PRECISION RENTALS v. BOHANNON

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

PRECISION RENTALS, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

BRYAN BOHANNON, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0578
FILED 05-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-014850
The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Foster Law Partner, Phoenix
By Brian J. Foster, Ross P. Meyer
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Mesch Clark & Rothschild PC, Tucson
By Barney M. Holtzman, Andrew Richards
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
PRECISION RENTALS v. BOHANNON, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Precision Rentals, LLC (“Precision Rentals”) appeals the
superior court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Modern Lift, Inc.
(“Modern Lift”). For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Precision Rentals was a construction equipment rental
company that rented to general contractors and subcontractors.1 Bryan
Bohannon began his employment as a salesperson at Precision Rentals in
2016. In 2019, Precision Rentals presented its sales representatives with a
“Confidentiality, Non-Disclosure, Non-Solicitation, Non-Competition, and
Assignment Agreement” to protect its recent investment of $6 million into
new rental equipment. Bohannon executed this agreement October 2019.
The Non-Solicitation Agreement prohibited Bohannon from soliciting
clients and prospective clients during the twelve-month period
immediately following his separation or termination from Precision
Rentals.

¶3 In July 2023, Bohannon left Precision Rentals to work at
Modern Lift, another company that rents construction equipment to general
contractors and subcontractors. Precision Rentals alleges that while
employed by Modern Lift, Bohannon solicited Precision Rentals’ customers
and that “[w]hen Mr. Bohannon left, Precision Rentals’ sales dropped ‘due
to [Mr. Bohannon] leaving and taking a couple of significant customers
with him.’” Precision Rentals states Bohannon diverted $495,505.01 in
revenue from Precision Rentals to Modern Lift.

¶4 In September 2023, Precision Rentals filed a complaint against
Bohannon and Modern Lift, later requesting a temporary restraining order
to enforce the Confidentiality and Non-Solicitation restrictions against

1 Precision Rentals sold its business in January 2024.

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Bohannon. After holding a hearing, the superior court issued a ruling in
favor of Bohannon and Modern Lift, finding that Precision Rentals was
unlikely to succeed on the merits. Modern Lift then filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment in November 2024, which the court ultimately granted
in May 2025, awarding attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions.

¶5 Prior to entry of judgment, Precision Rentals filed a Motion
for Reconsideration in March 2025 and a Motion for New Trial in May 2025,
both of which were denied. Precision Rentals timely appealed following
entry of final judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Erred in Granting Modern Lift’s Motion for
Summary Judgment Because the Restrictive Covenant Was
Reasonable and Enforceable.

¶6 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Glazer v.
State, 237 Ariz. 160, 167 ¶ 29 (2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only
if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We view
the facts and any inferences drawn from those facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.” Tierra Ranchos
Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 199 ¶ 15 (App. 2007).

¶7 Non-competition and non-solicitation covenants that restrict
an employee’s right to compete with an employer after termination of
employment will generally be upheld if the restrictions are reasonable.
Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 213 Ariz. 24, 26 ¶ 8 (2006).
“A restriction is unreasonable and thus will not be enforced: (1) if the
restraint is greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate
interest; or (2) if that interest is outweighed by the hardship to the employee
and the likely injury to the public.” Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 194 Ariz.
363, 369 ¶ 20 (1999).

¶8 Here, Precision Rentals contends the court erred in holding,
as a matter of law, that Precision Rentals’ Non-Solicitation Agreement was
unenforceable because it lacked a legitimate business interest for that
protection. Precision Rentals also argues a genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding the reasonableness of the agreement, which precludes
entry of summary judgment, and which should be presented to the trier of

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fact. We address the legitimacy of Precision Rentals’ business interests in
the Agreement and its reasonableness in turn.

A. Precision Rentals Had a Legitimate Interest to Protect.

¶9 Restrictive covenants that prevent employees from pursuing
a similar vocation after termination of employment are disfavored.
Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216 (App. 1989). Thus, such covenants
will not be upheld unless they “protect[] some legitimate interest beyond
the employer’s desire to protect itself from competition[,]” Farber, 194 Ariz.
at 367 ¶ 12, and are no broader than necessary to protect that interest, Amex
Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 515 (App. 1986). The legitimate
interest of a post-employment restraint is “to prevent competitive use, for
a time, of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the
employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the
employment.” Farber, 194 Ariz. at 367 ¶ 12 (quoting Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 647 (1960)). “The
burden is on the employer to prove the extent of its protectable interest.”
Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 216.

¶10 We have previously acknowledged that “close customer
contact with the attendant ability to divert customer trade . . . [is] one of the
strong justifications for a noncompetition covenant from one through
whom the goodwill of the enterprise is developed and exercised.” Amex
Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 518. We have long held that “[a]n employer does
have a protectable interest in maintaining customer relationships when an
employee leaves.” Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217. The law upholds restrictive
covenants to protect those relationships “for as long as may be necessary to
replace the employee and give the replacement a chance to show that he
can do the job” and resolution of “[e]ach case hinges on its own particular
facts.” Id.

¶11 Here, Precision Rentals argues it had a legitimate interest in
its customer relationships, as well as the investment in millions of dollars’
worth of rental equipment, which helped develop its customer base. The
summary judgment briefings included affidavits sufficient to show
existence of Precision Rentals’ customer list and its investment of
substantial funds over years for the purpose of expanding its ability to rent
to more customers. These facts also establish that Bohannon solicited
customers for Precision Rentals during his work that yielded significant
revenue for Precision Rentals. Further, Precision Rentals maintains that
when Bohannon left its employ, he “immediately began soliciting the

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customers he built a relationship with, at Precision Rentals, and started
renting to them at Modern Lift,” in violation of their agreement.

