State v. Adam Michael Christopher

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 29, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP812-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF713

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ADAM MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Brown County: THOMAS J. WALSH, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Adam Michael Christopher, pro se, appeals from a
judgment convicting him of multiple counts of possession of child pornography
No. 2023AP812-CR

and from an order denying his postconviction motion. Christopher argues that the
circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by failing to
adequately explain its reasons for imposing a consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentence on a particular count. Christopher also asserts that he is entitled to
resentencing because the court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. We
reject Christopher’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2015, the State charged Christopher with eleven counts of
possession of child pornography, based on videos found on his laptop. Each of
those counts carried a mandatory minimum term of three years’ initial
confinement. See WIS. STAT. § 939.617(1) (2015-16).1 Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Christopher entered guilty pleas to all eleven charges. In exchange for
Christopher’s pleas, the State agreed to cap its total sentence recommendation at
ten years’ initial confinement followed by ten years’ extended supervision.

¶3 The circuit court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI),
which recommended concurrent sentences of three years’ initial confinement
followed by three years’ extended supervision on Counts 1 through 10 and a
consecutive sentence of three years’ initial confinement followed by three years’
extended supervision on Count 11. At sentencing, consistent with the plea
agreement, the State recommended a total of ten years’ initial confinement
followed by ten years’ extended supervision. The defense, in turn, asked the court

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2023AP812-CR

to impose “the minimum period of initial confinement” on each count—i.e., three
years—and to make all of Christopher’s sentences concurrent with one another.

¶4 The circuit court sentenced Christopher to four years’ initial
confinement followed by four years’ extended supervision on Count 1. On
Counts 2 through 10, the court imposed sentences of three years’ initial
confinement followed by three years’ extended supervision, concurrent with each
other and with Christopher’s sentence on Count 1. On Count 11, the court
sentenced Christopher to four years’ initial confinement followed by four years’
extended supervision, consecutive to his sentences on the other counts. Thus, in
the aggregate, Christopher’s sentences totaled eight years’ initial confinement
followed by eight years’ extended supervision.

¶5 Christopher’s appointed appellate attorney filed a no-merit report,
but counsel later voluntarily withdrew the no-merit report after this court
identified a potential issue of arguable merit regarding multiplicity. Christopher
then filed a postconviction motion seeking to vacate his conviction on Count 11,
asserting that Counts 9 and 11 were multiplicitous because they were based on two
copies of the same video. Christopher asserted that vacating his conviction on
Count 11 would result in him being “released immediately to extended
supervision, which would continue until 2024.”

¶6 The circuit court agreed with Christopher that Counts 9 and 11 were
multiplicitous; however, it declined to vacate his conviction on Count 11. Instead,
the court determined that it would be more appropriate to vacate Christopher’s
conviction on Count 9 because doing so would allow “[b]oth parties [to] retain the
benefit of the plea agreement” and because “the remaining convictions and

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No. 2023AP812-CR

sentences do not disturb the Court’s sentencing goals.” Christopher did not appeal
the court’s decision to vacate Count 9 rather than Count 11.

¶7 Thereafter, Christopher filed a postconviction motion for sentence
modification or, in the alternative, resentencing. Christopher argued that the
circuit court had erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by making his
sentence on Count 11 consecutive to his sentences on Counts 1 through 10. He
also argued that the court had relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. The
circuit court denied Christopher’s motion in a written order, and this appeal
follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Sentencing Discretion

¶8 Sentencing decisions are committed to the circuit court’s discretion,
and our review on appeal is limited to determining whether the court erroneously
exercised its discretion. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678
N.W.2d 197. “[S]entencing decisions of the circuit court are generally afforded a
strong presumption of reasonability because the circuit court is best suited to
consider the relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant.” Id., ¶18
(citation omitted). “Appellate judges should not substitute their preference for a
sentence merely because, had they been in the trial judge’s position, they would
have meted out a different sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, a
defendant bears a “heavy burden” in attempting to show that a circuit court
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶30,
326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409.

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No. 2023AP812-CR

¶9 A proper exercise of sentencing discretion requires a circuit court to
consider three primary factors: the gravity of the offense, the defendant’s
character, and the need to protect the public. Id., ¶28. Additional relevant factors
include the defendant’s criminal record and any history of undesirable behavior
patterns; the defendant’s personality, character, and social traits; any
recommendation in a PSI; the vicious and aggravated nature of the crime; the
defendant’s degree of culpability; the defendant’s demeanor at trial; the
defendant’s age, educational background and employment record; the defendant’s
remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant’s need for close
rehabilitative control; the rights of the public; and the length of pretrial detention.
Id. Sentencing courts have “considerable discretion” in determining the weight
given to each sentencing factor. Id.

