Brittany Thompson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 80
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-698
Opinion Delivered February 12, 2025

BRITTANY THOMPSON APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 72JV-23-206]
V.
HONORABLE STACEY
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF ZIMMERMAN, JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

The Washington County Circuit Court terminated Brittany Thompson’s parental

rights to her son, MC.1 On appeal, Thompson argues that the circuit court erred in

changing the goal of the case at the permanency-planning stage from reunification to

termination of parental rights and adoption. She also asserts that the circuit court erred in

finding that termination and a permanent no-contact order was in MC’s best interest. We

affirm the circuit court’s order.

This case began on 27 March 2023, at approximately 1:17 a.m. when Fayetteville

police responded to a report of a woman asleep in her car in a Taco Bell parking lot for

several hours. Police found Thompson passed out in a car with the engine running.

Eighteen-month-old MC was asleep in a car seat. Thompson admitted taking Xanax and

1
Thompson has two other children who were living with their biological father at
the time MC was taken into custody. The circuit court placed those two children in the
sole legal custody of their father, and they are not parties to this appeal.
1
was arrested for DWI, second-degree child endangerment, and refusal to submit to a sobriety

test. She also had warrants in Benton County and in Texas. Police were unable to reach

an appropriate caregiver to take MC, so the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS)

placed an emergency hold on him. Police searched the car and found a glass smoking pipe,

plastic straws, a plastic baggie containing residue that field-tested positive for

methamphetamine, and one and a half bars of Xanax. Consequently, Thompson was also

charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

On 30 March 2023, the circuit court entered an order for emergency custody of MC

and later found probable cause to continue custody with DHS. According to the probable-

cause order, Thompson had been “going back and forth” between Oklahoma, Texas, and

Arkansas but now lived in Oklahoma and planned to stay there. Thompson was allowed

weekly supervised visits with MC and ordered to submit to random drug screens, participate

in individual counseling, obtain and maintain stable housing and employment, and resolve

her criminal charges.

The circuit court convened an adjudication hearing on May 31. Thomas Watkins, 2

MC’s biological father, testified that MC had spent the early part of his life going back and

forth between Thompson and his mother, Erica Hamilton. Thomas said that Thompson

and his mother had a disagreement in May or June 2022, so Thompson stopped “bringing

[MC] around” his family. Thomas asked that his mom and stepdad, Erica and Bryant

Hamilton, who live in Dallas, Texas, be considered for placement.

2
Watkins was incarcerated at the time MC was taken into custody, and he remained
incarcerated throughout the pendency of the case.
2
On 14 June 2023, the court adjudicated MC dependent-neglected due to neglect

and parental unfitness. Specifically, the court cited Thompson’s drug use and “the fact that

she exposed [MC] to imminent danger after being found passed out in the parking lot of a

Taco Bell with [MC] in the car.” The goal of the case was set as reunification of the juvenile

with a fit parent with the concurrent goal of placement with a relative. Thompson was

ordered to, among other things, submit to psychological evaluation, abstain from illegal drug

use, submit to random drug screens, resolve all criminal charges, and follow the case plan

and court orders

In October 2023, the court reviewed the case and found that Thompson was not in

compliance with court orders, had not shown sufficient stability, and had not demonstrated

that she can keep MC safe. In addition to other court orders already in place, Thompson

was ordered to enter and complete a residential treatment facility for substance abuse. The

court ordered that MC be placed with the Hamiltons as soon as the necessary home study

was approved and noted that Thompson agreed that MC should be placed with the

Hamiltons. The goal of the case remained reunification with the concurrent goal of

placement with a relative.

On 28 February 2024, the circuit court convened a permanency-planning hearing.

Hayley Miles, MC’s caseworker, testified that MC was currently in a foster home and doing

well. DHS was in the process of placing MC with the Hamiltons, and they had been visiting

MC. Miles explained that MC could not currently be placed with Thompson because there

were concerns with her sobriety and mental health. Thompson had not complied with

court orders, including submitting to drug screens, obtaining stable housing or employment,

3
and consistently exercising visitation with MC. Thompson did, however, complete

residential treatment for drug abuse in January 2024. She was currently staying with her

brother and sister-in-law. Her criminal charges had not been resolved. DHS recommended

that the goal of the case be changed to adoption, and the hope was that MC could be placed

in an adoptive placement with his paternal grandparents.

