Randy Curtis v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 94
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-25-256

Opinion Delivered February 11, 2026
RANDY CURTIS
APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 30CR-23-257]
V.
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. SHIRRON,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO
CORRECT THE SENTENCING
ORDER

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant Randy Curtis appeals after he was convicted by a Hot Spring County

Circuit Court jury of failure to comply with sex-offender registration and reporting

requirements. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve 240 months’ incarceration.

On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed

verdict. We affirm appellant’s conviction but remand for the limited purpose of correcting

the sentencing order.

I. Relevant Facts

Appellant was charged by felony information with failure to comply with sex-offender

registration and reporting requirements, a Class C felony, in violation of Arkansas Code

Annotated section 12-12-904 (Supp. 2023). The State further stated that appellant’s
sentence should be enhanced because he is a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-4-501 (Repl. 2024). A jury trial was held on December 12, 2024.

During opening arguments, the State told the jury it intended to prove that appellant

had failed to register a vehicle he had access to and had failed to report that he had moved

from a trailer to a different structure on an adjacent lot with a different address as required.

Defense counsel told the jury that the case was not as simple as the State suggested and asked

the jury to listen to the evidence and “come back with a reasonable verdict.”

Candy Perry, the chief deputy for the Hot Spring County Assessor’s Office, testified

that the office had personal-property records for appellant and his wife, Theresa Curtis, from

2023. According to the records, the couple had assessed and listed the following personal

property for that year: a “2005 Ford Taurus, a 2015 Ford F150 2-wheel drive pickup, a 1990

aluminum boat 14 foot long, a 1980 boat trailer 16 foot long, [and] a 1973 Johnson boat

motor.” In addition to personal property, Ms. Perry testified that appellant and Mrs. Curtis

owned multiple lots, specifically lots 40, 41, and 57 in an unrecorded subdivision and had

assessed for a residential building on that land. Although she explained that 9-1-1 had

designated two addresses in the subdivision as being on Ridgefield Court instead of Ranger

Drive, she said that the “stick built structure” on lot 57 of appellant’s land “is being assessed

for 316 Ranger Drive.”

Detective Glen Pye with the Hot Spring County Sheriff’s Department testified that

he was aware that appellant and Mrs. Curtis had purchased “multiple lots off Ridge Road.”

He stated that he visited 316 Ranger Drive on March 10, 2023. He said that, at that time,

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there was an older mobile home at the address, but he knew that the mobile home was

removed sometime after August 31, 2023. At the time of his March 2023 visit, appellant

and Mrs. Curtis were inside the mobile home, and a white Ford pickup truck and a black

Ford Taurus was parked outside.

Detective Pye testified that he visited the property a second time on August 31, 2023.

On that day, Mrs. Curtis was at the mobile home, but appellant was not. Detective Pye

found appellant inside another structure, “like a log cabin,” located approximately 150 to

200 yards east of the mobile home. When appellant came out, appellant spontaneously told

Detective Pye that he lived in that “stick built structure.” Detective Pye said that the same

white Ford pickup truck that he saw in March 2023 was parked outside the structure.

Lieutenant Jerry Norwood, a sex-offender coordinator/investigator with the Hot

Spring County Sheriff’s Department, testified that appellant transferred his sex-offender

registration from Saline County to Hot Spring County on June 21, 2021. Before the move,

appellant had told Lieutenant Norwood that he was moving his mobile home to 316 Ranger

Drive. Lieutenant Norwood testified that he had subsequently visited the address and took

pictures of the “white and blue, single wide . . . older trailer.” Appellant signed a renewal

form for his registration and reporting requirements on September 14, 2023. At that time,

appellant indicated that he only had access to a 1994 blue Ford F150 truck and listed his

address as 316 Ranger Drive. Lieutenant Norwood explained that the form was completed

on the computer, and a copy was printed and given to appellant after it was completed. He

went over the form with appellant and asked whether there were any changes to the

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information on the form. Appellant did not tell him he had acquired a new vehicle or that

he had access to his wife’s vehicle.

After later determining that appellant had failed to comply with the reporting

requirements, Lieutenant Norwood filed a probable-cause affidavit on October 17, 2023,

and an arrest warrant was issued. Appellant subsequently went back in to talk with

Lieutenant Norwood on January 18, 2024, and appellant admitted that he had forgotten to

register the “white Ford truck and the black Taurus.”

After the State rested, defense counsel moved for directed verdict. He specifically

argued the following:

The defense would move for a directed verdict of not guilty on the failure to
comply with sex offender registration requirements.

The first element of the charge is that Mr. Curtis is required to register as a
sex offender and we have stipulated to that fact. There’s no question about that fact.

The second part of that states that Mr. Curtis is to report in person a change
of address and information concerning a vehicle; the make, model, color, and license
tag.

The state has not presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Randy Curtis did not register his address.
The supervising officer stated that he had been to that property three (3) times and
all three (3) times, there was nobody there. In that, he acknowledged -- or the officer
acknowledged that there was a -- a structure on the hill on the same property. I believe
the officer said that he thought it might be a different tract of property only because
of the distance. And he said it was a hundred (100) or a hundred and fifty (150) yards
from the mobile home that was on the property to the -- the site built structure.

