Charles Paul Jacobson v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CHARLES PAUL JACOBSON,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
,
Court of Appeals No. A-14355
Trial Court No. 3AN-20-04331 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
(Amended on Rehearing
(Sept. 30, 2026))
No. 0493 — August 19, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Catherine M. Easter, Judge.
Appearances: Doug Miller, Law Office of Douglas S. Miller,
Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy,
for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R.
Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
Judges.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Charles Paul Jacobson pleaded guilty to one
count of attempted second-degree sexual assault.1 In exchange, the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges in this case as well as all the charges in a separate
criminal case.2 The parties agreed that Jacobson would be sentenced to 20 years with
1 Former AS 11.41.420(a)(1) (2020) & AS 11.31.100(a).
2 According to the superior court’s order denying Jacobson’s motion to withdraw his
uilty plea, the dismissed charges included two counts of first-degree sexual assault, one	g

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5 years suspended (15 years to serve) and 10 years of probation. Jacobson would also
be statutorily required to register as a sex offender for a term ending 15 years following
his unconditional discharge from probation.3
After Jacobson changed his plea, but before his sentence was imposed,
Jacobson’s trial attorney told the superior court that Jacobson wanted to withdraw his
plea because Jacobson believed that the trial attorney had provided ineffective
representation. The superior court appointed conflict counsel for Jacobson.
Conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw Jacobson’s guilty plea, which
was supported by affidavits from Jacobson and his trial attorney. Conflict counsel
argued that there was a fair and just reason for Jacobson to withdraw his plea because
Jacobson had a good-faith but mistaken understanding of the terms of the plea
agreement, including that Jacobson did not understand that his duty to register as a sex
offender would continue until 15 years after his release from probation.4 Conflict
counsel also argued that Jacobson felt coerced and manipulated into entering into the
plea agreement and that Jacobson was distrustful of his trial attorney because there had
been a breakdown in their attorney-client relationship.
The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on Jacobson’s motion to
count of felony driving under the influence, one count of felony refusal of a chemical test,
one count of first-degree vehicle theft, one count of third-degree assault, two counts of
first-degree witness tampering, one count of third-degree escape, one count of fourth-
degree assault, one count of misdemeanor driving under the influence, one count of driving
with license suspended, two counts of first-degree unlawful contact, and three counts of
violating conditions of release.
3 AS 12.63.010(a); AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B).
4 See Alaska R. Crim. P. 11(h)(2) (“Before sentencing, the trial court shall allow a
defendant to withdraw a plea whenever the defendant, upon timely motion, proves that
withdrawal is necessary to correct manifest injustice. Absent a showing that withdrawal is
necessary to correct manifest injustice, the trial court may in its discretion allow the
defendant to withdraw a plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been
substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”).

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withdraw his plea at which both Jacobson and his trial attorney testified. The superior
court found that Jacobson’s plea was freely and voluntarily given at the change of plea
hearing and that “Jacobson’s statements about misunderstanding the sex offender
registration requirements [were] not credible.” The superior court also found that “no
persuasive facts were presented to support any claim of mistrust or breakdown of
communication” and that Jacobson “presented no evidence to support the claim that
[his trial attorney] ‘coerced’ or ‘pressured’ him into accepting the deal beyond
conclusory statements.” The superior court denied Jacobson’s motion to withdraw his
plea, finding that this was “a case where Jacobson took a deal on the eve of trial, and
simply changed his mind after the fact in an effort to manipulate the system.”5
On appeal, Jacobson does not challenge the superior court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his plea. Indeed, Jacobson acknowledges on appeal that the superior
court “understood the facts and the law as to the claim as brought, and ruled correctly
on it.” Instead, Jacobson now argues that his conflict counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel in litigating the motion to withdraw Jacobson’s plea —
specifically, by allegedly failing to claim in the motion that Jacobson’s trial attorney
had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Jacobson further argues that the superior
court should have sua sponte investigated whether conflict counsel’s representation was
ineffective. The record is insufficient to support either claim.
First, although Jacobson complains on appeal that conflict counsel did not
litigate a free-standing claim of ineffective assistance by Jacobson’s trial attorney, the
5 See McClain v. State, 742 P.2d 269, 271 (Alaska App. 1987) (“The defendant’s
reason for seeking [plea] withdrawal must be evaluated against the delay preceding the
request, the extent of prejudice to the prosecution, and the likelihood that the defendant is
attempting to manipulate the system to obtain an unfair advantage.”); see also Ningealook
v. State, 691 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Alaska App. 1984) (“Based on the finding that Ningealook
fully understood his no contest plea and the finding that Ningealook entered that plea to
manipulate the system, the trial judge could conclude that Ningealook did not establish a
fair and just reason for withdrawing his no contest plea.”).