Erica Hamilton, MC’s paternal grandmother, testified that she and her husband had

been working to comply with the requirements that would allow MC to be placed in their

home. They had almost completed the required foster-parent classes, had gotten CPR

certification, and had two home inspections. They have had regular visits and contact with

MC, coordinating with the foster parents for telephone calls once or twice a week.

Hamilton said they were prepared to take MC on a permanent basis.

Watkins testified that he thought it was best for MC to be placed with his parents

until Thompson is able to reunify with MC or until he (Watkins) is released and can be

approved for custody of MC. He explained that he would be eligible for parole in

November 2024.

Thompson, who arrived at the hearing forty-five minutes late, testified that she had

been staying with her sister-in-law since January 2. She planned to stay there and save

money from her office job at a demolition and excavation company. Thompson wanted

MC returned to her and said she could take him immediately. She was not concerned about

sobriety issues because she had completed extensive residential treatment. She blamed her

inconsistency with drug screens on a lack of transportation from Bentonville to Fayetteville.

4
She was now focused on resolving her legal issues. If MC could not be returned to her

soon, she wanted him placed with the Hamiltons until she could finish the case plan.

On cross-examination, she agreed that she had obtained stable housing and

employment only since January 2024. She could not identify the name of the company

where she was employed. She acknowledged that she entered inpatient treatment nine

months after MC was taken into custody. She also agreed that she had been arrested on

drug charges two months after MC was taken into custody.

Haley, MC’s foster mom, testified that MC had been in her home since the end of

March 2023 and that he was doing well. She believed it was in MC’s best interest to be

placed with the Hamiltons as soon as it was cleared through DHS. She said there had been

issues with Thompson being consistent with visitation, specifically her arriving so late that

the visit was canceled or just not showing up. But since Thompson had finished treatment

in early January, she had attended all three scheduled visits.

After hearing all the testimony and arguments from counsel, the circuit court

concluded that there was “no compelling reason not to change the goal to adoption.” The

court’s written order stated,

The Court notes that [MC] came into care for multiple reasons, specifically,
Mother’s illegal drug use, Mother’s arrest, Mother’s instability in her housing
and employment, and Mother’s possession of illegal substances. The Court
finds that the testimony today shows that Mother is not making measurable,
sustainable, progress towards the goal of the case. The Court notes that you
look at progress throughout the entire life of the case, not just in the last few
months. The Court finds that Mother was not even consistent in her visits
with [MC] prior to going to rehab in December of 2023. The Court finds
that the only stability that [MC] has had in his life is during his stay in foster
care. . . . The Court finds that Mother has been present at every hearing in
this case, where she receives a checklist of what she needs to do to get [MC]
back. The Court finds that the only stretch of stability that Mom has shown
5
is in the last two months of this case, however, that is not enough to show
this Court that she can maintain stability and sobriety to have [MC] safely
returned to her. The Court finds that it is not in [MC]’s best interests to wait
around and see if parents can demonstrate stability and sobriety.

....

Mother only recently completed inpatient substance-abuse treatment.
Mother has not maintained stable housing or employment, has not maintained
consistent contact with DHS, has not submitted to random drug screens, and
has not demonstrated an ability to protect the juvenile and keep him safe from
harm.

The court found that the permanent goal for MC would be adoption with DHS filing a

petition for termination of parental rights.

On 27 March 2024, DHS petitioned to terminate Thompson’s parental rights. On

May 31, the circuit court intended to hold the termination hearing, but a problem with

Watkins appearing via Zoom necessitated a continuance. However, the court used the

hearing as an opportunity to receive an update. Erica Hamilton testified that MC had been

living with her since April 20 and was doing well. He talked to his mom almost every day,

either through Messenger or Zoom. He had not had any contact with his half sisters,

however; Hamilton was waiting for Thompson to provide their contact information.

Thompson testified and confirmed that she had the contact information for the other

children and would provide that to Hamilton that day. Thompson said she planned to take

the girls to Great Wolf Lodge near Dallas so they could visit MC in person as well.

