CourtListener 10003553•In re D.M. CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 7/15/24 In re D.M. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.M., a Person Coming B334166
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 22LJJP00291
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.J., JR.
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Father P.J., Jr., appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights. P.J. contends the court erred
in declining to consider placing his son D.M. with paternal
grandmother under the relative placement preference set forth
in section 361.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.1 The
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) contends P.J. has no standing to appeal from the court’s
order and, alternatively, the court correctly found section 361.3
did not apply. We agree and affirm the court’s order in its
entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
D.M. was born in July 2022. At the hospital, D.M.’s mother
reported she had used methamphetamine during her pregnancy,
although her and D.M.’s. toxicology screenings were negative.
DCFS was contacted. Mother told DCFS that P.J. was the
baby’s father. They had split up after the first few months of
her pregnancy. Mother also completed a parentage questionnaire
stating she believed P.J. was D.M.’s father, he had held himself
out as the father, but he was not present for the birth and had
not signed the birth certificate.2 Mother said she had no contact
with P.J., but she had learned he recently had been arrested.
P.J. had a violent criminal history from 2012 to 2022.
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Mother, who is not a party to this appeal, was legally
married to, but separated from, another man (E.C.) when D.M.
was conceived. E.C. said he was not D.M.’s father. The court
ultimately found E.C. was “no type of father to D.M.”
2
A DCFS social worker first met with P.J. at the sheriff’s
station, where he was in custody. He confirmed he had not
seen the baby and had been present only during the beginning
of mother’s pregnancy.3 In a telephone call a few days later,
P.J. said he could not care for D.M. “at the moment” due to
financial instability. He “provided possible placement for the
child.” (The detention report does not state whom P.J. identified,
but the social worker unsuccessfully attempted to contact
paternal grandmother the same day.)
DCFS obtained court authorization to remove D.M.
from parents. On July 15, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300
petition on behalf of D.M. based on mother’s substance abuse,
P.J.’s domestic violence incident with the mother of D.M.’s
paternal half-sibling C.J., and P.J.’s inability to care for D.M.
A month later, on August 16, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended
petition adding allegations of P.J.’s substance abuse.
At the July 18, 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
found P.J. to be D.M.’s alleged father. P.J. did not appear. The
court removed D.M. from parents’ custody. D.M. was placed
with foster caregiver Ms. C.
DCFS spoke with paternal grandfather and paternal aunt
Vanessa on August 4, 2022. They confirmed P.J. was in jail.
Paternal grandfather said he could not “care for [D.M.]
financially,” but he wanted to have a relationship with
3 P.J. had been in a relationship with the mother of his
other child C.J. He had been involved in a domestic violence
incident with her in January. On July 29, 2022, C.J.’s mother
obtained sole custody of C.J. and a temporary restraining order
against P.J. A criminal protective order also was issued.
3
“his grandchild.” Aunt Vanessa also could not provide a home
for D.M. but said she and paternal family could offer support
through other means, such as childcare and transportation.
They wanted to have a relationship with D.M.
A week later, on August 11, 2022, a social worker
again spoke with P.J. He clarified he “ ‘want[ed] to be a father’ ”
to D.M., but currently could not care for him due to his
incarceration. P.J. told the social worker he had spoken to
paternal relatives, and they had agreed to care for D.M. while
he was incarcerated. He asked that paternal aunt Vanessa
be considered for relative placement. On August 17, 2022,
P.J. pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon. He later
was sentenced to four years in state prison.
The juvenile court arraigned P.J. on August 24, 2022.
He filed a statement of parentage that same day stating he
believed he was D.M.’s parent and asking the court to make
a presumed father finding. P.J. also identified paternal aunts
Valerie, Vanessa, and L.J., as well as paternal grandmother,
as possible relative placements in his relative information sheet.
The court deferred its paternity finding. It ordered a pretrial
release investigation of paternal relatives.
DCFS filed its pretrial release investigation report
on September 6, 2022. On August 31, 2022, DCFS met with
paternal relatives and assessed their home for D.M.’s placement.4
Paternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, paternal aunt
4 DCFS assessed paternal aunt L.J.’s home on August 26,
2022. She did not have room for D.M. in her home but could
help paternal family with childcare.
