Christopher Conduff v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 98
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS III & IV
No. CR-24-264

CHRISTOPHER CONDUFF Opinion Delivered February 19, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NOS. 04CR-19-2172, 04CR-22-984, AND
04CR-22-1527]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE BRAD KARREN, JUDGE

AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO
CORRECT THE SENTENCING
ORDER

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellant Christopher Conduff appeals the revocation of his probationary sentences

in three separate cases by the Benton County Circuit Court. He challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting the revocations and argues that the circuit court erred in refusing

to grant him 615 days of preconviction jail-time credit to which he was entitled. We affirm

and remand to the circuit court to correct errors in the sentencing order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In 2019, Conduff was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of

drug paraphernalia, and terroristic threatening in Benton County Circuit Court case

number 04CR-19-2172. Conduff subsequently was charged with delivery of

methamphetamine and introduction of a controlled substance into another person in case
number 04CR-22-984 as well as stalking in case number 04CR-22-1527. He pleaded guilty

to all these charges on September 26, 2023.

The plea agreements filed on September 26—as well as the combined sentencing order

filed on October 16—in all three cases note that Conduff had 615 days of jail-time credit.

Conduff was sentenced to 120 days in jail as a condition of his six years’ probation for the

three offenses in 04CR-19-2172. He was ordered to serve the same jail term as a condition

of his ten years’ probation for his other crimes in 04CR-22-984 and 04CR-22-1527, and he

was credited a total of “615 days” for time already served toward this condition of his

probation. The terms and conditions of Conduff’s probation also required that he report as

directed by his supervising probation officer; be “gainfully employed”; and, if instructed to

undergo any rehabilitative program, provide “proof of compliance” to his probation officer.

The State filed the initial petitions to revoke Conduff’s probation in all three cases

on November 20, alleging that he had failed to report to his probation officer and that his

whereabouts were unknown. The State filed amended revocation petitions in all three cases

on December 27, which specified, in part, that Conduff had inexcusably violated the

conditions of his probation by not reporting as directed to Colorado Probation and Parole

(“CPP”) on November 15, 2023, in violation of condition number 7, and by failing to

provide proof of his employment in violation of condition number 11.

At the revocation hearing held on January 2, 2024, the circuit court took judicial

notice of the terms and conditions of Conduff’s probation and considered the following

evidence.

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Probation officer Rylie Hickman testified she had been Conduff’s supervising officer

in Benton County since October 2023. Hickman testified that she reviewed the written

conditions of probation with Conduff when he was released from custody on October 2 at

his intake meeting. Hickman explained that at this meeting, Conduff told her that he wanted

to transfer the supervision of his probation to Colorado, where he allegedly lived. Hickman

testified that Conduff “was ordered to report weekly by phone” to the Benton County

probation office for instructions related to his request to transfer supervision. Hickman

further testifed that despite this being a “lined-out” condition of his probation, Conduff did

not contact her as arranged following his intake meeting, and that Conduff was later arrested

in Arkansas in December 2023. Hickman also testified that Conduff was never employed

after the imposition of his probation, and when asked whether Conduff had provided any

proof of employment, she answered no.

Probation officer Paul Clark testified that he supervises interstate transfers of

probation supervision for the Benton County probation office. Clark stated that he met with

Conduff on October 2 to process the transfer of Conduff’s probation supervision to

Colorado. Clark testified that Conduff completed an application for his probation to be

transferred to Colorado and provided a contact address and phone numbers there. Clark

testified that Conduff’s transfer request was initially approved by CPP on October 5. Clark

explained that while that approval authorized Conduff to reside in Colorado, the final

approval of Conduff’s probation transfer required that he first report to CPP.

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Officer Clark testified that he learned that CPP ultimately denied Conduff’s transfer

request because he had “failed to arrive” by November 15. On November 9, when Benton

County probation officers were unable to directly contact Conduff, they left multiple

messages at the phone numbers Conduff had provided advising Conduff to report to CPP

by November 15. Clark further testified that officers also were unable to contact Conduff at

his alleged residence in Colorado, and when asked why Conduff’s transfer request was

denied, Clark confirmed that “he didn’t contact [CPP] as directed[.]”