The circuit court reconvened the termination hearing on 26 June 2024. Watkins

again testified that he would be eligible for parole in November 2024. He opined that it

was in MC’s best interest to stay with his mother until he or Thompson could gain custody

6
of MC. He did not believe it was in MC’s best interest for his parental rights or Thompson’s

parental rights to be terminated.

Hayley Miles testified that MC had been placed with the Hamiltons on April 20.

Their home was a potential adoptive placement, and Miles believed MC would be adopted

if parental rights were terminated because he is in a relative placement and he is highly

adoptable. MC could not be placed safely with his mother at the time of the hearing due

to ongoing concerns about substance abuse and overall stability. Thompson also still had

pending criminal charges. Miles opined that Thompson had not demonstrated an ability to

protect MC and keep him safe from harm.

Thompson testified that she had moved to Addison, Texas, at the end of April to be

near MC and was waiting for approval for an apartment. She still had felony charges pending

in Arkansas, but she “anticipate[d] them going away due to the circumstances of the situation

of the arrest.” She also has “a few, small court cases for traffic stuff.” She explained that

she moved to Texas so she could continue visits with MC and that she had an “extremely

good bond” with him. She sees him approximately three times a week and has video calls

with him every day. She said that it is in MC’s best interest for her to remain in his life.

She also said she has a strong relationship with her other two children and that the girls have

a relationship with MC. The children loved each other, and it is in the children’s best

interest for their relationship to continue. She also stated that she loves MC, that MC loves

her, and that it would “really crush him” to lose his relationship with her.

Thompson explained that she was employed as a bookkeeper for Reynolds

Excavation, but it was not full time. She is paid biweekly, and her last paycheck was $800.

7
She had not used illegal substances since the end of November 2023. In addition to

completing residential treatment, she had done a drug-and-alcohol assessment and taken

parenting classes. She was not currently in counseling.

Erica Hamilton testified that she was willing to adopt MC or have guardianship of

MC. She did not think it was a good idea to terminate the parental rights of MC’s parents.

She planned to allow her son and Thompson to continue to have a relationship with MC

via supervised visits as long as it was in MC’s best interest. She also stated that they have

family in the Dallas area and that MC is able to play with his cousins.

Following the testimony and closing arguments from counsel, the court made the

following findings. The testimony showed that Thompson did not have stability in her

housing, and “[t]hat’s exactly where we were when this case opened.” Thompson was

living in Dallas when MC was taken into care, then she went to Oklahoma, then she was

in Tulsa. “You can’t even keep up with all the places mom’s been because she’s highly

unstable.” The court also questioned the status of Thompson’s employment. The court

continued,

She successfully completed a month of Harbor House, but she’s not been in
any followup counseling. So throughout this 15 months, mom’s not been in
counseling, although I’ve ordered her to, except for that month she was at
Harbor House. She’s not presented herself for surprise random drug screens.
She has pending . . . felony criminal charges in Washington County, and she
has a warrant for her arrest out of Dallas, Texas, which came to her attention
in previous hearings. She still hasn’t taken care of it. It’s outrageous. She
currently has in Washington County in case 72CR-23-1260 pending charges
for heroin, possession of heroin, possession of methamphetamines, fentanyl, a
failure to appear for those things. And she had Xanax and was under the
influence of illegal drugs when she was hunched over, passed out in the car
with little [MC] in the car on a cold, March evening 15 months ago at the
back of the parking lot at Taco Bell.

8
Regarding Thompson’s drug use during the pendency of the case, the court found

that Thompson had not undergone drug screens as the court had ordered. The court

reviewed the drug-screen log presented into evidence and found that Thompson had

presented for drug testing once in April 2023, which revealed a positive result for THC,

amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA, and fentanyl. Thompson “no showed” for her

drug screens in May, June, July, August, and September 2023.

Then she finally had one October 4th, 2023, and guess what? She’s positive
for marijuana, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. Then she no
showed October, November, first one in February 2024. And then February
2024 she had two drug screens she showed up for, first two negative ones
she’s had in this whole case. Are you kidding me? Two negative drug screens
in 15 months. She has not shown that she is off of drugs, can stay off illegal
drugs.