4
Vanessa and her two children, and paternal aunt Valerie
shared the home. Paternal grandmother and aunts wanted to
provide a home for D.M. They would care for D.M. as a family,
with help from aunt L.J. They had never met D.M. and asked
for visitation. DCFS could not recommend D.M. be placed with
paternal relatives at that time, however. Paternal grandfather,
who lived in the home, had a criminal record—dating back
to 2012 and earlier in 1992, 1994, and 1997—requiring further
review by the RFA (resource family approval) division. DCFS
gave paternal grandmother, Vanessa, and Valerie an RFA
application to have the home reviewed further.
Paternal grandmother turned in the RFA application
about two weeks later, on September 16, 2022. She told the
social worker she and the other paternal relatives “still very
much want[ed] to start visitation” with D.M. DCFS submitted
the application for processing on September 19, 2022, and asked
the court to order visitation between D.M. and paternal relatives.
On October 20, 2022, the court sustained the amended
section 300 petition as to P.J.’s domestic violence issues and
his and mother’s substance abuse issues under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court convened the disposition
hearing a month later, on November 21, 2022. P.J. was not
present—he was in the process of being transferred to state
prison. The court declared D.M. a dependent of the juvenile
court, removed him from parental custody, bypassed family
reunification services as to mother (due to her failure to reunify
with her older children), bypassed reunification services for P.J.
based on his status as an alleged father and four-year period
of incarceration (§ 361.5, subds. (a), (e)), and set a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing for March 21, 2023. The court
5
found D.M.’s current placement appropriate. After the court
made its findings, P.J.’s counsel relayed his client’s request for
a paternity test. The court stated it would order the DNA test
once P.J.’s place of incarceration was determined—a necessity
for the order.
On December 23, 2022, P.J.’s counsel walked on the
proposed DNA testing order with P.J.’s place of incarceration.
The court issued the order on January 3, 2023. On February 23,
2023, the Department informed the court that D.M.’s DNA
sample had been collected in January, but P.J.’s had not, as he
had been transferred to a new facility. The testing lab required
a new court order, which the court issued on February 27, 2023.
The taking of P.J.’s DNA sample continued to be delayed
due to his transfers to different facilities—requiring the court to
issue a new order each time—and a backlog in sample collections
within the prison system. Pending receipt of the DNA results,
the court continued the March 21, 2023 section 366.26 hearing
several times—to June, August, October, and, finally, December
2023.
In the meantime, as reported in the permanency planning
adoption assessment, paternal relatives had withdrawn their
RFA application as of January 27, 2023. On that day, paternal
aunt Valerie told the social worker, “ ‘We can’t take on a full
commitment with someone else[’]s child until they are 18 years
old. So we withdrew the application until we find out [if D.M.]
is my brother’s.’ ” The report noted Ms. C. wanted to adopt D.M.
if he was not placed with paternal relatives. She had been caring
for D.M. since he left the hospital after his birth—she loved him
and saw “ ‘him as [her] own.’ ” DCFS recommended adoption
by Ms. C. as D.M.’s permanent plan.
6
In its May 2023 status review report, DCFS noted
paternal relatives were visiting D.M. bi-weekly for two hours,
“while they navigate if they would like to be considered for
permanency for [D.M.].” They did not want to move forward
with the RFA process until they were sure of D.M.’s paternity.
After two monitored visits in February 2023 and one in early
March went well, DCFS liberalized paternal relatives’ visits
to unmonitored. It also offered paternal relatives additional
visitation hours, but the family declined.
On May 22, 2023, the court identified adoption as
D.M.’s permanent plan and found his placement continued
to be appropriate.
Paternal relatives stopped visiting D.M. after his first
birthday in July 2023. Ms. C. told DCFS in September, and
again in October, that she had not heard from paternal relatives
since that July visit. In November 2023, DCFS reported that
D.M. and Ms. C. appeared to be bonded with each other. D.M.
called Ms. C. “ ‘mama,’ ” and he turned to her for support.
Ms. C. was committed to adopting D.M.
