Chippewa County v. C. F.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 21, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1744 Cir. Ct. No. 2025TP3

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO K. S. F., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

CHIPPEWA COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

C. F.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Chippewa County:
JAMES M. ISAACSON, Judge. Reversed.
No. 2025AP1744

¶1 GILL, J.1 Cynthia appeals an order terminating her parental rights
to her son, Kevin.2 Cynthia argues that the circuit court erred by granting the
Chippewa County Department of Human Services’ (the County) motion for partial
summary judgment during the grounds portion of the termination of parental rights
(TPR) proceeding. In particular, she contends that the court’s prior order denying
her visitation with Kevin did not adequately give her notice of the conditions she
needed to meet in order to be granted visitation with Kevin.3 We agree and,
therefore, reverse the TPR order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In September 2023, the County filed a petition to adjudicate Kevin a
child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). After Cynthia pled no contest and

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

Cases appealed under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.107 are “given preference and shall be taken
in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the appellant’s
reply.” RULE 809.107(6)(e). Conflicts in this court’s calendar have resulted in a delay. It is
therefore necessary for this court to sua sponte extend the deadline for a decision in this case. See
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2)(a); Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D., 191 Wis. 2d 680, 694, 530
N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, we extend our deadline to the date this decision is
issued.
2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential matter using a
pseudonym, rather than her initials. We do the same for the child.
3
A contested TPR proceeding involves a two-step procedure. Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS
v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. The first step is a factfinding
hearing, in which a jury or circuit court determines “whether any grounds for the termination of
parental rights have been” proved. Id., ¶26 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 48.424(3)). The termination
proceedings then move to the second step, a dispositional hearing, at which the circuit court must
consider the best interests of the child in deciding whether to terminate the parent’s rights. WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(2).

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No. 2025AP1744

the circuit court held a dispositional hearing, the court granted the County’s
petition and ordered that Kevin remain in an out-of-home placement.

¶3 In January 2024, the County filed both a request to revise the
dispositional order and a memorandum in support, stating that a revision was
necessary due to Cynthia’s “erratic and unpredictable” behavior, which the County
stated had “negatively impacted [Kevin’s] wellbeing and presented as a safety
concern.” The County requested that Cynthia have no contact with Kevin’s care
providers and that Cynthia’s visitation with Kevin be suspended.

¶4 The County’s memorandum provided the factual basis for the
County’s request, including, in part, that Cynthia “ha[d] not complied” with the
following “conditions of reunification”:

1. That [Cynthia] … shall have regular, appropriate, and
consistent visits and contact with [Kevin] … per the
[County’s] Family Interaction Plan. The terms of visitation
shall be at the discretion of the [County.]

2. That [Cynthia] … shall not use or possess any
non-prescribed mood-altering chemical substances and
shall submit to a drug and alcohol screen (hair, blood,
breath, saliva, nails, breathalyzer, or urine) as directed by
the assigned case manager/social worker.

3. That [Cynthia] … shall under no circumstances interfere
with the placement of [Kevin] …. [Cynthia] … shall not
negatively influence [Kevin’s] … perception of [his]
placement. [Cynthia] … shall not discuss the CHIPS action
or visitation with [Kevin] … unless authorized by the
[County].

¶5 Cynthia waived the revision hearing, and the circuit court adopted
the County’s allegations as its own findings of fact. In January 2024, the court
granted the revision “as requested” (the “revision order”). The court’s revision
order provided “[t]hat [Cynthia] shall not have any contact with the care

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No. 2025AP1744

providers” and “[t]hat visitation between the mother, [Cynthia] and … [Kevin]
shall be suspended until further order of the [c]ourt.” The revision order also
contained a notice concerning the grounds on which parental rights may be
terminated, which stated: “A list of potential grounds to terminate your parental
rights is given below. Those that are check-marked may be most applicable to
you, although you should be aware that if any of the others also exist now or in the
future, your parental rights can be taken from you.” Of that list, the only ground
that was check-marked was continuing CHIPS. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2).

¶6 In March 2025, the County filed a petition to terminate Cynthia’s
parental rights to Kevin, alleging that grounds for TPR existed due to continuing
denial of periods of physical placement or visitation. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4).
The County then moved for partial summary judgment as to the grounds portion of
the TPR process, arguing that the fact of Cynthia’s continuing denial of periods of
physical placement or visitation was established by the circuit court’s revision
order, which had been in effect for over one year at the time the TPR petition was
filed.

