CourtListener 10670686•Aaron Johnson, Nancy Williams, Derek Bateman, Jack Ficaro, Dashonda Bennett, Latisha Kali, Quinton Lee, Esta Glass, Joyce Jones, Deja Bush, Jarvis Dean, Taja Penn, Lisa Cormier, Mia Brand, Tammy Cowart, John Young, Mark Johnson, Latara Jackson, Senata Waters, Raymond Williams, Cynthia Hawkins, Crystal Harris, Rashunda Williams, and Mary Blackerby v. Greg Reed, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce
Aaron Johnson, Nancy Williams, Derek Bateman, Jack Ficaro, Dashonda Bennett, Latisha Kali, Quinton Lee, Esta Glass, Joyce Jones, Deja Bush, Jarvis Dean, Taja Penn, Lisa Cormier, Mia Brand, Tammy Cowart, John Young, Mark Johnson, Latara Jackson, Senata Waters, Raymond Williams, Cynthia Hawkins, Crystal Harris, Rashunda Williams, and Mary Blackerby v. Greg Reed, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce
CourtListener 10670686Ala12 set 2025
Testo completo
Rel: September 12, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2025
_________________________
SC-2022-0897
_________________________
Aaron Johnson, Nancy Williams, Derek Bateman, Jack Ficaro,
Dashonda Bennett, Latisha Kali, Quinton Lee, Esta Glass, Joyce
Jones, Deja Bush, Jarvis Dean, Taja Penn, Lisa Cormier, Mia
Brand, Tammy Cowart, John Young, Mark Johnson, Latara
Jackson, Senata Waters, Raymond Williams, Cynthia Hawkins,
Crystal Harris, Rashunda Williams, and Mary Blackerby
v.
Greg Reed, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama
Department of Workforce
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-22-900134)
SC-2022-0897
After Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States
LEWIS, Justice. 1
The United States Supreme Court has reversed this Court's earlier
judgment in this case, see Johnson v. Alabama Secretary of Labor
Fitzgerald Washington, 387 So. 3d 138 (Ala. 2023), and has "remand[ed]
the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion."
Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. ___, ___,145 S. Ct. 465, 473 (2025).2
In this Court's previous opinion, we set forth the pertinent facts and
procedural history as follows:
"This suit began when 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and
motion for injunctive relief against [the] Secretary … and the
Department, with each plaintiff pleading numerous claims
related to the Department's handling of their unemployment-
benefits applications. In essence, each of the plaintiffs had
filed one or more applications for benefits and was unsatisfied
with how the Department handled (or failed to handle) those
applications. After [the] Secretary … and the Department
moved to dismiss the complaint against them, the plaintiffs
1This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court;
it was reassigned to Justice Lewis on May 22, 2025.
2"During this litigation, Alabama changed the name of its
Department of Labor to the Department of Workforce, and Greg Reed,
Alabama's first Secretary of Workforce, was substituted as the
respondent." Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S., ___, ___ n.1, 145 S. Ct. 465, 468
n.1 (2025). We will refer to the Department of Workforce as "the
Department" and to Secretary Reed as "the Secretary."
2
SC-2022-0897
filed an amended complaint, which dropped several of their
initial claims and also dropped the Department as a
defendant.
"The surviving counts -- all of which are federal claims
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
-- alleged that [the] Secretary['s] … 'policies, practices, and
procedures' related to 'unemployment compensation
applications' violated the Social Security Act of 1935, 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), as well as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Each plaintiff demanded several forms of relief, including: (1)
a permanent injunction directing [the] Secretary … to
'promptly make decisions on all applications' for
unemployment compensation; (2) a preliminary injunction
directing [the] Secretary … to 'issue an initial nonmonetary
decision within the next ten days to every plaintiff who has
not yet received a decision'; (3) a permanent injunction
directing [the] Secretary … to 'pay every [unemployment-
benefit] claim that has been approved within two days of the
date of approval'; (4) a permanent injunction requiring [the]
Secretary … to provide any claimants who request a hearing
confirmation of the request and to 'schedule a date not more
than 90 days later than the request for the hearing'; (5) a
preliminary injunction directing [the] Secretary … to 'provide
within ten days a hearing date for each of the plaintiffs who
have requested a hearing'; (6) a permanent injunction
directing [the] Secretary … to provide 'all information about
the unemployment compensation program and all notices to
claimants using language and format making them easily
read and understood by people with an eighth grade
education'; (7) a preliminary injunction compelling [the]
Secretary … 'within two weeks to file a plan for rewriting
notices and information sheets to ensure that they can be
easily read and understood by people with an eighth grade
education'; and (8) an order awarding the plaintiffs attorney
fees.
