ECLI:EU:C:2026:846•Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 October 2026.#European Institute for Innovation through Health Data v Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking.#Appeal – Order for interim relief – Arbitration clause – Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ‘Horizon 2020’ – Grant agreements – Final audit report – Eligibility of personnel costs – Application for a suspension of execution – Lack of urgency – No right to reply – No hearing convened – Rights of the defence.#Case C-676/26 P(R).
Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 October 2026.#European Institute for Innovation through Health Data v Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking.#Appeal – Order for interim relief – Arbitration clause – Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ‘Horizon 2020’ – Grant agreements – Final audit report – Eligibility of personnel costs – Application for a suspension of execution – Lack of urgency – No right to reply – No hearing convened – Rights of the defence.#Case C-676/26 P(R).
ECLI:EU:C:2026:846Eu Presid Vice C8 ott 2026
Testo completo
ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
8 October 2026 (*)
( Appeal – Order for interim relief – Arbitration clause – Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ‘Horizon 2020’ – Grant agreements – Final audit report – Eligibility of personnel costs – Application for a suspension of execution – Lack of urgency – No right to reply – No hearing convened – Rights of the defence )
In Case C‑676/26 P(R),
APPEAL pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 17 June 2026,
European Institute for Innovation through Health Data, established in Oosterzele (Belgium), represented by P. Lefebvre and T. O’Kelly, advocaten,
appellant,
the other party to the proceedings being:
Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, represented by P.-E. Partsch and B. ten Seldam, avocats,
defendant at first instance,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,
after hearing the Advocate General, M. Szpunar,
makes the following
Order
1 By its appeal, the European Institute for Innovation through Health Data seeks to have set aside the order of the President of the General Court of the European Union of 17 April 2026, European Institute for Innovation through Health Data v Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking (T‑85/26 R, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2026:273), by which the President of the General Court rejected its action under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking suspension of the execution and ‘enforcement’ of the final audit report of 12 September 2025 (‘the final audit report’) relating to the projects financed by the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking (‘the IHI Joint Undertaking’), namely Projects ‘821520 – ConcePTION’, ‘853966 – EU-PEARL’, and ‘945345 – H2O’, carried out in connection with Grant Agreement Number 821520 – ConcePTION of 6 May 2019, Grant Agreement Number 853966 – EU-PEARL of 27 November 2019, and Grant Agreement Number 945345 – H2O of 30 September 2020, respectively (‘the grant agreements at issue’).
Background to the dispute
2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 13 of the order under appeal. It may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows.
3 The appellant is an international non-profit organisation, founded in Belgium on 28 April 2015. It was involved, as a beneficiary, in the grant agreements at issue, under the framework programme for research and innovation ‘Horizon 2020’.
4 The IHI Joint Undertaking is a body of the European Union established by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 (OJ 2021 L 427, p. 17).
5 The grant agreements at issue were the subject of an ex post audit which was managed by the audit service of the European Commission and concerned, inter alia, the eligibility of the personnel costs declared in those agreements. The final audit report found that there were ‘ineligible costs declared under personnel costs category’, since the contracts with in-house consultants had been concluded not with natural persons, but with one-person companies owned by those natural persons. However, according to the annotations to Article 6.2.A.2 of each of those agreements, such contracts could not be concluded with a third-party legal entity.
6 On 15 October 2025, the IHI Joint Undertaking, in connection with the recovery procedure for Project Number 853966 – EU-PEARL, informed the appellant of its intention to recover the sum of EUR 330 835.91.
7 By email of 17 December 2025, the IHI Joint Undertaking, inter alia, confirmed that the implementation of the results of the audit could not be suspended.
The action before the General Court and the order under appeal
8 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 February 2026, the appellant brought an action under Article 272 TFEU seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the grant agreements at issue are to be interpreted and applied in such a way that the personnel costs concerned constitute eligible costs under those agreements.
9 By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 February 2026, the appellant made an application for interim relief, in which it claimed that the President of the General Court should order the suspension of the execution and ‘enforcement’ of the final audit report.
10 On 24 February 2026, the IHI Joint Undertaking lodged its written observations on the application for interim relief (‘the written observations of 24 February 2026’) with the Registry of the General Court.