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reality is that the motion to withdraw his plea specifically alleged that the trial attorney
provided Jacobson with erroneous advice and that there was a breakdown in Jacobson’s
relationship with his trial attorney during the time leading up to and including the entry
of Jacobson’s plea. Furthermore, conflict counsel explained in his pleading that,
because he was filing the motion under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h)(2),
the superior court could allow Jacobson to withdraw his plea under the “any fair and
just reason” standard. Thus, even if the superior court was not explicitly asked to
consider whether the trial attorney’s representation of Jacobson was ineffective
(i.e., whether the trial attorney’s representation fell below the standard a minimally
competent criminal defense attorney would provide and prejudiced Jacobson by causing
him to enter a guilty plea), the court could nevertheless allow Jacobson to withdraw his
plea if it determined that Jacobson subjectively did not understand the potential
consequences of the plea.6
And when the superior court issued its order, it specifically considered
whether there was any evidence that the trial attorney had coerced or pressured
Jacobson into taking the deal, and it found none. The court also addressed and rejected
Jacobson’s claim that his trial attorney did not show him evidence, apparently accepting
the trial attorney’s assertion that he brought the discovery with him when he visited
Jacobson in jail and noting that Jacobson had admitted that he chose not to keep the
discovery with him at the jail. 7
6 Cf. Harrison v. State, 860 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Alaska App. 1993) (holding that, “even
in the absence of a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, the superior court had
broad discretion to find a ‘fair and just reason’ to allow withdrawal” of the plea if it
accepted defendant’s contention that he was “confused” about the legal strategies available
to him).
7 The court also considered whether there was a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship and determined that there was none.

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Second, as we have previously explained, ineffective assistance of counsel
claims should generally be raised in the superior court through either a motion for a
new trial or an application for post-conviction relief so that the appropriate record can
be developed.8 Although Jacobson raised specific complaints about his trial attorney
during the litigation on his motion to withdraw his plea, he did not sufficiently develop
a record regarding his conflict counsel’s alleged incompetence. Accordingly, we decline
to review Jacobson’s claim of ineffective assistance of conflict counsel for the first time
on direct appeal.9
Lastly, we conclude that the record in this case did not provide a basis for
the superior court to sua sponte investigate conflict counsel’s effectiveness in
representing Jacobson.10 When Jacobson requested to withdraw his plea, the superior
court appointed conflict counsel to investigate this request and to file an appropriate
motion. Conflict counsel then filed a motion asserting that Jacobson had a mistaken
understanding of the terms of the plea agreement, felt coerced and manipulated into
taking the plea agreement, and had a breakdown in his relationship with his trial
attorney. This motion was supported by affidavits from the trial attorney and Jacobson.
The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw and conflict
counsel presented the testimony of both Jacobson and his trial attorney. Based on this
record, there was no reason for the superior court to independently investigate the
effectiveness of conflict counsel’s representation of Jacobson.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.
8 Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Alaska App. 1984).
9 See id.
10 See In re K.B., 551 P.3d 1141, 1145-46 (Alaska 2024) (holding that trial courts must
inquire when the defendant “asks for new counsel and the apparent grounds for the request
are credible” but advising caution during such an inquiry).