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SC-2022-0897
"[The] Secretary … again moved to dismiss, arguing
that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction (on a
variety of theories), that the plaintiffs lacked a private cause
of action, and that the plaintiffs' claims were substantively
meritless. The circuit court granted [the] Secretary['s] …
motion without specifying the ground on which it based its
dismissal. The plaintiffs promptly filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the judgment of dismissal, which the circuit
court denied. The plaintiffs then timely appealed to this
Court. 3"
Johnson, 387 So. 3d at 140-41.
This Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing the
case, stating that the "circuit court and this Court [lacked] power to
address the merits of [the plaintiffs'] claims" because the plaintiffs had
not exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 144. The plaintiffs
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari;
that petition was granted. The United States Supreme Court held that
this Court contravened its precedents by "interpret[ing] the State's
administrative-exhaustion requirement for unemployment benefits
claims to in effect immunize the … Secretary … from § 1983 due process
suits alleging that the Department has unlawfully delayed in processing
benefits claims." Williams, 604 U.S. at ___, 145 S. Ct. at 473. Therefore,
3Two of the plaintiffs in the circuit court did not appeal. See
Johnson, 387 So. 3d at 140 n.1.
4
SC-2022-0897
that Court "reverse[d] the judgment of [this] Court and remand[ed] the
case for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion."
Williams, 604 U.S. at ___, 145 S. Ct. at 473.
Upon remand to this Court, the Secretary filed an unopposed
request for supplemental briefing; that request was granted by this
Court. The Secretary represents that, "[t]oday, [the p]laintiffs have all
either been paid in full or received administratively final denials, such
that even a favorable decision from this Court 'would accomplish nothing'
now." Secretary's supp. brief p. 6 (quoting Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So.
3d 555, 560 (Ala. 2020)). The plaintiffs deny the Secretary's contention
and request that this Court remand this case to the circuit court for that
court to make a determination on whether the case is now moot.
" 'The general rule in this state is that if, pending an appeal, an
event occurs which makes determination of the case unnecessary, the
appeal will be dismissed.' " Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631
So. 2d 953, 957 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Adams v. Warden, 422 So. 2d 787,
790 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)). Here, the plaintiffs have requested only
injunctive relief. If the Secretary's averment that "[the p]laintiffs have
all either been paid in full or received administratively final denials" is
5
SC-2022-0897
accurate, there would be no need for a determination of this case.
However, the plaintiffs do not concede the accuracy of that statement.
Although this Court may receive facts concerning whether a case
has become moot, see Aliant Bank v. Carter, 197 So. 3d 981, 984 (Ala.
2015), here, the supplemental briefs reveal a factual dispute germane to
the issue of mootness that is better resolved by the circuit court.
Therefore, we remand this cause to the circuit court to determine
whether this case has become moot. 4 See Johnson v. New York State
4The plaintiffs argue that, even if the case were moot, it would fall
within an exception to the mootness doctrine, specifically, because it is
capable of repetition yet evading review. "This exception applies when
there is a 'significant issue that cannot be addressed by a reviewing court
because of some intervening factual circumstance, most often that the
issue will be resolved by the passage of a relatively brief period of time.' "
Plunk v. Reed, [Ms. SC-2024-0021, Jan. 17, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2025) (quoting McCoo v. State, 921 So. 2d 450, 458 (Ala. 2005)). The
plaintiffs have the burden of showing the applicability of the exception.
See id.
As noted in this Court's previous opinion, this case arose from the
following circumstances:
"With the onset of COVID-19, the Alabama Department
of Labor received a record number of applications for
unemployment benefits. To be precise, Alabamians filed
nearly 1.5 million such applications with the Department
between April 2020 and March 2022, far above the 737
applications that had been filed in May 2019, before the onset
of COVID-19. Unsurprisingly, the Department struggled to
6
SC-2022-0897
Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75, 76 (1972) (remanding the case "to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to determine
whether th[e] case ha[d] become moot"); Crosby v. Seminole Landing
Prop. Owners Ass'n, 265 So. 3d 266, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (remanding
the case "to the trial court with instructions for it to determine whether
[the issue on appeal] is moot"). Due return shall be made to this Court
within 42 days of the date of this opinion.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, and McCool,
JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
process the additional million-plus applications in a timely
fashion. The plaintiffs … are among the many individuals
who experienced delays in the handling of their applications.
Early last year, they brought this lawsuit in the Montgomery
Circuit Court in an effort to jumpstart the administrative-
approval process."
Johnson, 387 So. 3d at 140.
Considering the unprecedented circumstances that gave rise to this
case, even if the circuit court determines that the case is moot, we cannot
conclude that the plaintiffs have shown that this case falls within the
proffered exception. Therefore, a remand is necessary for a
determination of the issue of mootness.
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SC-2022-0897
Wise, J., recuses herself.
8
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