “no detriment exists
in terminating parental rights” in this case. Rather, the
department believed it would be “more detrimental” to continue
the relationship with mother “in place of implementing a
permanent plan of adoption.”
To be sure, S.H. is “thriving” in her current placement with
paternal aunt and uncle with whom she and Bella have lived
since November 2022. S.H. looks to paternal aunt and uncle to

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meet her needs and they are committed to adopting her.
Although S.H. is too young to fully understand the complexity of
adoption, when asked if she could live in one place forever, S.H.
said she wanted to live with the prospective adoptive parents,
whom she refers to as “mom and dad.”
On this record, there was no abuse of discretion.
Disposition
The judgment (orders terminating parental rights and
selecting adoption as the permanent plan) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Gustavo Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, Giselle Marie Achecar, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson N. Hornick,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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