Senica Gerard Parker v. State of Alabama

Rel: May 1, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CR-2025-0788
_________________________

Senica Gerard Parker

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CC-23-1758.70)

COLE, Judge.

Senica Gerard Parker appeals the Mobile Circuit Court's order

revoking his probation based on his commission of various new offenses.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
CR-2025-0788

Facts and Procedural History

On November 1, 2023, Parker pleaded guilty to first-degree

receiving stolen property, a violation of § 13A-8-17, Ala. Code 1975.

Parker was sentenced, in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement,

to 10 years' imprisonment, which was "split to the time" Parker had

already served, and Parker was ordered to serve 3 years' probation.1

(Supp. R. 13.) No issues were preserved or reserved for appeal from

Parker's guilty-plea conviction. (Supp. R. 10.)

On April 4, 2025, Parker's probation officer filed a delinquency

report with the circuit court, alleging that Parker had violated the

conditions of his probation. Specifically, Parker had been arrested and

charged with various new offenses -- driving under the combined

influence of alcohol and a controlled substance, a violation of § 32-5A-

191(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975; felony attempting to elude, a violation of § 13A-

1Although Parker had 10 prior felony convictions and was on
probation at the time he committed the offense of first-degree receiving
stolen property for which he pleaded guilty, the State did not present any
aggravating circumstances. (Supp. R. 6-7.) Likewise, Parker did not
assert any mitigating circumstances. (Supp. R. 7-8.) In addition, after
Parker pleaded guilty and was sentenced, the circuit court granted the
State's motion to nolle pros a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a violation of § 13A-12-212, Ala. Code 1975. (2nd
Supp. C. 14, 58; Supp. R. 16.)
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10-52, Ala. Code 1975; and first-degree theft of property, a violation of §

13A-8-3, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court held a revocation hearing.

At the revocation hearing, Officer Jeffery Jones, with the Daphne

Police Department, testified that he encountered Parker on January 26,

2025. Off. Jones had just responded to a "report of a stolen vehicle" when

he encountered the reported stolen vehicle and attempted to make a

traffic stop. (R. 5-8.) Off. Jones explained that Parker "accelerated" when

he first turned on his lights and sirens and that Parker drove nearly "70

miles an hour in a 35 and 45-mile-an-hour zone." (R. 8.) Parker drove

"[a] few miles" before being pulled over. The driver, later identified as

Parker, "eventually came to a stop" and Off. Jones suspected that Parker

was "under the influence of multiple controlled substances." (R. 6-7.) Off.

Jones testified that a "blood draw" was subsequently performed and

Parker's blood-test results showed that he had multiple controlled

substances in his system, including cocaine and methamphetamine. Off.

Jones further stated that Parker was "sluggish, nodding off," that his

"speech was slurred," and that "he appeared very nervous." (R. 12-13.)

Additionally, Off. Jones testified that "there was an open container of

alcohol in the car" and that the vehicle had a "strong" odor of alcohol. (R.

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13.) Parker told Off. Jones that he had "smoked crack cocaine ten

minutes" before the traffic stop and that "he had [had] a few beers earlier

in the day." (R. 15.)

The circuit court revoked Parker's probation and ordered him to

serve the remainder of his 10-year sentence. This appeal follows.

Discussion

Parker raises only one argument on appeal, which he raises for the

first time -- that his original sentence was "illegal" because his sentence

was split to "time served," which was less than the minimum split time

required by the presumptive sentencing standards. Thus, Parker

contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation

and that the only action this Court may take is to vacate his "void"

sentence. The State agrees that Parker's original sentence was

"unauthorized" by the presumptive sentencing standards. However,

because Parker has raised this argument on appeal from the order

revoking his probation, his argument is not properly before this Court for

appellate review unless the departure is a jurisdictional error. See, e.g.,

Brooks v. State, 340 So. 3d 410, 460 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (" 'A guilty

plea, intelligently and voluntarily entered by an accused, waives all

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nonjurisdictional defects.' " (quoting Lancaster v. State, 362 So. 2d 271,

272 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978))). For the reasons stated below, we hold that

the failure to comply with the presumptive sentencing standards, unlike

the failure to comply with the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code

1975, is not a jurisdictional error.