On November 6, 2023, DCFS finally received the paternity
test results from the testing facility. They showed P.J. was
D.M.’s biological father. On November 28, 2023, P.J. appeared
in court virtually from his facility. The court found him to be
D.M.’s biological father based on the testing results. P.J. asked
to be present in person for future hearings. As state prison
facilities were not honoring in-person court attendance
by inmates, the court ordered P.J. to be made available to
appear at the December 14, 2023 section 366.26 hearing by
WebEx (video) or phone from his place of incarceration.
7
The court convened the section 366.26 hearing on
December 14, 2023. P.J. was not present. The court denied
P.J.’s counsel’s request for a continuance. The court noted P.J.
had appeared by phone from his facility at the last hearing
and was told to call in that morning but had not.
Paternal grandmother, who was present, addressed
the court first. She explained the family had been awaiting
the results of D.M.’s paternity test, which had been delayed
until recently. She wanted to care for D.M. now that it was
certain he was P.J.’s child. The court stated that the time to
consider relative preference for placement “ha[d] passed.” The
court explained P.J. had been denied the opportunity to reunify
with D.M. on the same day he had asked for the paternity test.
The court continued, “even as a biological father[,] he’s not
entitled to the [reunification] services that would have been
ordered, so he and the mother were never given the opportunity
[to reunify].” P.J., therefore, “w[as] never on a path to reunify.
It d[id]n’t matter that he was bio or not.” Paternal grandmother
thought that was unfair given the family had received the
paternity test results only a few weeks earlier. The court
explained, “perhaps if you had expressed an interest on
November 21st, 2022, you could have been considered. But
the fact that you are here now and we are at the hearing that
we’re at, there is no legal basis for [the court] to consider you.”
Paternal grandmother responded the family had been visiting
D.M. and could not attend the hearing a year earlier because
someone had objected and excluded them.
The court then heard argument on DCFS’s
recommendation to terminate parental rights. Counsel for P.J.
objected to the termination of parental rights and asked that
8
D.M. be placed with paternal grandmother. Counsel for DCFS
noted P.J. had had no contact with D.M., and parental relatives
had not asked consistently for the child’s placement. Despite P.J.
having said he was D.M.’s father “from the beginning,” paternal
relatives “wait[ed] and wait[ed] to make sure they were related.”
D.M. also was “doing very well” in the home of his caregiver
who wanted to adopt him. Counsel for D.M. joined in the
recommendation to terminate parental rights.
After considering argument and DCFS’s reports, the
court terminated parents’ parental rights over D.M., selected
adoption as his permanent plan, and designated Ms. C. as D.M.’s
prospective adoptive parent. The court allowed visitation—
at Ms. C.’s discretion—between D.M. and paternal relatives
until the adoption was finalized. P.J. appealed from the order
terminating parental rights and the order denying the child’s
placement with paternal grandmother.
DISCUSSION
P.J. challenges the court’s order terminating his parental
rights solely on the ground the court erred in denying his request
to place D.M. with paternal grandmother without applying
the factors under the relative placement preference set forth
in section 361.3. He asks us to reverse the order terminating
parental rights and remand the matter for a section 361.3
hearing to consider placing D.M. with paternal grandmother
before the court selects and implements a permanent plan
for D.M. P.J. lacks standing on appeal to challenge the court’s
placement decision, and, in any event, section 361.3 does
not apply.
9
1. P.J. lacks standing to challenge the placement order
made at the hearing terminating his parental rights
“Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and
doubts are resolved in its favor, only a person aggrieved by
a decision may appeal.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236
(K.C.).) An “aggrieved person” is one who has a legally cognizable
interest that the court’s decision has injuriously affected “in an
immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote
consequence of the decision.” (Ibid.; see also In re Isaiah S.
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 435 (Isaiah S.).) Thus, a party does
not have standing “to urge errors on appeal that affect only
the interests of others.” (In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492,
499 (A.K.).)
The section 361.3 relative placement preference requires
the court to give “preferential consideration” to a relative’s
request for placement of a dependent child who has been removed
from a parent’s custody. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) “ ‘Preferential
consideration’ ” means “that the relative seeking placement
shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.”
(Id., subd. (c)(1).) “[T]he fact that a parent makes his or her
wishes known to the court,” however, “does not necessarily
establish standing for the parent to challenge the court’s ruling
against the parent’s wishes for relative placement.” (Isaiah S.,
supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) Section 361.3 “protects a
relative’s ‘separate interest’ in a relationship with the child.
