Regina McLaughlin v. Joseph M. Cole

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
August 6, 2025
REGINA MCLAUGHLIN,
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
Petitioner Below, Petitioner INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 24-ICA-509 (Fam. Ct. Marion Cnty. Case No. FC-24-2012-D-79)

JOSEPH M. COLE,
Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Regina McLaughlin (“Mother”) appeals the Family Court of Marion
County’s November 27, 2024, Order denying her petition for contempt regarding unpaid
medical bills for one of the parties’ children. Respondent Joseph Cole (“Father”) responded
in support of the family court’s order.1 Mother filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the family court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In a prior appeal, we provided a detailed recitation of the facts surrounding the
parties’ underlying child support action. See McLaughlin v. Cole, 24-ICA-343, 2025 WL
899405 (W. Va. Ct. App. March 24, 2025) (memorandum decision) (affirming the family
court’s order finding Mother in contempt for failing to pay child support). Thus, we will
only briefly discuss the background facts of the case in this decision.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2013, and they share three children, all of whom
have now reached the age of majority. However, on February 7, 2022, prior to the children
reaching the age of majority, the family court entered an order with the following directive
addressing how the parties would split the children’s medical care costs:

Regina M. McLaughlin should pay 23% and Joseph M. Cole should pay 77%
of all medical, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical, and
pharmaceutical expenses incurred by or on behalf of the child(ren) and not
covered by insurance, including the deductible, if any, after Regina M.

1
Mother is self-represented. Father is represented by Samantha L. Koreski, Esq.
1
McLaughlin has paid the first [t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty and 00/100 ($250.00)
(per child) annually.

On August 23, 2024, Mother’s husband, Chris McLaughlin, filed a motion to
intervene, wherein he requested to be included as a party of interest in the proceedings and
that he be permitted to testify on Mother’s behalf. On August 26, 2024, the family court
entered an order denying the motion to intervene.

On August 30, 2024, Mother filed a petition for contempt against Father, alleging
that he failed to pay his share of their daughter’s medical bills, which totaled $15,844.48.
An order to show cause was entered on October 2, 2024. On October 15, 2024, Father filed
an answer to the petition for contempt, denying all allegations.

On or about October 10, 2024, the family court received a phone call from the
Administrative Office (“AO”) of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
(“SCAWV”) stating that Mother had informed them that the family court did not
accommodate her Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) accommodation request. The
family court informed the SCAWV that Mother had not requested accommodations but
that her husband had filed a motion to intervene. A week later, the family court received
another call from the SCAWV directing the family court to conduct the hearing through
Microsoft Teams to accommodate Mother. The family court informed the caller from the
SCAWV that Mother would need to file a request for a virtual hearing to allow Father the
opportunity to respond.

On or about October 22, 2024, two days before the contempt hearing, Mother filed
a letter requesting medical accommodations for the upcoming hearing. The letter stated
that “aggressive, rapid-fire, or antagonistic questioning, as well as demands for answers to
questions lacking clear context” could trigger a seizure. Mother requested a Microsoft
Teams hearing and asked that either her husband be allowed to assist during the hearing or
that the court pay for a medical advocate to assist during the hearing. Father responded
with objections.

The family court advised the parties that the hearing would be conducted through
Microsoft Teams but stated that it would favorably consider a request for continuance from
Father to allow logistical preparation for the hearing. The family court also held that
Mother’s husband was not permitted to be present for the virtual hearing.

The virtual hearing was conducted on October 24, 2024. At that hearing, Mother
asserted that she mailed Father copies of the subject medical bills. Father denied that he
ever received them. By order entered on November 27, 2024, the family court denied
Mother’s petition for contempt, finding that there was no measurable way to determine
whether Father had specific knowledge of the medical bills, and that Mother did not meet
her burden of proof. It is from the November 27, 2024, order that Mother now appeals.

2
For these matters, we apply the following standard of review:

When a final order of a family court is appealed to the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review
the findings of fact made by the family court for clear error, and the family
court’s application of law to the facts for an abuse of discretion. The
Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review questions of law de novo.

Syl. Pt. 2, Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53, 902 S.E.2d 185 (2024); accord W.
Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying standards for appellate court review of family
court orders).

On appeal, Mother raises eleven assignments of error, several of which will be
consolidated. See generally Tudor’s Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley, 229 W. Va. 396,
402, 729 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2012) (allowing consolidation of related assignments of error).