Parker pleaded guilty to first-degree receiving stolen property,

which is a Class B felony and a violation of § 13A-8-17, Ala. Code 1975.

In accordance with his negotiated plea agreement with the State, he was

sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, which was "split for … [Parker] to

serve Time Served" followed by 3 years' probation. (Supp. C. 9-10, R. 13;

2nd Supp. C. 51-52, 58.) At the time of Parker's sentencing, he had served

only 7 months and 12 days. Parker's sentence was authorized under the

Split Sentence Act, which provides that "where the imposed sentence is

not more than 15 years" for a Class B felony, a defendant shall be

confined "for a period not exceeding three years … and that the execution

of the remainder of the sentence be suspended … and that the defendant

be placed on probation for such period … as the court deems best." § 15-

18-8(a)(1) (emphasis added). However, both parties contend that

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Parker's sentence was also controlled by the presumptive sentencing

standards.

The record from Parker's plea hearing, the sentencing worksheets,

and the circuit court's sentencing order indicate that the parties and the

circuit court intended that Parker be sentenced in accordance with the

presumptive sentencing standards. The circuit court's sentencing order

states: "On recommendation of the State and by agreement with the

Defendant, and according to the Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, the

Defendant is now sentenced by the Court to imprisonment in the

Alabama State Penitentiary for the term of ten (10) years." (2nd Supp.

C. 51.) The circuit court's order also notes that "[n]o aggravating factors

were asserted by the State and no mitigating factors were asserted by

[Parker]." (2nd Supp. C. 51.) At the time Parker was sentenced, the

presumptive sentencing standards required that he serve a term of 81 to

154 months' imprisonment for a straight sentence and a term of 18 to 31

months' imprisonment for a split sentence. However, Parker had served

only 7 months and 12 days, making the split to "time served" a departure

from the presumptive sentencing standards.

"A sentence comports to the Standards when the
sentence conforms to the recommendations on Prison the [sic]

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In/Out Worksheet and the sentence length is chosen from the
recommended sentence ranges on the Sentence Length
Tables, including where prison is recommended, and a split
sentence is imposed, the split portion of the sentence cannot
be suspended and both the total sentence and the
incarceration portion of the split must conform to the
recommendations on the sentence length tables provided the
total sentence length and incarceration portion lengths also
comport to the requirements of Ala. Code § 15-18-8."

Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 28 (2019).

Additionally,

"[a] split sentence conforms to the Standards, where
prison is recommended, if the total sentence imposed and the
length of the 'split' fall within the statutory ranges specified
in Ala. Code § 15-18-8 and the recommended sentence ranges
provided in the Sentence Length Table."

Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 29 (2019).

In departing from the presumptive sentencing standards, the

circuit court also did not comply with departure procedures: "The

aggravating and/or mitigating factors found as reasons for any departure

must be stated in the written sentencing order, even if the departure

sentence is the result of a plea agreement and the parties have agreed to

the existence of the aggravating and/or mitigating factors." Presumptive

and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 30 (2019) (emphasis

added).

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To be sure, despite the fact that the State and Parker agreed on

the sentence in question, " 'a [circuit] court cannot accept a plea

agreement that calls for an illegal sentence.' " Wells v. State, 381 So. 3d

508, 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Calloway v. State, 860 So. 2d

900, 906 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (emphasis added)). However, contrary to

Parker's contentions, his "departure sentence" -- which complied with

applicable sentencing statutes but departed from the presumptive

sentencing standards and departure procedures -- was not "illegal" and,

thus, is not a jurisdictional error.

