Mohr v. Mohr

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SHANON MOHR, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TODD MOHR, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0601 FC
FILED 05-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2022-004254
The Honorable Harla M. Davison, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Spencer Fane LLP, Phoenix
By Norma C. Izzo and Alexandra H. LeClair
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Reardon House Colton PLC, Scottsdale
By Kristi A. Reardon, Taylor S. House, and Sally M. Colton
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
MOHR v. MOHR
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Todd Mohr (“Husband”) challenges portions of a dissolution
decree ordering him to pay Shanon Mohr (“Wife”) for marital waste and
equity in the marital home. This Court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties were married in 1993 and have four adult children
together. During the marriage, Husband was employed as a deputy sheriff.
In December 2020, the parties separated and unsuccessfully attempted to
file separation paperwork through an online service. Then, in September
2022, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, seeking equitable
division of community property, a greater share of community assets based
on marital waste, and spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319. Husband
contested Wife’s claims for marital waste and spousal maintenance.

¶3 At trial in January 2025, the parties stipulated that the
community terminated as of December 24, 2020 (“the community
termination date”). After trial, the superior court entered a decree of
dissolution (“the Decree”). This Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the superior court’s findings. See Mitchell v. Mitchell,
152 Ariz. 317, 323 (1987).

Marital Waste

¶4 In 2005, Husband was suspended from his employment due
to allegations that he stopped a female motorist and then accompanied her
to a hotel. During his suspension, Husband worked other jobs.
Nevertheless, the parties struggled financially and eventually lost their
home in a short sale. In 2009, Husband was reinstated because the motorist
stopped cooperating in Husband’s ongoing disciplinary proceedings after
she received a settlement. Husband’s suspension was reduced to ten days
and Husband was informed he could recover $204,378.80 in backpay by
filing a declaration of outside earnings form.

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¶5 Nearly two years later, in January 2011, Husband’s employer
sent Husband a final written request stating:

Pursuant to the Stipulated Agreement dated March 30, 2009,
we have made several requests for you to complete and
forward the Declaration of Earnings form. To this date, you
have not complied or have elected not to proceed with
submission of the Declaration of Earnings paperwork.
Therefore, this is a final letter of our intent to request this
form. Please be advised, in order for us to proceed with the
repayment process and to receive credit for thirty-one (31)
months of retirement, it is mandatory for us to receive the
Declaration of Earnings. If we do not hear from you within
two (2) weeks from the date of this letter, it will be filed and
the settlement will be closed.

Even after this letter, Husband did not file a declaration of outside earnings.
Thus, Husband never recovered any backpay, which also affected his
retirement service credits. Husband subsequently retained an attorney but
was unsuccessful in his untimely attempt to get backpay.

Equity in Marital Home

¶6 As of December 2020, the stipulated community termination
date, the parties’ equity in the marital home was $210,000. When the parties
separated, Wife moved out of the marital home. Husband subsequently
proposed the parties convey the home to their son (“Son”) and asked Wife
to leave her equity of $105,000 in the marital home until Son could get it
refinanced. In exchange, he promised to pay her the equity from another
source.

¶7 In November 2021, Wife signed a warranty deed adding Son
to the deed for the marital home. Then, in December 2021, the parties signed
a warranty deed transferring the deed into Son’s name alone. Wife did not
realize that she was transferring her entire ownership interest in the marital
home to Son and did not intend to gift it to him. Instead, she thought she
was signing additional paperwork to add him to the deed.

The Decree

¶8 In March 2025, the court entered the Decree, awarding Wife
$102,189 due to marital waste, $1,400 in monthly spousal support, and
$105,000 for equity in the parties’ new marital home, acquired after the

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short sale. The court’s finding of marital waste was based on Husband’s
suspension and subsequent failure to timely seek his backpay.

¶9 Husband moved to alter or amend the Decree under Arizona
Rule of Family Law Procedure 83. The superior court denied that motion
and Husband timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Evidence Supports the Finding of Marital Waste.

¶10 Husband first argues the court’s finding of marital waste for
“non-receipt of hypothetical income” is not covered under A.R.S.
§ 25-318(C). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. In re Marriage of
Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 580 ¶ 7 (App. 2000).1

¶11 A.R.S. § 25-318(C) permits a court to consider “excessive or
abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition
of community, joint tenancy and other property held in common.” Here,
the superior court found Husband committed marital waste through his
suspension and subsequent unreasonable forfeiture of backpay, which falls
within the statute. See Goodell v. Goodell, 257 Ariz. 563, 571-72 ¶¶ 35-38 (App.
2024) (unreasonably forfeiting employment benefits can constitute
destruction of community property and thus marital waste).

¶12 Husband next argues that substantial evidence does not
support the superior court’s finding of marital waste. This Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s
findings. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346 ¶ 5 (App. 1998).

¶13 As the spouse alleging waste, Wife had the initial burden to
make a prima facie showing that Husband’s actions were excessive,
abnormal, or constituted destruction of community property. See id. at 346-
47 ¶¶ 6-7. Once Wife made a prima facie showing of waste, it was Husband’s
burden “to go forward with evidence to rebut the showing of waste because
all of the evidence relative to the expenditures is generally within the
knowledge, possession, and control of the spending spouse.” Id. at ¶ 7.