¶7 Cynthia filed a motion to deny the County’s motion for partial
summary judgment. Cynthia argued that there existed genuine issues of material
fact as to (1) “the appropriateness” of the circuit court’s revision order suspending
visitation, (2) “the appropriateness of the conditions for reinstatement of
visitation,” (3) “whether [Cynthia] was properly advised of the procedure to
reinstate visitation,” (4) “whether the [c]ourt placed any responsibility for
amending or revising the suspension of visitation on the [County],” and
(5) “whether any of the [one-year] timeframe[s] associated with [WIS. STAT.
§] 48.415(4) should be excluded based on lack of counsel.”

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No. 2025AP1744

¶8 After a hearing on the motions, which included testimony from
Kevin’s social worker, the circuit court found that there had been a CHIPS order
denying Cynthia visitation with Kevin and that one year had passed since that
order was entered. The court therefore granted the County’s motion for partial
summary judgment on the grounds portion of the TPR process, thereby implicitly
denying Cynthia’s motion.

¶9 During the dispositional phase, the circuit court heard testimony
from Kevin’s foster mother, Kevin’s social worker, Cynthia’s probation agent, and
Cynthia. Thereafter, the court found that it was in Kevin’s best interests to
terminate Cynthia’s parental rights, and it entered a TPR order.

¶10 Cynthia’s appointed appellate counsel subsequently filed a no-merit
report stating that “there were no procedural defects in the proceedings,” that the
circuit court properly granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment,
and that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by terminating
Cynthia’s parental rights. (Formatting altered.) We rejected the no-merit report,
stating that there was an issue of arguable merit as to whether the court’s visitation
order provided Cynthia with the required notice of potentially applicable grounds
for TPR. We also noted that there was an issue of arguable merit due to the
visitation order not including any conditions that Cynthia was required to fulfill in
order to regain visitation with Kevin. We then converted the no-merit appeal to
this appeal on the merits.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Cynthia first argues that the circuit court erred by granting the
County’s motion for partial summary judgment during the grounds portion of the
TPR process because the revision order did not adequately set forth the conditions

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No. 2025AP1744

for reinstatement of Cynthia’s visitation rights with Kevin. Cynthia additionally
argues that the court’s dispositional order placing Kevin outside of her home did
not adequately warn her that the TPR ground ultimately sought by the County was
one of the grounds “most applicable” to her.4

¶12 We review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
“applying the same methodology as the circuit court but benefiting from the circuit
court’s analysis.” State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶36, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 734
N.W.2d 81. Partial summary judgment is available on the grounds portion of TPR
proceedings “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2); see Steven V. v. Kelley H.,
2004 WI 47, ¶35, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856.

¶13 Further, the resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret statutes,
which presents a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Stewart,
2018 WI App 41, ¶18, 383 Wis. 2d 546, 916 N.W.2d 188. “[S]tatutory
interpretation ‘begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.’ Statutory language is given its
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or
specially[]defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional

4
Because we reverse the TPR order due to the circuit court’s revision order failing to
adequately inform Cynthia of the conditions necessary to be granted visitation with Kevin, we
need not address Cynthia’s argument that the revision order failed to adequately notify her of the
TPR ground sought by the County. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d
628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (noting that we need not address all issues when the resolution of one of
those issues is dispositive).

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No. 2025AP1744

meaning.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).

¶14 The circuit court granted the County’s motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground of continuing denial of periods of physical placement or
visitation under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4). This ground requires proof of two
elements. First, “[t]hat the parent has been denied periods of physical placement
by court order in an action affecting the family or has been denied visitation under
an order under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 938.363 or
938.365 containing the notice required by [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.356(2) or
938.356(2).” Second, “[t]hat at least one year has elapsed since the order denying
periods of physical placement or visitation was issued”; and “the court has not
subsequently modified its order so as to permit periods of physical placement or
visitation.”5 Sec. 48.415(4)(a), (b).