[Citation.] In contrast, a parent’s interest in a dependency
proceeding is in reunifying with the child. [Citations.]
The parental interest in reunification is distinguished from
a relative’s ‘separate interest’ in preferential placement
10
consideration or in having a relationship with the child.
[Citation.]” (A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.)
After reunification services are terminated or bypassed
(as was the case here), however, “ ‘the parents’ interest in the
care, custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer
paramount. Rather, at this point, “the focus shifts to the needs
of the child for permanency and stability.” ’ ” (K.C., supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 236.) For this reason, a parent generally does
not have standing to raise relative placement issues on appeal
where the parent’s reunification services have been terminated
or bypassed. (A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.)
Nevertheless, our high court has held “[a] parent’s appeal
from a judgment terminating parental rights [can] confer[ ]
standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s
placement,” but “only if the placement order’s reversal advances
the parent’s argument against terminating parental rights.”
(K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 234–235, 238 [finding father
who did not contest the termination of his parental rights in
the juvenile court could not be aggrieved by the court’s order
denying grandparents’ section 388 petition to have his child
placed with them and thus had no standing to appeal the
placement decision].) This is because “[t]he placement of a
dependent child with relatives can, under certain circumstances,
make the termination of parental rights unnecessary.” (Id.
at p. 237.) Specifically, under what is known as the relative
caregiver exception, a juvenile court may choose not to terminate
parental rights when “[t]he child is living with a relative who is
unable or unwilling to adopt the child because of circumstances
that do not include an unwillingness to accept legal or financial
responsibility for the child, but who is willing and capable of
11
providing the child with a stable and permanent environment
through legal guardianship, and the removal of the child
from the custody of their relative would be detrimental to the
emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
In K.C., however, our high court found the father had
“no remaining, legally cognizable interest in [his child’s] affairs,
including his placement,” where he did not argue below—or
on appeal—that a statutory exception to termination of parental
rights applied or contend the order terminating his parental
rights “was improper in any respect.” (K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th
at pp. 236–237.) P.J. contends that is not the case here, as
he objected (through counsel) to the court’s termination of his
parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing and “maintained
he wished to maintain a relationship with D.M.” As in K.C.,
however, P.J.’s counsel never argued a statutory exception
to termination of his parental rights applied to support that
objection. Nor did P.J. contest the court’s finding that D.M. was
adoptable, or its earlier orders identifying adoption as D.M.’s
permanent plan and finding D.M.’s placement with Ms. C. was
appropriate. He thus would seem to have “no remaining, legally
cognizable interest in [D.M.’s] affairs.” (Id. at p. 237.)
Nevertheless, relying on In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th
1 (H.G.), and In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042
(Esperanza C.), P.J. argues he has standing because, had D.M.
been placed with paternal grandmother, he may have been able
to advance the application of the relative caregiver exception
against the termination of his parental rights—an argument he
did not have absent that placement. The facts and procedural
posture of those cases are distinguishable.
12
In H.G., parents appealed from an order removing
their child from her grandparents’ custody under section 387—
“without considering whether the child’s placement was no longer
appropriate in view of the criteria in section 361.3”—and the
judgment terminating their parental rights. (H.G., supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4, 6–7.) There, had the child not been
removed from her relative placement, the relative caregiver
exception to adoption might have applied as the child had
been living with her grandparents. As the court explained,
“a placement decision under section 387 has the potential to
alter the court’s determination of the child’s best interests and
the appropriate permanency plan for that child, and thus may
affect a parent’s interest in his or her legal status with respect
to the child.” (Id. at p. 10.)
Relying on H.G., the court in Esperanza C. held a mother
had standing to challenge the juvenile court’s denial of her
section 388 petition that argued the child services agency
had abused its discretion in rejecting a relative’s placement
application—after denying his request for a criminal records
exemption—and asking the court to place the child with
the relative. (Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1050–1051, 1053–1054.) The child, who had been placed
in a prospective adoptive home, also appealed from the court’s
denial of her own section 388 petition seeking placement with
the relative. (Id. at pp. 1049, 1051.) The juvenile court found
the relative’s conviction was “exemptible” but believed it had no
jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of the exemption and
summarily denied the petitions. (Id. at p. 1051.) The mother’s
parental rights were terminated. (Id. at p. 1052.) The reviewing
court found the mother had standing to appeal because resolution
13
of the issue in favor of placing the child with the relative made
an alternative permanency plan to adoption “a statutory option
for the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 1054.)