After the State rested and Conduff presented no evidence in his defense, the circuit

court revoked Conduff’s probation in all three cases, determining that Conduff had

inexcusably failed to report as directed to CPP by November 15, 2023, in violation of

condition number 7 and had not complied with the employment condition of his probation

in violation of condition number 11.

Conduff testified during the sentencing phase that he had been employed as a local

contractor for Grandmaster Craftsman, working seven days a week, from two days after his

release up until his rearrest. Conduff also testified that he reported this information to his

supervising officer. The circuit court found Conduff’s testimony not credible and sentenced

him to four years’ imprisonment; suspended imposition of his remaining sentences for a

period of one year for each of his underlying crimes in 04CR-19-2172, 04CR-22-984, and

04CR-22-1527; and credited him the thirty-two days spent in jail after the revocation

petitions were filed.

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The circuit court entered a combined sentencing order on January 5 noting thirty-

two days of jail credit.1 Conduff filed motions seeking additional jail credit on January 9,

citing Polston v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 530, and arguing that he was entitled to a total of 527

days of jail-time credit toward his new sentences pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-4-404 (Repl. 2024). The State responded, asserting that Conduff’s pretrial

detention had been credited toward the 120-day sentences imposed as a condition of his

probation for his 2023 pleas and that he was not entitled to any additional jail-time credit

under Arkansas law.

The circuit court denied Conduff’s motions following a hearing on January 25. The

circuit court noted that Conduff’s sentence to serve 120 days in jail was based on his 2023

pleas, and it credited the 615 days spent in jail prior to his pleas toward these sentences. The

circuit court ruled that the former jail-time credit would not be applied toward the sentences

for Conduff’s later probation violations. The circuit court entered amended sentencing

orders in all three cases on January 29, still noting thirty-two days of jail-time credit. Conduff

filed timely notices of appeal in all three cases on January 31.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In order to revoke a probationary sentence, a circuit court must find by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of his

1
On December 1, 2023, Conduff was arrested on the revocation warrant. On January
2, 2024, by order of the circuit court, he was sentenced to forty-eight months in the Arkansas
Division of Correction. The thirty-two days of jail time matches the window of time between
December 1, 2023, and January 2, 2024.

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probation. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(d) (Supp. 2023). Arkansas Code Annotated section

5-4-303(e)(2) (Repl. 2024) provides that when probation is imposed, defendants shall be

given a written statement explicitly setting forth the conditions under which they are being

released. The purpose of this written notice requirement is to assist a defendant in leading a

law-abiding life, see section 5-4-303(a), and to avoid any misunderstanding that a violation of

the conditions of probation may result in its revocation. E.g., Gilbreth v. State, 2020 Ark. App.

86, at 6, 596 S.W.3d 29, 33.

The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant received

written notice of a condition under section 5-4-303(e)(2) and similarly need only prove one

violation of the conditions of probation. E.g., Geeslin v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 571, at 5–6,

533 S.W.3d 132, 135–36. The State’s burden of proof is less than is required to convict in

a criminal trial, and evidence that is insufficient to convict may still support revocation. E.g.,

Goad v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 483, at 4, 636 S.W.3d 401, 403. On appeal, this court will

affirm a circuit court’s revocation unless the decision is clearly erroneous or clearly against

the preponderance of the evidence. Id. When considering sufficiency challenges, this court

defers to the superior position of the circuit court to determine the credibility of witnesses,

and a circuit court is not required to believe a defendant’s self-serving testimony at

revocation. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Condition number 7—failure to report

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Conduff submits that reporting to the CPP office as directed on November 15, 2023,

was not a condition of his probation that was expressly communicated to him in writing. He

notes that none of the terms and conditions of his probation required him to report to any

particular place on any particular date, and he claims that the State presented no proof that

he was ever required to report on November 15, 2023, in Colorado as a condition of his

probation. Accordingly, he maintains that the circuit court improperly implied and then

later revoked on a condition not expressly communicated in writing to him. See, e.g., Ball v.

State, 2021 Ark. App. 209, 624 S.W.3d 111.

Conduff maintains that the only evidence presented was that Colorado rejected his

request for an interstate transfer on November 15, 2023, when officers there were unable to

contact him. He asserts there simply was no proof that he was directed to report on

November 15, 2023, in Colorado and that he failed to report as directed.

We disagree. The record before us establishes that condition 7 of Conduff’s terms

and conditions of probation provide that he “must report as directed” by his supervising

probation office, which he does not contest was the Benton County Probation Office.

