William Mayfield v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 577
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-25-27

WILLIAM MAYFIELD Opinion Delivered December 3, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GRANT COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 27CR-22-98]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MARGARET DOBSON,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

William Mayfield appeals his conviction of possession of a firearm by certain persons

for which he was sentenced to 216 months in the Arkansas Division of Correction. On

appeal, he argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm in

question; (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; and (3) the circuit

court erred in denying his request to dismiss his counsel. We affirm.

On August 25, 2022, Officer Stephen Williams of the Grant County Sheriff’s Office

responded to a report of a one-car motor vehicle accident. When he arrived on the scene,

he found Mayfield sitting in the driver’s seat of a GMC Yukon, which had wrecked into trees

at the edge of a wooded area. Mayfield was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Williams

checked on Mayfield and waited with him for an ambulance to arrive. Mayfield resisted the
emergency medical technicians’ (EMTs’) initial attempts to check his vital signs. The EMTs

eventually were able to calm him down and pull him out of the car and onto a gurney. When

Mayfield was pulled from the Yukon, Williams saw a handgun lying on the seat, where it

would have been under or abutting Mayfield’s right side.

Detective David Ponder of the Grant County Sheriff’s Office was also on the scene

of the accident. He described what he witnessed: “When [Mayfield] was pulled out of the

vehicle there was a pistol observed in the driver’s seat that he was sitting on top of.”

The State charged Mayfield as a habitual offender with possession of a firearm by

certain persons. He also was charged with simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms,

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and possession of drug

paraphernalia. The charge of possession of a firearm by certain persons was severed and

tried separately.

Mayfield was represented by public defender Victoria Leigh. The speedy-trial time was

tolled, and the trial ultimately was set for July 15, 2024. On July 10, Mayfield told the court,

“Your Honor, I’m going to fire my attorney. I’m going to move trial counsel and I’d request

a change of venue.” The court denied the request to change the venue and inquired as to

whether Mayfield had new counsel. Mayfield responded that he did not have new counsel

and did not have the money to hire new counsel. The court then asked whether he intended

to represent himself, to which Mayfield responded that he did not intend to represent

himself, and he wanted the court to appoint him another attorney. The court refused, stating

that he already had an excellent attorney in Leigh.

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The case proceeded to trial on July 15. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and

Mayfield was sentenced to 216 months in the Arkansas Division of Correction. Mayfield

timely appealed.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Possession of a Firearm

Mayfield argues that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the gun on

which he appeared to be sitting. His reasoning is that this court should apply the joint-

occupancy analysis because the State did not prove that he owned the car that he was driving.

We disagree.

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Speer

v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 473, 698 S.W.3d 683. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

when it is supported by substantial evidence, meaning the evidence compels a conclusion

one way or the other without forcing the trier of fact to resort to speculation or conjecture.

Railey v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 433, 675 S.W.3d 912. On appeal, this court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State and considers only that evidence that

supports the conviction. Id.

When a defendant is the only occupant of a vehicle, “the State need only prove

constructive possession of the contraband without including any inquiry into the elements

for joint occupancy.” Cain v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 465, at 8, 609 S.W.3d 680, 685. This

rule applies whether the sole-occupant defendant is the owner, primary driver, or merely a

borrower of the car. Bens v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 6, 593 S.W.3d 495. “Constructive

possession is the control or right to control the contraband. Constructive possession may

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be implied when the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible

to the accused and subject to his or her control.” Cain, 2020 Ark. App. 465, at 8, 609 S.W.3d

at 685 (citation omitted).

In the present case, Mayfield was the sole occupant of the Yukon, so it is irrelevant

who owned the vehicle. We only consider whether the State met its burden of proving he

constructively possessed the gun. The firearm in question was found lying in the open, on

top of the seat in which Mayfield was sitting. It was on the right side of the seat near the

location of the receiving end of the seatbelt buckle. It was either under Mayfield’s right thigh

or buttock, or it was directly beside him abutting his thigh. Since the gun was found

immediately and exclusively accessible to Mayfield and subject to his control, he

constructively possessed it.1 Any argument to the contrary is without merit. The conclusion

that Mayfield possessed a firearm is supported by substantial evidence.

II. Denial of Motion for Mistrial

Mayfield argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when

it informed the jury that the defendant was represented by the public defender. The State

responds that Mayfield’s argument is not preserved for appeal, and even if it is, it is without

merit. We agree that Mayfield’s argument is not preserved for appeal; thus, we decline to

reach the merits.

1
Indeed, it could be said that Mayfield actually possessed the gun without addressing
constructive possession. “Actual possession is marked by direct physical control of the
[contraband].” Boykin v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 47, at 2, 568 S.W.3d 315, 316.

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At the beginning of the trial, before voir dire, the court introduced the trial

participants to the jury venire. In doing so, the judge introduced the deputy prosecutor.

