Parker v. Meeks

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SHILOH PARKER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ERNEST THOMAS MEEKS, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0549
FILED 06-05-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-026863
The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Shiloh Parker, Sacramento, CA
Plaintiff/Appellant

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix, AZ
By Sanford K. Gerber, Jennifer M. Martin, and Luan Gurra
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
PARKER v. MEEKS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the
Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Shiloh Parker appeals the dismissal of her complaint against
Ernest Thomas Meeks and subsequent award of attorney fees and costs
against her. This Court affirms the dismissal and award of costs but vacates
the fee award and remands.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Parker and Meeks were involved in an automobile accident
on January 22, 2022. That accident spawned two cases. Only one of the cases
is the basis for this appeal, but the background of both will be provided for
context.

Case 1

¶3 In January of 2023, Parker filed a complaint for damages
against Meeks in superior court (Case No. CV2023-050155) (“Case 1”).
Parker and Meeks engaged in litigation over the next 20 months.
Dissatisfied with the judge, Parker sought reassignment for cause. When a
new judge was not assigned, Parker moved to dismiss her case voluntarily.

Case 2

¶4 On September 25, 2024—just one day before moving to
dismiss Case 1—Parker filed a new complaint for damages against Meeks
in superior court (Case No. CV2024-026863) (“Case 2”). The complaint was
based on the same accident as Case 1 and both complaints included the
same causes of action and prayers for relief. Parker then purported to serve
Meeks via process on October 29, 2024. When Meeks did not file a response
within 30 days, Parker applied for entry of default. Meeks opposed the
application based on improper service and filed a separate motion for a stay
until Case 1 was dismissed.

¶5 The court denied Parker’s application for entry of default
because she did not mail a copy to Meeks’s attorney. At a status conference,

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Meeks’s counsel informed the court that Case 1 had been resolved and that
he intended to file a motion to dismiss in Case 2. The court orally found that
Meeks had made good faith efforts to meet and confer.

¶6 Meeks filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
Ariz. R. Civ. P., but did not include a good faith consultation certificate as
required by subsection (j). In response, Parker argued the motion to dismiss
was untimely and improper since it lacked the consultation certificate. The
court granted Meeks’s motion to dismiss.

¶7 Meeks then applied for attorney fees and costs. In July of 2025,
the court entered final judgment awarding Meeks fees under A.R.S.
§ 12-349 and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.

¶8 Parker timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Did Not Err in Granting Meeks’s Motion to Dismiss.

¶9 Parker argues the court erred in granting Meeks’s motion to
dismiss because: 1) it was filed more than 20 days after Parker’s complaint
was served; 2) it did not include a good faith certificate; 3) the court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate Meeks’s motion; 4) the court did not specify the
legal and factual basis for its judgment; and 5) the court abused its
discretion by declining to toll the statute of limitations. “Dismissal of a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.” Coleman v. City of Mesa,
230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7 (2012).

A. Defendant’s Motion Was Timely.

¶10 Parker argues Defendant’s motion to dismiss was untimely
because it was filed more than 20 days after service of the complaint.

¶11 Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)(i), “a
responsive pleading” must be filed “within 20 days after being served with
the summons and complaint.” A motion to dismiss, however, is not a
responsive pleading. See In re $70,070 in U.S. Currency, 236 Ariz. 23, 27 ¶ 11
(App. 2014); Graham v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Ariz. Div., 120 Ariz. 275,
277 (App. 1978). Instead, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion can be raised at nearly any
point in litigation, including at trial. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).

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¶12 Here, Meeks did not file a responsive pleading, he filed a
motion to dismiss. The 20-day clock for a responsive pleading simply does
not govern such motions. Meeks’s motion to dismiss was not untimely.

B. Under the Circumstances, Failure to Attach a Consultation
Certificate Was Harmless.

¶13 Parker argues that the court erred in dismissing her complaint
because Meeks did not file a good faith consultation certificate with his
motion.

¶14 Rule 12(j), Ariz. R. Civ. P., requires that a “good faith
consultation certificate complying with Rule 7.1(h)” must accompany a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. A “good faith consultation certificate” is “a
separate statement certifying and demonstrating that the movant has tried
in good faith to resolve the issue by conferring with—or attempting to
confer with—the party or person against whom the motion is directed.”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(h).

