Thomas Edison Douglas, Jr. v. State of Alabama

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CR-2024-0313
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Thomas Edison Douglas, Jr.

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Jefferson District Court
(DC-20-9635, DC-20-10149, and DC-20-10150)

COLE, Judge.

Thomas Edison Douglas, Jr., appeals the revocation of his probation

by the Jefferson District Court. Douglas was originally convicted of

certain persons forbidden to possess a firearm, a violation of § 13A-11-72,

Ala. Code 1975, trafficking in heroin, a violation of § 13A-12-231, Ala.
CR-2024-0313

Code 1975, and first-degree receiving stolen property, a violation of §

13A-8-17, Ala. Code 1975. He was sentenced, as a habitual felony

offender, to 20 years' imprisonment, which sentences were split for

Douglas to serve 3 years' imprisonment followed by 5 years' supervised

probation for each conviction; the sentences were ordered to run

concurrently. On April 9, 2024, the district court revoked Douglas's

probation and reinstated Douglas's original 20-year sentences for each

conviction but then, under § 15-18-8.2, Ala. Code 1975, resplit those

sentences for Douglas to serve 8 years' imprisonment followed by 2 years'

supervised probation; those sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Facts and Procedural History

On March 12, 2024, Douglas's probation officer filed a delinquency

report alleging that Douglas had violated the terms and conditions of his

probation by committing new criminal offenses. Specifically, Douglas's

probation officer alleged that Douglas had been arrested for first-degree

receiving stolen property, a violation of § 13A-8-17, Ala. Code 1975;

trafficking in morphine, a violation of § 13A-12-231, Ala. Code 1975;

unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance

(methamphetamine), a violation of § 13A-12-211, Ala. Code 1975; first-

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degree unlawful possession of marijuana, a violation of § 13A-12-213, Ala.

Code 1975; and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of

§ 13A-12-260, Ala. Code 1975.

On April 9, 2024, the district court held a probation-revocation

hearing. At the hearing, Douglas, represented by counsel, admitted that

he violated the terms of his probation and waived his right to a formal

hearing. The district court then found itself reasonably satisfied that

Douglas had violated the terms of his probation, revoked Douglas's

probation, and resplit Douglas's concurrent sentences of 20 years'

imprisonment for Douglas to serve 8 years' imprisonment followed by 2

years' supervised probation for each conviction. On April 10, 2024, the

district court issued its written order revoking Douglas's probation and

resplitting his sentences as ordered in open court. (C. 55-56, 134-35, 212-

13.) This appeal follows.

Discussion

The sole issue Douglas raises on appeal is whether the district

court's resplitting of his sentences comports with Alabama law.1 Both

1Although no objection was raised in the district court to Douglas's

resplit sentences, "[i]t is well settled that '[m]atters concerning
unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional.' Hunt v. State, 659 So. 2d 998,
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the State and Douglas agree that the sentences were not resplit in

accordance with Alabama law. However, the State and Douglas dispute

how to interpret § 15-18-8.2, Ala. Code 1975.

Section 15-18-8.2 provides:

"(a) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, if a
defendant's probation is revoked, and the defendant was
sentenced pursuant to Section 15-18-8, [Ala. Code 1975,] the
sentencing judge may determine the length of revocation
sentence, including the ability to resplit the sentence within
the remainder of the sentence pursuant to Section 15-18-8. If
the revocation sentence imposed is less than the length of
time remaining on the original sentence, the remainder of the
sentence shall be suspended and the defendant may be placed
on probation for a period and upon terms as the court deems
best.

"(b) This section shall apply to any defendant who is
subject to probation without regard to when he or she was
sentenced for or committed the crime."

Douglas contends that the phrase in § 15-18-8.2, allowing the district

court "to resplit the sentence within the remainder of the sentence

pursuant to Section 15-18-8," Ala. Code 1975, should mean that, having

already served three years of the maximum five-year imprisonment split

999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore, this Court may take notice of an
alleged illegal sentence 'at any time and may do so even ex mero motu.'
Moore v. State, 40 So. 3d 750, 753 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)." Towns v.
State, 293 So. 3d 975, 985 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).
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originally imposed for his convictions, "the revocation sentence should be

limited to the [two] years remaining split time under the split range

provided for in § 15-18-8." (Douglas's brief, p. 4.) Douglas acknowledges

that, under his interpretation, once the maximum imprisonment portion

of a split sentence is served, the sentence could no longer be resplit. On

the other hand, "[t]he State contends that when probation is revoked for

a defendant originally sentenced pursuant to the Split Sentence Act,

Section 15-18-8.2 reauthorizes the revoking court to split the sentence in

accordance with Section 15-18-8 … based on the defendant's base

sentence." (State's brief, p. 13 (emphasis added).) In support of its

argument, the State notes that § 15-18-8.2 also authorizes a revoking

court to resplit a sentence "for any subsequent probation revocations up

to and until the defendant has served the full term of his original base

sentence." (State's brief, p. 13 (emphasis added).) We agree with the

State's interpretation of § 15-18-18.2.

