act-2008-0-40•Pennsylvania Act 2008-40 — JUDICIAL CODE (42 PA.C.S.) - APPEALS GENERALLY AND APPEALS FROM ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS, MAPS, ETC.
Pennsylvania Act 2008-40 — JUDICIAL CODE (42 PA.C.S.) - APPEALS GENERALLY AND APPEALS FROM ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS, MAPS, ETC.
act-2008-0-402008 Pa. Act 40Law
Act text
JUDICIAL CODE (42 PA.C.S.) - APPEALS GENERALLY AND APPEALS FROM
ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS, MAPS, ETC.
Act of Jul. 4, 2008, P.L. 325, No. 40 Cl. 42
Session of 2008
No. 2008-40
HB 1330
AN ACT
Amending Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for
appeals generally and for appeals from ordinances,
resolutions, maps, etc.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
hereby enacts as follows:
Section 1. Section 5571 of Title 42 of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes is amended to read:
§ 5571. Appeals generally.
(a) General rule.--The time for filing an appeal, a petition
for allowance of appeal, a petition for permission to appeal or
a petition for review of a quasi-judicial order, in the Supreme
Court, the Superior Court or the Commonwealth Court shall be
governed by general rules. No other provision of this subchapter
shall be applicable to matters subject to this subsection.
(b) Other courts.--Except as otherwise provided in
subsections (a) and (c) and in section 5571.1 (relating to
appeals from ordinances, resolutions, maps, etc.), an appeal
from a tribunal or other government unit to a court or from a
court to an appellate court must be commenced within 30 days
after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken, in
the case of an interlocutory or final order.
(c) Exceptions.--
(1) Election cases.--The time for appeal from an order
in any matter arising under the act of June 3, 1937
(P.L.1333, No.320), known as the "Pennsylvania Election
Code," or any other statute relating to registration or
elections shall, if such statutes provide for a lesser time
for appeal, be governed by the appropriate provision of such
statutes.
(2) Financing cases.--The time for appeal from an order
in any matter arising under the act of July 12, 1972
(P.L.781, No.185), known as the "Local Government Unit Debt
Act," or any other statute relating to the incurring of debt
by a government unit, shall if such statutes provide for a
lesser time for appeal, be governed by the appropriate
provision of such statutes.
(3) Probate matters.--The time for appeal from an order
of a register of wills under Title 20 (relating to decedents,
estates and fiduciaries) shall, if such statute provides a
greater time for appeal, be governed by the appropriate
provision of such statute.
(4) Execution matters.--The time for appeal from an
order of any system or related personnel entered in
connection with enforcement of attachments, judgments or
similar process or orders shall be governed by general rule.
[(5) Ordinances, resolutions, maps, etc.--
Notwithstanding section 909.1(a)(2) of the act of July 31,
1968 (P.L.805, No.247), known as the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code, questions relating to an
alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption of any
ordinance, resolution, map or similar action of a political
subdivision, including appeals and challenges to the validity
of land use ordinances adopted pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code, shall be raised by appeal or
challenge commenced within 30 days after the intended
effective date of the ordinance, resolution, map or similar
action. As used in this paragraph, the term "intended
effective date" means the effective date specified in the
ordinance, resolution, map or similar action or, if no
effective date is specified, the date 60 days after the date
the ordinance, resolution, map or similar action was finally
adopted but for the alleged defect in the process of
enactment or adoption.]
(6) Implied determinations.--When pursuant to law a
determination is deemed to have been made by reason of the
expiration of a specified period of time after submission of
a matter to a tribunal or other government unit or after
another prior event, any person affected may treat the
expiration of such period as equivalent to the entry of an
order for purposes of appeal and any person affected shall so
treat the expiration of the period where the person has
actual knowledge (other than knowledge of the mere lapse of
time) that an implied determination has occurred.
(d) Interlocutory appeals.--A petition for permission to
appeal from an interlocutory order must be filed within 30 days
after its entry.