As to MC’s best interest, the court found that MC is highly adoptable and that the

paternal grandparents are willing to either adopt MC or have guardianship of him. The

court further stated,

What concerns me is that here we have an excellent grandmom, Ms.
Hamilton, and the testimony at previous hearings was that for the first year of
his life, little man was going back and forth between mom and Ms. Hamilton
until mom and Ms. Hamilton got into a disagreement, and what does mom
do? She cuts off contact. That’s not best for [MC]. Mom was not acting in
his best interest. So I find that with respect to best interest that it is in [MC]’s
best interest that I terminate mom’s rights to [MC]. He needs to stay put
where he is and have permanency knowing where he’s gonna put his head at
night, and it’s not gonna be at some hotel with somebody who doesn’t know
where she works, with somebody who’s still using fentanyl, who knows,
heroin, fentanyl, drug charges pending, and a warrant in Texas where she
currently is that she could’ve taken care of that she hasn’t.

The court found that Thompson had been totally noncompliant with court orders except

for the one month she stayed at Harbor House. The court concluded that DHS had proved

9
statutory grounds for termination3 and that it was in MC’s best interest that Thompson’s

parental rights be terminated.4 The court also ordered that Thompson and her family have

no contact with MC, stating, “I’m not gonna have a ruckus at Ms. Hamilton’s home because

mom’s showing up because she wants visits, and then have it all go downhill.” However,

the court specifically noted that Erica Hamilton could “coordinate with [the half sisters’

father] to have little man have contact with his sisters.”

On July 5, before the court’s written order was filed, Thompson and Watkins filed

a joint motion to reconsider the termination of parental rights and the no-contact order.

They asserted that there was no reason to terminate Thompson’s parental rights because

MC was placed with a relative and that a no-contact order was not in MC’s best interest.

They contended that the orders were contrary to the testimony and the record from the

hearing, and they noted that neither DHS nor the attorney ad litem had requested a no-

contact order. The court did not rule on this motion.

The court entered its written order on 31 July 2024 and primarily reiterated its

findings made at the hearing. In particular, the court found that “Mother has not shown

she can stay sober and that she continues to be highly unstable; the Court finds that Mother

is still unsure as to where she will be living at the end of the month, let alone in the future.”

The court also found that “there shall be no further contact between [MC] and his mother,

3
Thompson has not challenged the court’s findings on the statutory grounds for
termination on appeal.
4
The court did not terminate Watkins’s parental rights and changed the goal of
Watkins’s case to guardianship with a fit and willing relative.
10
as the contact would not be in [MC]’s best interests.” Thompson filed a timely appeal from

the permanency-planning order and the termination order.

I. Goal Change at Permanency-Planning Stage

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-338(c) (Repl. 2020) governs permanency-

planning hearings and provides the following permanency goals listed in order of preference:

(1) Placing custody of the juvenile with a fit parent at the permanency
planning hearing;

(2) Returning the juvenile to the guardian or custodian from whom the
juvenile was initially removed at the permanency planning hearing;

(3) Authorizing a plan to place custody of the juvenile with a parent,
guardian, or custodian only if the court finds that:

(A)(i) The parent, guardian, or custodian is complying with the
established case plan and orders of the court, making significant and
measurable progress toward achieving the goals established in the case plan
and diligently working toward reunification or placement in the home of
the parent, guardian, or custodian.

(ii) Regardless of when the effort was made, the court shall consider
all evidence of an effort made by the parent, guardian, or custodian to
remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the juvenile from the
custody of the parent, guardian, or custodian and give the evidence the
appropriate weight and consideration in relation to the safety, health, and
well-being of the juvenile.

(iii) The burden is on the parent, guardian, or custodian to demonstrate
genuine, sustainable investment in completing the requirements of the case
plan and following the orders of the court in order to authorize a plan to
return or be placed in the home as the permanency goal;

(B) The parent, guardian, or custodian is making significant and
measurable progress toward remedying the conditions that:

(i) Caused the juvenile’s removal and the juvenile's continued removal
from the home; or

(ii) Prohibit placement of the juvenile in the home of a parent; and
11
(C)(i) Placement of the juvenile in the home of the parent, guardian,
or custodian shall occur within a time frame consistent with the juvenile’s
developmental needs but no later than three (3) months from the date of
the permanency planning hearing.