11 By letter of 3 March 2026, the appellant applied to the General Court seeking the opportunity to reply to the written observations of 24 February 2026, present comments on the orders of the General Court cited in those observations, and produce evidence. On 5 March 2026, it was informed that the President of the General Court had decided not to include that letter in the case file, since that type of measure was not provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
12 On 9 March 2026, the appellant made a request, under Article 106 and Article 157(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that the parties be allowed to make oral observations. In particular, in its view, convening a hearing was necessary to allow it to comment on the written observations of 24 February 2026. On 9 March 2026, it was informed that the President of the General Court had decided not to include that request in the case file, since that type of measure was not provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
13 By the order under appeal, the President of the General Court dismissed the appellant’s application for interim relief, on the ground that it had failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency was satisfied.
14 In the first place, in paragraphs 27 to 32 of that order, he rejected the appellant’s arguments relating to the likelihood of pecuniary damage.
15 In the second place, in paragraphs 33 to 36 of that order, he rejected the appellant’s arguments relating to the likelihood of it suffering harm consisting in damage to its reputation.
Forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal
16 The European Institute for Innovation through Health Data claims that the Court of Justice should:
– set aside the order under appeal;
– suspend the execution of the final audit report pending the outcome of the proceedings brought before the General Court in Case T‑85/26; and
– order the IHI Joint Undertaking to pay the costs of the present proceedings.
17 The IHI Joint Undertaking contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the appeal; and
– order the appellant to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by IHI Joint Undertaking in the present proceedings.
The appeal
18 The appellant raises, in essence, one ground in support of its appeal, alleging infringement of its rights of defence.
Arguments
19 By its single ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the order under appeal is vitiated by an error of law since its rights of defence were not respected in the interlocutory proceedings before the President of the General Court.
20 According to the appellant, the rejection, by the President of the General Court, of its requests, first, to reply to the written observations of 24 February 2026 and, secondly, to have a hearing convened, infringes its rights of defence, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. Raising the need to ensure the adversarial nature of the proceedings, the appellant submits that it wished to respond to those observations given the sudden change of position adopted by the IHI Joint Undertaking following the exchanges between the two parties before the application for interim relief was lodged on 9 February 2026.
21 The IHI Joint Undertaking contends that the appellant’s arguments must be rejected as unfounded.
Assessment
22 It should be recalled, in the first place, that, under the first paragraph of Article 39 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, the President may, ‘by way of summary procedure, which may, in so far as necessary, differ from some of the rules contained in this Statute and which shall be laid down in the Rules of Procedure, adjudicate upon applications to suspend execution, as provided for in Article 278 [TFEU]’.
23 In that context, Article 157(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court authorises the President of the General Court to prescribe a short time limit within which the opposite party is to submit written or oral observations. Furthermore, Article 157(2) of those rules of procedure provides that the President of the General Court may grant an application for interim relief or other interim measures made by a party even before the observations of the opposite party have been submitted.
24 It is apparent from those provisions that the judge hearing the application for interim measures is empowered to rule without first hearing the parties in their oral observations, and, a fortiori, without taking account of the written pleadings or evidence submitted on the initiative of the parties after the written procedure or a possible hearing (order of the President of the Court of 30 April 2010, Ziegler v Commission, C‑113/09 P(R), EU:C:2010:242, paragraph 29, and order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 December 2020, Price v Council, C‑298/20 P(R), EU:C:2020:1006, paragraph 26).
25 More specifically, as regards, first, whether the appellant had the right to reply to the written observations of 24 February 2026, it must be noted that the Rules of Procedure of the General Court do not contain any provision, pertaining to interlocutory proceedings, on the possibility of the parties submitting written pleadings or evidence after the written part of the procedure has been closed. It is for the President of the General Court to ascertain the necessity of admitting written observations and supplementary evidence after the written part of the procedure has been closed. The President must, in that regard, enjoy broad discretion (order of the President of the Court of 30 April 2010, Ziegler v Commission, C‑113/09 P(R), EU:C:2010:242, paragraph 30 and order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 December 2020, Price v Council, C‑298/20 P(R), EU:C:2020:1006, paragraph 27).
26 It has already been held that the submission of a reply on the initiative of a party after the written procedure in interlocutory proceedings is a measure not provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 December 2020, Price v Council, C‑298/20 P(R), EU:C:2020:1006, paragraph 28).
27 As regards, secondly, convening a hearing in relation to an application for interim relief, it is for the President of the General Court to ascertain the necessity of holding such a hearing and to hear the parties’ oral submissions. In that regard, the President must enjoy broad discretion (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of 24 March 2009, Cheminova and Others v Commission, C‑60/08 P(R), EU:C:2009:181, paragraph 81; order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 57, and order of the Vice-President of the Court of 1 December 2021, Inivos and Inivos v Commission, C‑471/21 P(R), EU:C:2021:984, paragraph 45).