The Alabama Supreme Court "has routinely held that the

imposition of a sentence in a criminal case that is not authorized by

statute creates a jurisdictional defect that is nonwaivable and that can

be raised at any time." Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10, 13 (Ala. 2021)

(emphasis added). The Alabama Supreme Court thus recognized that

" ' "a trial court does not have [subject-matter] jurisdiction to impose a

sentence not provided for by statute." ' " Id. (quoting Ex parte Butler, 972

So. 2d 821, 825 (Ala. 2007), quoting in turn Hollis v. State, 845 So. 2d 5,

6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)). "[A] sentence unauthorized by statute exceeds

the jurisdiction of the trial court and is void." Id. at 15 (emphasis added).

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In Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 2006), the Alabama

Supreme Court explained subject-matter jurisdiction as follows:

"Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a case or issue
a decree. Black's Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed.2004). Subject-
matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain
types of cases. Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So.
754, 755 (1911) (' " By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought." ' (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308,
316, 19 L. Ed. 931 (1870))). That power is derived from the
Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code. See United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L.
Ed.2d 860 (2002) (subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a
court's 'statutory or constitutional power' to adjudicate a
case). In deciding whether Seymour's claim properly
challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask
only whether the trial court had the constitutional and
statutory authority to try the offense with which Seymour was
charged and as to which he has filed his petition for certiorari
review.

"Under the Alabama Constitution, a circuit court 'shall
exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as may be
otherwise provided by law.' Amend. No. 328, § 6.04(b), Ala.
Const. 1901. The Alabama Code provides that '[t]he circuit
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony
prosecutions ....' § 12-11-30, Ala. Code 1975. The offense of
shooting into an occupied dwelling is a Class B felony. § 13A-
11-61(b), Ala. Code 1975. As a result, the State's prosecution
of Seymour for that offense was within the circuit court's
subject-matter jurisdiction, and a defect in the indictment
could not divest the circuit court of its power to hear the case.

"The United States Supreme Court has long held that
'defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to
adjudicate a case.' Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781. …

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Id. at 538. (emphasis added).

In short, the presumptive sentencing standards are not

"jurisdictional." Indeed, the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003

expressly provides trial courts with the authority and discretion to depart

from those standards. See § 12-25-2(a)(2) and (5), Ala. Code 1975 ("The

purposes of the commission shall be to … determine and recommend …

sentencing policies and practices appropriate for the state which: … (2)

maintain[] judicial discretion and sufficient flexibility to permit

individualized sentencing as warranted by mitigating or aggravating

factors … [and] (5) [p]rovide judges with flexibility in sentencing options

and meaningful discretion in the imposition of sentences." (emphasis

added)). Those standards are waivable, and departures are expected.

See 12-25-34.2(c), Ala. Code 1975 ("Durational and dispositional

departures from the presumptive sentencing standards shall be subject

to appellate review."), and § 12-25-34.2(a)(2), (4), and (9), Ala. Code 1975

(defining "departure" as "[a] sentence that departs from the presumptive

sentence recommendation," "dispositional departure" as "[a] sentence

that departs from the presumptive sentence recommendation for

disposition of sentence," and "sentence range departure" as "[a] sentence

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that departs from the presumptive sentence recommendation as to the

sentence range").

Moreover, although the Legislature never established the "scope of

appellate review" to be applied to a departure from the presumptive

sentencing standards, the scope of review was established by this Court

in Hyde v. State, 185 So. 3d 501, 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). This Court

held that, "when reviewing a circuit court's decision to depart from either

a dispositional or durational recommendation under the presumptive

sentencing standards, this Court will apply an abuse-of-discretion

standard of review." Id. (emphasis added). We also explained that "abuse

of discretion" is the well-established standard of review for evaluating

sentences that are "within the statutory range." Id. (emphasis added).

See also Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So. 2d 1076, 1090 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2006) ("Satterwhite's sentence clearly falls within the statutory

range. We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion on

the part of the trial court in sentencing Satterwhite to 30 days'

imprisonment in the county jail." (emphasis added)); Best v. State, 895

So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ( "It is well settled that, absent

an abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal

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where the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory

range." (emphasis added)); Sparks v. State, 665 So. 2d 996, 998 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1995) (" 'Where the punishment is within the statutory range,

this Court will not overturn the sentencing decision absent a clear abuse

of discretion by the trial court. Fordham v. State, 513 So. 2d 31, 34 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1986)." (emphasis added)); Pickron v. State, 475 So. 2d 600,

601 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) ("The sentence imposed by the trial judge in

the case sub-judice is well within the range of punishment authorized by

statute, and we deem it inappropriate to substitute our judgment for that

of the trial court as to the punishment the appellant-defendant should

receive. To do so would constitute an unwarranted invasion by an

appellate court of the province of the trial court. As long as the sentence

imposed by the trial court is within statutory boundaries, the Court of

Criminal Appeals will not overturn the decision absent clear abuse."