(ii) The court may authorize a plan to place custody of a juvenile with
a parent, guardian, or custodian of the juvenile despite finding that
placement of the juvenile in the home of the parent, guardian, or custodian
of the juvenile may not occur within the three-month period required
under subdivision (c)(3)(C)(i) of this section if the plan is in the best
interest of the child during extraordinary circumstances.

....

(4) Authorizing a plan to obtain a guardianship or adoption with a fit and
willing relative;

(5) Authorizing a plan for adoption with the department’s filing a petition
for termination of parental rights unless:

(A) The juvenile is being cared for by a relative and the court finds
that:

(i) Either:

(a) The relative has made a long-term commitment to the child and
the relative is willing to pursue guardianship or permanent custody; or

(b) The juvenile is being cared for by his or her minor parent who is
in foster care; and

(ii) Termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the
juvenile;

(B) The department has documented in the case plan a compelling
reason why filing a petition for termination of parental rights is not in the
best interest of the juvenile and the court approves the compelling reason
as documented in the case plan; or

(C)(i) The department has not provided to the family of the juvenile,
consistent with the time period in the case plan, the services as the
department deemed necessary for the safe return of the juvenile to the

12
juvenile’s home if reunification services were required to be made to the
family.

(ii) If the department has failed to provide services as outlined in the
case plan, the court shall schedule another permanency planning hearing
for no later than six (6) months;

(6) Authorizing a plan to obtain a guardian for the juvenile;

(7) Authorizing a plan to obtain a permanent custodian, including
permanent custody with a fit and willing relative; or

(8) Authorizing a plan for another planned permanent living arrangement
that includes a permanent planned living arrangement and addresses the
quality of services, including, but not limited to, independent living services
and a plan for the supervision and nurturing the juvenile will receive.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-338(c). Although the permanency goals are listed in order of

preference, the circuit court must balance that preference with the individual facts of each

case and consider the best interest, health, and safety of the juvenile. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-

27-338(c); see also Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 64, 684 S.W.3d

219 (holding that circuit court did not err in authorizing a plan of adoption with DHS filing

a petition for termination of parental rights rather than authorizing a plan to obtain a

guardianship or adoption with a fit and willing relative).

The burden of proof in a permanency-planning hearing is preponderance of the

evidence. Yelvington v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 337, 580 S.W.3d 874.

The standard of review on appeal is de novo, and we will reverse only if the circuit court’s

findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 344

13
Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). It is well settled that credibility determinations are left to

the circuit court. Yelvington, supra.

Thompson contends that the circuit court clearly erred at the permanency-planning

stage when it changed the goal of the case from reunification with a concurrent goal of

relative placement to adoption with DHS filing a petition for termination of parental rights.

She argues that the court erred in choosing the fifth most preferred goal—adoption with a

termination petition—instead of the fourth most preferred goal—authorizing a plan to

obtain a guardianship or adoption with a fit and willing relative. According to Thompson,

the court erroneously ruled that because the home study had not been completed and MC

could not be placed with the Hamiltons that day, then the goal of the case must be changed

to adoption. But the statute requires only there to be a plan “to obtain a guardianship or

adoption with a fit and willing relative.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-338(c)(4). The court

clearly found the Hamiltons trustworthy, as it authorized week-long unsupervised visits for

MC at their home in Texas despite the lack of a completed home study.

In addition, Erica Hamilton testified that she and her husband are willing to be a

permanent home for MC if necessary, including through adoption, but that she wants

Thompson and Watkins to be a part of MC’s life. Thompson acknowledges that the relative

preference outlined in the statute must be balanced with the individual facts of each case,

Robinson, supra, and that the statute requires that the court select a goal based on the best

interest, health, and safety of the juvenile. Yelvington, supra. However, based on the

particular facts of this case, she asserts that the goal that would have best met MC’s needs

14
was guardianship or adoption with a fit and willing relative, and “the court’s decision to

bypass this preference was clearly in error.”

