Van Camp Trust v. American Transmission Company LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 7, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1725 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV1145

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

VAN CAMP TRUST, JAMES A. VAN CAMP,
AND MARLAYNE C. VAN CAMP,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V.

AMERICAN TRANSMISSION COMPANY LLC,
ATC MANAGEMENT INC., AND
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County:
DIANE SCHLIPPER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Graham, P.J., Blanchard, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP1725

¶1 PER CURIAM. James A. Van Camp, Marlayne C. Van Camp, and
the Van Camp Trust (collectively, Van Camp) appeal a money judgment entered
against them and in favor of American Transmission Company LLC, ATC
Management Inc., and Dairyland Power Cooperative (collectively, ATC),
following a jury verdict after a just compensation trial. On appeal, Van Camp
argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the jury to be informed of the effect
of the special verdict. Van Camp also argues that the court erred when it did not
allow an appraiser called by Van Camp to testify about unpublished studies that
the expert reviewed as a basis for his opinion. We reject Van Camp’s arguments
and affirm the judgment.

¶2 After ATC acquired an easement for an electric transmission line on
Van Camp’s property, Van Camp commenced this circuit court action pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 32.06(10) (2023-24)1 to appeal the just compensation award that
ATC made to Van Camp under § 32.06(6). Van Camp disputed the amount of just
compensation it received, leading to a four-day jury trial. The jury was tasked
with returning a special verdict consisting of two factual determinations: the fair
market value of the Van Camp property before the taking of the transmission line
easement, and the value of the Van Camp property after the taking, assuming
completion of the transmission line project.

¶3 Van Camp filed a pretrial motion in limine asking the circuit court to
prohibit testimony, exhibits, and jury instructions regarding the effect of the
special verdict. The court ruled on Van Camp’s motion as follows:

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2023AP1725

I would grant the motion that the jury should not be
shown or told the effect of the special verdict. But I
disagree that the term[s] just compensation or damages
does that, so I would deny the motion to exclude those
terms. Certainly -- … and you obviously all know this; but
if there’s a specific objection during trial, of course I would
hear that. And if the defendants go on and on and on about
justice demanding a certain thing that might call for an
objection[,] but [specifically regarding] the term[s] … just
compensation or damages, I am going to deny the motion
in limine to exclude those.

¶4 On appeal, Van Camp asserts that, as a result of the circuit court’s
ruling on the motion in limine, the jury heard witnesses and ATC’s counsel make
references to “just compensation” and “damages” during the trial. As an example,
Van Camp cites ATC’s counsel’s statement during closing argument that the
amount of compensation must be fair to both the landowner and “the public who’s
paying for the project.” According to Van Camp, these references caused the jury
to refocus its attention on the equitable question of what would be fair instead of
concentrating on its factfinding duty of determining the value of the property
before and after the taking. Van Camp argues that, under Besnah v. City of Fond
du Lac, 35 Wis. 2d 755, 758-59, 151 N.W.2d 725 (1967), and Zombkowski v.
Wisconsin River Power Co., 267 Wis. 77, 81, 64 N.W.2d 236 (1954), a jury
should not be informed of the effect of its answers to the questions of a special
verdict in a takings case.

¶5 In another takings case, CCH Investments LLC v. American
Transmission Co., No. 2023AP896, unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 4, 2024),
this court rejected arguments similar to the ones made here by Van Camp. 2 In

2
In their briefs, both Van Camp and ATC cite CCH Investments LLC v. American
Transmission Co., No. 2023AP896, unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 4, 2024), for its
persuasive value pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2023AP1725

CCH Investments, as in this case, the property owner filed a motion in limine
seeking to preclude testimony, exhibits, and jury instructions regarding the effect
of the special verdict in the just compensation trial. Id., ¶12. The circuit court
denied the motion and determined that references to compensation would be
permissible so long as the concept of compensation was not a major focus of the
testimony. Id., ¶15. During the trial, both sets of attorneys and appraisers
referenced the change in value to the property that resulted from the taking, and
also referred to that number as the “compensation” that would have to be paid for
the easement. Id., ¶17. On appeal, the property owner challenged the court’s
ruling on its motion in limine, stating that the ruling violated the holdings in
Zombkowski and Besnah. Id., ¶11.

¶6 In affirming the circuit court, we stated that we were “not persuaded
that the circuit court’s ruling on CCH’s motion in limine violated Zombkowski,
Besnah, or any other case.” Id., ¶23. As we explained, “Zombkowski
disapproved of a jury instruction that explained how ‘damages’ would be
calculated in a takings case, Zombkowski, 267 Wis. at 81, and Besnah prescribed
the proper form of the special verdict, Besnah, 35 Wis. 2d at 759.” CCH
Investments, No. 2023AP896, ¶24. We further explained:

[Although Zombkowski or Besnah confirm that the
general rule against informing the jury of the effect of the
special verdict applies in a just compensation case, w]e do
not read Zombkowski or Besnah as extending further to
categorically prohibit any and all reference to the term
“compensation” in a just compensation case. As our
supreme court has explained, remarks by witnesses or
attorneys are “not improper merely because an intelligent
juror might be able to infer therefrom the effect upon the
final result of [the juror’s] answers to the special verdict.”
Kobelinski v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56
Wis. 2d 504, 521, 202 N.W.2d 415 (1972).

CCH Investments, No. 2023AP896, ¶25.

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No. 2023AP1725

¶7 In the instant case, no party disputes that the form of the jury
instructions and special verdict were proper. As to references to compensation
during trial testimony and argument, Van Camp contends that such references
were more widespread in this case than in CCH Investments. However, Van
Camp does not make any persuasive argument as to why this court’s fundamental
conclusions in CCH Investments about what Zombkowski and Besnah stand for
should not be applied in this case. The circuit court enjoys broad discretion in
making evidentiary rulings, and we must affirm those rulings if the court
permissibly exercised its discretion by rationally applying the proper legal
standard to relevant facts. See, e.g., Rembalski v. John Plewa, Inc., 2023 WI App
58, ¶10, 409 Wis. 2d 647, 998 N.W.2d 523. Here, we are not persuaded that the
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it declined to exclude, by
motion in limine, all references during the trial to damages and just compensation.

¶8 We turn next to Van Camp’s argument that the circuit court erred
when it did not allow Van Camp’s appraiser to testify at trial about unpublished
studies conducted by other appraisers that the testifying appraiser reviewed to
assist him in reaching his opinion. ATC objected to the potential testimony about
unpublished studies on hearsay grounds. The court sustained the objection and
excluded the testimony. On appeal, Van Camp argues that the exclusion of the
hearsay testimony on the topic of unpublished studies that the appraiser relied on
was an erroneous exercise of discretion.

¶9 We need not reach the merits of Van Camp’s argument because we
conclude that the issue is forfeited. Van Camp did not address the matter of
excluded hearsay in a motion in limine. Accordingly, Van Camp would have
needed to raise the circuit court’s alleged error regarding that issue in a postverdict
motion in order to preserve its right to appeal the issue. See Ford Motor Co. v.

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No. 2023AP1725

Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 417, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987). Van Camp did
not do so and, therefore, the issue is forfeited. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids
Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶45, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (when an issue
was never raised in the circuit court, we generally treat the issue as having been
forfeited).

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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