¶10 “In exercising discretion, sentencing courts must individualize the
sentence to the defendant based on the facts of the case by identifying the most
relevant factors and explaining how the sentence imposed furthers the sentencing
objectives.” Id., ¶29. Proper sentencing objectives include, but are not limited to,
“the protection of the community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of
the defendant, and deterrence to others.” Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40.
Ultimately, a sentence should “call for the minimum amount of custody or
confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of
the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Id., ¶44 (citation
omitted).

¶11 On appeal, Christopher renews his argument that the circuit court
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by making his sentence on
Count 11 consecutive to his sentences on the remaining counts. A circuit court “is
permitted wide discretion in determining whether to impose a concurrent or

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No. 2023AP812-CR

consecutive sentence.” State v. Davis, 2005 WI App 98, ¶27, 281 Wis. 2d 118,
698 N.W.2d 823. A court “properly exercises its discretion in imposing
consecutive or concurrent sentences by considering the same factors as it applies
in determining sentence length.” State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, ¶46, 320
Wis. 2d 209, 769 N.W.2d 110. Notably, however, a court is not required to “state
separately why it chose a consecutive rather than a concurrent sentence.” Id., ¶45.

¶12 Here, the sentencing transcript reflects that the circuit court did not
erroneously exercise its discretion by imposing a consecutive sentence on
Count 11. The court began its sentencing remarks by correctly noting that it was
required to consider “the gravity of the offense, the character of the defendant, the
need to protect the public, as well as other aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, including rehabilitative needs[ and] punishment.”

¶13 The circuit court then addressed Christopher’s character, noting his
relatively young age and the fact that his past criminal record was “virtually
nonexistent.” The court also noted that Christopher had obtained a GED and had
some college credits. In addition, the court observed that Christopher had worked
for a reputable employer and had been “promoted up through the ranks
periodically at that company, which also sp[oke] well of his character.” The court
also considered Christopher’s upbringing and letters of support submitted by his
family members. Additionally, the court considered a doctor’s report that had
been submitted by the defense, which opined that Christopher “doesn’t appear to
be an individual in need of incarceration in order to avoid substantial risk to the
community.”

¶14 The circuit court then considered the gravity of the offenses,
however, and noted that “we can speak of good character traits, we can speak of

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No. 2023AP812-CR

poor character traits, and then we can speak of just terrible offenses, and these
types of offenses are terrible offenses.” The court emphasized the effect of child
pornography offenses on the victims depicted in the videos, noting that those
victims are “being exploited day in and day out as … the images of them are
flashed through the Internet.” The court stated that “the public demands
protection from things like that.”

¶15 The circuit court then expressed concern that people who view child
pornography have a compulsion to do so, “particularly when no help is being
sought or received.” While the court acknowledged Christopher’s claim that his
alcohol consumption had lowered his inhibitions and contributed to his decision to
seek out child pornography, the court did not accept Christopher’s alcohol use as a
full explanation for his conduct, stating instead that there is “something underlying
who Mr. Christopher is that draws him to this type of activity.”

¶16 The circuit court continued, “And in reading the [PSI], the comment
that the defendant, Mr. Christopher, clearly has a deviant sexual interest in
children, is a concern to this Court, and it’s a concern that has got to be addressed
before he’s able to be in our community again.” The court noted that, when
speaking to the PSI author, Christopher had described having “an attraction to
petite or thin body type[s] versus an attraction to children.” The court stated,
however, that

[t]he things that he was viewing also—and the state
mentioned it in this report—went beyond though just
simply viewing children in pornographic situations but,
rather, included bestiality and teen rape.[2] All of those
2
In the next section of this opinion, we address and reject Christopher’s argument that
the circuit court relied on inaccurate information when it referred to him having an interest in
“teen rape.”

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No. 2023AP812-CR

things go even beyond the issue of pornography, beyond
child pornography. It gets into a deeper level.

¶17 Addressing the protection of the public and Christopher’s
rehabilitative needs, the circuit court then stated that Christopher’s positive
character traits do not “balance out” his viewing of child pornography, which
“needs to be addressed for our community.” The court continued:

[I]t heavily weighs on me, the severity of … these
offenses—there’s 11 counts—and the public needs to be
protected from people who are interested in this type of
activity, that being interested in seeing children engaged in
bestiality or teen rape or again child pornography, and the
public demands protection from that. So that I see a strong
need for rehabilitative needs in this case. There is a huge
need for that so that the public can be satisfied these issues
are getting addressed. There is a need for punishment
because again this is—these are very serious offenses.

¶18 Finally, the circuit court summarized the sentencing
recommendations made by the parties and the PSI author. In particular, the court
rejected Christopher’s argument that the PSI author may not have intended to
recommend a consecutive sentence on Count 11.

