Dey v. Matheka CA2/8

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Filed 7/12/24 Dey v. Matheka CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PENNY DEY, as Successor B321403
Trustee, etc.,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21WCUD00388

v.

ROBERT MATHEKA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. James A. Kaddo, Judge. Affirmed.

Cal Tenant Law and Jeremy Cook for Defendant and
Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________
SUMMARY
The jury in a commercial unlawful detainer trial found in
favor of the lessor. The judgment awards the lessor possession of
the premises and $26,818 in holdover damages. The tenant
(defendant) appeals. He contends the trial court erred by refusing
to allow him to present evidence on his “main defense” of retaliatory
conduct by the lessor. Defendant also contends the lessor’s
mistaken deposit and subsequent reimbursement to defendant of a
rent check, occurring after lessor’s 30-day eviction notice,
invalidated the notice as a matter of law, and the issue should not
have gone to the jury. Defendant claims he had no individual
liability and should have been dismissed from the case; that he was
prejudiced by admission of irrelevant evidence that inflamed the
jury; and the court was biased against him.
We conclude the trial court properly rejected defendant’s
retaliation defense and none of defendant’s other claims has merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Plaintiff Sandra Johnson was a trustee of the Martha H.
Marsh Revocable Trust, the owner of the property. She died during
this litigation, in August 2021, and her sister Penny Dey became
the trustee and plaintiff. (At trial, the parties sometimes referred
to Ms. Johnson as “the former landlord.”)
Ten years earlier, in August 2011, the trust as lessor and
Kala Construction, Inc. as tenant entered into a commercial lease of
an office and utility yard in the City of La Verne. Robert Matheka
signed the lease for the tenant. Mr. Matheka is the defendant.
(A default judgment was entered against Kala Construction.)
The lease was for a one-year term beginning September 1,
2011, and ending September 1, 2012, “with self renewing clause or
30 day notice in writing, prior to lease end.” Rent was $2,300 per
month, with a 6 percent service charge if not paid by the fifth day of

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each month. “Each year during the term of this lease and any
extensions of it, beginning with the second year of the lease, the
monthly rental for the twelve months commencing on September 1,
2012, shall be increased” by an amount “to be determined at that
time, by approval of both parties.” (Underscore omitted.) The rent
was never increased.
Plaintiff wanted to sell the property, and defendant knew that
plaintiff was trying to do so. In February 2020, plaintiff served a
30-day notice of termination of tenancy, but did not proceed further
at that time and continued to receive rent payments from
defendant.
A year later, on March 31, 2021, plaintiff served the operative
30-day notice of termination of tenancy, requiring defendant to
vacate the premises within 30 days.
Defendant remained in the premises and sent plaintiff a
check for May 2021 rent, which plaintiff cashed by mistake. She
reimbursed defendant by sending him a check for $2,300 and
explaining his payment had been deposited by mistake.
On June 24, 2021, plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer
complaint. Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint on
October 27, 2021, seeking possession, back rent or holdover
amounts and attorney fees.
Defendant remained in possession of the premises until the
time of trial, at which he represented himself.
Trial began on March 16, 2022, and ended on March 18, 2022,
with a general verdict for plaintiff, awarding damages of $26,818.
The court entered judgment awarding plaintiff possession of the
premises and $26,818 in holdover damages.
Defendant filed a timely appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant, now represented by counsel, does not claim a lack
of substantial evidence to support the verdict. Instead, he contends