The court then stated, “I have Victoria Leigh, who is our public defender, who is our

attorney. She is here today representing the defendant.” The court then introduced the case

and proceeded with voir dire.

After voir dire was completed and the jury chosen, Mayfield’s attorney stated that she

was moving for a mistrial “on the basis of the jury hearing that Mr. Mayfield is availing

himself of the Public Defender’s Office,” thus signaling to the jury that he was indigent.

Mayfield’s attorney argued that Mayfield was prejudiced by the jury learning that he was

indigent, and combining the jury’s knowledge of his indigency with the severity of the charge

and his lack of parole options if convicted necessitated a mistrial. 2 The court denied the

motion for a mistrial but offered to give a curative instruction, which defense counsel

declined.

A motion for mistrial must be made at the first opportunity. Cherry v. State, 2024

Ark. App. 249, 688 S.W.3d 164. The reason for this is to give the court the opportunity to

cure any perceived error before prejudice occurs. Id. In McCoy v. State, 2010 Ark. 373, 370

S.W.3d 241, the supreme court declined to reach the merits of the appellant’s argument that

the circuit court erred in denying his request for a mistrial on the basis that his argument

was not preserved. The prosecutor made an arguably improper comment through

2
If convicted, Mayfield would not be eligible for parole. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-
93-609(c) (Supp. 2025) and 5-73-103(c)(1) (Repl. 2024).

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questioning during voir dire, and the appellant failed to move for a mistrial until the

prosecutor asked the improper question multiple times. The supreme court stated that it

had been “resolute in holding that a motion for mistrial must be made at the first

opportunity.” Id. at 13, 370 S.W.3d at 249. Because Mayfield’s motion for mistrial was not

made at the earliest opportunity, the denial of his motion is not preserved for appellate

review.

III. Denial of Request for New Public Defender

Mayfield’s final argument is that the circuit court erred in denying him the

opportunity to obtain new counsel, which would have entailed continuing the trial date. We

disagree.

A defendant’s request to change counsel when made on the eve of trial is treated as a

motion for a continuance since the change of attorneys would require such. Edwards v. State,

321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2d 310 (1995). Although grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and guaranteed by article 2, section 10 of the Arkansas

Constitution, “the right to counsel of one’s choosing is not absolute, and the circuit court

retains broad discretion to grant or deny a continuance for purposes of obtaining new

counsel.” Liggins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 321, at 5, 463 S.W.3d 331, 335; see also Raino v.

State, 2021 Ark. App. 331. The court’s decision to deny the continuance will not be

overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the circuit

court acts “improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Abernathy v. State,

2024 Ark. App. 532, at 4, 699 S.W.3d 842, 845. Furthermore, “once competent counsel is

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obtained, any request for a change in counsel must be considered in the context of the

public’s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice.” Raino, 2021 Ark. App 331, at 6

(citing King v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 531, at 3–4, 589 S.W 3d 420, 423). “In fact, ‘the right

to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for

them.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). “When a defendant

has not identified a counsel of his choice, he is not manifestly deprived of that choice.”

Abernathy, 2024 Ark. App. 532, at 5, 699 S.W.3d at 846. Finally, the denial of a motion for

a continuance will not be overturned absent a showing of prejudice, which requires alleging

particular facts showing prejudice that resulted in a denial of justice. Galvin v. State, 2021

Ark. App. 121, 618 S.W.3d 475.

Mayfield’s argument is that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a new

attorney made on July 10, five days before trial, when he informed the court he was going to

fire his attorney. The court inquired whether Mayfield had new counsel or planned to hire

new counsel, to which Mayfield replied no. Mayfield stated that he did not plan to represent

himself, either, and that he wanted the court to appoint him a new attorney. The court

denied the request, stating that Mayfield already had an excellent attorney. Previously, in

various pro se pleadings, Mayfield moved the court to “fire” his attorney. Three months

before trial, at a pretrial hearing, Mayfield told the court that he wanted to fire his attorney.

At that time, the circuit court told him he already had experienced counsel and informed

him that if he wanted a new attorney, he would have to hire one.

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While Mayfield argues on appeal that he acted diligently in seeking to dismiss his

counsel, the record is devoid of any action on his part to hire new counsel. Even after the

circuit court informed Mayfield three months before trial that if he wanted a new attorney,

he would have to hire one, Mayfield failed to take action to do so. Thus, he did not act

diligently. See Galvin, supra. By the time of the final pretrial hearing, Mayfield had not

identified counsel of his choice. Nor has Mayfield now alleged facts showing prejudice that

resulted in a denial of justice. On the record before us, we cannot say that the circuit court

abused its discretion in denying Mayfield’s motion for a continuance in order to obtain new

counsel or that Mayfield was prejudiced by the court’s denial. Thus, we affirm on this point.

Affirmed.

WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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