DHS5 responds that at the time of the permanency-planning hearing, MC was not

being cared for by a relative, and the court had evidence that termination of parental rights

was in MC’s best interest. The case law makes clear that a circuit court is permitted to set

termination as a goal even when a relative is available and requests custody “because the

Juvenile Code lists permanency goals in order of preference, prioritizing a plan for

termination and adoption unless the juvenile is already being cared for by a relative, the

relative has made a long-term commitment to the child, and termination of parental rights

is not in the child’s best interest.” Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 508,

13, 657 S.W.3d 881, 888–89. The court could not legally place MC with the Hamiltons

without a completed home study, and there was “no compelling reason for the court to

choose guardianship rather than adoption where there was no reasonable prospect for

reunification” with Thompson. In fact, Thompson has not challenged the court’s finding

that there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification.

DHS explains that there would be no practical difference in the outcome of the case

had the court set the goal as adoption with a fit and willing relative; the parental rights of

both parents would have to be terminated to achieve that goal, and “there is no evidence

that the court was unwilling to have MC achieve permanency through the Hamiltons.”

Finally, DHS contends that arguing that the circuit court should have reached a different

5
DHS and MC’s attorney ad litem filed a joint response, but for simplicity’s sake,
they will be referred to as “DHS.”
15
result based on the particular facts of this case is no more than a request for this court to

reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we will not do. See McCord v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 244, 599 S.W.3d 374 (appellate court does not act as super fact-

finder, nor do we second-guess the circuit court’s credibility determinations).

We affirm the circuit court’s decision at the permamency-planning stage to change

the goal of the case from reunification with a concurrent goal of relative placement to

adoption with DHS filing a petition for termination of parental rights. The circuit court

found no compelling reason to consider guardianship in Thompson’s case because she had

not made measurable and sustainable progress toward the goal of the case, and the court

could not find the Hamiltons “fit and willing” relatives for placement purposes until the

home study was completed. Thus, application of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-338(c)(4) was

precluded, and setting the goal of the case pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-338(c)(5)

still allowed for MC to ultimately be adopted by the Hamiltons.

II. Best Interest

A circuit court’s best-interest finding must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence. Singleton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 455, 468 S.W.3d 809.

Clear and convincing evidence is proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction

on the allegation sought to be established. Dinkins, supra. On appeal, we will not reverse

the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In

16
determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference

to the opportunity of the circuit court to assess the witnesses’ credibility. Id.

In making a best-interest determination, the circuit court is required to consider two

factors: (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted and (2) the potential of harm to the

child if custody is returned to a parent. Ware v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App.

480, 503 S.W.3d 874. Other considerations in making a best-interest finding may include

the preservation of the child’s relationship with a grandparent; the severance
of child support from a parent; whether a less drastic measure could be
employed such as a no-contact order or supervised visitation; whether
continued contact with the parent would be beneficial to the children if or
when the children are living with a relative and not in an indeterminate state
that is working against them; and whether the children are living in continued
uncertainty.

Phillips v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 383, at 12, 585 S.W.3d 703, 709–10.

Thompson argues that DHS failed to present sufficient evidence that termination was

in MC’s best interest. Termination was not necessary to achieve a permanency goal of

guardianship or permanent custody, which would have maintained the status quo for the

case and furthered the public policy of the state to preserve and strengthen families.

Termination also did not serve MC’s best interest, given his bond with his mother and his

half-siblings.

The record shows that since MC has been in Hamilton’s care, Hamilton has

facilitated contact between Thompson and MC because she thought it was important for

MC to have a continued relationship with both his parents. Both Hamilton and Watkins

believe that Thompson should have continued contact with MC. While acknowledging

that she was not ready to assume custody of MC on the day of the termination hearing,

17
Thompson argues that she had made some progress, she was engaged in the case, and she

was working toward obtaining stability in her housing and employment. More importantly,

she and MC have a bond, and despite moving to Texas and having few resources, she had

video calls with him almost daily and had regular in-person visitation, which took

coordination efforts on her part with the Hamiltons.

Thompson also notes that this court has held it was reversible error for a circuit court

to fail to consider the effect of termination on a familial relationship, including siblings. See

Caldwell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 102 (the termination of parental rights

results in the termination of all other familial rights that flow through that parent).