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that assorted legal errors necessitate reversal as a matter of law.
We disagree.
1. Retaliatory eviction
Defendant’s principal claim—which he describes as his “main
defense”—is that the trial court did not allow him to present
evidence or testimony of retaliation. He asserts this case is “an
illegal retaliatory eviction in which the landlord removed the gas
lines and shut off the water in retaliation of [defendant] remaining
on the premises.” Defendant claims the court erred in concluding
the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction does not apply to a
commercial lease. We find no error in the circumstances of this
case.
Under the Civil Code, it is unlawful for a lessor (among other
things) to “bring an action to recover possession . . . for the purpose
of retaliating against the lessee because the lessee . . . has lawfully
and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1942.5, subd. (d).) Most cases involving retaliatory eviction
concern residential leases. However, in Custom Parking, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 90 (Custom Parking), the
court held that the defense of retaliatory eviction could be raised in
an unlawful detainer action brought against a commercial tenant,
where the lessor terminated the tenancy “because [the tenant’s]
officers and employees refused to perjure themselves in an action
involving [the lessor] and other tenants of [the lessor].” (Id. at
pp. 91-92; see id. at p. 101.)
Custom Parking explains the history of the retaliatory
eviction defense and the development of the principle that a
landlord “ ‘ “may be precluded from evicting a tenant in retaliation
for certain kinds of lawful activities,” ’ ” such as reporting a crime to
the police or other basic legal rights. (Custom Parking, supra,
138 Cal.App.3d at p. 94; see id. at pp. 93-95.) The court also

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recognized the issue was complicated “by case law which recognizes
and/or applies a distinction between commercial and residential
unlawful detainer actions.” (Id. at p. 96; see id. at pp. 96-101.)
Custom Parking allowed the retaliatory eviction defense in
that case because it involved a “strong public policy against
intimidating witnesses in a lawsuit from testifying honestly,” a
context where “the distinction between a commercial and a
residential tenancy pales into insignificance.” (Custom Parking,
supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 101.) The court applied the principle
established in S.P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal.3d
719, a residential eviction case: “In evaluating whether defendants
have raised a valid defense of retaliatory eviction, we must engage
in a balancing process. We must determine whether the public
policies furthered by protecting defendants from eviction outweigh
the interests in preserving the summary nature of unlawful
detainer proceedings.” (Id. at p. 724; see id. at pp. 724, 730 [an
eviction in retaliation for the filing of a federal lawsuit charging
violations of a federal farm labor statute was improper].)
In short, in a commercial case, the retaliatory eviction defense
is applicable, if at all, only where there is a strong public policy that
would be furthered by protecting the lessee from eviction: as
Custom Parking observes, “whether the need for litigating that
matter in the unlawful detainer action is so vital as to overcome the
public policy underlying the summary nature of unlawful detainer.”
(Custom Parking, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 100.) Defendant has
identified no public policy of any kind that supports protecting him
from eviction. Consequently, the trial court did not err in excluding
evidence of defendant’s purported retaliatory eviction defense.
2. Other Contentions
a. Receipt of rent after 30-day notice
Defendant asserts that because plaintiff cashed his May 2021
rent check, his tenancy was reinstated and another 30-day notice

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was required before he could be evicted. He contends the court
should not have sent this issue to the jury, and instead should have
dismissed the case. We disagree.
Neither of the cases defendant cites stands for the proposition
that a new 30-day notice was required despite plaintiff’s evidence of
mistaken cashing of the rent check and return of the funds to
defendant. Neither case concerns mistaken deposit of a rent check.
In Highland Plastics, Inc. v. Enders (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, the court states the principle that “if the rent was not
accepted by the landlord, there was no waiver of plaintiff’s
termination of defendant’s month-to-month tenancy nor was
there an implied withdrawal of the notice of termination.” (Id. at
p. 12.) In Highland Plastics, the landlord did not deposit the rent
checks, and the evidence was “sufficient to support the implied
finding of the trial court that there was no acceptance of the
tendered rent during the notice period.” (Id. at pp. 11-12.) Here,
the jury could reasonably find plaintiff’s mistaken deposit of the
rent and its return to defendant did not amount to receipt or
acceptance of the rent. The other case, Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good
Roads Oil Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 435, does not help defendant either.
Kern involved a lease of oil lands and stands for the proposition that
“[t]he acceptance of rent by the landlord from the tenant, after the
breach of a condition of the lease, with full knowledge of all the
facts, is a waiver of the breach and precludes the landlord from
declaring a forfeiture of the lease by reason of said breach.” (Id. at
p. 440.) This case has nothing to do with waiver after breach of a
condition of the lease.
Defendant asserts there are “problems with [the mistake]
theory” because the return check was sent a month later and “could
not be cashed” because it was made out to defendant (and not to his
corporation). The jury apparently found no such problems; nor do
we.