This Court applies a de novo standard of review to claims that

concern only questions of law or the interpretation of a statute. Simons

v. State, 217 So. 3d 16, 22 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016).

" 'It is well settled that "[w]ords used in the
statute must be given their natural, plain,

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ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and
where plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly what it
says." Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy
Sheriffs' Ass'n of Tuscaloosa County, 589 So. 2d
687, 689 (Ala. 1991). "[T]he first rule of statutory
construction [is] that where the meaning of the
plain language of the statute is clear, it must be
construed according to its plain language." Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501,
504 (Ala. 1993). "Principles of statutory
construction instruct this Court to interpret the
plain language of a statute to mean exactly what
it says and to engage in judicial construction only
if the language in the statute is ambiguous." Ex
parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ala. 2001).

" ' "The cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is to determine and give effect to the
intent of the legislature as manifested in the
language of the statute." Ex parte State Dep't of
Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala. 1996)
(emphasis added). Although legislative intent
"may be gleaned from the language used, the
reason and necessity for the act, and the purpose
sought to be obtained," Ex parte Holladay, 466 So.
2d 956, 960 (Ala. 1985), "[i]n construing [a]
statute, this Court should gather the intent of the
legislature from the language of the statute itself,
if possible." Pace v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
578 So. 2d 281, 283 (Ala. 1991). "Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the
language of the statute is conclusive," id., and "the
court must give effect to the clear meaning of that
language." Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So.
2d 1365, 1376-77 (Ala. 1994).

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" 'This fundamental rule of statutory
construction applies to penal statutes. "Absent
any indication to the contrary, the words [in a
penal statute] must be given their ordinary and
normal meaning." Walker v. State, 428 So. 2d 139,
141 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). " 'Penal statutes are to
reach no further in meaning than their words,' " Ex
parte Bertram, 884 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Clements v. State, 370 So. 2d 723, 725
(Ala. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Beck v.
State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1980)), and "it is well
established that criminal statutes should not be
'extended by construction,' " Ex parte Evers, 434
So. 2d 813, 817 (Ala. 1983) (quoting Locklear v.
State, 50 Ala. App. 679, 282 So. 2d 116 (1973)).

" 'In sum, "[i]f the language of [a] statute is
unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial
construction and the clearly expressed intent of
the legislature [in the plain language of the
statute] must be given effect." Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielson, 714 So. 2d 293,
296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems
Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992)). "[O]nly if there is no rational way to
interpret the words stated will we look beyond
those words to determine legislative intent."
DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc.,
729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998). "We should turn
to extrinsic aids to determine the meaning of a
piece of legislation only if we can draw no rational
conclusion from a straightforward application of
the terms of the statute." 729 So. 2d at 277.

" 'In determining whether judicial
construction is required, "[t]he language of the
entire statute under review must be read together
and the determination of any ambiguity must be

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made on the basis of the entire statute." Sheffield
v. State, 708 So. 2d 899, 907 (Ala. Crim. App.
1997). "Because the meaning of statutory
language depends on context, a statute is to be
read as a whole." Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d
405, 406 (Ala. 1993). We must also bear in mind
that " '[t]here is a presumption that every word,
sentence, or provision was intended for some
useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that
some effect is to be given to each, and also that no
superfluous words or provisions were used.' "
Sheffield v. State, 708 So. 2d 899, 909 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997) (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 at pp.
551-52 (1953)).'

"State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724, 735-736 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010)."

Simons, 217 So. 3d at 24-25.

Here, there is no dispute that the district court had the authority

to resplit Douglas's sentences after revoking Douglas's probation. See §

15-18-8.2(a) (allowing a court to resplit a sentence provided the

"defendant's probation is revoked, and the defendant was sentenced

pursuant to Section 15-18-8"). The dispute concerns how to interpret "the

sentence" in the following provision: "the sentencing judge may

determine the length of revocation sentence, including the ability to

resplit the sentence within the remainder of the sentence pursuant to

Section 15-18-8." § 15-18-8.2(a) (emphasis added).