(e) Action following grant of permission to appeal.--The
period limited by this section is tolled by the filing of a
petition for permission to appeal. If the petition is granted
further proceedings in the matter, including any time
limitations, shall be governed by general rules or rules of
court, and not by the provisions of subsections (b) through (d).
(f) Cross appeals.--An appellee may be permitted by general
rules or rules of court to take an appeal within the time
limited by rule from an order from which another party has taken
a timely appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the time
otherwise limited by this section has expired.
Section 2. Title 42 is amended by adding a section to read:
§ 5571.1. Appeals from ordinances, resolutions, maps, etc.
(a) Applicability; court of common pleas.--
(1) This section shall apply to any appeal raising
questions relating to an alleged defect in the process of or
procedure for enactment or adoption of any ordinance,
resolution, map or similar action of a political subdivision.
(2) An appeal pursuant to this section shall be to the
court of common pleas.
(b) Appeals of defects in statutory procedure.--
(1) Any appeal raising questions relating to an alleged
defect in statutory procedure shall be brought within 30 days
of the intended effective date of the ordinance.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (c), it is the
express intent of the General Assembly that this 30-day
limitation shall apply regardless of the ultimate validity of
the challenged ordinance.
(c) Exemption from limitation.--An appeal shall be exempt
from the time limitation in subsection (b) if the party bringing
the appeal establishes that, because of the particular nature of
the alleged defect in statutory procedure, the application of
the time limitation under subsection (b) would result in an
impermissible deprivation of constitutional rights.
(d) Presumptions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, appeals pursuant to this section shall be subject to and in
accordance with the following:
(1) An ordinance shall be presumed to be valid and to
have been enacted or adopted in strict compliance with
statutory procedure.
(2) In all cases in which an appeal filed in court more
than two years after the intended effective date of the
ordinance is allowed to proceed in accordance with subsection
(c), the political subdivision involved and residents and
landowners within the political subdivision shall be presumed
to have substantially relied upon the validity and
effectiveness of the ordinance.
(3) An ordinance shall not be found void from inception
unless the party alleging the defect in statutory procedure
meets the burden of proving the elements set forth in
subsection (e).
(e) Burden of proof.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, an ordinance shall not be found void from inception except
as follows:
(1) In the case of an appeal brought within the 30-day
time limitation of subsection (b), the party alleging the
defect must meet the burden of proving that there was a
failure to strictly comply with statutory procedure.
(2) In the case of an appeal which is exempt from the
30-day time limitation in accordance with subsection (c), the
party alleging the defect must meet the burden of proving
each of the following:
(i) That there was a failure to strictly comply with
statutory procedure.
(ii) That there was a failure to substantially
comply with statutory procedure which resulted in
insufficient notification to the public of impending
changes in or the existence of the ordinance, so that the
public would be prevented from commenting on those
changes and intervening, if necessary, or from having
knowledge of the existence of the ordinance.
(iii) That there exist facts sufficient to rebut any
presumption that may exist pursuant to subsection (d)(2)
that would, unless rebutted, result in a determination
that the ordinance is not void from inception.
(f) Void ordinances.--A determination that an ordinance is
void from inception shall not affect any previously acquired
rights of property owners who have exercised good faith reliance
on the validity of the ordinance prior to the determination.
(g) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this
subsection:
"Intended effective date." Notwithstanding the validity of
the challenged ordinance, the effective date specified in the
challenged ordinance or, if no effective date is specified, the
date 60 days after the date the ordinance would have been
finally adopted but for the alleged defect in the process of
enactment or adoption.
"Ordinance." An ordinance, resolution, map or similar action
of a political subdivision.
"Statutory procedure." The preenactment and postenactment
procedures prescribed by statute or ordinance in adopting an
ordinance.
Section 3. This act shall take effect immediately.
APPROVED--The 4th day of July, A. D. 2008.
EDWARD G. RENDELL
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.