Robert Lynn Hyler v. Michelle Dawn Hyler

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 161
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-23-829

ROBERT LYNN HYLER Opinion Delivered March 12, 2025

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 72DR-21-445]

HONORABLE DIANE WARREN,
MICHELLE DAWN HYLER JUDGE

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellant Robert Hyler appeals the Washington County Circuit Court’s division of

property in his divorce from appellee Michelle Hyler. Specifically, Robert argues that the

circuit court erred in ordering the sale of approximately 2.5 acres of his nonmarital property

on which the marital residence was added, with the proceeds to be distributed equally

between the parties. We affirm the circuit court’s decision.

The parties were married on May 13, 1997, and a decree of divorce was entered on

February 22, 2023. In addition to its division of personal property, which is not at issue in

this appeal, the circuit court ordered an 11-acre tract that the parties owned jointly to be sold

and the proceeds divided; returned to Michelle five parcels of real property that she owned

prior to the marriage; and returned to Robert three parcels of real property that he owned

prior to the marriage—a 39.32-acre tract, a 40-acre tract, and a 19-acre tract—with the
exception of approximately 2.5 acres of the 40-acre tract where the parties’ marital home was

located (the marital residence). In the divorce decree, the circuit court recognized that the

real property on which the marital residence was located belonged to Robert prior to the

marriage; that the marital residence was purchased using money from both parties after they

had married and was moved from its original location to the real property owned by Robert;

that the marital residence and Robert’s nonmarital real property had become commingled

such that valuation of each separate property was not possible; that the marital residence

could not be moved; and that no evidence was presented regarding the value of the marital

residence separately from Robert’s nonmarital real property or vice versa. The court further

found that when Robert and Michelle mutually agreed to place the marital residence on

Robert’s nonmarital property, it became part of the property, and while the real property

continued to belong to Robert and the marital residence was marital property, the properties

were physically intertwined and could not realistically be separated. The circuit court found

that the equitable solution was to sell the marital residence and the 2.5 acres of Robert’s

nonmarital real property on which the marital residence was located and divide the proceeds

equally between Robert and Michelle.

Domestic-relations cases are tried de novo on appeal, and the appellate court does

not reverse a circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous; a finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire

evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Gillum v.

Gillum, 2025 Ark. App. 95. A circuit court is given broad powers to distribute both marital

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and nonmarital property in order to achieve an equitable distribution; the overriding

purpose of the property-division statute is to enable the court to make a division of property

that is fair and equitable under the circumstances. Id. In reviewing a circuit court’s findings,

we defer to the court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be accorded to their testimony. Id.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 (Repl. 2020) provides that all marital

property shall be distributed one-half to each party unless such a division would be

inequitable, and all other property shall be returned to the party who owned it prior to

marriage unless the court makes some other division that it considers to be equitable. If a

circuit court determines, for equitable reasons, that marital property should be unequally

distributed or that nonmarital property should not be distributed to the party who owned it

prior to the marriage, the court must take into consideration the length of the marriage; the

age, health, and station in life of the parties; the occupation of the parties; the amount and

sources of income; their vocational skills; their employability; the estate, liabilities, and needs

of each party and the opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income;

the contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital

property, including services as a homemaker; and the federal income tax consequences of

the court’s division of property. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1).

Robert argues that the 2.5 acres should have been awarded to him as his nonmarital

property, and the most Michelle could expect was a monetary award for the value of any

marital improvements she could prove she had made to the property. He also argues that

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Michelle failed to prove the value of the land before and after improvements were made with

marital funds. Last, he argues that the circuit court failed to address the factors listed in

section 9-12-315 when making an unequal distribution of property.

It is undisputed that the 2.5 acres of real property on which the marital residence was

located was Robert’s nonmarital property, which was acknowledged by the circuit court. The

parties agreed that, during the marriage, Michelle had purchased the house that they agreed

to move onto Robert’s nonmarital property. Michelle testified that she paid $17,000 for the

house from funds in her 401(k), while Robert testified that the house cost $12,000, but he

admitted that Michelle had provided the money for the house. The parties made

improvements over the twenty plus years they lived in the marital residence, including

bulldozing the land and pouring a foundation for the house, running plumbing and

electricity, adding a metal roof, building an outside fireplace and privacy fence, and painting

and adding flooring. Michelle testified that she and Robert had mortgaged the marital

residence for various reasons and had repaid the mortgage with marital funds. Robert

admitted in his testimony that he did not have the ability to buy Michelle out of any interest

that she claimed in the marital residence; he testified that he believed it was fair for Michelle

to be awarded no interest in the marital residence and the 2.5 acres, even though she had

invested time and money into it over the years because “she knowed it was on my land.”

