In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to H.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0182
FILED 06-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD535618
JS521397
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Department of Child Safety
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Markus K. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights as to H.B. He argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s
findings and the court erred by misapplying Michael J. v. Department of
Economic Security, 196 Ariz. 246 (2000). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 H.B. was born substance-exposed on December 24, 2023. At
the time, Father was incarcerated and paternity was unknown. About two
weeks later, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of H.B.
and alleged dependency as to Justine B. (“Mother”) and Father, who were
not married. Four days later, Father was released from prison.

¶3 By March 2024, Father knew DCS was involved with H.B. but
did not know where DCS had placed H.B. DCS unsuccessfully attempted
to contact Father multiple times. Around October 2024, Father reached out
to DCS and requested to be involved with H.B.’s case. But when DCS again
tried to contact Father, he did not respond. Father was arrested the
following month, and in March 2025, he was sentenced to 4.5 years in
prison, followed by 3 years of probation.

¶4 In May 2025, after locating Father in prison, DCS filed a
Motion for Genetic Testing. The court granted the motion, and the test
established Father’s probability of paternity as 99.9999%. Two months later,
DCS moved for summary judgment on the issue of paternity, which the
court granted.

¶5 That same month, DCS also filed petitions to terminate
Father’s and Mother’s1 parental rights to H.B. As to Father, DCS alleged he
abandoned H.B. and the length of his sentence would deprive H.B. of a
normal home for a period of years. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (4). DCS also
alleged that termination of Father’s parental rights was in H.B.’s best

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

interests because “it would further the plan of adoption, which would
provide [H.B.] with permanency and stability.”

¶6 In October 2025, the court held a combined dependency and
termination hearing. The court found H.B. dependent as to Father and
terminated his parental rights. In doing so, the court found Father
abandoned H.B. by making no efforts to “establish his constitutional rights
to his child” and that Father’s sentence is of a length that will deprive H.B.
of a normal home. The court also found that termination of Father’s rights
was in H.B.’s best interests because it would promote permanency and
stability in H.B.’s life.

¶7 On November 14, 2025, Father filed a premature notice of
appeal. We stayed the appeal and permitted Father to seek relief for his
untimely appeal in the superior court, pursuant to Arizona Rule of
Procedure for the Juvenile Court 603(a)(5)(A). Father subsequently filed a
Motion to Allow a Notice of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, which the court
granted on January 13, 2026.

¶8 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections
8-235, 12-120.21(A), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues the court erred because there was insufficient
evidence to support either termination ground and the court misapplied a
factor in its length-of-sentence analysis.

¶10 The court may terminate a parent-child relationship if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence at least one statutory ground for
termination and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in
the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 8 (2021). We review the juvenile court’s decision to
terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion. Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579
¶ 10. We will affirm unless there is no reasonable evidence to support the
court’s findings. Id.

¶11 When the court finds termination is justified under multiple
statutory grounds, “we will affirm the termination if any one of the
statutory grounds is proven[.]” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224
Ariz. 373, 376 ¶ 14 (App. 2010). Because we conclude there is reasonable
evidence supporting the court’s finding of abandonment, we need not
address Father’s arguments regarding the length-of-sentence ground.

3
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

Further, because Father did not challenge the court’s best-interest finding,
we will not address it. Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–
78 ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (noting failure to raise an argument on appeal results in
waiver).

¶12 Under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B)(1), the court may terminate a
parent-child relationship if it finds the parent has abandoned the child.
Abandonment is defined as:

[T]he failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1). “[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective
intent, but by the parent’s conduct . . . .” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 18.

¶13 “[A]n unwed father with no existing parental relationship
must act quickly and persistently after the child’s birth to take whatever
steps are reasonably possible to develop a parental relationship.” Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 105 (1994); see also Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (noting that only after unwed fathers
“demonstrate[] a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood . . .
may it be said that he acts as a father toward his children” (citation
modified)). He must also “vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent
necessary.” Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97
(1994).

¶14 Father argues he was not H.B.’s parent before his paternity
was established in July 2025, and therefore, his conduct before that time was
not subject to analysis under the abandonment statutes. He then claims the
evidence of abandonment was insufficient because the court could not rely
on evidence before paternity was established.