28 In the second place, the principle that the parties should be heard forms part of the rights of the defence. It applies to any procedure which may result in a decision by an EU institution perceptibly affecting a person’s interests. The EU Courts ensure that the principle that the parties should be heard is observed in proceedings before them and that they themselves observe that principle (judgment of 2 December 2009, Commission v Ireland and Others, C‑89/08 P, EU:C:2009:742, paragraphs 50 and 51, and order of the Judge hearing the application for interim measures of 22 November 2018, Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission, C‑334/18 P(R), EU:C:2018:952, paragraph 47).
29 In interlocutory proceedings, Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court cannot be understood as authorising, as a general rule, the President of the General Court to give judgment without observing the principle that the parties should be heard. That provision provides only for a derogation procedure allowing the President of the General Court to adopt interim measures as a precautionary measure, pending the decision which must be made on the application for interim measures at the end of the inter partes proceedings required by Article 157(1) of those rules of procedure (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of 27 March 2024, Commission v Amazon Services Europe, C‑639/23 P(R), EU:C:2024:277, paragraph 41).
30 In the light of the speed which, by its nature, characterises interlocutory proceedings, the judge hearing an application for interim measures is not required to hear systematically the party making the application on all the information provided by the other party which that judge intends to take into consideration in order to rule on the application for interim measures (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 1 December 2021, Inivos and Inivos v Commission, C‑471/21 P(R), EU:C:2021:984, paragraph 47). That solution results from the absence of a rule providing for the submission, in principle, of a reply and a rejoinder in proceedings for interim relief (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 27 March 2024, Commission v Amazon Services Europe, C‑639/23 P(R), EU:C:2024:277, paragraph 46).
31 In addition, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, neither the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, nor Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, requires that a hearing be convened in all proceedings (order of 7 June 2018, Gaki v Europol, C‑671/17 P, EU:C:2018:416, paragraph 18).
32 However, the principle that the parties should be heard grants each party to proceedings, irrespective of its legal status, inter alia, the right to be apprised of the documents produced and observations made to the Court by the other party and to discuss them. In order to satisfy the requirements relating to the right to a fair hearing, it is important for the parties to be apprised of, and to be able to debate and be heard on, the matters of fact and of law which will determine the outcome of the proceedings (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 27 March 2024, Commission v Amazon Services Europe, C‑639/23 P(R), EU:C:2024:277, paragraph 42).
33 Moreover, it is also clear from settled case-law that an infringement of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, results in the annulment of the decision taken at the end of a procedure only if, had it not been for such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (order of 14 April 2016, Dalli v Commission, C‑394/15 P, EU:C:2016:262, paragraph 41, and judgment of 9 November 2023, XC v Commission, C‑527/21 P, EU:C:2023:850, paragraph 64).
34 In the present case, it must be found, first, that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 24 to 27 above, the President of the General Court was not required to grant the appellant either the right to submit a reply or the right to call for a hearing to be convened. Accordingly, the fact that the appellant did not have the opportunity to reply to the written observations of 24 February 2026 cannot be regarded as an infringement of the rights of the defence.
35 Secondly, it is apparent from paragraphs 30 to 37 of the order under appeal that the President of the General Court found that the condition relating to urgency was not satisfied since the appellant had failed to produce any evidence capable of demonstrating the risk of serious and irreversible harm. On that last point, the appellant has not put forward any matter of fact or of law which might determine the outcome of the proceedings and on which the parties have not been able to debate and be heard.
36 In any event, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that any comment made by the appellant on the written observations of 24 February 2026 would be capable of leading the President of the General Court to consider that, contrary to what he found in the order under appeal, the condition relating to urgency was satisfied.
37 The single ground of appeal raised by the appellant, alleging infringement of its rights of defence, must therefore be rejected.
38 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed.
Costs
39 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.
40 Pursuant to Article 138(1) of those rules, which is applicable to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
41 Since the IHI Joint Undertaking has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful in its single ground of appeal, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. European Institute for Innovation through Health Data shall pay the costs.
Luxembourg, 8 October 2026.
|
V. Di Bucci |
T. von Danwitz |
|
Registrar |
Vice-President |
* Language of the case: English.
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