Emmanuel Hawley v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
EMMANUEL R. HAWLEY,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14378
Trial Court No. 2KB-18-00422 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0495 — August 26, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District,
Kotzebue, Paul A. Roetman and Gregory A. Miller, Judges.
Appearances: Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender,
and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Cori M. Mills,
Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Beach and Haines, Judges.
Emmanuel R. Hawley was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count
of second-degree sexual assault.1
On appeal, Hawley argues that his case should have been dismissed prior
to trial based on a violation of Alaska Criminal Rule 45. The parties have filed a joint
motion for limited summary disposition under Alaska Appellate Rule 214. In the joint
1 AS 11.41.420(a)(3).

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motion, the State concedes that the superior court violated Criminal Rule 45 and that
Hawley’s conviction must therefore be vacated. We have reviewed the record, and we
conclude that the State’s concession is well-founded.2
Rule 45 requires that a defendant be brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of service of the charging document, subject to certain periods excluded by
rule.3 Failure to bring a defendant to trial within this time, as extended by certain
prescribed excluded periods, requires dismissal of the defendant’s case with prejudice.4
One such excluded period “result[s] from an adjournment or continuance granted at the
timely request or with the consent of the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.”5 In
Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, this Court held that “the plain
language of Rule 45(d)(2) is clear: the rule explicitly requires the consent of both a
defendant and their counsel.”6 The Court made clear that, as a general matter, no
express personal waiver by the defendant is required when a defendant’s counsel
requests a continuance.7 “Rather, in the absence of any indication otherwise, courts may
presume that defense counsel has spoken with their client and that their client consents
to the continuance.”8 However, a court may not toll the speedy trial clock under
2 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (holding that an appellate
court must independently assess whether the State’s concession of error in a criminal case
is well-founded).
3 Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(b)-(d).
4 Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(g).
5 Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(d)(2).
6 Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Ct., 530 P.3d 604, 611 (Alaska App. 2023).
7 Id. at 607.
8 Id.

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Rule 45(d)(2) over the defendant’s personal objection.9 Therefore, “once a defendant
brings an objection to the trial court’s attention, the Rule 45 clock resumes running”
(unless there are other grounds under the rule to exclude time).10
Here, the State agrees that Hawley clearly objected to his lawyer’s request
for a continuance at a March 1, 2023 hearing.11 But the superior court nevertheless
tolled the speedy trial clock under Rule 45(d)(2), despite Hawley’s personal objection.
Hawley subsequently filed two pro se motions to dismiss his case based on a violation
of Rule 45. Both motions were rejected for filing because Hawley was represented.
Hawley also renewed his speedy trial claims in two representation hearings shortly
before trial.
Although the State takes no position on the date of Hawley’s first
objection to continuance, the State agrees that the Rule 45 speedy trial clock had fully
run before Hawley went to trial and that the superior court should therefore have
dismissed Hawley’s case with prejudice under Rule 45(g). We agree that this
concession is well-founded.12 We accordingly vacate Hawley’s conviction.
The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED and Hawley’s
conviction is VACATED.
9 Id. at 610.
10 Id.
11 The State takes no position on whether Hawley’s statements in earlier hearings
qualified as objections to the tolling of Rule 45.
12 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972).