People v. Munoz CA2/2

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Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Munoz CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B329389

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. VA033493)

DELFINO OLIVAS MUNOZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, LaRonda J. McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
In 1996, a jury convicted appellant Delfino Olivas Munoz
(Munoz) of special circumstance murder committed when he was
24 years old. Munoz was sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2023, Munoz moved,
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1203.01, for a proceeding under
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook) seeking to preserve evidence for
a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. The
trial court denied Munoz’s motion because he was statutorily
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. Munoz appeals,
contending section 3051 violates equal protection by excluding
young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP. Munoz further
contends his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
We reject these contentions and affirm the trial court’s order.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 3051
Section 3051 gives certain youth offenders the opportunity
for parole in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration,
depending on the length of the sentence they are serving for their
“controlling offense.”2 (§ 3051, subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(1)–(4);
Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
The Legislature amended section 3051 in 2017 to allow
parole eligibility hearings for juveniles—but not young adult
offenders—sentenced to LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4); Stats. 2017,
ch. 684, § 1.5.) The purpose of this amendment was to bring

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 “ ‘Controlling offense’ ” is the offense or enhancement for
which the longest term of imprisonment was imposed. (§ 3015,
subd. (a)(2)(B).)

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California into compliance with federal law articulating the
constitutional limits on sentencing young offenders. (Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) Mar. 21, 2017, p. 4.) In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S.
460 [132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407] (Miller), the Supreme
Court held mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles
unconstitutional. In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S.
190 [136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599] (Montgomery), the Supreme
Court made the prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences for
juveniles retroactive. Montgomery provided, however, that “[a]
State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile
homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by
resentencing them.” (Id. at p. 212.) By amending section 3051,
the Legislature sought “to remedy the now unconstitutional
juvenile sentences of [LWOP],” without the need for “a
resentencing hearing, which is time-consuming, expensive, and
subject to extended appeals.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 21,
2017, p. 3; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346–347
(Morales).)
Neither Miller nor Montgomery declared LWOP sentences
for young adults unconstitutional, and section 3051 continues to
exclude from the youth offender parole hearing process several
categories of offenders, including young adults sentenced to
LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) The statute “ ‘permit[s] the
reevaluation of the fitness to return to society of persons who
committed serious offenses prior to reaching full cognitive and
emotional maturity,’ unless the person was ‘between 18 and 25
years of age when they committed their offense [and] sentenced
to [LWOP].’ [Citation.] It therefore ‘distinguishes both between

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those who committed their offenses under 18 years of age and
those between 18 and 25 years of age, and between offenders 18
to 25 years of age sentenced to prison terms with the possibility
of parole and those in the same age group who have been
sentenced to [LWOP].’ ” (People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
769, 777 (Acosta).)
After enactment of section 3051, the California Supreme
Court decided Franklin, which created a process for offenders
who qualified for a youth offender parole hearing under section
3051 to preserve youth-related mitigation evidence. (Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284.) A Franklin proceeding gives
“ ‘an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time
of the offense so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later,
may properly discharge its obligation to “give great weight to”
youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether
the offender is “fit to rejoin society” ’ ” despite having committed a
serious crime while he was a child in the eyes of the law. (Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
II. Equal protection
On appeal, Munoz initially raised two equal protection
arguments. He first argued that section 3051 violates equal
protection by treating young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP
differently from young adult offenders convicted of murder and
serving parole eligible sentences. Munoz next argued there is no
rational basis for treating young adult offenders sentenced to
LWOP differently from juvenile offenders (offenders younger
than 18 at the time of the offense) sentenced to LWOP.
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 held that it was

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not irrational for the Legislature to exclude from youth offender
parole eligibility young adults serving LWOP sentences. (Id. at
p. 864.) Munoz concedes that Hardin forecloses his equal
protection challenge premised on the statutory distinction
between young adults sentenced to LWOP and young adults
convicted of murder who receive non-LWOP sentences. The
Supreme Court in Hardin did not address Munoz’s alternative
equal protection argument—that section 3051 violates equal
protection by excluding young adult offenders sentenced to
LWOP while including juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP.
We reject that contention for reasons we discuss.
“Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution
guarantee to all persons the equal protection of the laws. The
right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the
government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people
unequally without some justification.’ [Citations.] ‘The California
equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to
the federal equal protection clause.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 189, 195 (Jackson).)
“To succeed on an equal protection claim, [Munoz] must
first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects
two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”
(People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 195 (Edwards).)
This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated
for all purposes, but whether they are similarly situated for
purposes of the law challenged. (People v. Morales (2016) 63
Cal.4th 399, 408.)
If the appellant can establish a class of criminal defendants
is similarly situated to another class of defendants who are