Thompson’s testimony showed that all her children have a bond, but with her parental

rights terminated, MC’s half siblings become legal strangers with no protections to ensure

that their relationship with MC would continue posttermination.

Finally, Thompson asserts that while the termination of her parental rights was

unduly harsh, “the no contact order served no other purpose but punishment (not only of

the mother, but of the child), which absolutely is inconsistent with our Juvenile Code.”

She urges this court to reverse the no-contact order so that Hamilton, who is entrusted with

MC’s care, can decide whether continued contact with Thompson is in MC’s best interest

without court interference.

In response, DHS first notes that Thompson has not challenged the findings that MC

is adoptable or that he would face potential harm if returned to Thompson’s care. Instead,

she again argues that termination was unnecessary because a less restrictive means of

permanency could have been achieved with guardianship or permanent custody with the

18
Hamiltons. However, this court has held that a circuit court is permitted to set termination

as a goal even when a relative is available and requests custody. Anderson v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 18, 658 S.W.3d 470. When the parent demonstrates stability

and a reasonable hope for reunification, then there is no harm in waiting a little longer

before terminating parental rights; but when that stability and a reasonable hope for

reunification are not present, there is no reason to further delay achieving permanency

through termination and adoption. Id.

In addition, this court has consistently held that termination of parental rights will

not be reversed on the basis of a parent’s bond with the child. Sturgeon v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs. 2023 Ark. App. 337, 669 S.W.3d 921. Similarly, we have repeatedly held that

evidence of a genuine sibling bond is required to reverse a best-interest finding based on the

severance-of-a-sibling-relationship argument. Id. Here, DHS contends, there was no

evidence of a genuine bond between these children, and the circuit court’s oral ruling

anticipated continued contact between MC and his half sisters.

Finally, DHS asserts that Thompson’s argument against the no-contact order is a

request for this court to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we will not do. McCord,

supra. It also argues that whether the court places a no-contact order is within its discretion

in protecting the best interest of the juvenile. Johnson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023

Ark. App. 296, at 8, 667 S.W.3d 582, 587–588 (“The issue of visitation lies within the

sound discretion of the circuit court, with the primary consideration being the best interest

of the children.”)

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We affirm both the termination order and the no-contact order. Thompson asserts

that this case is similar to Cranford v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. App.

211, 378 S.W.3d 851, Caldwell v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark. App.

102, and Lively v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2015 Ark. App. 131, 456 S.W.3d

383. In Caldwell and Lively, the child was in the permanent care of the mother, and in

Cranford, the children were in the custody of the grandparents. This court reversed those

termination decisions, finding that termination would not necessarily result in greater

permanency or stability for the children in those particular circumstances. Here, however,

the children were still in the custody of DHS, and the Hamiltons were just a permanent-

placement option. Depending on whether Watkins’s parental rights are ultimately

terminated, this placement option may change.

This case is more analogous to Brumley v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2015

Ark. 356. In Brumley, our supreme court held that termination was appropriate despite the

child’s placement with an aunt. The court found Cranford distinguishable because the father

in Brumley was going to remain incarcerated for another six months, and he lacked essential

components of the case plan—such as stable housing and employment—that the father in

Cranford had demonstrated before his incarceration. Similarly, Thompson has failed to

comply with the case plan throughout the case, has not had stable employment throughout

the case, and did not have stable housing by the time of the termination hearing. The

stability and reasonable hope for reunification that was found in Cranford is lacking here.

In addition, the evidence of Thompson’s bond with MC and MC’s bond with his

half sisters came primarily from Thompson, and it is within the circuit court’s purview to

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assess the credibility of witnesses. Dinkins, supra. Also, as noted above by DHS, the circuit

court anticipated continued contact between MC and his half sisters facilitated by Hamilton.

Regarding the no-contact order, we hold that the circuit court was in the best

position to assess the relationship between both Thompson and MC and Thompson and

Hamilton and determine whether a no-contact order was necessary and in MC’s best

interest. The situation is also analogous to whether a parent is granted a final visit after

termination, a decision that is within the circuit court’s discretion. Best v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 485, 611 S.W.3d 690. We hold that the circuit court did not

clearly err in implementing the no-contact order.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree.

Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

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