Catherine F. Conway v. Douglas H. Frazer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 28, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP895 Cir. Ct. No. 2021SC11399

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

CATHERINE F. CONWAY,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

DOUGLAS H. FRAZER, ELIZABETH AELION, SCOTT BOTCHER AND KELLY
MEYER,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
J.D. WATTS, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GEENEN, J.1 Catherine F. Conway, pro se, appeals the circuit
court’s order dismissing with prejudice her claims against Douglas H. Frazer,

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP895

Elizabeth Aelion, Scott Botcher, and Kelly Meyer, members of the Village of Fox
Point (the “Village”) Board of Review. Conway also appeals various non-final
orders of the circuit court denying motions she brought during the pendency of the
case. Although Conway admits that her claims were resolved by a valid
Settlement Agreement and Release (“Release”), she alleges that the agreement
was breached when an insurance company issued the settlement check. She also
contends that her claim for statutory sanctions against Frazer, Aelion, Botcher, and
Meyer (collectively, “Board Members”) was not resolved by the Release. Because
we conclude that there was no breach of the agreement, we affirm the circuit
court’s order enforcing the Release, denying Conway’s motions, and dismissing
the case with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal arises from Conway’s challenge to the Village’s
assessment of her property. The Village’s Board of Review sustained the
assessment by a vote of four board members (i.e., the respondent Board Members)
to two, finding that Conway failed to overcome the presumption of correctness
that attaches to a municipal assessor’s valuation of property. Conway then sought
review from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (“DOR”), which issued an
order reducing the assessed value by almost $100,000.

¶3 After DOR’s reassessment, Conway contacted the Board of Review
and the Village Attorney, seeking payment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 70.503 for
losses Conway incurred due to the Board Members’ alleged violation of WIS.
STAT. § 70.502. Specifically, Conway claimed that the Board Members, by voting
to uphold the assessment, acted with intentional disregard for her rights, violating
their statutory duty described in § 70.502; she sought damages under the civil

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liability provision at § 70.503. After the Village Attorney denied the claims,
Conway filed suit in small claims court against the Board Members.

¶4 Several years of litigation followed, including an appeal and remand
to circuit court, and multiple summary judgment motions. Conway also filed
motions for reconsideration of any adverse rulings, motions to disqualify the
Board Members’ lawyers, and motions for sanctions; all were denied.

¶5 The parties were then ordered to mediate Conway’s claims. After
negotiation, discussion, and revisions to the terms, the parties reached an
agreement and executed the Release.

¶6 The Release explained that the parties’ purpose in entering that
agreement was to “[a]void the costs and burdens of protracted litigation including
an appeal,” and to “[d]ischarge all claims against [Board Members] which are the
subject of the Complaint[.]” To facilitate this goal, the Board Members would
make a settlement payment to Conway for the damages she sought, with interest.
The Release noted that Board Member Aelion, also Village Trustee, and Board
Member Botcher, the Village Manager, would not participate in deciding whether
any Village assets, including insurance contracts, would be used to make payment
to Conway. In exchange for the settlement payment, Conway agreed to
“completely release[] and discharge[] [Board Members] from the claim for
damages set forth in the Complaint. This Release is a full and final disposition of
all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and nature against the
[Board Members].” The Release specified that Conway was waiving any and all
claims and the right to recovery beyond what was specified in the Release:

The Releasing Party fully and forever releases, waives,
dismisses, surrenders and discharges the Released Parties
from any and all claims, complaints, demands, liabilities,

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grievances, rights of action and damages whatsoever in law
or equity … asserted or could have been asserted, arising
out of, based upon, or in any way connected with the
Releasing Party’s claims against the Released Parties. This
release is intended to be construed broadly and includes but
is not limited to, any and all claims under state or federal
law (common law or statutory), for compensatory and/or
punitive damages, pain and suffering, compensation or
other benefits, interest, liquidated damages, penalties, costs
and disbursements, attorney’s fees, statutory damage
awards or statutory indemnification, as well as any other
element of recovery arising out of or related to the
Releasing Party’s claims or all other damages of whatever
kind or nature … arising out of the incident above.

¶7 Conway filed a notice with the circuit court acknowledging that she
executed the Release.