¶15 However, Rule 12(j) does not prescribe a consequence for
noncompliance. And Parker cites no authority—nor was this Court able to
find any—holding that a trial court must deny an otherwise meritorious
motion merely because no certificate was attached. In fact, relevant
authority cuts the other direction. Under Rule 61, Ariz. R. Civ. P., courts
“must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s
substantial rights.” When a party has “shown no prejudice and merely
demand[s] compliance with a technical rule,” any error is harmless. Creach
v. Angulo, 189 Ariz. 212, 216 (1997).

¶16 Meeks’s motion did not include a good faith consultation
certificate. But Parker does not argue that she was prejudiced and no
prejudice appears from the record. At the status conference, Meeks
informed the court that he had been unsuccessfully trying to meet and
confer with Parker. In response, the court found that Meeks had engaged
in good faith efforts to meet and confer and that any consultation would
likely be futile. Under these circumstances, requiring Meeks to file a
certificate restating what the court had already found on the record would
have been an empty formality and any error was harmless. See id.

¶17 Parker’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because
it was untimely and lacked a good faith consultation certificate fails for the
same reasons.

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C. The Court Was Not Required to Make Specific Legal or
Factual Findings.

¶18 Parker argues the court’s order was legally deficient because
it lacked supporting legal or factual findings. This Court reviews
interpretation of court rules de novo. Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243 Ariz. 531, 533
¶ 8 (2018). Parker provides no legal support for her argument. And neither
Rule 7.1, which sets forth the requirements for ruling on motions, nor Rule
58, which governs entry of judgment, requires the court to provide specific
findings of fact and law when entering a judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1;
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58. Thus, Parker’s argument fails.

D. There Was No Basis for Tolling the Statute of Limitations.

¶19 Parker’s final argument is that the court erred by declining to
toll the statute of limitations for Case 2 and that this Court should reinstate
the case under A.R.S. § 12-504. This argument is without merit.

¶20 As an initial matter, if Parker wanted § 12-504 to save her
voluntarily dismissed complaint, she needed to ask in Case 1 and not Case
2. See A.R.S. § 12-504(A) (“If an action timely commenced is terminated by
abatement, voluntary dismissal by order of the court or dismissal for lack
of prosecution, the [trial] court in its discretion may provide a period for
commencement of a new action for the same cause . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Parker never made this request in Case 1. Even if she had, the superior court
had the discretion to deny Parker relief. See Passmore v. McCarver, 242 Ariz.
288, 292 ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (“In deciding how to exercise its discretion under
[A.R.S. § 12-504(A)], the court must consider several factors [including]
whether the plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith.” (citation
modified)).

¶21 Next, Parker claims that Stewart v. Kodiak Cakes, LLC, 537 F.
Supp. 3d 1103 (S.D. Cal. 2021), held that a motion to dismiss based on a
statute of limitations cannot be decided at the pleading stage. She does not
provide a page cite for this 133-page case, nor could this Court find the
claimed holding. Regardless, under Arizona law, a motion to dismiss based
on a statute of limitations defense may be decided at the pleading stage. See
Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Pima Cnty., 200 Ariz. 199, 204 ¶ 20 (App. 2001)
(the “affirmative defense of a statute of limitations may be raised in a
motion to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that the claim is
barred”).

¶22 Turning to the equitable tolling argument, this Court reviews
a superior court’s application of equitable tolling involving a mix of law

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and fact for an abuse of discretion. McCloud v. State, Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
217 Ariz. 82, 86-87, 89 ¶¶ 10, 17 (App. 2007).

¶23 The doctrine of equitable tolling is an uncommon remedy. It
“should be used only sparingly” and in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id.
at 88-89 ¶¶ 16-20. It allows a plaintiff to sue “after the statutory time period
for filing a complaint has expired if they have been prevented from filing in
a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances.” Id. at 87
¶ 11 (quoting Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999)). When requesting equitable tolling, it is the burden of the party
opposing the statute of limitations defense to provide evidence that the
statute be tolled. Id. at 85, 87 ¶¶ 8, 13.

¶24 Parker has not met her burden. She does not allege
“extraordinary circumstances” in any of her pleadings that warrant tolling
the statute of limitations. A tactical decision to dismiss one case to seek a
different judge does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”
warranting equitable tolling. Although Arizona courts disfavor motions to
dismiss based on the statute of limitations, such motions will be granted
when the claims in the complaint “are clearly brought outside the relevant
limitations period.” Montano v. Browning, 202 Ariz. 544, 546 ¶ 4 (App. 2002).
Such is the case here. Any harm to Parker’s right to seek relief is self-
inflicted. The court did not err by denying Parker’s request for equitable
tolling.