Officer Hickman testified that she advised Conduff of this condition of his probation at his

intake meeting. Moreover, Officer Clark also testified that he specifically instructed Conduff

to report to CPP to complete the transfer of his supervision to Colorado and that phone

messages were left at the contact phone numbers he provided advising him to report to CPP

by November 15, 2023.

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Although Conduff argues that the absence of a written condition specifying that he

was to report to CPP by that date was insufficient notice pursuant to section 5-4-303(e)(2), it

is undisputed that Conduff’s probation was expressly conditioned on his reporting as

directed by the Benton County Probation Office. The messages left on his phone directing

him to report to CPP by November 15, 2023, and his failure to do so, establish that he

inexcusably violated this express condition of his probation. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 2018

Ark. App. 69, at 1–4, 540 S.W.3d 316, 316–318 (affirming revocation after probationer was

advised via voicemail and failed to report as directed).

Conduff’s assertion that he lacked notice because the written conditions did not

specify the date on which he was directed to report to CPP is meritless. See Butry-Weston v.

State, 2021 Ark. App. 51, at 7–8, 616 S.W.3d 685, 690 (holding the reversal of revocation

was unwarranted because the terms and conditions failed to specify the date by which

defendant was to report to probation). Moreover, in contrast to Ball, supra, the circuit court’s

revocation was not premised on a condition not specified in the terms and conditions of

Conduff’s probation. Compare Butry-Weston, 2021 Ark. App. 51, at 4–5, 616 S.W.3d at 688,

with Ball, 2021 Ark. App. 209, at 1–3, 624 S.W.3d at 112–13.

2. Condition number 11—proof of employment

Conduff also argues that providing proof of employment was not a condition of his

probation, so any purported failure to do so cannot be the basis for a revocation. He claims

that his conditions of probation related to employment required him only to (1) allow a

supervising officer to visit him at his place of employment; (2) be gainfully employed or

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enrolled as a student at all times; (3) notify his supervising officer in advance of any change

in employment; and (4) obtain prior approval from a supervising officer before quitting his

employment.

Conduff notes that the only testimony at the revocation hearing was that he did not

provide proof of employment to his supervising officer in Arkansas. Conduff asserts that

even if this were true, this was not a violation of any of his conditions and cannot support a

revocation of his probation. He urges that even if the conditions can be read to require him

to report his employment, there was no condition requiring that he provide proof of such.

He maintains that the circuit court improperly implied and then revoked on the basis of a

condition that was never communicated in writing. See Gilbreth, supra.

Officer Hickman testified that Conduff was never employed while under her

supervision and that he never provided proof of employment, despite the fact that condition

11 required him to be gainfully employed or enrolled as a student at all times. Although

Conduff argues that this written condition did not include a provision requiring proof of

his employment status, we hold that it is inherent—not implied, as was the relevant condition

in Ross v. State, 268 Ark. 189, 594 S.W.2d 852 (1980)—in the requirement that he be

employed that he provide at least some evidence of it. Moreover, Conduff even acknowledges

cases in which Arkansas circuit courts have imposed similar conditions explicitly requiring a

probationer to provide proof of employment. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 2017 Ark. App 486,

at 1 (probation conditioned on Henderson’s being gainfully employed and that he report

any changes in his address or employment status); Warbritton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 441,

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at 2 (signed conditions of suspended sentence or probation required Warbritton to notify

her probation officer in advance of any change of address or employment).

B. Denial of Conduff’s Request to Add Pretrial Jail Credit

Conduff submits that he spent 615 days in jail before originally being placed on

probation in the three cases at issue in this case. He claims that the circuit court erred by

denying him this credit upon the revocation of those three probationary sentences despite

being expressly asked to do so and after being presented with authority making clear that he

was entitled to it. He argues that we must correct the circuit court’s error and correct his

sentencing order to reflect these additional 615 days of pretrial jail-time credit against his

sentence.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-404 states:

If a defendant is held in custody for conduct that results in a sentence to
imprisonment or confinement as a condition of suspension or probation, the court,
the Division of Correction, or the Division of Community Correction shall credit the
time spent in custody against the sentence, including time spent in a local jail facility
awaiting transfer to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community
Correction.

