CourtListener 10003475•People v. Barroca CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Barroca CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330144
(Super. Ct. No. 18CR01674)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
GAIL EVELYN ADAMS
BARROCA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Gail Evelyn Adams Barroca appeals from an order denying
her motion to withdraw her plea. She contends that the trial
court erred in denying her motion and that her trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Barroca was charged with two counts of forgery against an
elder by a caretaker after she forged checks and attempted to
deposit them into her account (Pen. Code,1 § 368, subd. (e); counts
1 & 2). She was also charged with two counts of second degree
commercial burglary (§ 459; counts 3 & 4), grand theft of personal
property (§ 487, subd. (a); count 5), dissuading a witness from
reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 6), sending a
threatening letter for extortion (§ 523; count 7), theft from an
elder by a caretaker (§ 368, subd. (e); count 8), and misdemeanor
identifying information theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); count 9.)2 It
was further alleged as to count 6 that the offense was a serious
and/or violent felony pursuant to sections 1192.7, subdivision (c)
and 667.5.
Barroca pleaded no contest to count 2. Under the plea
agreement, Barroca was to be placed on two years’ probation with
a maximum of 180 days of county jail and was to pay restitution.
The remaining counts were to be dismissed.
Plea form and plea hearing
In July 2022, Barroca submitted a written plea form and
waiver of rights. She signed the form and initialed various
statements in the form, including that she was “not taking any
medication that affects [her] ability to understand this form and
the consequences of [her] plea.” She also initialed next to a
statement that she was pleading no contest “freely and
voluntarily and with full understanding of everything in this
form.” She signed the statement admitting that she read the plea
form and discussed each item in the form with her attorney. Her
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Counts 8 and 9 involved crimes against other victims.
2
attorney, Martin Cohn, also signed the statement stating that he
reviewed the form with her.
At the plea hearing, the trial court asked Cohn if he
reviewed the plea form with Barroca. He said he did and that he
“explained everything to her. She initialed the boxes. She and I
both signed . . . in the proper place.” The prosecutor also asked
Barroca if she reviewed the form with Cohn; she answered “Yes.”
Barroca indicated that Cohn answered any questions she had
regarding the plea form or the plea itself. Barroca also said she
understood the terms of the plea agreement, including that she
would plead no contest to count 2, be placed on two years’
probation, and pay restitution. Barroca also said she understood
she was waiving her right to a jury trial. Barroca pleaded no
contest to count 2. The trial court found that Barroca had
“expressly, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently waived
her rights” and the plea was “free and voluntar[y].”
Sentencing
At sentencing, the trial court gave Barroca the opportunity
to review the terms and conditions of probation and to ask any
questions to her counsel. After Barroca reviewed the probation
terms, the court suspended pronouncement of judgment and
ordered her to serve two years of probation with the conditions,
including that she serve 60 days in county jail. The court also
ordered Barroca to pay $28,492.25 in restitution to Wells Fargo
and $2,500 to a former bank employee.
Probation violation and motion to withdraw
A few months later, the probation department reported
Barroca violated probation. Barroca denied the alleged violation.
The court set a date for a hearing.
3
Meanwhile, Barroca, who was represented by new counsel,
moved to withdraw her no contest plea. She alleged that at the
time she entered her plea, she was taking prescription pain
medication that affected her ability to fully appreciate and
understand the plea agreement. She submitted evidence of
medical records showing that she was prescribed oxycodone
during the time she entered her plea. She declared that had she
not been medicated, she would have been “clear-minded” and
would not have entered the plea.
At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge, who was the
same judge at the plea hearing, noted, “Ms. Barroca, I observed
you. I have a pretty specific recollection of seeing you on a
number of occasions. . . . [T]he Court is pretty sensitive to people
who come to court who may be under the influence of a narcotic
and/or a prescribed medication. And there was nothing that
caught my attention on [the day of the plea hearing] or for that
matter any other day.” The court further stated that they went
over the plea form and “specifically address[ed] the question of
whether or not [she was] taking any medication that would affect
[her] ability to understand the form and the consequences of
entering a plea, and [she] indicated affirmatively on the form and
in a colloquy with the district attorney that you were not taking
any medication that affected your ability to enter the plea. [¶]
And that’s the best record.” Barroca said that she did what Cohn
told her to do. Cohn appeared remotely via Zoom. The court
asked defense counsel if she was prepared to ask Cohn questions,
and she responded, “I’m fine proceeding informally today, but I’ll
submit.” “I am prepared to submit on my written documents and
the paperwork I provided today.” Cohn testified that he reviewed
the plea form with Barroca. However, soon after he began to
4
testify, the court terminated the hearing and continued it to
another day when Cohn could be present in court.
