Trempealeau County v. S. K.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 4, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP645 Cir. Ct. No. 2009ME58

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF S. K.:

TREMPEALEAU COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

S. K.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Trempealeau County:
RAMONA A. GONZALEZ, Judge. Reversed.

¶1 GILL, J.1 Sharon2 appeals orders extending her involuntary
commitment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20 and allowing for the involuntary

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP645

administration of medication and treatment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g).
Sharon argues that Trempealeau County failed to prove that she is dangerous
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and (1)(am). We agree that the County failed to present
sufficient evidence of Sharon’s dangerousness to extend her involuntary
commitment and we reverse the orders.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Sharon was emergently detained in 2009 after she ran in front of a
moving vehicle and was nearly struck by it. After a final hearing, the circuit court
found that Sharon was mentally ill, dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20, and a
proper subject for treatment. The court entered orders for Sharon’s involuntary
commitment and for her involuntary medication and treatment.

¶3 Since that time, the County has annually petitioned to extend
Sharon’s involuntary commitment and for her involuntary medication and
treatment, and the circuit court has granted each petition. A hearing on the most
recent petition took place in November 2024 and is the subject of Sharon’s current
appeal.

¶4 At the hearing, Dr. Jeffrey Marcus testified that he is a
board-certified psychiatrist and that he examined Sharon in October 2024 via
videoconference. Marcus opined that Sharon suffers from a treatable mental
illness in the form of schizophrenia. Marcus stated that Sharon displayed some
minor “residual” symptoms of schizophrenia and explained that she is “well-

2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential matter using a
pseudonym, rather than her initials.

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No. 2025AP645

treated” on her current medication. Marcus explained that when Sharon is
“acutely symptomatic,” she exhibits more florid symptoms, such as hallucinations,
delusions, thought disorganization, and erratic behavior. Moreover, Marcus stated
that these symptoms have caused a potential safety risk to Sharon in the past.
Marcus clarified that the past safety risk he was referring to was the 2009 instance
of Sharon running in front of a moving vehicle.

¶5 Marcus further testified that Sharon does not recognize that she has a
mental illness and does not believe that she needs to take her medication. Marcus
explained that Sharon’s failure to recognize the fact that she has a mental illness is
the “primary reason” why an extension of Sharon’s involuntary commitment is
necessary. Marcus expressed concern that if Sharon’s involuntary commitment
were not extended, she would stop taking her medication. Marcus further stated
that there would be “substantial risks” if Sharon stopped taking her medication,
including a “decompensation of psychosis and with that an increased risk of
dangerousness.” Marcus opined that it was “highly unlikely” that Sharon would
take her medication voluntarily if her involuntary commitment were not extended.
He stated that he discussed “the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to”
medication with Sharon, but he opined that she was not capable of applying an
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication
due to her belief that she does not have a mental illness.

¶6 Marcus’s report was received into evidence over Sharon’s hearsay
objection regarding the events leading up to Sharon’s 2009 involuntary
commitment. In his report, Marcus notes that Sharon “has a history of
experiencing severe psychotic decompensation which has been relatively slow to
respond to treatment.” Marcus further explained that Sharon “would be at very
high risk of psychotic and functional decompensation if she were to withdraw

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No. 2025AP645

from her antipsychotic treatment.” Marcus also noted that if Sharon’s treatment
were withdrawn, there was a “high likelihood” of the “emergence of grossly
unsafe behavior.” The report does not specify what those “unsafe behaviors”
could potentially be.

¶7 DeeAnn Anderson, Sharon’s former case manager, testified that one
of the “common themes” of Sharon’s history is her belief that she does not have a
mental illness and does not need psychotropic medication. Anderson further
stated that Sharon told her that she would not voluntarily take her psychotropic
medication. Anderson also explained that Sharon’s dangerousness stems from her
impaired judgment and her belief that her children are in “grave danger.”

¶8 Jamie Kurth, a social worker for the County who had worked with
Sharon for approximately one and one-half years, testified that she did not believe
that Sharon would voluntarily continue to take her medication if she were not
ordered to do so. Kurth testified that Sharon informed her that she would not
voluntarily take her medication as recently as three to four weeks before the final
hearing. Kurth also opined that if Sharon were not involuntarily committed,
Sharon would engage in behavior that could necessitate another commitment.

¶9 Lisa Hass testified that she worked with Sharon in her capacity as a
community support program nurse and that Sharon had expressed “a lack of
knowledge about the benefits of her medication.”

¶10 Following the testimonial phase of the hearing, the circuit court
made the following findings:

[A]lthough I do not have any current indications … that
[Sharon] is a danger to herself, it is the fact of her denial of
her mental health and her denial of her need for
medications that give me what I believe is a firm footing on

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No. 2025AP645

the third standard that she is really unable to fully
comprehend what is at stake here and that if this
commitment was not granted that she would be in need of
another commitment.…

….