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b. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Before jury selection, defendant made an oral motion to
dismiss himself from the case, arguing that he was not a party to
the lease and did not live on the property. Plaintiff’s counsel
contended a judgment against defendant was needed to obtain a
writ of possession and defendant was refusing to surrender
possession as an individual. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion.
On appeal, defendant again contends the lease was in the
name of a corporate entity which had already defaulted and
therefore defendant had no individual liability. His argument takes
up less than a page, cites no authority, and does not address his
refusal to surrender possession of the premises. No error has been
demonstrated.
c. The claimed evidentiary error
The trial court admitted into evidence an August 13, 2021 e-
mail from plaintiff’s counsel, responding to an e-mail from a lawyer,
Chelsea Cooper, who stated she was filing an ex parte application
on defendant’s behalf. The responding email from plaintiff’s
counsel stated that “due to your client’s behavior during the last few
months” occupying the property, the owner had died of cancer
“without any end of life money as she was selling this property for
her hospice care. Your client knew this full well.” (Underscoring
omitted.) Defendant objected on the ground Ms. Cooper was not his
lawyer. At trial, on cross-examination of defendant by plaintiff’s
counsel, defendant was told to read the e-mail to the jury. There
was also testimony from another witness and comments in
plaintiff’s closing about the landlord’s cancer. Defendant contends
it was an abuse of discretion to allow plaintiff to use the late
owner’s illness to inflame the jury.
Defendant did not object to this evidence on the ground he
now raises on appeal. However, we need not address the

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admissibility of the evidence; even if there were error, defendant
has shown no reasonable probability that he would have obtained a
more favorable result absent the error.
d. Judicial bias
Finally, defendant contends the trial court “express[ed] such a
severe and consistent bias throughout the trial in front of the jury”
that defendant “could not possibly have a fair trial.” Defendant
relies on Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
994, where the court reversed the judgment “because the judge
committed misconduct so egregious [the plaintiffs] were denied a
fair trial.” (Id. at p. 1002; see also id. at p. 1008 [“ ‘[w]here . . . the
appearance of judicial bias and unfairness colors the entire record,
we depart from the general rule requiring plaintiff to make an
affirmative showing of prejudice’ ”].) This is not such a case.
Defendant first recites the trial court’s comments at a
settlement conference, where the judge spoke to each side
separately. These comments were not made in front of the jury.
Next, defendant criticizes the court for asking defendant why he
was refusing to leave, and stating “now you’re talking as a lawyer?”
when defendant responded that landlords must follow a series of
steps to evict a tenant legally. Defendant claims this exchange
“communicated to the jury [the court’s] view that [defendant]
should have left,” and was comparable to the Haluck trial court’s
misconduct in implying unethical or underhanded behavior by
counsel in that case. We disagree.
The exchange just described was not in any way comparable
to the egregious misconduct in Haluck, which was described at
length (Haluck, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003-1007) and
included lack of courtesy and decorum, conduct “ ‘cast[ing] the
judicial system itself in a bad light’ ” (id. at pp. 1003-1004), and
many examples of “inappropriate conduct that mocked plaintiffs
and their testimony and impugned their credibility” (id. at p. 1007).

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Defendant then asserts he “did not get a chance to present his
case in the manner he wanted,” “he was not able to testify about the
checks, or other topics he might want to raise,” and the judge
“frequently displayed a hostile demeanor.” Defendant ends by
referring to “derogatory comments coloring the entire record,” but
identifies no comments made before the jury that can be described
as derogatory.
Unlike defendant, we do not see judicial bias against
defendant on the record of this trial. Indeed, we see instances
where the trial court criticized plaintiff’s counsel and raised
objections on behalf of defendant. Certainly this is not a case where
defendant may be relieved of the affirmative burden of showing
prejudice, as in Haluck, where “ ‘the court’s comments would cause
a reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of the judge or would
cause us to lack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings such
as would necessitate reversal.’ ” (Haluck, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1008.) Defendant has established no such doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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