(In the Matter of the Adoption of Minor Child) Jacob Little v. Jackson Grant Roberts

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 275
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-278

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION Opinion Delivered: May 6, 2026

OF MINOR CHILD
APPEAL FROM THE BOONE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JACOB LITTLE
[NO. 05PR-22-5]
APPELLANT

HONORABLE JOHNNIE A.
V.
COPELAND, JUDGE

JACKSON GRANT ROBERTS AFFIRMED
APPELLEE

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Jacob Little (“Jacob”) appeals from the final decree of adoption granted in the Boone

County Circuit Court on October 22, 2024, in favor of appellee Jackson Grant Roberts

(“Jackson”). On appeal, Jacob argues that the circuit court erred in finding that (1) his

consent to the adoption was unnecessary; and (2) that the adoption was in the best interest

of the minor child (MC). We affirm.

I. Background

MC was born in October 2014 to Kaitlyn Roberts (“Kaitlyn”) and Jacob. Kaitlyn and

Jacob were later married in July 2015. After losing his job in the fall of 2017, Jacob confessed

to Kaitlyn that he had been using methamphetamine for several years and had stolen

multiple tools and other equipment that Kaitlyn found around the property. Following this
confession, Jacob’s erratic behavior escalated: he shot guns outside of Kaitlyn’s and MC’s

bedroom windows and sent Kaitlyn a picture of his gun with the text “my friends said to tell

you hi” with a middle-finger emoji.

Due to Jacob’s escalating behavior, Kaitlyn petitioned the circuit court for a divorce

and, separately, for an order of protection. In her petition for an order of protection, Kaitlyn

cited Jacob’s “meth usage, suicide threats, carrying multiple weapons, job loss, non-support,

stealing, erratic behavior, paranoia, use of tracking devices and cameras, and daily verbal

abuse and anger” as the reason for the order. Kaitlyn was initially granted a temporary order

of protection that allowed Jacob supervised visitation with MC.

From October 26, 2017, to September 25, 2020, Jacob was frequently incarcerated.

His incarceration was mainly due to two separate cases that resulted in his pleading guilty to

forty-eight mostly drug-related felonies. He had one significant period of release from

October 10, 2018, until July 20, 2019. Jacob does not contend that he sought visitation with

MC during his period of release. All parties agree that Jacob last saw MC in October 2017

at her third birthday party. Jacob has not provided financial support, nor has he

communicated with MC since then.

On December 18, 2017, the divorce decree was granted and included the following

language:

That [Kaitlyn] shall have primary physical custody of the minor child. Because
of [Jacob]’s incarceration, there shall be no visitation and no child support.
Either party may petition the Court for visitation or support once [Jacob] is no
longer in custody.

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The court entered a final order of protection on February 6, 2018, with an expiration date

of January 16, 2023. The final order of protection included the following language: “[Kaitlyn]

is awarded custody of [MC] pursuant to the Decree of Divorce filed December 18, 2018.

[Jacob] shall have no visitation with [MC].”

In December 2018, Kaitlyn began dating Jackson Roberts, and they were married in

June 2021. Jackson testified that during this period, he saw MC as his child, he had

financially and emotionally provided for MC, and they had a close bond. On February 24,

2021, Jacob filed a petition for visitation with MC. On January 13, 2022, Jackson filed a

petition in a separate action asking to adopt MC. Jackson alleged that Jacob’s consent was

unnecessary. The circuit court consolidated the two cases and held a hearing on both issues,

considering the testimony of the witnesses—Acacia Johnson, licensed professional counselor;

Billy Brady, owner of New Life Center, a reentry program; Kaitlyn; Eirc Stewart, Jackson’s

employer; Lindsey Weddle, Kaitlyn’s coworker; Natalie Roberts, Jackson’s mother; Jackson;

Jacob; Tess Little, Jacob’s wife; and Penny Little, Jacob’s mother.