¶8 A few days later, Conway received a settlement check from the
Village’s insurer, League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual Insurance
(“LWMMI”), for the agreed-upon value. After receiving the check, however,
Conway wrote “void” on the check and sent it to the Village with a letter
explaining that she believed LWMMI could not issue the settlement check to her
because neither the Village nor LWMMI was “obligated to defend or pay the
claim” against the Board Members. She also refused to stipulate to the dismissal
of the case, claiming the Board members were “jointly and severally” liable for the
settlement payment and therefore were in default. She alleged that dismissal of
her claim was improper due to conflicts of interest, and because she believed at
least some of the Board Members, as well as the Village Attorney, a non-party,
violated their duties as public officials related to her property assessment.
Conway also asserted that the Release only settled her claim under WIS. STAT.
§ 70.503, and did not affect her WIS. STAT. § 70.502 claim.

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¶9 Conway wrote to the court, raising these same issues. She asked the
court to enter judgment and impose sanctions against the Board Members
accordingly. She also asked the court to disqualify the Board Members’ counsel
due to claimed conflicts of interest, renewing a motion that the court previously
denied.

¶10 The Village moved to enforce the Release in order to dismiss the
case and Conway’s motions.

¶11 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the parties’ motions. The
record on appeal does not contain the transcript from that hearing; however the
docket entry reflects that:

Based on discussions held court finds that [WIS. STAT.
§] 807.05 does apply and ENFORCES settlement
agreement and release—release is final and binding.
Plaintiff agrees to accept receipt of check as originally
tendered, [Board Members] to re-send to Plaintiff. Parties
are release[d] from all claims, as stated on record….

Court orders matter dismissed by stipulation to settlement
agreement—Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions
as moot[.]

LMWWI reissued the settlement check to Conway, and the action was dismissed.

¶12 Conway appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶13 On appeal, Conway challenges the dismissal of her case with
prejudice and various non-final prior orders denying her motions for summary
judgment, sanctions, and to disqualify Board Members’ counsel due to claimed
conflicts of interest. While Conway primarily rehashes her allegations of
wrongdoing by the Board Members and their lawyers, the crux of the dispute on

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appeal is not those allegations, but whether Conway is entitled to maintain any of
her claims in light of the settlement agreement provisions under which she
released all claims she made in, or relating to, her complaint. Conway alleges that
she may maintain her claims because the Board Members breached the terms of
the Release since they, personally, did not advance the funds for the settlement
payment that she received. It also appears that Conway contends that important
governmental interests justify putting aside the Release in order to sanction the
Board Members, their counsel, and various non-parties under the Rules of
Professional Conduct that apply to Wisconsin lawyers and the rules of civil
procedure.

¶14 The Board Members respond that there was no breach. The Release
broadly released all of Conway’s claims arising out of her property assessment and
the subsequent challenge of that assessment. The Board Members further argue
that, because Conway admits the Release was valid, all of her claims are barred or
mooted by the specific release provisions in the agreement, including her claim for
statutory sanctions against the Board Members. We agree.

¶15 Whether a settlement agreement is binding and enforceable is a
question of law. Waite v. Easton-White Creek Lions, Inc., 2006 WI App 19, ¶5,
289 Wis. 2d 100, 709 N.W.2d 88. Resolution of the issues requires a court to
“interpret and apply WIS. STAT. § 807.05 to the facts” before it. Waite, 289
Wis. 2d 100, ¶5. Under § 807.05, an agreement is enforceable if (1) it is in writing
and (2) it is subscribed by the party to be bound, or his or her attorney. Marks v.
Gohlke, 149 Wis. 2d 750, 753, 439 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1989). If there is an
enforceable agreement, we interpret its provisions consistent with principles of
contract interpretation, and we review the circuit court’s conclusions de novo.
American Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Nersesian, 2004 WI App 215, ¶14, 277

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Wis. 2d 430, 689 N.W.2d 922 (holding that “a settlement agreement is a contract
and is governed by the traditional requirements for contracts…. Accordingly, the
interpretation of a settlement agreement is a question of law reviewed independent
of the circuit court”).

¶16 The Release is in writing and was signed by Conway and each of the
Board Members, and Conway explicitly states in her brief that she “does not
dispute that the parties’ Settlement Agreement is valid and that she accepted the
agreement. Furthermore, she acknowledges that … she received a check from
LWMMI … for the amount agreed upon by the parties.” We accept Conway’s
admission that the Release is valid and enforceable and that she received the
settlement payment, and we conclude that the circuit court correctly determined
that the Release is binding and enforceable.