In her first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth assignments of error,
Mother asserts that the family court erred or abused its discretion when it failed to hold
Father in contempt. Specifically, Mother argues that the family court failed to address
Father’s deliberate delays, contradictory statements, misrepresentations, evasion of
accountability, and procedural misconduct. We disagree. The SCAWV has long held that
“[t]o find a person guilty of . . . contempt, it is necessary to find that he violated the order
of court intentionally, knowingly and purposefully, without justifiable excuse.” Carpenter
v. Carpenter, 227 W. Va. 214, 218, 707 S.E.2d 41, 45 (2011) (citation omitted). Here,
Father testified that he never received the medical bills from Mother, and she presented no
evidence showing otherwise. The family court correctly held that there was “no measurable
way to determine the truth” and Mother failed to prove that Father “had any specific
knowledge of [the child’s] medical bills prior to the filing of [the] [p]etition for
[c]ontempt.” Additionally, regarding Mother’s allegation that the family court failed to
address Father’s delays, contradictory statements, and misrepresentations, we find no error
by the family court. Mother’s brief primarily consists of her overall displeasure with the
proceedings below, but fails to show how the family court’s ruling was erroneous or an
abuse of its discretion. See William M. v. W. Va. Bureau of Child Support Enf’t, No. 20-
0620, 2021 WL 3833867, at *3 (W. Va. Aug. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision) (finding
alleged error by family court harmless where petitioners failed to show that they suffered
prejudice or had their substantial rights adversely affected by alleged error). Therefore, we
find no error or abuse of discretion by the family court’s decisions on these issues.

In her sixth assignment of error, Mother contends that the family court failed to
comply with procedural requirements by issuing a final order that lacked the requirements
in Rule 22(c) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court, causing undue
delays. Specifically, Mother argues that the family court erred when it delayed issuing its

3
final order until sixty-five days2 after the hearing and that the delay prevented her from
pursuing an appeal. We disagree. Rule 22(c) states as follows:

A family court final order shall contain language explicitly informing the
parties (1) that it is a final order; (2) that any party aggrieved by the final
order may take an appeal either to the intermediate court of appeals or
directly to the supreme court of appeals under West Virginia Code § 51-2A-
15; (3) that an appeal to the intermediate court of appeals may be filed by
either party within thirty days after entry of the final order; and (4) that in
order to appeal directly to the supreme court, both parties must file, either
jointly or separately within fourteen days after entry of the final order, a joint
notice of intent to appeal and waiver of right to appeal to the intermediate
court of appeals.

Here, the family court included all the language required pursuant to Rule 22(c) in
the final order. Moreover, Mother’s argument contains a material inaccuracy. The family
court held the hearing on October 24, 2024, and the final order was entered on November
27, 2024, which is thirty-four days, not sixty-five. Importantly, Mother did not present any
evidence that she was prejudiced by the family court’s slight delay in entering the final
order or explain how the delay prevented her from pursing this appeal. See William M. v.
W. Va. Bureau of Child Support Enf’t, No. 20-0620, 2021 WL 3833867, at *3 (W. Va. Aug.
27, 2021) (memorandum decision) (finding alleged error by family court harmless where
petitioners failed to show that they suffered prejudice or had their substantial rights
adversely affected by alleged error). Therefore, we find that there was no error or abuse of
discretion, and affirm the family court on this issue.

Regarding her eighth and eleventh assignments of error, Mother argues that the
family court erroneously applied inconsistent evidentiary standards by improperly shifting
the burden of proof to mother. We disagree. “[T]he general rule is that the burden of proof
rests with the complaining party to demonstrate . . . that the defendant is in noncompliance
with a court order.” Carpenter v. Carpenter, 227 W. Va. 214, 219, 707 S.E.2d 41, 46 (2011)
(per curiam). Further, the moving party must also demonstrate that his or her rights have
been prejudiced by the contemnor’s noncompliance. Id. After it has been shown that a
violation has occurred and prejudice has been suffered from the violation, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to establish any defenses. Id. Here, the burden of proof was on
Mother to show that Father was aware of the medical bills and failed to pay his portion of
them. Father testified that he never received the bills, and as stated above, Mother was
unable to prove that he received them. As such, we find no basis in law to warrant relief.

2
Mother incorrectly cited Rule 52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
in support of her contention that the order was entered untimely. The applicable rule in this
case is Rule 22(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court,
which states that all orders shall be entered by the court within twenty days of the hearing.
4
In her ninth assignment of error, Mother argues that the family court showed bias
against her by denying her reasonable ADA accommodations, despite clear documentation
of her medical conditions and need for such accommodations. We disagree. Mother
requested a virtual hearing, asked that she not be subjected to cross-examination, and asked
that her current husband be permitted to participate in the hearing. To accommodate
Mother’s requests, she was granted a virtual hearing rather than an in-person hearing.
Although the family court determined that it would be unreasonable to restrict cross-
examination and allow Mother’s husband to participate, the court advised Mother that she
could take breaks during the hearing if necessary. Mother’s mere disagreement with the
court’s weighing of evidence does not entitle her to relief on appeal. See generally Xerxes
R. v. Richard P., No. 24-ICA-76, 2024 WL 5003524 (W. Va. Ct. App. December 6, 2024)
(memorandum decision).

Accordingly, we affirm the family court’s November 27, 2024, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: August 6, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

5