Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 July 2026.#Robert Wandert Jagtenberg v European Commission.#Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Obligation for non-privileged parties to be represented before the Courts of the European Union – Third and seventh paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statue of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Prohibition on ‘self-representation’ – University teacher – Right of audience – Proof – Appeal clearly inadmissible.#Case C-876/25 P.

ORDER OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber)

15 July 2026 (*)

( Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Obligation for non-privileged parties to be represented before the Courts of the European Union – Third and seventh paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statue of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Prohibition on ‘self-representation’ – University teacher – Right of audience – Proof – Appeal clearly inadmissible )

In Case C‑876/25 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 29 December 2025,

Robert Wandert Jagtenberg, residing in Rotterdam (Netherlands),

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

European Commission,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of I. Ziemele, President of the Chamber, A. Kumin and M. Bošnjak (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

Order

1        By his appeal, Mr Robert Wandert Jagtenberg seeks to have set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 31 October 2025, Jagtenberg v Commission (T‑319/25, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:1012), by which the General Court dismissed, in part as having been brought before a court manifestly lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine it, in part as manifestly inadmissible, and in part as manifestly lacking any foundation in law, his action for a finding by the General Court that the European Commission had unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 seeking the interpretation of a number of provisions of EU law (‘the letter of 28 January 2025’).

 Legal context

2        The first to third and the seventh paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union state:

‘The Member States and the institutions of the Union shall be represented before the Court of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer.

The States, other than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and also the EFTA Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in same manner.

Other parties must be represented by a lawyer.

…

University teachers being nationals of a Member State whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the Court as are accorded by this Article to lawyers.’

3        Title IV of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, entitled ‘Direct actions’, includes Article 119, paragraph 1 of which provides:

‘A party may be represented only by his agent or lawyer.’

4        Title V of the Rules of Procedure, entitled ‘Appeals against decisions of the General Court’, consists of Articles 167 to 190 of those rules.

5        Article 168(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides:

‘Articles 119 … of these Rules shall apply to appeals.’

6        Article 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure states:

‘A party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings may at any time apply for legal aid.’

 Background to the dispute

7        The General Court set out the background to the dispute in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the order under appeal as follows:

‘2      On 28 January 2025, [Mr Jagtenberg] sent a letter to the Commission, in which he claimed that Article 5.2 of the Wet Inkomstenbelasting 2001 (Law on income tax of 2001) of 11 May 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 215), as amended, infringed a number of provisions of EU law … [He], in essence, requested that the Commission confirm or contest his interpretation of the provisions of EU law at issue.

3      On 12 March 2025, the Commission replied to that letter, stating, in essence, that it did not see any immediate grounds to open an infringement procedure and that it was unclear how the national provision relied on by [Mr Jagtenberg] was incompatible with EU law.’

 The procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal

8        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 May 2025, Mr Jagtenberg brought an action under Article 265 TFEU claiming, primarily, that the General Court should declare a failure to act by the Commission in that it unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 and that it should order the Commission to define a position on that letter; in the alternative, he sought to have the case referred to the Court of Justice so that it could be treated as a request for a preliminary ruling.

9        By the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action.

10      In the first place, the General Court, in paragraph 8 of that order, rejected the first head of claim relating to the Commission’s alleged failure to act as manifestly inadmissible, finding that, having regard to the contents of the reply which it had sent to Mr Jagtenberg, the Commission had in fact defined a position on the letter of 28 January 2025. In addition, in paragraph 10 of the order, the General Court observed that, in any event, an action for a declaration that the Commission, in refusing to initiate an infringement procedure, has failed to act, in breach of the FEU Treaty, is inadmissible.

11      In the second place, in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, the General Court rejected the head of claim, on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, relating to the issuing of an order with regard to the Commission and to clarification of the scope of certain provisions of EU law.

12      In that respect, in paragraph 14 of that order, the General Court observed that, in the context of an action for failure to act based on Article 265 TFEU, it is not entitled either to issue directions to the EU institutions or to rule whether the conduct of a Member State is compatible with the Treaties.

13      In the third place, the General Court, in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, also rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law the head of claim raised in the alternative, by which Mr Jagtenberg had requested that the case be treated as a reference for a preliminary ruling and that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it be referred to the Court of Justice.

14      The General Court held, in paragraph 17 of that order, that the action brought before it had to be regarded as an action for failure to act under Article 256 TFEU and that, consequently, it fell within its exclusive jurisdiction. It also observed that, in any event, under Article 267 TFEU it is only the courts or tribunals of the Member States that are empowered to make requests for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice.

15      Lastly, in paragraph 19 of that order, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety, stating that ‘it is not necessary to rule on the question of whether the applicant is validly represented in the proceedings by a professor, that is to say, whether the latter person satisfies the conditions laid down in the seventh paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union’.

 The form of order sought by the appellant and the procedure before the Court of Justice

16      By his appeal, Mr Jagtenberg claims that the Court of Justice should:

–        set aside the order under appeal;

–        dispose of the dispute and find:

–        that Article 265 TFEU must be interpreted as allowing the appellant to bring proceedings first before the Commission and then before the Court in order to obtain an authoritative interpretation on the hitherto unclarified aspects of EU law that are relevant, both to EU-wide uniformity and to his action at national level, since the national supreme court has failed to make a request itself to the Court for a preliminary ruling,

–        that he may act for himself, without being represented, in proceedings based on Article 265 TFEU since he enjoyed that right before the national courts and has demonstrated a sufficient knowledge of EU law so as to be capable of defending his own interests,

–        in the alternative, that the seventh paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that university law professors from all EU Member States have a right of audience before the Court, provided they are sufficiently qualified in the domain of EU law,

–        that EU law, in particular Article 131 TFEU and Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted in the manner indicated in the appeal;

–        order each party to bear its own costs.