¶17 We therefore turn to Conway’s claim that the Board Members
breached the terms of the Release because LWMMI and not the members,
personally, advanced the funds for the settlement payment, and that LWMMI “is
not an insurer for any of the [Board Members].” Conway’s argument is
conclusory. She asserts that LWMMI does not provide coverage for the Board
Members or the acts at issue, but identifies no support in the record nor any legal
authority that suggests LWMMI’s role in issuing payment is improper, or even
relevant. We do not consider undeveloped arguments, State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633, and we do not develop a party’s arguments, Doe 1
v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI 65, ¶35, 403 Wis. 2d 369, 976 N.W.2d
584. Although pro se litigants are granted some leniency by courts, a reviewing
court has no duty to walk pro se litigants through the procedural requirements or to
point them to the proper substantive law. Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d

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442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992). We therefore reject Conway’s argument that
Board Members breached the terms of the Release.

¶18 Conway next alleges that the circuit court erred as a matter of law
when it dismissed the case and her then-pending motions after finding that the
Release “results in the release of all claims [and] the disposition of this action and
renders this case moot[.]” To resolve this claim, we consider the parties’ intentions
as to the scope of the Release by giving contract terms their plain or ordinary
meaning. Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807.
If the contract is unambiguous, consideration of extrinsic evidence is not
warranted. Id.

¶19 The Release makes clear that the parties agreed that the Release be
construed broadly to resolve the litigation, in its entirety, and to prevent appeals,
collateral litigation, and any renewed or new claims that may arise from the same
set of facts. Accordingly, Conway is not entitled to litigate whether intentional
conduct occurred under WIS. STAT. § 70.502 for the purpose of seeking sanctions.
If Conway wanted a verdict on that claim, she was required to proceed to trial or
to summary judgment. She did not and, instead, agreed to the Release in which
she expressly agreed to release all claims against the Board Members arising out
of the property assessment dispute. Conway also agreed to release the claims that
the Board Members violated § 70.502. Conway does not explain how any claim
she made in her complaint survives the Release, which very clearly states that the
parties wished to “[d]ischarge all claims against [Respondents] which are subject
of the [c]omplaint[.]”

¶20 While Conway states that she has no authority from the State to
waive the fine described in WIS. STAT. § 70.502 and argues that the circuit court

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had a “duty to enforce” the statute, neither argument is sufficiently developed.
Conway does not identify the source of, nor provide legal support for, her claim
that the State’s involvement is required or that the circuit court has an independent
duty to sanction the Board Members in the absence of any factual determination
that sanctionable conduct occurred. We do not consider undeveloped arguments,
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 647, and therefore conclude that Conway released all of her
claims pursuant to the Release.

¶21 Because Conway released all of her claims relating to WIS. STAT.
§§ 70.502 and 70.503 under the Release, she has no basis upon which to challenge
the merits of the non-final orders she appeals. By agreeing to and executing the
Release, Conway waived the right to challenge the factual and legal errors she
raises on appeal. As a general rule, a party who receives a benefit under the terms
of a settlement is not permitted to carry on his or her warfare by an appeal that
would undermine the purpose of the settlement—here, to resolve the case without
further litigation or appeal. Wyandotte Chem. Corp. v. Royal Elec. Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 577, 656-57, 225 N.W.2d 648 (1975).

¶22 While Conway claims that the circuit court erred in finding those
various matters moot, her argument is conclusory and undeveloped. She does not
identify the standard of review or legal framework that applies to mootness and
offers no legal authority in support of her cause. Because Conway fails to

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adequately develop her argument that the circuit court’s mootness determination
was erroneous, we reject it.2

CONCLUSION

¶23 Because the Release is a valid settlement agreement and it bars
Conway from maintaining claims related to the dispute of her property assessment
that is the subject of the complaint, we conclude that the circuit court did not err
when it dismissed this case with prejudice and dismissed Conway’s motions as
moot.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

2
Conway’s various motions sought relief including 1) the disqualification of Board
Members’ counsel and 2) requiring counsel to withdraw years-old pleadings that she believes
were frivolous, despite the case’s dismissal. The case was dismissed, the matter is closed.
Resolution of the claims—other than expending judicial and party resources—would have no
effect on the outcome of this case, which was resolved by settlement. The claims are therefore
moot.

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