Schritter v. Schritter

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

TANNER JAY SCHRITTER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

LORINDA LYNN SCHRITTER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0546 FC
FILED 04-24-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015DO201700175
The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Tempe
By Alexandra Sandlin, Keith Berkshire
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

David Dick & Associates, Chandler
By David Alan Dick
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
SCHRITTER v. SCHRITTER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Lorinda Lynn Schritter (“Mother”) appeals from a post-
decree order modifying parenting time, affirming child support, and
allocating fees from a psychological evaluation. For the following reasons,
we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Tanner Jay Schritter (“Father”) divorced in 2018
and have one child, born in 2015. Father lives in Kingman and Mother lives
in Gilbert. The original dissolution decree awarded the parties joint legal-
decision making authority with Father having tie-breaking authority if the
parties could not agree, week on/week off parenting time, and ordered
Father to pay $91 in monthly child support.

¶3 By 2024, after resolving various petitions and cross-petitions
seeking to modify the original decree (and accounting for related appeals),
Father had sole legal decision-making authority, the child lived with Father
during the school year and Mother during the summer break, with the non-
custodial parent receiving parenting time every other weekend. Mother
was also required to pay nearly $500 in monthly child support. See Schritter
v. Schritter, 1 CA-CV 20-0399 FC, 2021 WL 3089042 (Ariz. App. July 22,
2021); Schritter v. Schritter, 1 CA-CV 23-0550 FC, 2024 WL 4356500, at *6, ¶
40 (Ariz. App. Oct. 1, 2024).

¶4 In March 2024, Father petitioned to modify parenting time
and asked that Dr. Ronn Lavit be appointed to perform a parenting
evaluation. Father volunteered to pay the entire cost of retaining Dr. Lavit
subject to possible reallocation.

¶5 Mother denied the allegations and argued Father had failed
to show a change of circumstances that materially affected the child, and
thus, his petition should be summarily denied. Mother also challenged the
request to have Dr. Lavit appointed. After hearing oral argument, the
superior court appointed Dr. Lavit and ordered Father to pay the costs of

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the evaluation, subject to potential reallocation. The court also appointed
Samuel Vederman as the best interests attorney (“BIA”) for the child.

¶6 Both before and at the hearing on Father’s petition, the parties
disputed their financial circumstances, including Mother alleging she had
recently lost her job.

¶7 Mother, Father, and the child’s clinical therapist testified at
the April 2025 hearing. The court received numerous exhibits, including the
BIA’s position statement and Dr. Lavit’s report, as well as exhibits and
testimony from prior hearings.

¶8 In June 2025, the superior court affirmed Father’s sole legal
decision-making authority and largely affirmed the parenting time
schedule with minor changes, including a clarification of end-of-summer
transfers and a modification to the winter break schedule so that each party
has parenting time for half of each break. However, the court significantly
changed orders concerning contact between the parties, the child, and their
families. Notably, the court ordered the non-custodial parent to not have
any contact with the child during the custodial parent’s parenting time
except for a ten-minute phone call each week.

¶9 As for child support, the superior court attributed income of
$20 per hour to Mother beginning in August 2024, which included her
period of unemployment. Based on Mother’s changed circumstances,
including the loss of health insurance, the court found Mother’s new child
support obligation would be $492 per month under the Guidelines. But
because this change was less than 2%, the court found it did not warrant
modification and affirmed the earlier child support order.

¶10 Finally, because both parties participated and benefited from
the evaluation, the superior court ordered Mother to reimburse Father
$10,000 towards the cost of more than $50,000 for Dr. Lavit’s evaluation. In
doing so, the court considered the finances of each party.

¶11 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
-2101(A)(2).

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DISCUSSION

I. Mother Has Shown No Error or Resulting Prejudice by the Court
Considering Father’s Modification Petition.

¶12 Mother argues the superior court erred by modifying
parenting time without legal justification under A.R.S. § 25-411(A). Mother
alleges the court erred by holding an evidentiary hearing because Father
filed his petition in March 2024, less than one year after the previous
parenting time order issued in April 2023, without presenting affidavits
demonstrating the child’s environment endangered the child’s physical,
mental, or emotional health.

¶13 Although Father filed his petition within one year of the
previous order contrary to A.R.S. § 25-411(A), Mother’s argument fails for
three reasons. First, because Mother did not raise the argument in the
superior court, she waived the issue. Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216
Ariz. 530, 535, ¶ 18 (App. 2007). Second, even if she had timely objected
under § 25-411, she needed to seek relief by special action, which she failed
to do. In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 302, ¶ 11 (App. 2000) (“The
time for achieving the statute’s intended protections . . . has passed if
noncompliance is first brought to our attention on appeal from the final
judgment.”). Third, even if this issue was properly before us, “we will not
reverse for alleged noncompliance with § 25-411 on appeal absent a
showing of prejudice.” Id. at 303, ¶ 12. And “an appellant will have great
difficulty showing prejudice . . . after a hearing has occurred.” Id. Mother
does not argue, let alone show, that Father’s premature petition prejudiced
her. Accordingly, Mother fails to show error.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Modifying
the Parenting Plan.

