Terry Leroy Long v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 62
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No.CR-25-112

Opinion Delivered February 4, 2026

TERRY LEROY LONG APPEAL FROM THE SHARP
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 68CR-23-108]
V.
HONORABLE ROB RATTON,
STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

Terry Leroy Long appeals his convictions for rape and argues that the circuit court

erred in (1) allowing the use of a certified facility dog at trial and (2) denying his motion for

a new trial. We affirm.

In August 2023, the State accused Long of rape by engaging in sexual intercourse or

deviate sexual activity with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. He was

eventually charged with fourteen counts of rape and as a habitual offender.

On 1 November 2024, the State moved to allow use of a certified facility dog to

accompany the minor victim, who was thirteen at the time of trial, during her testimony.

The motion explained that the presence of the certified facility dog “may reduce anxiety”

experienced by a child witness while testifying in a criminal trial and that the dog would

remain out of the view of the jury during the child’s testimony. At a hearing on the matter,

defense counsel argued that the statute governing the use of certified facility dogs is likely
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unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. Counsel asserted

that the Arkansas Constitution gives sole authority to prescribe rules of procedure and

practice in the courts to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The State responded that the statute

has “been around for a long time” and is a ”well-established practice.” The court ruled that

it would allow the use of the dog.

Long’s case proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on fourteen counts of

rape. The jury recommended a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment on each count to run

consecutively, a total of 560 years’ imprisonment, and the court imposed the recommended

sentence. Long moved for a new trial, arguing that his sentence shocked the conscience

and violated his due-process rights and the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment, but his motion was deemed denied. Long has timely appealed.

Long first argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the use of a certified facility

dog at trial. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-43-1002(b) (Supp. 2023) provides that

“if a certified facility dog is available . . . a child witness or vulnerable witness of the party

shall be afforded the opportunity to have a certified facility dog accompany him or her while

testifying in court.” Long asserts that by reducing the minor victim’s anxiety during her

testimony, the dog’s presence “artificially enhance[ed] the demeanor and credibility of the

most crucial witness in the case.” This robbed the jury of “important observable

characteristics,” Long contends, because behaviors associated with anxiety are often

associated with deception. He also asserts that the use of a certified facility dog is “not in

keeping with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment,” which allows a defendant to test the

credibility of his accuser.

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The State responds that Long’s arguments are not preserved for review because he

failed to raise them to the circuit court. We agree that Long did not raise any Sixth

Amendment argument below, nor did he argue that the use of the certified facility dog

would artificially enhance the child victim’s credibility. Issues raised for the first time on

appeal, even constitutional ones, generally will not be considered. Chandler v. State, 2024

Ark. App. 260, 688 S.W.3d 170.

Long also argues that the statute violates the separation of powers established by the

Arkansas Constitution. He notes that the Arkansas Supreme Court holds the power to

establish practice and procedure in the circuit courts, and in State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 800

S.W.2d 402 (1990), the supreme court held that when the legislature enacts laws that conflict

with rules of court, it would defer to the General Assembly only to the extent that the

conflicting court rule’s primary purposes and effectiveness are not compromised; otherwise,

the court rules remain supreme. After listing a few more constitutional rights that he claims

are violated by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-1002, Long concludes that the statute amounts to

a “total abrogation of the constitutional right of a defendant to have a fair trial” and is

therefore invalid.

The State suggests that Long failed to adequately develop and support his

constitutional challenge below, which prevents this court from reaching the merits of his

argument. An appellant must raise an issue in the circuit court and support it with sufficient

argument and legal authority, if there is any, to preserve it for an appeal. Schermerhorn v.

State, 2016 Ark. App. 395, 500 S.W.3d 181. This is true even when the issue concerns the

constitutionality of a statute. Id. If a particular theory was not presented to and ruled upon

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by the circuit court, then the theory will not be reviewed on appeal. Id. In other words,

an appellant has the burden of providing a record sufficient to demonstrate reversible error.

Id.

Long’s constitutional challenge before the circuit court consisted of the following:

[M]y only thoughts with respect to that matter at this point in time—
this is only the second time I’ve actually seen this—this particular statute—is
one of separation of powers in that this is a legislative enactment, and as I
understand the Arkansas Constitution, it gives sole authority to prescribe rules
of procedure and practice in the courts to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and
I don’t think this has gone through that route. So, I think the statute itself is
likely and unconstitutional. And, no, I haven’t had time to put the Attorney
General on notice of that claim.

Although Long mentioned the separation of powers, he did not cite any provision of the

Arkansas Constitution, any standard of constitutional review, or any case law or secondary

authority to support his argument. See Schermerhorn, supra. Because Long failed to provide

the circuit court with a developed argument on which to rule, we will not address the

argument on appeal. 1

Finally, Long argues that the circuit court erred in not granting his motion for new

trial. He asserts, as he did below, that his sentence is “so shocking to the conscience, and

so disproportionate that it violates both the 8th Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article 2, § 9 of the Arkansas State Constitution.” He contends that the

sentence indicates the jury’s verdict and recommended sentence was based on sympathy,

prejudice, or a dislike of him or his attorney. Long also asserts a violation of his right to due

process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section

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We note that Long’s argument on appeal is also underdeveloped and conclusory.
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8 of the Arkansas Constitution. Due to these constitutional violations, he argues the circuit

court should have granted him a new trial pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-130 (Repl.

2016).

The State recommends holding that Long’s constitutional challenge to his sentence

is not preserved because he failed to make a contemporaneous objection when the sentence

was imposed. A contemporaneous objection to the circuit court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences is necessary in order to preserve an argument for appeal that the circuit court

abused its discretion. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). A defendant

who makes no objection at the time the sentence is imposed has no standing to complain

about it. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 324, 287 S.W.3d 587 (2008). The State asserts that Long

failed to object when his sentence was imposed and that he cannot raise the argument for

the first time in a motion for new trial. See Merrill v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 575, 702 S.W.3d

420 (an objection made for the first time in a motion for new trial is untimely).

Long replies that his motion for new trial “was a pending objection at the time of

sentencing on November 26, 2024.” Alternatively, his motion could be considered a

petition for postconviction relief timely filed under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Long cites Moore

v. State, 2014 Ark. 231 (per curiam), in support. In Moore, the appellant filed a pro se

petition for reduction of sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016)

and alleged his sentence was excessive. The circuit court denied the petition and noted that

the petition was also without merit if considered as a petition for postconviction relief.

Moore’s petition had been verified and timely filed, so the supreme court considered the

appeal as the denial of Rule 37 relief.

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We hold that Long’s argument is not preserved for review because there was no

contemporaneous objection made below. His claim that his motion was pending at the

time of sentencing is inaccurate; he was sentenced by the court at the conclusion of his trial

on 13 November 2024. That was his first opportunity to object, not when the court entered

the sentencing order on November 26. His alternative argument to treat his motion as a

Rule 37 petition is also unavailing. Unlike in Moore, Long’s motion was not verified. A

circuit court lacks jurisdiction to consider arguments raised in an unverified Rule 37.1

petition, Williamson v. State, 2012 Ark. 170 (per curiam), and when the circuit court lacks

jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks jurisdiction. Winnett v. State, 2012 Ark. 404 (per

curiam).

Affirmed.

TUCKER and THYER, JJ., agree.

R.T. Starken, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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