As the K.C. court noted, in both these cases the parents
had standing to challenge the placement orders because, unlike
the father there, “the possibility existed that reversing those
orders might lead the juvenile court not to terminate paternal
rights.” (K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 237.) Similarly, no
circumstances existed here at the time of the placement decision
that would make application of the relative caregiver exception
a realistic possibility.
In H.G., the child already had been living with the
grandparents and had developed a relationship with them—
facts key to the application of the relative caretaker exception.
(See § 366.26, subd.(c)(1)(A).) D.M., on the other hand, never
was placed in paternal grandmother’s care, nor does the record
suggest he developed a bond with her during their bi-weekly
visits. Moreover, the placement decision in H.G. concerned
the child’s removal from the relatives’ home (H.G., supra, 146
Cal.App.4th at p. 10), not the removal of a child from the only
home he had known so as to place him with a relative, as would
be the case here.
And in Esperanza C., the agency had applied the wrong
standard in finding the relative’s home was unsuitable for
the child’s placement. (Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1050, 1061.) Thus, there was a realistic possibility the
relative’s home would be approved if the correct standard were
applied, which in turn could result in a change of placement and
affect the court’s determination as to the child’s permanent plan.
(Id. at p. 1054.) Critically, paternal relatives here withdrew
14
their RFA application, thereby removing paternal grandmother’s
home from consideration for D.M.’s placement. Paternal relatives
wanted to be sure of D.M.’s paternity, but nothing in the record
indicates paternal grandmother resubmitted the RFA application
after receiving the paternity results. And, unlike the parent
and child in Esperanza C., neither P.J. nor paternal grandmother
filed a section 388 petition asking the court to change D.M.’s
placement. Rather, they waited until the section 366.26 hearing
to ask the court to consider placing D.M. with paternal
grandmother.
Moreover, in Esperanza C., the child’s counsel obviously
agreed the child should be placed with the relative, having
filed the section 388 petition and appeal on the child’s behalf.
D.M.’s counsel, on the other hand, joined in both DCFS’s
recommendation to terminate paternal rights, and its earlier
recommendation to bypass P.J.’s reunification services due to
his four-year term of incarceration. Finally, the relative and
his wife in Esperanza C. had asked the agency to place the
child with them from the beginning of the proceedings, filed a
grievance with the agency when it denied their home evaluation,
and even attempted to appeal from the juvenile court’s orders.
(Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1050–1051.)
Here, not only did paternal grandmother withdraw her RFA
application, but she also stopped visiting D.M. months before
the section 366.26 hearing and did not appeal the denial of
her placement request. (See Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034–1035 (Cesar V.) [relative, although
not a party, had standing to appeal denial of her placement
request under section 361.3].)
15
Noting we must liberally construe his standing to challenge
the court’s purported error in failing to consider placement
with paternal grandmother, P.J.—mirroring the language in
Esperanza C.—argues that, even if “unlikely,” an alternative
permanency plan to adoption remained a “statutory option” for
the court. (See Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.)
We disagree.
D.M.’s placement with paternal grandmother would
not have advanced P.J.’s argument that the relative caregiver
exception applied. By the section 366.26 hearing, D.M. was
a year and five months old. The only home he ever had known
was with Ms. C. He called her “ ‘mama.’ ” He visited paternal
relatives only bi-weekly until his first birthday in July 2023
when they stopped contacting Ms. C.5 Even if the court had
agreed to place D.M. with paternal grandmother, it then would
have “immediately proceeded to the permanency determinations
of the section 366.26 hearing.” (A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at
p. 500 [father who asked the court at the section 366.26 hearing
to place child with grandmother had no standing because
placement with relative would not advance an argument
that his parental rights should not be terminated].) As D.M.
would not have developed the type of relationship with paternal
grandmother that would have made his removal from her
detrimental to his emotional well-being, the relative caregiver
exception could not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A); see A.K.,
5 In September and October 2023, Ms. C. told DCFS
paternal relatives had not contacted her about D.M. since
his birthday visit. Nothing in the record indicates they visited
between October and the December 2023 section 366.26 hearing.