¶14 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion in
modifying the parenting plan and asserts its best-interests findings were
“legally deficient and selectively applied.” Mother’s challenge is limited to
the slight modification to the winter break parenting schedule. The court
divided the winter break in half so that each party had parenting time
during the break every year rather than alternating years. We review a
superior court’s parenting time order for an abuse of discretion, Nold v.
Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and will affirm if the court’s ruling
is supported by substantial evidence, Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16
(App. 2009).

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¶15 While a parent is “entitled to reasonable parenting time” to
ensure “substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing contact” with the
child, the superior court is required to determine parenting time in
accordance with the best interests of the child. A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A);
-403.01(D). It must make “specific findings on the record about all relevant
factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the
child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B).

¶16 Here, the superior court made detailed findings for each
factor. Mother takes issue with how the court weighed the evidence for each
factor, but we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan,
246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019). We defer to the court’s credibility
determinations and the weight given to conflicting evidence. Id.

¶17 Along with the conflicting evidence provided by Mother and
Father, the court considered Dr. Lavit’s report opining that Mother had
issues with accepting responsibility in her life, including blaming the court
system for her unemployment, when in reality, Mother lost her job due to
her negative attitude. And contrary to Mother’s argument, the superior
court did not reduce her parenting time. The court’s order merely changed
parenting time for a full winter break every other year to parenting time for
half of winter break every year. Recognizing the court considered
conflicting evidence, Mother fails to show the court abused its discretion in
modifying the winter break parenting time schedule.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Limiting
Non-Custodial Parental Contact with the Child.

¶18 Mother next argues that the superior court abused its
discretion when it reduced phone calls between the non-custodial parent
and the child from twice a week to once a week. She alleges the court
improperly weighed the evidence and ignored both the BIA’s statement
and Dr. Lavit’s report. We review a superior court’s parenting time order
for an abuse of discretion. Nold, 232 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 11. But we do not reweigh
the evidence; we defer to the superior court’s determinations of the weight
given to conflicting evidence. Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20.

¶19 The superior court has broad authority to dictate a parenting
plan consistent with the child’s best interests in contested cases and to
“determine . . . factors . . . necessary to promote and protect the emotional
and physical health of the child.” A.R.S. §§ 25-403; -403.02(B), (D). The court
heard testimony that contact with Mother during Father’s parenting time
worsened the child’s concerning behavior. Dr. Lavit’s report indicated the

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child felt he was often “caught in the middle of his parent’s arguing.”
During at least one instance of Father’s parenting time, Mother’s
conversation with the child on the phone increased conflict between Father
and the child and between the parties themselves.

¶20 The court’s order noted the custodial parent could consent to
more contact in writing and it hoped both parties would be generous in
permitting more contact when in the best interest of the child. But it noted
that these “clear boundaries must be in place” to ensure “better
communication and clear designation of who determines contact with the
child during each parent’s time with the child.” Additionally, the court
applied these restrictions to both parties. Mother fails to show error.

IV. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to
Modify Child Support.

¶21 Mother next argues the superior court improperly imputed
income to her despite “undisputed evidence that her unemployment was
involuntary.” Mother also claims the court excluded Father’s income
streams without explanation. We review child support awards for an abuse
of discretion, Birnstihl v. Birnstihl, 243 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 8 (App. 2018), and
accept the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Sherman v.
Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

A. Mother’s Income

¶22 Mother argues the superior court should not have imputed
income to her from August 2024 to January 2025 because she was
involuntarily unemployed. The court attributed $20 per hour—Mother’s
income since January 2025—to Mother during her period of unemployment
because it found she was voluntarily unemployed. The court also noted
that, even if Mother’s unemployment was considered involuntary, it would
be reasonable for Mother to seek replacement income.

¶23 A.R.S. § 25-320(N) requires the superior court to “presume, in
the absence of contrary testimony, that a parent is capable of full-time
employment at least at the applicable state or federal adult minimum wage,
whichever is higher.” The Guidelines provide factors to consider in
attributing income when a parent is unemployed, whether voluntary or
involuntary. A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § II(A)(4)(e). In addition to the child’s best
interests and “all other relevant factors,” if unemployment is involuntary,
the court considers “whether it is reasonable for that parent to find
replacement income above actual earnings.” Id. at II(A)(4)(e)(i). If
voluntary, but with reasonable cause, the court should consider “whether

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the parent’s decision and its benefits outweigh the effect that the reduced
income has on the child’s best interests.” Id. at II(A)(4)(e)(ii). If voluntary
but without good cause, the court should consider “whether income
attribution is appropriate . . . and . . . [i]f the parent has the ability to find
suitable work in the marketplace at a greater income based on the parent’s
current educational level, training and experience, and physical capacity.”
Id. at II(A)(4)(e)(iii), (iv).