1 Although Wife contends that several of Husband’s arguments on appeal

are waived, this Court exercises its discretion to address the merits. See Meek
v. Meek, 256 Ariz. 405, 409 ¶ 15 (App. 2023).

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¶14 Here, Wife made a prima facie showing that Husband
committed waste. Husband was suspended from employment based on his
own misconduct and forfeited $204,378 in backpay after he was reinstated,
resulting in the loss of the parties’ home and some retirement service
credits.

¶15 Husband argues Wife failed to show waste because he would
not have received the entire $204,378 if he had applied for backpay. Instead,
he claims that his backpay would have been offset with his earnings from
other jobs he worked during his suspension. He also claims that if he had
received the backpay, he would have had to amend the family’s tax returns,
which would have resulted in a significant cost to the community. Husband
is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses,
which this Court will not do. Id. at 347 ¶ 13.

¶16 Although Husband testified he would have received backpay
of only $30,000 to $35,000, he presented no corroborating evidence that such
an offset would have occurred or that he received any income from other
employment during his suspension. He also testified he had to withdraw
$90,000 from his retirement account during his suspension because he had
gone to a “very low income.” Even with that withdrawal, the parties lost
their home to a short sale.

¶17 Husband also argues no waste occurred because any waste
was unintentional as he attempted to recoup his lost wages by obtaining
counsel. The plain language of A.R.S. § 25-318(C), however, does not
require a showing of intentionality. And although the record shows
Husband obtained counsel, it was “too little, too late” because he had
already failed to file paperwork for almost two years despite repeated
reminders.

¶18 The superior court did not err in finding Husband committed
marital waste, awarding half of that marital waste to Wife, or by using it as
a basis for an upward deviation in spousal maintenance. See A.R.S.
§§ 25-319(B)(11), 25-319 app. § III.C.4.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Awarding $105,000 to Wife for
Her Equity in the Marital Home.

¶19 Husband argues the superior court erred in its award of
$105,000 for Wife’s equity in the marital home because it made no explicit
findings that the parties’ transfer of the marital home to Son was fraudulent,
even though Wife requested findings of fact and conclusions of law under
Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 82. This Court interprets the Rules

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of Family Law Procedure de novo, Sobrino v. Fisk, 259 Ariz. 25, 25 ¶ 6 (App.
2024), and will not disturb the apportionment of community property
absent an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 5.

¶20 Rule 82 provides:

If requested before trial, the court must make separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings and
conclusions may be stated orally on the record after the close
of the evidence or may appear in an opinion, minute entry, or
memorandum of decision filed by the court.

¶21 The Rule, however, does not require findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding claims that did not form the basis for its
decision. See Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 132 (App. 1990) (under
analogous Rule 52, a court need only make findings on the ultimate facts
necessary to resolve the disputed issues). Although Wife claimed the
transfer to Son was a fraudulent conveyance, the superior court’s award of
$105,000 was not based on fraud, and instead based on Wife’s equity in the
marital home at the community termination date:

At time of trial, the parties agreed that, for purposes of an
equitable division of property under A.R.S. § 25-318, the
appropriate division date for property is December 24, 2020
(community termination date). The testimony was that prior
to the [stipulated] termination date, the parties owned . . . the
marital home. Further testimony indicated that following
their separation, the parties conveyed the marital home to
Adult Son. . . . Husband testified that Wife subsequently
gifted her interest, but the Court is not persuaded by
Husband’s testimony, particularly in light of Adult Daughter,
Adult Son, and Wife’s Mother’s testimony that Wife’s
community interest was never intended as a gift.

¶22 Because the superior court’s award was not based on fraud, it
did not need to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
whether the conveyance was fraudulent. See id.

¶23 Further, the superior court’s decision is consistent with
Husband’s oral agreement to pay Wife $105,000 for her equity interest in
the home. After the parties separated, Husband asked Wife to leave her
equity in the marital home so that Son could refinance it. He promised to
pay her $105,000 from other sources, but never did. Thus, the superior
court’s award of $105,000 to Wife was not an abuse of discretion.

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III. Son Was Not an Indispensable Party.

¶24 Finally, Husband argues that Son should have been joined as
an indispensable party under A.R.S. § 25-314(D) because Wife asked the
superior court to “order Husband to pay Wife her equity of $105,000 . . . [or]
order the sale of the marital home to ensure all parties, including [Son],
receive their equity.” A party is indispensable when their “interest in the
controversy is such that no final judgment or decree could be entered, doing
justice between the parties actually before the court and without injuriously
affecting the rights of others not brought into the action.” Town of Gila Bend
v. Walled Lake Door Co., 107 Ariz. 545, 549 (1971).

¶25 That is not the case here. The superior court entered a final
decree ordering Husband to pay Wife $105,000 for her equity in the marital
home. The order had no effect on Son or the home. Thus, Son was not an
indispensable party. See Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9, 15 ¶ 22 (App. 1998) (“If
. . . it is possible to fashion relief which does not adversely affect the
transferee’s interest, the transferee need not be joined . . . .”).

IV. Attorney Fees.

¶26 Both parties request attorney fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 25-324 and Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. In its
discretion, this Court denies both parties’ requests for attorney fees.
Because Wife is the successful party on appeal, this Court awards her
taxable costs contingent upon her compliance with Rule 21. See A.R.S.
§ 12-341.

CONCLUSION

¶27 The Decree is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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