Pursuant to this statute, a defendant is entitled to receive jail-time credit on a revoked

probation for the time the defendant spent in custody awaiting trial on the charge that

resulted in the probation. See Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 85 603 S.W.2d 410, 412 (1980)

(holding that appellant should have received credit on his suspended sentence for the 114

days he spent in custody awaiting trial on the 1978 charge that resulted in the five-year

suspended sentence).

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This court reaffirmed the above principle in Polston v. State:

Polston was held in custody for 228 days on the drug charge to which he
eventually pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. When Polston’s probation
was subsequently revoked and he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, Polston
was entitled to credit for these 228 days spent in custody. See Boone, supra. As found
by the trial court, Polston was also entitled to credit for the 4 days he spent in custody
on the revocation warrant. This totals 232 days that Polston was jailed and that should
have been included in the jail-time-credit calculation.

2020 Ark. App. 530, at 5.

On September 26, 2023, Conduff pleaded guilty to charges of first-degree stalking in

case number 04CR-22-1527; introduction of a controlled substance and delivery of

methamphetamine or cocaine in case number 04CR-22-984; and possession of a firearm by

certain persons, first-degree terroristic threatening, and possession of drug paraphernalia in

case number 04CR-19-2172. He was sentenced to a total of ten years of probation across all

counts pursuant to the plea agreements filed on September 26 and resulting combined

sentencing order filed on October 16. Conduff notes that the sentencing order states that

Conduff had 615 days of jail-time credit. As such, Conduff maintains he was entitled to

these 615 days of credit against his revocation sentences pursuant to Polston, supra, and Boone,

supra.

Conduff requests that this court reverse and dismiss his revocation or, alternatively,

reverse the circuit court and correct his sentencing order to add his 615 days of preconviction

jail-time credit and for any and all proper relief to which he is entitled.

As a preliminary matter, we decline to reverse because the record is inadequate to

determine the amount of pretrial detention he served for each of his six underlying offenses

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before entering his guilty pleas in 2023. See, e.g., Furlow v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 192, at 15,

664 S.W.3d 457, 467 (holding it is an appellant’s burden to file a sufficient record enabling

review of a jail-time-credit claim). But even as it stands now, the record before us shows that

Conduff is not entitled 615 days’ jail-time credit toward each of his sentences.

Section 5-4-404 generally provides that a defendant held in custody for conduct that

results in a sentence of imprisonment or confinement as a condition of probation shall be

credited the time spent in custody against the sentence. Although the statute does not

address how jail-time credit should be allocated among multiple convictions, our supreme

court has held that jail credit is “not appropriate when the incarceration is due wholly to

unrelated charges that are based on conduct other than that for which the defendant is

sentenced.” Bailey v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 53, at 4, 571 S.W.3d 21, 23 (quoting Humphrey v.

State, 300 Ark. 383, 384, 779 S.W.2d 530, 531 (1989)). This court similarly has held that

the cause of a defendant’s confinement must be related to the offense for which he receives

jail credit. E.g., Moore v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 185, at 6, 644 S.W.3d 448, 451.

Although Conduff maintains that he is entitled to a total of 615 days in jail credit

accruing before September 26, 2023, other than what was reflected in his initial sentencing

order, he cites nothing in the record that supports his contention that he served that amount

of time in jail for each of the six separate offenses to which he pleaded guilty in 2023.

In case number 04CR-19-2172, the record shows that Conduff was arrested for

unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of drug paraphernalia, and terroristic

threatening on August 28, 2019. After he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in that case,

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Conduff was released from custody on these charges when he posted a “cash bond” on July

17, 2020. Conduff subsequently was arrested after he failed to appear for a scheduled

omnibus hearing in that case on November 16, 2022. Conduff provides no authority to

support his allegation that he was entitled to jail-time credit for confinement on his failure-

to-appear arrest. Thus, he was confined a total of only 325 days before he pleaded guilty to

unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of drug paraphernalia, and terroristic

threatening in case number 04CR-19-2172 on September 26, 2023.