At the continued hearing, Cohn was not present. At the
beginning of the hearing, defense counsel said, “we are prepared
to proceed and it is Ms. Barroca’s request to proceed today. I did
explain to her that it sounds like there’s [a] personal issue with
Mr. Cohn being present today. But I just want to make it clear
that Ms. Barroca would like to proceed today.”
The court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. It found
that “everything in the record indicates she was fully aware and
cognizant of what was the information being provided to her. [¶]
She’s indicated in writing. She initialed the provision of the plea
form which acknowledged that she understood all the terms and
conditions of the plea, that she wasn’t under the influence of any
controlled substance. There’s nothing that would suggest that
she was.”
DISCUSSION
Motion to withdraw plea
Barroca contends the trial court erred in denying her
motion to withdraw her plea and that the court violated her due
process and equal protection rights. We are not persuaded.
Section 1018 provides that a court may “for a good cause
shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn.” The
defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that there
is good cause for withdrawal of their guilty plea. (People v.
Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415-1416.) “ ‘A plea may
not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed
[their] mind.’ ” (Id. at p. 1416.) To establish good cause, the
defendant must show they were “operating under mistake,
ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of [their]
5
free judgment, including inadvertence, fraud, or duress.” (Ibid.)
The defendant must also show prejudice in that they would not
have accepted the plea agreement had it not been for the
mistake. (Ibid.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a
plea for abuse of discretion. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1223, 1254 (Fairbank).) We will not reverse unless the
trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
(People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) We “must adopt the
trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports
them.” (Fairbank, at p. 1254.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Barroca was not under the influence of prescribed medication at
the time she entered her plea and that her plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. The plea form reflects Barroca
initialed the statement indicating that she was not taking any
medication that affected her ability to understand the
consequences of her plea. She also initialed the statement
indicating she entered the plea “freely and voluntarily and with
full understanding of everything in this form.” At the plea
hearing, Barroca said she understood the terms of the plea
agreement, and both she and Cohn said he reviewed the plea
form with her before she signed it. Moreover, the trial judge, who
had multiple opportunities to observe Barroca, found “there was
nothing that caught my attention” at the plea hearing suggesting
Barroca was under the influence of a prescribed medication. (See
Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254 [substantial evidence,
including the trial court’s own observation of the defendant
supported the finding that the defendant was not intoxicated at
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the time of the plea].) Based on these findings, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Barroca’s motion to withdraw her
plea.
Barroca contends her due process rights were violated
when the court “unilateral[ly]” and “perfunctorily” terminated the
hearing in the middle of Cohn’s testimony and denied her motion.
She also contends the court violated her equal protection rights
and failed to apply the clear and convincing legal standard by
denying her an evidentiary hearing. These contentions are
without merit. The record reflects the trial court did not
unilaterally terminate the hearing and that she had an
evidentiary hearing. Moreover, the record reflects Barroca
submitted on her written motion and the medical records she
provided to the court. And, on the day of the continued hearing,
Barroca acknowledged Cohn’s absence but said she wanted “to
make it clear that [she] would like to proceed” regardless of his
absence. Barroca did not object or raise any other arguments,
even though she had the opportunity to do so at the hearing.
Nothing on this record shows the court deprived Barroca of a
hearing. The court applied the correct legal standards to find
that Barroca did not present clear and convincing evidence of
good cause to withdraw her plea.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Barroca contends Cohn rendered ineffective assistance
when he represented her in the plea hearing. We conclude
otherwise.3
3 Barroca asserts she intended to raise the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the trial court, but she was
deprived of the opportunity to do so. The Attorney General
disputes this claim. Regardless, we need not resolve this issue
7
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance must prove (1)
deficient performance, and (2) resulting prejudice. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Riel (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1153, 1175.) We need not address both prongs of this
test. If a defendant fails to establish either prong, the claim
should be denied. (Strickland, at p. 697.)
Barroca has not carried her burden to show counsel’s
performance was deficient. If “ ‘ “the record on appeal sheds no
light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ ”
(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) The record
here is silent as to why Cohn advised Barroca to plead no contest.
(People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403 [the record must
affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose].)
Cohn could have had a legitimate tactical reason for advising
Barroca to accept her plea bargain considering that she was
charged with nine counts involving multiple victims. Had she
gone to trial, she potentially could have been convicted of all nine
counts, including a strike offense (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and the
court could have imposed a more significant sentence, including
prison time. Under these circumstances, we cannot say Cohn had
no legitimate tactical reason for advising Barroca to plead no
contest to one count of elder abuse by forgery and accepting
probation.
because we conclude there was no ineffective assistance of
counsel.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
9
Brian E. Hill, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Susan Wolk, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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