¶24 Mother argues the superior court ignored “undisputed
evidence that her unemployment was involuntary and that she missed
significant work due to her court-mandated participation in Dr. Lavit’s
evaluation process.” Not so. This fact was heavily disputed. There was
competing evidence on the cause of Mother’s unemployment. Mother
alleged it was because she missed too much work to attend court
hearings.1 However, Father testified and presented documentary evidence
that Mother was fired for dishonesty, insubordination, and for being
“combative, uncooperative, and condescending with customers.” The
superior court found Father’s testimony and evidence more credible and
determined Mother was unemployed voluntarily “due to her own
behavior.” “We do not reweigh evidence or determine the credibility of
witnesses.” Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 276, ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (internal
quotations omitted). Because Mother started working again in January
2025, earning $20 per hour, the superior court properly determined it was
appropriate to attribute this hourly income for her period of unemployment
as well.

¶25 Furthermore, the superior court found, whether her
unemployment was voluntary or involuntary, attributing $20 per hour to
her was appropriate because it was “reasonable for Mother to seek
replacement income.” The superior court did not err in attributing income
to Mother.

B. Father’s Income

¶26 Mother argues the superior court erred when it failed to
include Father’s income from investments in its child support calculations.
In its order, the court affirmed its child support order issued in February
2025. The court determined that Mother’s change in income and loss of

1 Mother also asks this court to consider evidence not in the appellate record

showing her termination was involuntary. We do not consider evidence
that was not part of the record before the superior court. See Nelson v.
Nelson, 164 Ariz. 135, 138 (App. 1990).

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health insurance from August 2024 onward did not constitute a significant
change to warrant adjusting child support. The court made no findings as
to Father’s income. But because Mother did not request findings of fact and
conclusions of law, see Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 82(a), we assume the court
found every fact necessary to support the judgment if factually supported,
see Bender v. Bender, 123 Ariz. 90, 92 (App. 1979).

¶27 The child support order issued April 2023 attributed $3,091.51
per month to Father from disability income. And at the evidentiary hearing
in April 2025, Father confirmed he received disability income every month
and an annual distribution from a partnership his grandfather started when
he was young. However, Father testified that the distribution varies each
year. In 2023, Father received $20,000 from the partnership, but in 2024, he
estimated that he received $5,000, and some years, he received no money.
Per Section II(A)(1)(d) of the Guidelines, “a court has discretion to consider
whether non-continuing or non-recurring income is considered income for
purposes of calculating child support.” The court was within its discretion
to disregard this transient income in calculating child support.

¶28 Mother also argues that the superior court failed “to
scrutinize [Father’s] claimed disability.” On cross-examination, Mother
questioned Father about his disability and his ability to work. Father
explained his disability and how it prevents him from working a desk job.
Mother relies on a court finding in the 2018 dissolution decree that Father
“ha[d] the ability to earn at least minimum wage,” and she generally
criticizes the court’s reliance on Father’s testimony at the most recent
hearing. Because we do not reweigh evidence or determine credibility on
appeal, Mother fails to show error. Clark, 243 Ariz. at 276, ¶ 14.

V. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Reallocated Some of the Costs of Dr. Lavit’s Evaluation.

¶29 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion in the
allocation of Dr. Lavit’s fees. Because she objected to the evaluation, Mother
asserts she should not be responsible for the expense and accuses Father of
increasing the costs of the evaluation. Mother also argues she should not
pay for the evaluation because Father has “significantly greater financial
resources.”

¶30 In contested legal decision-making and parenting time
proceedings, the court may order an investigation and report. A.R.S. § 25-
406(A). And if one is ordered, the court must “allocate the cost based on the
financial circumstances of both parties.” Id. at (B). Mother’s arguments

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concerning her objection to the evaluation and Father’s actions “increasing
costs” are not dispositive.

¶31 Although Mother’s argument concerning Father’s financial
resources is relevant, the record does not support her assertion. Dr. Lavit’s
evaluation cost more than $50,000 and the court ordered Mother to pay only
$10,000—less than 20% of the total. Based on the record presented, Mother’s
monthly income is greater than Father’s monthly income. Thus, Mother
fails to show the court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay a portion
of the evaluation expenses.

VI. Mother’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.

¶32 Finally, Mother argues her due process rights were violated
because the evidentiary hearing was held almost a year after Father
petitioned to modify parenting time. The remainder of Mother’s due
process argument consists of repeating the same arguments discussed
above. Because Mother has failed to show error, we will not repeat that
analysis here.

¶33 As to the delay of the evidentiary hearing, Mother fails to
show she was prejudiced. Mother twice moved to continue the
proceedings. And some of the delay arose from discovery disputes,
initiated by Mother, regarding Father’s income. Other delays were due to
administrative issues. The superior court “has broad discretion over the
management of its docket,” Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992), and
on this record, Mother has not shown that her due process rights were
violated.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We affirm. Both parties request attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the reasonableness of their
positions and financial resources, we decline to award either party fees.
Father is entitled to his costs on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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