The [c]ourt is satisfied that she does meet the standard for a
recommitment and that at this time she is unable to make a
determination with regard to medications. Based upon the
testimony of the doctor and the other witnesses, [the court
finds] that she does suffer from … a mental illness … and
that she is substantially incapable of applying and
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages and
alternatives to her condition to make informed choices with
regard to accepting or refusing psychotropic medications.

The court then entered an order extending Sharon’s involuntary commitment for
twelve months on an outpatient basis and an order for involuntary medication and
treatment during the period of her commitment. Sharon now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Sharon argues that the County presented insufficient evidence for the
circuit court to conclude that she is dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.
in conjunction with § 51.20(1)(am). Whether the County has met its burden of
proof to support the extension of Sharon’s commitment presents a mixed question
of law and fact. See Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d
542, 895 N.W.2d 783. “We uphold a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard is a question
of law that we review de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶12 For a person to be subject to a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 involuntary
commitment, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

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subject individual is (1) mentally ill, (2) a proper subject for treatment, and
(3) dangerous to himself or herself or to others.3 Langlade County v. D.J.W.,
2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. WISCONSIN STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. provides five different means of proving that a subject is
dangerous. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶30. “The dangerousness standard is not
more or less onerous during an extension proceeding”; “[e]ach extension hearing
requires proof of current dangerousness.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54,
¶24, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. However, “[b]ecause an individual’s
behavior might change while receiving treatment, … § 51.20(1)(am) provides a
different avenue for proving dangerousness if the individual has been the subject
of treatment for mental illness immediately prior to commencement of the
extension proceedings.” Id., ¶19.

¶13 Sharon was found dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and
(1)(am). Section 51.20(1)(a)2.c. provides that a subject individual is dangerous if
he or she “[e]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a
pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of
physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or other individuals.” As
relevant here, § 51.20(1)(am) provides:

If the individual has been the subject of inpatient treatment
for mental illness … immediately prior to commencement
of the proceedings as a result of … a commitment or
protective placement ordered by a court under this
section … the requirement[] of a … pattern of recent acts
or omissions under par. (a)2.c. … may be satisfied by a
showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the
subject individual’s treatment record, that the individual

3
Sharon does not contest that she is mentally ill or that she is a proper subject for
treatment.

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No. 2025AP645

would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment
were withdrawn.

¶14 Sharon contends that the testimony of the County’s witnesses was
insufficient to prove that it was “much more likely than not” that she would
physically harm herself or others if treatment were withdrawn. See Marathon
County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶35, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (explaining that
“substantial probability” means “much more likely than not”). Specifically,
Sharon contends that “[t]he only evidence presented that [she] has ever been
dangerous was from 2009, when [she] walked in front of traffic.”

¶15 We conclude that, while the County presented evidence that Sharon
would stop taking her medication if she were not involuntarily committed, the
County failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of
Sharon’s dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. in conjunction with
§ 51.20(1)(am). While Dr. Marcus stated that there was a substantial risk of
Sharon decompensating if she were unmedicated, and that this decompensation
would come with an “increased risk of dangerousness” in the form of her
potentially engaging “in behaviors where she lacked awareness of the risk where
she could put herself in danger,” Marcus did not explain the types of dangers that
Sharon would face, or provide any examples of ways in which it is likely Sharon
would be dangerous to herself or others if she was no longer involuntarily
committed.

¶16 The County did not present any evidence of the types of dangers that
would arise with Sharon’s decompensation. For example, there was no evidence
that, if she were not involuntarily committed, Sharon would hurt herself, fail to eat
food or drink water, lose her home, or be unable to care for herself. Further, no
evidence was presented as to how Sharon would likely be a danger to others if she

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No. 2025AP645

was not involuntarily committed. Conclusory evidence—such as merely stating
that an individual would be “dangerous,” without evidence explaining the ways in
which the individual would be dangerous—is insufficient to support an
involuntary commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51. See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231,
¶40 (requiring specific factual findings regarding a subject individual’s
dangerousness); Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶13, 393 Wis. 2d
511, 947 N.W.2d 761 (stating that a lack of evidence supporting an expert’s legal
conclusion will render the expert’s testimony insufficient).

¶17 Sharon does not raise any independent arguments regarding the
involuntary medication order. We note, however, that there cannot be an
involuntary medication order without an underlying involuntary commitment. See
WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g). Thus, because we reverse the order for Sharon’s
involuntary commitment, we also reverse the order for her involuntary medication
and treatment.

By the Court.—Orders reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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