¶15 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.356, the notice statute pertinent to this
appeal, provides,

Whenever the court … denies a parent visitation because
the child … has been adjudged to be in need of protection
or services under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.347, 48.357,
48.363, or 48.365 … the court shall orally inform the
parent … who appears in court of any grounds for
termination of parental rights under [WIS. STAT. §] 48.415
which may be applicable and of the conditions necessary
for the child or expectant mother to be returned to the home
or for the parent to be granted visitation.

Sec. 48.356(1). Section 48.356(2) further provides that “any written order which
places a child or an expectant mother outside the home or denies visitation under
5
It is undisputed that the circuit court’s revision order denying visitation between
Cynthia and Kevin was an order issued under WIS. STAT. § 48.363.

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No. 2025AP1744

sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents or expectant mother of the information
specified under sub. (1).”

¶16 Cynthia argues that the circuit court’s grant of partial summary
judgment was improper because the revision order did not contain adequate notice
of the conditions Cynthia was required to meet to reinstate visitation with Kevin.
Instead, the revision order referenced a separate document—a memorandum the
County filed in the CHIPs action in support of its request to revise Cynthia’s
visitation—that contained the conditions for resumption of visitation. Cynthia
contends that the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 48.356 does not permit a
dispositional order denying visitation to “reference another pleading the parent
received at a different time to establish the conditions for resumption of
visitation.” The County agrees that the court’s order does not itself contain the
conditions to reinstate visitation, but that the order instead incorporates the
County’s memorandum requesting a revision of the dispositional order, which it
contends contains the actual conditions required of Cynthia for reinstating her
visitations with Kevin.

¶17 The County argues that the notice requirement under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.356—namely, that a circuit court order denying visitation must inform a
parent of the conditions to be granted visitation—can be satisfied by incorporating
by reference another document that contains the case-specific conditions to
reinstate visitation. In support of this argument, the County references the
standard form for revision of dispositional orders, which the County contends
“does not contemplate the [c]ourt including a written explanation for why it is
finding that the allegations of the request are proven and adopted as findings of
fact” and “puts the reader on notice that there may be additional documents
incorporated into the order.”

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No. 2025AP1744

¶18 Assuming without deciding that the County is correct in its assertion
that a circuit court’s order for revision of a dispositional order may incorporate by
reference another document to satisfy the notice requirement under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.356(2), we conclude that the County’s revision request here still did not
provide adequate notice to Cynthia. The County’s memorandum supporting its
request to revise Cynthia’s visitation listed three conditions, which it referred to as
“the conditions for reunification.” Reunification is different from visitation.
Compare Reunification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining
“reunification” as “[a] reunion or reuniting; esp., the return of a child who has
been removed from his or her parents because of abuse or neglect by one or both
of them”), with Visitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining
“visitation” as “[a] relative’s, esp. a noncustodial parent’s, period of access to a
child.—Also termed parental access; access; parenting time; residential time”)
(formatting altered). Indeed, if the first condition provided by the County—“[t]hat
[Cynthia] … shall have regular, appropriate, and consistent visits and contact with
[Kevin]”—were a condition necessary for Cynthia to be granted visitation, it
would have been impossible for Cynthia to meet this condition.

¶19 Further, the language the County used in its memorandum is vague
and unspecific. The memorandum states that “among the conditions of
reunification that the [circuit] court ordered [in October 2023], [Cynthia] was
specifically ordered to do the following…. [Cynthia] has not complied with those
conditions.” (Emphasis added.) “Among” means “in or through the midst of:
surrounded by.” Among, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/among (last visited Jan. 16, 2026).
Stating that these three conditions were “among” the conditions of reunification
and that Cynthia failed to meet these three conditions indicates that there may

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No. 2025AP1744

have been other conditions that the County did not include. Thus, even if we
interpreted WIS. STAT. § 48.356 in accordance with the County’s arguments, the
County’s memorandum still failed to inform Cynthia of all the conditions
necessary for her to be granted visitation with Kevin.

¶20 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court’s revision order
failed to adequately inform Cynthia of the conditions necessary for her to be
granted visitation with Kevin. Therefore, the County failed to meet its burden to
prove that grounds for TPR existed due to the continuing denial of periods of
physical placement or visitation between Cynthia and Kevin, and the court erred
as a matter of law by granting the County partial summary judgment on the
grounds phase of the TPR process.

By the Court.—Order reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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