16
at p. 500.) There also was no indication that paternal
grandmother would have been unwilling to adopt D.M., but
willing (and able) to become his legal guardian—another
requirement of the relative caregiver exception. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Rather, a hypothetical chain of events would have had
to occur to make legal guardianship, rather than termination
of parental rights, a possibility: (1) after applying the section
361.3 factors and considering whether paternal grandmother
had established and maintained a relationship with D.M.,6
the juvenile court would have to find it was in D.M.’s best
interest to be removed from Ms. C. and placed with paternal
grandmother; (2) paternal grandmother would have to resubmit
her RFA application to evaluate the home and address paternal
grandfather’s criminal history; (3) after being placed with
paternal grandmother, D.M. would have to form a significant,
emotional attachment to her, and she in turn would have to
agree to become D.M.’s legal guardian; and (4) at a once again
continued section 366.26 hearing, the court would have to apply
the relative caretaker exception thereby preserving P.J.’s
6 In determining whether placement with a relative is
appropriate, the child services agency and court must consider
a list of eight factors, the first of which is the best interest of the
child. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)–(8); In re J.Y. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
473, 477–478 (J.Y.).) After disposition, as was the case here, the
child services agency also must consider whether “the relative
has established and maintained a relationship with the child.”
(§ 361.3, subd. (d); Amber G. v. Superior Court (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 465, 491 (Amber G.).)
17
parental rights. Such “[s]peculation about a hypothetical
situation is not sufficient to support standing.” (In re Cody R.
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 381, 390.)
Accordingly, as there is no nonspeculative basis on which
P.J. could advance application of the relative caregiver exception
if we were to reverse the court’s placement decision, he has no
standing to challenge that decision on appeal.
2. Section 361.3 was inapplicable
Even if we were to conclude P.J. has standing, we would
find no error as section 361.3 did not apply. The application of
a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law that we review
de novo. (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292 (D.P.).)
By its terms, section 361.3 “provides for preferential
consideration of a relative’s request for placement of a child
with the relative early in dependency proceedings, before the
disposition order.” (J.Y., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 477; § 361.3,
subd. (a).) If the child’s placement must change after disposition,
relatives again must be given preference. (§ 361.3, subd. (d)
[“[s]ubsequent to [the disposition hearing], whenever a new
placement of the child must be made, consideration for placement
shall again be given . . . to relatives who have not been found
to be unsuitable and who will fulfill the child’s reunification
or permanent plan requirements”]; J.Y., at p. 478; see also
Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032 [applying § 361.3
after reunification period where child had to be moved].) Some
courts have held the relative preference applies throughout the
reunification period even where a new placement is not required.
(E.g., In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 592 (Maria Q.)
[appellate courts “ ‘consistently’ ” have held “ ‘that the relative
placement preference applies at least through the family
18
reunification period . . . regardless of whether a new placement
is required or is otherwise being considered by the dependency
court’ ”]; but see D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1294 [relative
placement preference “ ‘is applicable after disposition only when
a new placement is necessary’ ”].) In other words, juvenile courts
still “should consider relatives who have come forward [during
the reunification period] after an initial placement with a
nonrelative.” (Amber G., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.)
After the reunification period, therefore, the preference
no longer applies, absent a need to change the child’s placement.
In exceptional cases, however, courts have held section 361.3
may apply after the reunification period “where the relative has
made a timely request for placement during the reunification
period and the child welfare agency has not met its statutory
obligations to consider and investigate the relative seeking
placement.” (Maria Q., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 595; see
also, e.g., In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 711–712
(Isabella G.) [relatives requesting placement were entitled to
a hearing under section 361.3 after termination of reunification
services where they asked for placement of the child before
the disposition hearing, but the agency did not conduct a home
assessment and misrepresented the child’s placement could not
be changed for a year]; In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284,
1291–1294, 1299–1301 (R.T.) [reversing denial of relative’s
section 388 petition seeking placement after reunification period
where parent identified relatives early in the case, and relatives’
home assessments were completed, but the agency and court
failed to give relatives preferential consideration earlier in
the case].)