¶12 Modern Lift and Bohannon counter that this evidence does
not establish any legitimate business interest because those customers
frequently rented from multiple equipment companies and some had pre-
existing relationships with Bohannon personally and with Modern Lift.
Nevertheless, the existence of a customer list is, itself, sufficient to preclude
summary judgment as a matter of law, because we have recognized that
such lists are legitimately protectable. Id. Modern Lift’s critique does not
challenge the legitimacy of the interest because of what it is, but rather
because it allegedly maintains no value. And because “[e]ach case hinges
on its own particular facts[,]” id., whether sufficient value exists in Precision
Rentals’ customer list to support its claims for breach of the Non-
Solicitation Agreement presents a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Precision Rentals’ customer relationships justify the restraint.
Thus, the court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that protection of
Precision Rentals’ customer list and relationships was not a legitimate
business interest.

B. The Duration of the Restrictive Covenant of Twelve Months
Was Reasonable.

¶13 Precision Rentals also contends that the duration of twelve
months of its restrictive covenant was justifiable and therefore, the
restrictive covenant was reasonable. In determining whether a restraint is
reasonable—i.e., no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s
interest—we assess the duration, geographic area, and activity prohibited
by the restraint. Farber, 194 Ariz. at 370–71 ¶¶ 25, 27. “Courts seldom
criticize restraints of six months or a year on the grounds of duration as
such, and even longer restraints are often enforced.” Amex Distrib. Co., 150
Ariz. at 518 (quoting Blake, supra, at 677).

¶14 In Amex Distributing Co., the court found that the duration of
the covenant at issue, which was thirty-six months, had no justification. Id.
Here, however, facts introduced during summary judgment briefing show
the duration of twelve months is typical of the industry and Bohannon was
only precluded from renting or soliciting the same clients he sold to while
at Precision Rentals, for a period of 12 months, which Precision Rentals
shortened because it sold its business in January 2024. Modern Rentals
argues that 12 months is nevertheless excessive because of evidence
indicating that training a replacement salesperson does not require
imparting specialized knowledge and may take as little as 30–45 days. But

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this merely highlights the fact-intensive nature of the reasonableness
inquiry. See Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217 (“Each case hinges on its own
particular facts.”). And the question becomes still more factually
complicated when considering that Bohannon immediately began soliciting
Precision Rentals’ clients without providing any time at all for Precisions
Rentals to rebuild relationships after he left. The impact of such facts on the
issue of the reasonableness of the agreement’s duration cannot be decided
as a matter of law without further factual development.

¶15 Because we cannot conclude based on this record that 12
months was greater than necessary to protect Precision Rentals’ interest in
its customer relationships, the superior court erred in finding the restriction
unreasonable as a matter of law. Thus, whether the restriction is reasonable
is a genuine dispute of material fact, for which summary judgment is
inappropriate. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

II. The Superior Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment
Regarding the Damages Dispute.

¶16 Precision Rentals also contends there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to damages. Determination of “the amount of damages is a
question particularly within the province of the jury.” Ritchie v. Krasner, 221
Ariz. 288, 300 ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (citation modified). “Where the evidence or
inferences would permit a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either
party, summary judgment is improper. Further, a court must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in its favor.” Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz.
112, 116 ¶17 (App. 2008) (citation modified). A movant “may only obtain
summary judgment if it submits undisputed admissible evidence that
would compel any reasonable juror to find in its favor on every element of
its claim.” Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 224 Ariz. 289, 293 ¶ 20 (App. 2010).

¶17 Here, to contradict Modern Lift’s interpretation of the loss of
revenue, Precision Rentals points to evidence it presented of both lost
customer revenue and a reduction in Precision Rentals’ sales price due to
Bohannon’s breach of the restrictive covenant to support their assertion that
a genuine issue of material fact exists. Precision Rentals identified twelve of
its customers who collectively generated $495,505.01 in revenue for Modern
Lift within months of Bohannon’s departure from Precision Rentals. In fact,
Modern Lift began receiving revenue from these customers within just one
week of Bohannon’s hire.

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Decision of the Court

¶18 Modern Lift responds that most of these customers were
leasing from both companies, some had relationships with Modern Lift
before it hired Bohannon, some had relationships with Bohannon that pre-
dated his employment with Precision Rentals, and some rented more from
Precision Rentals than from Modern Lift. Modern Lift also argues an
increase in its own revenue from those clients is not necessarily evidence of
a decrease in Precision Rentals’ revenue caused by Bohannon’s departure.
Modern Lift asserts that Precision Rentals failed to provide its own sales
figures and this must be construed as an absence of damages. We disagree.

¶19 As noted, Precision Rentals provided evidence of reduced
sales figures and also testimony from its former operations manager that
sales dropped in correlation with Bohannon’s departure. And Modern Lift
admits that at least one customer who had no relationship with Bohannon
before he was employed by Precision Rentals stopped renting from them
after Bohannon left for Modern Lift. When viewing these facts—and all
reasonable inferences from them—in the light most favorable to Precision
Rentals, the record shows evidence that could support the fact of Precision
Rentals’ damages. Thus, the issue of damages presents a genuine dispute
of material fact and we therefore vacate summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We vacate the summary judgment award and remand to the
superior court for further proceedings.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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