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sentenced differently, we look to determine whether there is a
rational basis for the difference. (Edwards, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) Under this highly deferential standard,
“equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no
‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).)
To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must
negate “ ‘ “every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) “It is both the prerogative and the
duty of the Legislature to define degrees of culpability and
punishment, and to distinguish between crimes in this regard.
[Citation.] Courts routinely decline to intrude upon the ‘broad
discretion’ such policy judgments entail. [Citation.] Equal
protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.” (Turnage, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 74.) We independently review Munoz’s challenge to
section 3051. (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.)
Munoz’s equal protection claim fails because even if we
assume he is similarly situated to juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP, he fails to demonstrate the absence of a rational basis for
treating him differently from the juvenile offenders. As the
appellate court explained in People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193: “The Legislature had a rational basis to
distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life
without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a
sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But
the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when
imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26.

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[Citation.] . . . [T]he Legislature could rationally decide to
remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Id. at
p. 204.)
Age is a rational basis for distinguishing juvenile LWOP
offenders from young adults sentenced to LWOP. Drawing the
line at age 18 is “ ‘the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ ” (People v. Argeta
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482; see Roper v. Simmons (2005)
543 U.S. 551, 574 [125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1].) In criminal
sentencing matters, both the United States Supreme Court and
the California Supreme Court have found the line drawn between
juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one. (See, e.g., Miller,
supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471 [“children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons,
supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574 [“The age of 18 is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1380 [the
age of 18 “is the line the [United States Supreme Court] has
drawn in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence”].)
Although section 3051 is not a sentencing statute, it
impacts the length of sentence served. (In re Murray (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 456, 464.) California appellate courts have therefore
concluded that, for purposes of LWOP offenders, the line drawn
at 18 is a rational one when distinguishing juvenile LWOP
offenders from young adult LWOP offenders. (Ibid.; Morales,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th
at p. 199; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 779–780; In re
Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 482.) We reach the same
conclusion here. The age threshold is rational and not arbitrary.

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III. Cruel and unusual punishment
Munoz argues that excluding young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP from youth offender parole hearings violates
the ban on cruel and unusual punishment under the California
Constitution.
The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” (U.S. Const., 8th
Amend.) The California Constitution affords somewhat greater
protection to criminal defendants by prohibiting “[c]ruel or
unusual punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17, italics added; see
People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092.) “A
punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of the California
Constitution ‘if, although not cruel or unusual in its method, it is
so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.’ [Citation.] Because it is the Legislature’s function to
define crimes and prescribe punishments, the judiciary should
not interfere ‘unless a statute prescribes a penalty “out of all
proportion to the offense.” ’ ” (People v. Baker (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 711, 723 (Baker).)
Munoz concedes his sentence was neither cruel nor unusual
at the time it was imposed. Munoz nevertheless argues his
LWOP sentence became constitutionally infirm once the
Legislature granted youth offender parole hearings to some
offenders over the age of 18. By extending relief to non-juvenile
offenders, Munoz argues, the Legislature recognized that young
adults up to age 26 are less culpable than those who commit
offenses after age 26 and should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate eligibility for parole. Munoz’s argument overlooks
the fact that in 2020—four years after the Legislature extended

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youth offender parole hearings to young adult offenders up to age
23, and two years after it extended such relief to offenders up to
age 26—the California Supreme Court held the death penalty for
young adult offenders is not cruel and unusual punishment. (See
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429 (Flores).) As the court
in In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427 noted, if the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment “does not prohibit a sentence of
death for [young adult offenders], then most assuredly, it does
not prohibit the lesser LWOP sentence.” (Id. at p. 439.)
Although Flores was decided on federal constitutional grounds
(Flores, at p. 429), Munoz offers no persuasive argument against
applying the court’s reasoning in that case to claims under the
California Constitution. (See Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
p. 733 [noting the “considerable overlap in the state and federal
approaches” to cruel and/or unusual punishment].) We therefore
reject Munoz’s argument that LWOP sentences imposed on young
adult offenders constitute cruel or unusual punishment in
violation of the California Constitution. (See Williams, at p. 439
[rejecting argument LWOP sentences are cruel and unusual
punishment when imposed on 21-year-old offenders]; People v.
Argeta, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482 [rejecting claim that a
functional LWOP sentence for an 18-year-old offender is
categorically cruel and/or unusual punishment].)
IV. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Munoz contends that should this court determine that any
arguments he raises on appeal have been waived or forfeited by
failure to assert them in the trial court below, such waiver or
forfeiture would be the result of defense counsel’s failure to
perform with reasonable competence. We find no such waiver or
forfeiture, and no merit in any of the arguments Munoz raises on

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appeal. We therefore reject his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Munoz’s request for a Franklin
proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

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