(emphasis added)). We further explained that applying the abuse-of-

discretion standard in reviewing departures from the presumptive

sentencing standards was especially warranted "[b]ecause the

presumptive sentencing standards were implemented to '[a]llow judges

to retain significant discretion in arriving at a sentencing decision.' "

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Hyde, 185 So. 3d at 508 (quoting Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing

Standards Manual 14 (2013)). Thus, there exists "no reason to depart

from our traditional scope of appellate review of a circuit court's decision

to impose a certain sentence." Id. See also Presumptive and Voluntary

Sentencing Standards Manual 18 and 30 (2019) and (2024) ("the

Standards … [a]llow judges to retain significant discretion in arriving at

sentencing decisions as required by Ala. Code § 12-25-2(a)(5)" and "the

decision to depart from the presumptive sentence recommendation is in

the discretion of the court") (emphasis added)).

Since Hyde, this Court has repeatedly applied the abuse-of-

discretion standard in reviewing departures from the presumptive

sentencing standards. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, [Ms. CR-2024-0078,

Mar. 28, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2025) (applying an

abuse-of-discretion standard of review and holding that "the trial court

did not abuse its significant discretion in finding that good cause existed

to excuse the State's late notice of aggravating factors to seek sentences

that departed from those recommended under the presumptive

sentencing standards" (emphasis added)); Laakkonen v. State, 293 So. 3d

439, 444 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (holding that "the circuit court abused its

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discretion in departing from the presumptive sentencing standards");2

and Showers v. State, 256 So. 3d 124, 128 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017)

(applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and holding that "the

circuit court abused its discretion" by imposing sentences that "do not

comport with the requirements of the Presumptive and Voluntary

Sentencing Standards Manual"). Notably, in each of those direct appeals,

the challenges to the departure sentences were preserved.

This Court has also recognized that, although trial courts have

discretion to depart from the presumptive sentencing standards, "certain

procedures must be followed." Snow v. State, 197 So. 3d 549, 552 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015). Nonetheless, to be reviewed on appeal, we have

expressly held that a challenge to a trial court's departure from the

presumptive sentencing standards must be preserved below. As we

explained in Snow, "challenges to defects in the circuit court's

2Parker's reliance on Laakkonen to support his argument that his

sentence is "illegal" is misplaced. Laakkonen was a direct appeal, and
the appellant had preserved his argument below. We also expressly held
that "the circuit court abused its discretion in departing from the
presumptive sentencing standards," not that his sentence was "illegal"
and "void." 293 So. 3d at 441, 444. This Court then remanded the case
"for the circuit court to give Laakkonen the opportunity to withdraw his
guilty plea". Id. at 447.

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consideration of the presumptive sentencing standards are waivable and

were, in fact, waived when Snow failed to object to those defects in the

circuit court and thereby preserve his arguments for review on appeal."

Id. at 555. We thus held that, "[b]ecause Snow did not raise the

challenges to the circuit court's departure from the presumptive

sentencing standards below that he now raises on appeal, Snow's claims

are not preserved for appellate review." Id. We see no reason to overrule

our well-reasoned opinion in Snow (nor have we been asked to), which

properly held that challenges to a sentence departing from the

presumptive sentencing standards must be preserved below to be

considered and reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal. Because of

that discretion afforded trial courts, a claim based on either an erroneous

departure or a failure to comply with the procedures for departure is

waived if not raised below. And, a waivable claim is not jurisdictional.