The fact that sex offenders are not afforded the opportunity to read over their
verification form and read over that acknowledgment form and confirm, themselves,
that the information is correct in and of itself, to me, would negate the validity of the
form in that they’re signing something they don’t know. They get a copy of it and, of

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course, Lieutenant Norwood said that they have the chance to read over it afterwards,
but that’s after the fact. Now I know that he said that it could be modified, but that’s
– that’s that he has already acknowledged before reading.

The vehicle registration could certainly be an oversight. I know this
registration requirement is a strict liability requirement, but there is no evidence to
even speculate that Mr. Curtis did anything to try to hide his registration or anything
of that nature. He had a blue Ford pickup and then he had a 2015 Ford pickup.

I anticipate you’ll hear testimony about the blue Ford pickup in the defense’s
case, but, like I said, there’s just not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that Randy Curtis is guilty of failure to comply with sex offender registration
requirements.

The circuit court denied the motion.

Mrs. Curtis testified that the address for lot 40 where the mobile home used to sit is

372 Ridgefield Court. She further denied that she and appellant had ever lived in the mobile

home when moving to Hot Spring County. She claimed that they had instead moved into

the house that appellant had built at 316 Ranger Drive. Mrs. Curtis admitted that appellant

no longer had the blue 1995 Ford truck but had acquired the 2015 Ford truck when they

had first moved to Hot Spring County.

After the defense rested, and at the conclusion of all evidence, defense counsel

renewed his motion for directed verdict, which the circuit court again denied. The jury

found appellant guilty of failure to comply with sex-offender registration and reporting

requirements. During the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence of appellant’s

other prior convictions to prove that he is a habitual offender. The jury recommended that

he be sentenced as a habitual offender to serve twenty years’ imprisonment, which the circuit

court imposed. This appeal followed.

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II. Standard of Review

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency

challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only

the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if

substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of

sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one

way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence

may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s

guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35,

617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to

decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the

trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions

of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.

This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom

apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose,

being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be

shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because

intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common

knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty

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in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person

intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Registered sex offenders are required to verify their registration in person every six

months after their initial registration date during the period of time in which they are

required to register. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-909(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). Arkansas Code

Annotated section 12–12–904(a)(l)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2023) provides that a person is guilty of a

Class C felony for failure to comply with registration and reporting requirements if the

person “[f]ails to register or verify registration as required under this subchapter; [or] . . .

[f]ails to report a change of address, employment, education, or training as required under

this subchapter.” Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-906(g)(3)(L) (Supp. 2023)

provides in relevant part that a sex offender report any vehicle make, model, color, and

license tag number that the sex offender owns, operates, or to which he or she has access. A

sex offender must report any change in this information within five calendar days of the

change. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-909(b)(1)(D). The sex-offender-registration requirements

are mandatory, and the failure to comply with registration is a strict-liability offense. Hall v.

State, 2022 Ark. App. 232, 646 S.W.3d 204.

The State submitted to the jury two theories on which it could find appellant guilty.

The State argued and the jury was instructed that to sustain the charge, appellant had to fail

to report in person a change of address or information concerning a vehicle make, model,

color, and license tag number that appellant owned, operated, or to which he had access as

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required. Appellant argues on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to

support either theory. We disagree.

Regarding the requirement to report information concerning a change in vehicle,

appellant specifically argues on appeal that the State “failed to prove Appellant was not in

that five-day window when the vehicle was discovered on Appellant’s property.” However,

appellant failed to make this argument in his motion for directed verdict. An appellant may

not expand or enlarge the grounds for a directed-verdict motion when arguing the issue on

appeal. Adams v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 107, 594 S.W.3d 884. Instead, he is bound by the

scope of the directed-verdict motion made at trial, and all other arguments are not preserved

for appellate review. Id. Because this claim was not a basis for his motion at trial, it is not

preserved for appeal and is barred from review by this court. Id. Further, any other

arguments appellant made below regarding his failure to report information concerning new

vehicles but not raised on appeal are abandoned. Kelly v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 519; Echoles

v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 352, 524 S.W.3d 417.

Because we must affirm appellant’s conviction on the basis of his failure to report

information concerning a change in vehicles, it is unnecessary to address appellant’s

additional arguments regarding whether there was substantial evidence to support the State’s

alternate theory that appellant failed to report a change in address. We will affirm a general

verdict without regard to the State’s proof on a particular element of a charge if there is

sufficient evidence to convict on the alternative ground. See generally Taylor v. State, 2010

Ark. 372, at 14, 372 S.W.3d 769, 778; Norris v. State, 2010 Ark. 174, at 6, 368 S.W.3d 52,

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56. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction for failure to comply with sex-offender

registration and reporting requirements.

IV. Sentencing Order

Finally, we note that there is a clerical error in the sentencing order. Appellant was

charged as a habitual offender; appellant’s prior convictions were introduced at the

sentencing hearing; and the jury sentenced appellant as a habitual offender. However, the

box that would indicate appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender is not checked on

the sentencing order. The circuit court is free to correct a clerical error to have the judgment

speak the truth. Battles v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 198; Carter v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 57, 568

S.W.3d 788. Thus, we affirm appellant’s conviction but remand to the circuit court with

instructions to correct the sentencing order.

Affirmed; remanded to correct the sentencing order.

WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Gregory Crain, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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