17      By document of 26 January 2026, the Registry of the Court of Justice informed Mr Jagtenberg that the provisions of the third and seventh paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union required him to be represented before the Courts of the European Union by a lawyer or, as the case may be, by a university teacher who is a national of a Member State whose law accords him or her a right of audience. He was requested to produce, within a specified period, any evidence capable of establishing that the law of the Netherlands ‘accords’ Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, ‘a right of audience’ within the meaning of the seventh paragraph of Article 19. Furthermore, he was informed that the Court of Justice was likely to examine of its own motion, in the light of the evidence which he would produce, the validity of his representation, and that he could in any event regularise his appeal within that period by appointing another person authorised to represent him.

18      Mr Jagtenberg submitted observations in that regard within the prescribed period.

 Admissibility of the appeal

19      Under Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

20      It is necessary to apply that provision in the present appeal.

21      It is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that parties other than the Member States, the institutions of the European Union, the States, other than those Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992, and also the EFTA Surveillance Authority ‘must be represented by a lawyer’. That requirement is also clear from Article 119(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeals on the basis of Article 168(2) of those rules.

22      In the present case, the appeal has been signed by Mr Jagtenberg himself and, in the alternative, by Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor.

23      Mr Jagtenberg claims that he has the right to bring proceedings himself before the Court, by analogy with the preliminary ruling procedure, in which individuals may submit written observations in their own name. He also maintains that Ms de Roo is entitled, like any Netherlands citizen, to bring proceedings before the Netherlands courts. He argues that limiting the right of representation to professors who are nationals of certain Member States would be discriminatory. He adds that he has been unable to obtain representation by a lawyer, in particular because of the cost of such representation.

24      In the first place, it is clear from the provisions referred to in paragraph 21 above that natural persons cannot bring an appeal before the Court of Justice without being represented by a person authorised for that purpose. In the absence of any derogation provided for in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or the Rules of Procedure, the appellant’s signature by itself is not capable of satisfying that requirement (see, to that effect, order of 11 November 2024, Papasotiriou v Council and Commission, C‑344/24 P, EU:C:2024:949, paragraphs 19 and 20, and judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited).

25      Mr Jagtenberg cannot rely to any effect, in that regard, on the rules applicable to the preliminary ruling procedure.

26      That procedure, which is intended to ensure that EU law is interpreted uniformly, institutes direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties to the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 2010, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, C‑137/08, EU:C:2010:659, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia, C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22). It therefore cannot be equated with an appeal, which is a legal remedy brought on the initiative of a party against a judicial decision.

27      The fact that parties to the main proceedings may, in some circumstances, submit written observations in a preliminary ruling procedure without the involvement of a lawyer thus has no bearing on the obligation to be represented that is applicable to the present appeal.

28      Nor is it possible to accept the argument based on the cost of being represented by a lawyer. In fact, Article 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure permits any party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings to apply at any time for legal aid.

29      In the second place, under the seventh paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘university teachers being nationals of a Member State whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the Court as are accorded by this Article to lawyers.’ It follows from that provision that according a right of audience before the Court to a university teacher who is a national of a Member State is subject to the condition that that right is conferred on him or her by the law of that Member State. The meaning and scope of that condition must thus be interpreted by reference to the national law concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA, C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 41).

30      The seventh paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union merely gives due effect to the choices made by national laws as to the persons entitled to plead before the national courts. By according university teachers the same rights as those granted to lawyers, for the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute, the seventh paragraph of that article allows account to be taken of the fact that, in a number of Member States, some categories of university teacher may be granted, in accordance with specific requirements laid down to that end by national law, the right to represent parties before national courts.

31      However, in the present case, Mr Jagtenberg, when asked by the Court to adduce any evidence capable of establishing that Netherlands law accords Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, a right of audience before the Netherlands courts, for the purposes of the seventh paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, has not produced any evidence to that effect. The mere assertion, moreover wholly unsubstantiated, that any Netherlands national is permitted to represent himself or herself before the Netherlands administrative courts is, in any event, ineffective under that provision. It does not make it possible to establish that Ms de Roo is authorised on that basis to represent a third party before the Netherlands courts.

32      It is also apparent from the procedural documents before the Court, referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 above, that Mr Jagtenberg was informed that his appeal could be declared inadmissible on account of the irregular nature of his being represented by Ms de Roo, that he was given time to produce the relevant evidence or to regularise his appeal by appointing another person authorised to represent him, and that no regularisation was made within that deadline.

33      In those circumstances, Mr Jagtenberg does not have valid representation at the appeal stage. Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

 Costs

34      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

35      In the present case, since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and, therefore, before the latter could incur any costs, it is appropriate to decide that Mr Jagtenberg is to bear his own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby orders:

1.      The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

2.      Mr Robert Wandert Jagtenberg shall bear his own costs.

Luxembourg, 15 July 2026.

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*      Language of the case: English.