See also Ex parte Files, 413 So. 3d 679, 683 (Ala. 2024) ("If a challenge

… is subject to waiver, then the [error] has not been considered as

impacting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.")

In sum, the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act, the Presumptive and

Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual, and established caselaw make

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clear that trial courts maintain significant sentencing discretion to

depart from the presumptive sentencing standards. Thus, although a

trial court may abuse its discretion in departing from the presumptive

sentencing standards, a departure error is not a "jurisdictional" error

that renders a sentence illegal. Accordingly, we hold that Parker's

argument on appeal -- that his original sentence is "illegal" and "void"

because it departed from the presumptive sentencing standards -- is not

reviewable.

We further note that Parker's reliance on recent opinions vacating

illegal sentences is misplaced because, in those cases, we held that the

appellants' sentences were illegal and, thus, void because they failed to

comply with the Split Sentence Act, not because the sentences departed

from the presumptive sentencing standards. See, e.g., Ex parte

McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10, 16 (Ala. 2021) ("The split sentences the trial

court imposed on McGowan were unauthorized under § 15-18-8. In

addition to vacating the probation-revocation order, the proper procedure

at this juncture would be for the trial court to ' "conduct another

sentencing hearing and … reconsider the execution of [McGowan's 15]-

year sentence[s]. Because the [15]-year sentence[s] [were] valid, the

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circuit court may not change [them]." ' " (citations omitted)); McMillian v.

State, [Ms. CR-2023-0898, Jun. 27, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (2025) (McMillian

argued on appeal from his guilty-plea conviction, as he did below, that

his five-year "straight" sentence for a Class D felony was illegal because

it neither complied with the Split Sentence Act nor the presumptive

sentencing standards, and this Court, based on the "illegal" sentence,

reversed and remanded for the trial court resentence McMillian

(emphasis added)); 3 Spencer v. State, 397 So. 3d 985, 987 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2024) (recognizing that, "[a]lthough a circuit court does not have to

split a sentence it imposes for a Class B felony conviction, if it chooses to

3Although in McMillian, we did not expressly distinguish between

the trial court's imposing a sentence that was illegal because it did not
comply with the Split Sentence Act and the trial court's abusing its
discretion because it did not sentence McMillian under the presumptive
sentencing standards, that distinction is nonetheless clear based on the
cases cited therein, including Laakkonen v. State, 293 So. 3d 439 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2019). Moreover, McMillian was a direct appeal, and both
sentencing arguments were preserved below. See also Ex parte Town of
Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1210 (Ala. 2006) (noting that, even if
raised by the parties, a jurisdictional issue "not decided by the courts and
made part of the opinion of the case" has no precedential effect), and
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) ("Even
as to our own judicial power or jurisdiction, this Court has followed the
lead of Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a
prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it
was passed sub silentio.").

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do so, then it must split that sentence in accordance with § 15-18-8(a),

Ala. Code 1975," and holding that, because Spencer's split sentence did

not comply with the Split Sentence Act, it was "illegal" and, thus, void

and would not support an appeal).

In sum, a trial court's departure from the presumptive sentencing

standards is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Thus, any error therein

is not a jurisdictional error and may be reviewed on appeal only if it is

preserved below. Parker's split sentence complied with the jurisdictional

Split Sentence Act. And, Parker did not preserve and timely raise his

nonjurisdictional argument that the circuit court abused its discretion by

departing from the presumptive sentencing standards in imposing his

split sentence. Accordingly, Parker's challenge to his departure sentence

-- raised for the first time on appeal from the order revoking his probation

-- is not properly before this Court for review.

Conclusion

Because the only argument Parker made on appeal is not properly

before this Court, we affirm the circuit court's order revoking Parker's

probation.

AFFIRMED.

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Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Anderson, JJ., concur. Minor, J.,

concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.

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MINOR, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the result.

I concur in the Court's opinion to the point that it recognizes that,

because a circuit court's departure from the presumptive sentencing

standards is waivable and must be preserved for appellate review, Senica

Gerard Parker is due no relief. As to the rest of the Court's opinion, I

concur in the result.

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