Both Michelle and her son testified that the marital residence could not be moved.

The divorce decree stated that the parties married in 1997; therefore, at the time of

divorce, they had been married twenty-five years. In making its determination regarding

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property division, the circuit court acknowledged in the decree that the property-division

statute’s purpose is to ensure that property is divided fairly and equitably under the

circumstances; that such a division did not compel mathematical precision, only equitable

distribution; and that as a general rule, a spouse’s property acquired before marriage remains

his or her exclusive property upon divorce, but a narrow exception to that rule has been

recognized when marital funds have been used to improve nonmarital property or reduce its

debt. The court also noted in the decree that it had taken into consideration the parties’

limited income and cash flow: Robert’s source of income is Social Security, and Michelle

relies on her monthly Social Security Disability income of $2500.

Robert argues that Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983), is the

seminal case on the issue of determining the increased value of nonmarital property by

marital contributions. However, Williford and its progeny are distinguishable from the

present case. In Williford, the house and real property were owned by the husband prior to

the marriage; the parties added the wife to the homeowner’s insurance policy; the house was

damaged by a tornado; and the parties used the proceeds from the insurance company to

pay off a mortgage and make a down payment on rebuilding the house. While the husband

retained the real property and the house because it was his property prior to the marriage,

the trial court awarded the wife a marital interest in the rebuilt house and the appreciated

value of the house while crediting the husband with the value of the salvaged items from the

original house that were used in rebuilding the new house. Our supreme court agreed with

the trial court that the husband was entitled to retain the house and real property that he

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brought into the marriage and that the wife had a marital interest in the property; however,

it tweaked the numbers the trial court had used, affirming the decision as modified.

There is an important distinction in the present case. While the real property

belonged to Robert prior to marriage, the marital residence did not exist on the property

until after the parties had married, and they agreed to place that marital asset on Robert’s

nonmarital property. Michelle paid for the marital residence and paid to move it onto

Robert’s nonmarital real property, and the parties used marital funds to make improvements

to the marital residence and the surrounding real property while they lived in the house for

over twenty years. In the decree, the circuit court found,

When [Robert and Michelle] mutually agreed to place the house on [Robert’s]
property, it became part of the property, much as in a rented property, any
improvement which cannot be detached form the rented property becomes part of
the residence. In this case, while the real property continues to belong to [Robert]
and the house is marital property, the properties are physically entwined and cannot
(realistically) be separated.

Furthermore, neither party offered a valuation of the real property and the marital

residence at the time of divorce, either as one parcel or separately. The only monetary value

presented to the circuit court was that Michelle provided either $12,000 or $17,000 to

purchase the marital residence and have it moved onto Robert’s real property. Given the

lack of evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court’s determination that the nonmarital

and marital property were so intertwined that they could not be valued separately and could

not realistically be separated, and that the equitable solution, based on the facts presented,

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was to order the 2.5 acres and the marital residence sold and the proceeds divided equally,

is clearly erroneous.

Robert also argues that the circuit court failed to consider the factors listed in section

9-12-315 for distributing nonmarital property to the party who did not own it prior to

marriage. We disagree. In the divorce decree, the circuit court noted that the parties had

been married since 1997; Robert’s income consisted of Social Security, and Michelle’s

income consisted of Social Security Disability; and there was consideration of the limited

income and cash flow of both the parties. Furthermore, the decree set forth the parties’

other nonmarital properties as well as the debts, including a tax debt owed for unreported

gambling income. Although interspersed throughout the divorce decree, we cannot say that

the circuit court failed to consider the factors set forth in section 9-12-315 in making its

decision to order the marital residence and the 2.5 acres of Robert’s nonmarital real property

sold and the proceeds divided.1

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and WOOD, J., agree.

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We note that, in his reply brief, Robert argues that the 2.5 acres was located in the
middle of his nonmarital 40 acres and that the sale of that section of property would require
him to add access roads and/or incur negotiations regarding easements. He further argues
that he might have secured a loan or sold a separate parcel of land to buy Michelle out of
the marital residence, but the circuit court did not give him an opportunity to do so. These
arguments are not preserved for appeal because they were not made to the circuit court and
are being raised for the first time on appeal in his reply brief. We will not consider an
argument raised for the first time in a reply brief. Yafai Invs., Inc. v. Arkmo Foods, LLC, 2021
Ark. App. 484, at 3 n. 2.

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Graves Law Firm, by: Josie N. Graves, for appellant.

Matthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure & Thompson, P.A., by: Sara L. Waddoups, for

appellee.

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