II. The Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees Without Specifying
the Reasons for the Award.

¶25 Parker also argues the court improperly awarded attorney
fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-349(A) without setting forth the express
reasons for the award.

¶26 A.R.S. § 12-349(A) authorizes a court to assess reasonable
attorney fees against a party who: 1) brings or defends a claim without
substantial justification; 2) brings or defends a claim solely or primarily for
delay or harassment; 3) unreasonably expands or delays the proceeding; or
4) engages in abuse of discovery. When awarding fees under § 12-349, the
court must “set forth the specific reasons for the award.” A.R.S. § 12-350.
“The purpose of this requirement is to assist the appellate court on review.”
Bennett v. Baxter Grp., Inc., 223 Ariz. 414, 421 ¶ 28 (App. 2010). Thus, the
findings “need only be specific enough to allow an appellate court to test
the validity of the judgment.” Id. (quoting Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Corr., 188 Ariz. 237, 243 (App. 1997)) (citation modified). The findings need

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not take any particular form and may be established by reference to earlier
court orders. See Phx. Newspapers, 188 Ariz. at 243.

¶27 This Court reviews the application of §§ 12-349 and 12-350 de
novo, viewing “the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the
award” and affirming “unless the trial court’s finding . . . is clearly
erroneous.” Id.; see also Bennett, 223 Ariz. at 422 ¶ 31.

¶28 Here, the court’s signed judgment awarded Meeks the full
amount of his requested fees but did not identify which subsection of
§ 12-349(A) supported the award. Nor did it list any of the factors specified
in § 12-350. Although the judgment stated that fees were awarded
“pursuant to” Meeks’s application, it does not state that it relies on any of
the reasons set forth in that application. Because the court did not identify
the specific reasons for its award, this Court cannot affirm it. See Ariz.
Republican Party v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 250-51 ¶¶ 47-48 (2024). The award
of costs, however, is affirmed as it was awarded under A.R.S. § 12-341,
which makes the award mandatory to the successful party.

¶29 Accordingly, this Court vacates the award of attorney fees.
On remand, if the superior court wishes to reinstate the fee award, it must
set forth specific reasons as required by A.R.S. § 12-350.

III. Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶30 Both Parker and Meeks request attorney fees incurred on
appeal. This Court declines to award Parker any fees because she
represented herself. See Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. & Constr. of
the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126 ¶ 5 (App. 2014).

¶31 Meeks requests fees, costs, and sanctions pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 12-349(A)(1), (3) and Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 25. Under
§ 12-349(A)(1), a court “shall assess reasonable attorney fees” against a
party who “[b]rings or defends a claim without substantial justification.”
“[W]ithout substantial justification” means “that the claim or defense is
groundless and is not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F). Thus, a
showing of both groundlessness and absence of good faith must exist. See
Richer, 257 Ariz. at 247-49 ¶¶ 34-40. The party seeking attorney fees under
§ 12-349 bears the burden of establishing entitlement by a preponderance
of the evidence. In re Est. of Stephenson, 217 Ariz. 284, 289 ¶ 28 (App. 2007).

¶32 Meeks argues an award of fees is appropriate because
Parker’s opening brief is “entirely without substantial justification.”
Although some of Parker’s arguments were admittedly weak, she did

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prevail on the question of whether the trial court complied with A.R.S.
§ 12-350 when awarding attorney fees. More importantly, Meeks does not
make an argument as to why Parker’s appeal was in bad faith. Thus, Meeks
has not satisfied his burden with respect to the absence of good faith, a
prerequisite to an award of sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1).

¶33 Meeks also argues that fees should be awarded under
§ 12-349(A)(3) because Parker’s pursuit of an appeal that “lacks substantial
justification has unquestionably expanded the proceedings, mandating fees
under § 12-349(A)(3).” Meeks ties his argument to the lack of “substantial
justification,” which, as explained above, requires a showing of absence of
good faith. Because Meeks makes no independent argument as to why fees
are appropriate under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(3), this Court does not award fees
for the same reasons as explained above. This Court also, in its discretion,
declines to award Meeks fees under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure 25.

¶34 However, as the successful party on the dismissal, Meeks is
entitled to his costs on appeal, A.R.S. § 12-341, upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. See Henry v. Cook, 189 Ariz.
42, 43 (App. 1996) (holding that a party “who succeeds on less than all
claims is sufficiently successful to recover costs under [A.R.S. § 12-341]”).

CONCLUSION

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the superior
court’s grant of Meeks’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice and
award of costs. This Court vacates the award of attorney fees and remands
for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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