19
None of the above situations was present here. Although
paternal relatives first requested placement before disposition,
they withdrew their RFA application—thus abandoning their
request to be approved for D.M.’s placement—about two months
after the disposition hearing and the court’s effective termination
of the reunification period. There thus was no pending relative
placement request made within the reunification period for
DCFS or the court to give preferential consideration. And, as
D.M. never required a new placement after the disposition—he
was bonded with Ms. C. and doing well in her care—section 361.3
did not apply when the paternal grandmother finally asked the
court to place D.M. with her at the section 366.26 hearing—more
than a year after P.J.’s reunification services had been bypassed.
Nor does the record suggest DCFS or the court failed to
comply with its statutory obligations to consider or investigate
paternal relatives early in the case so as to give rise to the
statute’s application. In both R.T. and Isabella G., the child
services agencies knew of relatives who wanted custody but
did not consider them as placement options during the early
stages of the case, as required under section 361.3. Here,
once P.J. stated paternal relatives were willing to care for D.M.,
DCFS conducted a pretrial release investigation of the relatives’
shared home. DCFS was unable to recommend D.M.’s placement
with paternal relatives at that time, however, as paternal
grandfather’s criminal history required further assessment.
DCFS thus gave paternal relatives an RFA application so they
could pursue having their home approved for D.M.’s placement
and, once completed, promptly submitted it to the RFA division
for consideration—all before the jurisdiction and disposition
hearings. The approval process ceased only because paternal
20
relatives voluntarily withdrew the RFA application, not
because DCFS shirked its obligation to give them preferential
consideration for D.M.’s placement.
P.J. nonetheless argues the preference still applied at the
section 366.26 hearing due to the lengthy delay in the paternity
testing. He compares the testing delays to the agencies’ delays
in assessing relatives for placement in R.T. and in Isabella G.
and argues paternal grandmother should have been considered
under section 361.3 “once paternity was established.” We
can’t agree. The delays in the paternity testing were due to
P.J.’s incarceration, not DCFS’s or the juvenile court’s conduct,
as in R.T. or Isabella G. P.J.’s place of incarceration had to be
included in the testing order, which was not provided to the court
until late December 2022. The court issued the order shortly
thereafter, in early January 2023. Further delays ensued due to
P.J.’ s transfer to different facilities—requiring the court to issue
a new order with each transfer, which it did—and a backlog in
the collection of samples within the prison system.
True, paternal relatives withdrew their RFA application
because they wanted DNA confirmation of D.M.’s paternity
before engaging in the placement process. Yet, paternal
grandmother did not resubmit an RFA application upon learning
of the paternity results. Moreover, P.J. had maintained from
the beginning that D.M. was his child. It is unfortunate the
paternity testing took so long, but even if it had been completed
earlier, section 361.3 still would not have applied. P.J. asked
for a paternity test only at the end of the disposition hearing,
after the court already had bypassed his reunification services.
Moreover, the court did not deny P.J. the opportunity to reunify
with D.M. because he was an alleged father alone but also due to
21
his four-year prison sentence. As the juvenile court noted,
P.J. never was on a path to reunification—whether he was
determined to be D.M.’s biological father or not. Indeed, on
November 28, 2023, after the court declared P.J. to be D.M.’s
biological father, the court again found—as it had six months
earlier—D.M.’s permanent plan of adoption was appropriate.
There is no relative placement preference for adoption, however.
(A.K., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 498; see also In re K.L. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 52, 66 [section 361.3 does not apply where
agency “is seeking an adoptive placement for a dependent child
for whom the court has selected adoption as the permanent
placement goal”].)
We simply cannot construe the situation here as one where
relatives asked for placement during the reunification period
but were not approved until after its termination. (See, e.g.,
Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711–712, 722–723.)
Accordingly, under these circumstances, section 361.3 did not
apply, and the court therefore did not err in denying the paternal
grandmother’s and P.J.’s last-minute relative placement request.
22
DISPOSITION
The court’s December 14, 2023 order is affirmed in its
entirety.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
23
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