Following the hearing, on the basis of the testimony of the parties and witnesses and

evidence entered into the record and noting the best interest of MC, the circuit court granted

the petition. In so doing, the court found that Jacob’s consent to the adoption was not

required because for a period of at least one year, he had failed significantly without

justifiable cause to communicate with MC pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-

9-207(a)(2)(i) (Repl. 2020). This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

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The standard of review applicable to the issues in this case is well settled: adoption

cases are reviewed de novo. In re Adoption of A.P., 2021 Ark. App. 440, at 8, 638 S.W.3d 293,

299. The decision of the circuit court will not be reversed on appeal unless that decision is

clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support it, the

reviewing court is left with the “firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 9, 638

S.W.3d at 299. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, the reviewing court defers to the

circuit court because of its superior opportunity to observe the parties and to judge the

credibility of witnesses. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. 356.

III. Discussion

We first look at whether Jacob’s consent is required because that is the dispositive

issue. Ordinarily, the consent of a natural parent is required in an adoption case. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-9-206 (Repl. 2020). However, this consent is not required “if the parent for a period

of at least one (1) year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate

with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or

judicial decree.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207(a)(2) (Repl. 2020). A significant failure is “one

that is meaningful or important” and is “unjustifiable if it is voluntary and intentional, i.e.,

arbitrary and without adequate excuse.” Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352, at 6, 428

S.W.3d 543, 546. A person who wishes to adopt a child must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that consent is unnecessary. In re Adoption of J.N., 2018 Ark. App. 467, at 7, 560

S.W.3d 806, 812. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will

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produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.

Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007).

We view the issue of justifiable cause as factual but one that is determined largely on

the basis of the credibility of the witnesses, and we give great weight to a circuit court’s

personal observations when the welfare of young children is involved. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2017

Ark. 182, at 4, 519 S.W.3d 324, 327 (citing In re Adoption of K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844

S.W.2d 343 (1993)). “Without justifiable cause” means that the significant failure must be

willful in the sense of being voluntary and intentional; it must appear that the parent acted

arbitrarily and without just cause or adequate excuse. In re Adoption of J.N., 2018 Ark. App.

467, at 8, 560 S.W.3d at 812.

Jacob argues that his lack of communication with MC was justifiable due to his

incarceration, the divorce decree, and the order of protection. This court has recently held

that such impediments are not sufficient to justify lack of communication with a minor child.

In re Adoption of Minor Child, 2025 Ark. App. 116, at 6–7, 708 S.W.3d 784, 789 (“[Father]

argues that he had ‘justifiable cause’ for any failure to communicate with the minor children

because of his incarceration, the order of protection, and the terms of the order of divorce.

[He] claims any lack of communication was involuntary and beyond his control. We

disagree.”). Furthermore, this court has held that when an order of protection or a period of

incarceration stems from an individual’s intentional misconduct, the individual cannot later

use the order of protection or incarceration as justification for failure to communicate. See,

e.g., Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352, at 6, 428 S.W.3d 543, 546 (citing Zgleszewski v.

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Zgleszewski, 260 Ark. 629, 632, 542 S.W.2d 765, 767–68 (1976)) (holding that imprisonment

is no justification for failure to communicate with child); In re Adoption of Minor Child, 2023

Ark. App. 522, at 6, 678 S.W.3d 899, 903 (holding that intentional conduct that results in

circumstances justifiably prohibiting party from contacting the minor child cannot be used

to justify a lack of communication).

The record indicates that between October 26, 2017, and January 13, 2022, Jacob

made no attempt to contact MC. He made no attempt to reach out through friends, family,

or an attorney. Jacob, on appeal, argues that any such contact was prohibited by the order of

protection. However, in his deposition, Jacob readily admitted that he contacted other

parties despite standing no-contact orders. Furthermore, the order of protection did not bar

Jacob from seeking communication through an attorney acting as intermediary. Moreover,

Jacob made no attempt to modify the custody terms of the order of divorce, despite it

explicitly stating that Jacob could petition the court for visitation upon his release from

incarceration. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when it held that Jacob’s consent

was not necessary.

Since we affirm the circuit court’s holding that Jacob’s consent was not necessary for

Jackson to adopt MC, Jacob does not have standing to contest the adoption. See In re Adoption

of Minor Children, 2026 Ark. App. 123, at 19, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (appellant has no

standing to contest adoption when his consent was not required).

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

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Tschiemer Legal Briefing, by: Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellant.

Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appelllee.

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