Similarly, Conduff pleaded guilty to separate counts of delivery of methamphetamine

and introduction of a controlled substance into another person in case number 04CR-22-

984 on September 26, 2023. As his plea confirmed, Conduff committed these offenses on

October 31, 2021, and the record shows he was arrested on these two charges on May 18,

2022. On May 28, 2022, Conduff posted bail in 04CR-22-984, later failed to appear in this

proceeding on November 16, 2022, and was taken into custody on March 16, 2023, on the

bench warrant issued the day he failed to appear. The record reflects that Conduff spent a

total of eleven days in jail for the offenses charged in 04CR-22-984 before he pleaded guilty

to these offenses on September 26, 2023—for which he had been arrested only 497 days

earlier.

Conduff is also not entitled to 615 days’ jail credit in case number 04CR-22-1527. In

that case, Conduff was charged with first-degree stalking and arrested for this offense on July

23, 2022. While the record is unclear when he was released from pretrial detention on this

charge, it is undisputed that Conduff was out of custody when he failed to appear for an

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omnibus hearing scheduled in this case on November 16, 2022. Thereafter, the record shows

that Conduff remained in custody solely on the failure-to-appear warrant issued in November

2022 before he pleaded guilty to first-degree stalking on September 26, 2023. Accordingly,

it is impossible that Conduff was confined in jail for a total of 615 days for this crime as of

the day he pleaded guilty on September 26, 2023, when he committed the offense on July

23, 2022. And, as previously set out, Conduff is not entitled to aggregate the total time served

in jail for wholly unrelated charges or for his failure to appear in each of his underlying cases

prior to his 2023 pleas.

Moreover, not only is Conduff’s calculation of jail-time credit as of the plea date of

September 26, 2023, mistaken, but his argument also fails to account for the fact that, on

that date, he was ordered to serve 120 days’ incarceration as a condition of each probationary

sentence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-304(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2023). However, the record shows

that he did not actually serve those 120 days because he received credit for time already

served.

It is the appellant’s burden to file a sufficient record enabling the review of a jail-time-

credit claim, see, e.g., Furlow, supra, and it is not the duty of this court to make an appellant’s

arguments for him or her. McDaniels v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 219, at 3. Because we hold that

the record supports the circuit court’s findings that Conduff did inexcusably violate the

terms and conditions of his probation, and because Conduff failed to provide this court with

a record sufficient to enable our determinative review of his jail-time-credit claim, we affirm.

Notwithstanding, we note that among the errors in the sentencing order is the incorrect

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notation that Conduff is sentenced to forty-eight months in the county jail. Accordingly, we

remand to the circuit court with instructions to correct the sentencing order.

Affirmed; remanded to correct the sentencing order.

ABRAMSON, WOOD, and BROWN, JJ., agree.

TUCKER and THYER, JJ., dissent.

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge, dissenting. The majority in this case correctly

maintains that, under Arkansas law, a defendant is entitled to receive jail-time credit on a

revoked probation for time spent in custody awaiting trial on the charge that resulted in the

probation. See Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980); Polston v. State, 2020 Ark.

App. 530. However, while I agree with the majority that Conduff’s jail-time-credit calculation

is incorrect, I disagree with its conclusion that the dispute over Conduff’s calculation of the

credit should serve to deprive him of any of the credit for which he is legally entitled. This is

especially true when his argument is grounded on a prior sentencing order—signed by a judge

and approved by the prosecuting attorney—that clearly awards him jail-time credit. Our role

as an appellate court is not to make the calculation—we are not fact-finders; instead, the

matter should be remanded to the circuit court to make the calculation it should have made

in the first instance.1

1
I note that had the circuit court or the prosecutor sorted through the jail-time-credit
issue in the original sentencing order as the majority has attempted to do here, there would
be no need for a remand. Having failed to calculate the days initially, the State would have
us simply look away; and the majority, by affirming the circuit court, rewards that inaction
for a second time.

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Further, I do not believe, as the majority contends, that by remanding for the

calculation of jail-time credit, we would be making Conduff’s argument for him. Conduff

has argued on appeal that he is legally entitled to preprobation jail-time credit. That is the

issue before us, and even the majority agrees that Conduff is legally entitled to his

preprobation jail-time credit. We would simply be remanding for the fact-finder to make the

appropriate calculations. The bottom line here is that Conduff is entitled to his preprobation

jail-time credit; he requested that the circuit court give him credit for that time; the circuit

court refused to do so; he asked this court to award him jail-time credit; and now we have

likewise denied him that to which he is legally entitled. That is neither equity nor justice.

For these reasons, I dissent.

TUCKER, J., joins.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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