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Douglas's interpretation of § 15-18-8.2 attempts to obfuscate the

plain language of the statute. Specifically, Douglas asks this Court to

read "the remainder of the sentence" to apply only to any remaining

imprisonment time available under his original split sentence. However,

the language of the statute does not limit "the remainder" to any

remaining imprisonment time available under the original split

sentence; rather, it limits "the remainder" to "the sentence." § 15-18-

8.2(a), Ala. Code 1975. In addition, any split sentence is a split on a base

sentence. Thus, a resplit of the sentence must also necessarily mean

another split of the base sentence. Moreover, the next sentence of the

statute further emphasizes that the sentence being split or resplit is the

original or base sentence, not the split sentence: "If the revocation

sentence imposed is less than the length of time remaining on the original

sentence, the remainder of the sentence shall be suspended and the

defendant may be placed on probation for a period and upon terms as the

court deems best." Thus, Douglas's interpretation goes against the plain

language of § 15-18-8.2(a).

The plain language of § 15-18-8.2(a) also makes it clear that a court

revoking probation may order a sentence to be resplit after revoking a

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defendant's probation, but that any resplitting of the sentence must

comply with § 15-18-8 and that "the defendant may be placed on

probation for a period and upon terms as the court deems best." § 15-18-

8.2(a).

The district court revoked Douglas's probation and ordered

Douglas's 20-year sentences to be resplit for Douglas to serve 8 years'

imprisonment followed by 2 years' supervised probation. However, at the

time of Douglas's offenses, § 15-18-8(a)(2), authorized a sentencing court

to split a "sentence of greater than 15 years but not more than 20 years

… for a period of three to five years for Class A or Class B felony

convictions and for a period of three years for Class C felony convictions

…." Thus, Douglas's sentences for his convictions for trafficking in

heroin, a Class A felony, and first-degree receiving stolen property, a

Class B felony, could be resplit only to imprisonment terms "of three to

five years." Likewise, Douglas's sentence for his conviction for certain

persons forbidden to possess a firearm, a Class C felony, could be resplit

only for a term of imprisonment "of three years." Id. See, e.g., Smith v.

State, 334 So. 3d 250, 257 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (holding that, although

the Habitual Felony Offender Act determines the length of the base

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sentence, the initial classification of the offense applies for purposes of

the Split Sentence Act).

By resplitting Douglas's sentences for him to serve eight years'

imprisonment, the district court ordered sentences that exceeded the

maximum authorized sentences under Alabama law. 2 Because the

district court's order revoking Douglas's probation for violating the terms

of his probation by committing new offenses was legal, we affirm the

district court's revocation of Douglas's probation. However, because the

district court imposed an illegal resplit of each of Douglas's sentences, we

remand this cause to the district court with instructions for it to vacate

its resplit sentences for each of Douglas's convictions and to hold a

hearing in open court, at which Douglas shall be represented by counsel,

and impose a proper sanction for the revocation of Douglas's probation

2We note that, after sentencing Douglas, the district court stated in

open court: "I'll give him credit for any time served, and I'll run his cases
concurrent." (C. 156.) The district court also entered a written order
stating: "Defendant shall receive credit for any and all time served and
cases shall run concurrent." (C. 135.) The district court did not, however,
specify whether the time served was to apply to Douglas's 20-year base
sentences, to his 8-year imprisonment term under the resplit sentences,
or to both. Thus, we need not determine whether his "credit" was ordered
to be applied to the split term and, further, if subtracting the credit would
cause the eight-year split imposed, at least in practicality, to comply with
the applicable version of § 15-18-8.
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under § 15-22-54, Ala. Code 1975. Should the district court again choose

to resplit the remainder of Douglas's base sentences, the resplitting of

those sentences must comply with the version of § 15-18-8 that applied

at the time of Douglas's offenses.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the district court's order revoking Douglas's

probation is affirmed, but this cause is remanded with instructions for

the district court to vacate the resplit sentences it imposed and to hold a

hearing in open court, at which Douglas is represented by counsel, and

impose a legal sanction for the revocation of Douglas's probation in

accordance with this opinion. The corrected record should be certified

and transmitted to this Court at the earliest possible date and by no later

than 42 days after the date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Minor and Anderson, JJ., concur. Kellum, J.,

concurs in the result.

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