¶15 In coming to this conclusion, Father relies on In re G.R., 255
Ariz. 444 (App. 2023), where we concluded the court erred in adjudicating
G.R. dependent as to the father without first establishing paternity. In re
G.R., 255 Ariz. at 449 ¶ 30. But in that case, we limited our holding to
dependency proceedings, id. at 448 ¶ 22, so Father’s reliance on it is
misplaced. Here, although the court held a combined dependency and
termination proceeding, Father did not appeal the court’s finding of
dependency. Thus, In re G.R. is inapplicable.

4
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

¶16 We also decline to extend our ruling in In re G.R. because
another case is instructive on this issue. In Maricopa County Juvenile Action
No. JS-8490, our supreme court held that an unwed father abandoned his
child even though he “did not know with certainty that the child was his[.]”
179 Ariz. at 106. In that case, the mother became pregnant after having
sexual relations with both the father and another man. Id. at 104. The father
claimed he was unaware of the mother’s pregnancy and she moved away
before the child was born. Id. The father learned about the child shortly after
her birth but did not receive confirmation that he was the father until about
two years later when he ran into the mother. Id. When the father’s parental
rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment two years later,
father appealed and argued there was insufficient evidence of
abandonment because he “did not have sufficient reason to believe that he
had a child[.]” Id. at 105.

¶17 Our supreme court disagreed, concluding “that if a man has
reasonable grounds to know that he might have fathered a child, he must
protect his parental rights by investigating the possibility and acting
appropriately on the information he uncovers.” Id. at 106. Relying on
evidence both before and after paternity was established through the
father’s chance encounter with the mother, our supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s finding of abandonment because the evidence showed the
father did not “t[ake] any action to ascertain [his] true relationship” with
the child. Id. at 106–07.

¶18 Here too, the record does not show Father “act[ed] quickly
and persistently” to develop a parental relationship with H.B. Id. at 105.
Father testified that in June 2023 he knew Mother was pregnant and that by
March 2024—two months after he was released from prison—he knew H.B.
was in DCS custody. He also testified that when he heard H.B. was in DCS
custody, “[he] knew absolutely that there was a possibility” he was H.B.’s
father.

¶19 The record does not indicate that Father attempted to
establish paternity, and Father does not dispute the court’s finding that
while he was incarcerated, he “paid no support; sent no cards, gifts, or
letters; or made any contact whatsoever with [H.B.]” See Michael J., 196 Ariz.
at 251 ¶ 24 (concluding incarcerated father did not try to establish a bond
when he did not request letters, phone calls, pictures, or knowledge of how
the child was doing). Further, Father does not dispute the court’s finding
that after he reached out to DCS to get involved in H.B.’s case, he did not
return DCS’s attempts to contact him. Father notes he appeared at the court
hearings after paternity was established, but such conduct “is not action,

5
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

[but] merely reaction.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. at
107 (explaining coming forward after learning about the child’s impending
adoption was not evidence that father wanted a relationship). Father knew
about H.B. more than a year prior to establishment of his paternity, he
admitted he knew there was a possibility he was H.B.’s father, and he did
not make a persistent effort to establish a relationship with H.B. Thus, there
is reasonable evidence supporting the court’s finding of abandonment.

¶20 Our conclusion is further supported by the language of A.R.S.
Section 8-533. The legislature identified several grounds that justify the
termination of a parent-child relationship and included certain grounds
that apply when paternity has not been established. See, e.g., A.R.S.
§§ 8-533(B)(5) (permitting termination of parental rights when potential
father fails to file timely paternity action); -533(B)(6) (permitting
termination when putative father fails to file notice of paternity
claim); -533(B)(9) (permitting termination when parent’s identity is
unknown following diligent efforts); -533(F) (stating alleged parent’s failure
to take a test “to determine if the person is the child’s natural parent is
prima facie evidence of abandonment”). These subsections make clear that
the absence of established paternity is not an automatic defense to the
termination of parental rights. And more specifically, they suggest that
absence of established paternity does not necessarily preclude the court
from considering services provided to the putative parent during the
period before paternity is established for purposes of termination
proceedings.

¶21 Thus, we conclude the court did not err in finding Father
abandoned H.B. and affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6