¶19 When considered in their entirety, the circuit court’s sentencing
remarks show that the court provided a thorough explanation—tied to relevant and
appropriate sentencing factors—for its decision to impose sentences totaling eight
years’ initial confinement followed by eight years’ extended supervision.3

3
We note that, pursuant to statute, the circuit court could have imposed consecutive
sentences of 15 years’ initial confinement followed by 10 years’ extended supervision on each of
the child pornography counts, making Christopher’s total exposure for the ten counts for which
he was ultimately convicted 150 years’ initial confinement followed by 100 years’ extended
supervision. See WIS. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(d), 948.12(3)(a), 973.01(2)(b)4. We also observe that
the aggregate sentence that the court imposed was less than the State’s total recommendation of
ten years’ initial confinement followed by ten years’ extended supervision.

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No. 2023AP812-CR

Christopher’s sentences were clearly motivated by the seriousness of the offenses,
the need to protect the public, and the court’s assessment of Christopher’s
rehabilitative needs. The court’s sentencing remarks adequately justified the
overall length Christopher’s sentences, and, as noted above, the court was not
required to provide a separate explanation for its decision to impose a consecutive
sentence on Count 11. See Berggren, 320 Wis. 2d 209, ¶¶45-46.

¶20 In support of his argument that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by imposing a consecutive sentence on Count 11,
Christopher asserts that while child pornography cases “almost always involve
multiple units—sometimes thousands[—]it is customary for Wisconsin courts to
sentence such counts concurrently regardless of the quantity of material,
particularly when the counts are all part of the same course of conduct.”
Christopher cites no legal authority in support of this proposition. Regardless, as
the State correctly notes, the circuit court was required to fashion an individually
tailored sentence for Christopher. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48
(“Individualized sentencing … has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin’s
criminal justice jurisprudence.”). The fact that concurrent sentences have been
imposed in other cases involving multiple convictions for possession of child
pornography does not, in and of itself, show that the court in this case erroneously
exercised its discretion by imposing a consecutive sentence on Count 11.4

4
For the same reason, Christopher’s assertion that “many child pornography defendants
possess hundreds or thousands of files, collected over an extended period of time, and still get
sentenced to 3-4 years imprisonment” also fails to show that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion when imposing sentence in this specific case.

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No. 2023AP812-CR

¶21 Christopher argues that the circuit court failed to perform an
“individualized analysis” because “[e]very aggravating factor listed by the court
had no specific relation to Christopher, but instead applie[s] to every child
pornography offender.” We can infer from the court’s sentencing remarks,
however, that the court believed the protection of the public required a lengthy
sentence in this specific case so that Christopher would receive treatment in a
confined setting before being released. In reaching that conclusion, the court
discounted Christopher’s claim that he had accessed child pornography due to his
alcohol use, concluding instead that there is “something underlying who
Mr. Christopher is that draws him to this type of activity.” The court also rejected
Christopher’s assertion that he was merely attracted to “petite or thin body
type[s],” stating that his interests “went beyond … just simply viewing children in
pornographic situations.” Under these circumstances, Christopher’s assertion that
the court failed to impose an individualized sentence is unavailing.5

¶22 Christopher next argues that the circuit court “gave no indication as
to how an eight-year, consecutive sentence” would protect the public. He then
cites various documents contained in the appendix to his appellate brief in support
of the assertion that “recidivism rates for sex offenders are the lowest of any other
group, and child pornography rates are among the lowest of the low.” We note,
however, that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Christopher presented

5
In addition, we reject Christopher’s assertion that the circuit court’s sentencing remarks
show that the court “intends to apply long sentences to every child pornography defendant it
sentences—regardless of the individual facts of the case.” As discussed above, the court applied
proper sentencing factors to the facts of Christopher’s case. Contrary to Christopher’s assertion,
nothing about the court’s sentencing remarks suggests “a preconceived policy of sentencing that
is ‘closed to individual mitigating factors.’” See State v. Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 544
N.W.2d 574 (1996) (citation omitted).

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No. 2023AP812-CR

these documents to the circuit court at sentencing. See State v. Rogers, 196
Wis. 2d 817, 827, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (“We will not … blindside
trial courts with reversals based on theories which did not originate in their
forum.”). Given the information available to the court at the time of sentencing,
the court could reasonably conclude that the sentences it imposed were necessary
to enhance public protection by ensuring that Christopher received adequate
treatment before being released from prison.6

¶23 Finally, Christopher argues that the circuit court’s decision to
impose a consecutive sentence on Count 11 “was not a harmless one, as it kept
Christopher from being eligible for an earlier release via the Wisconsin Substance
Abuse Program.” See State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶26, 395 Wis. 2d 215,
952 N.W.2d 836 (holding that a defendant who is subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence is required to serve the full mandatory minimum term before
being released upon completion of the Substance Abuse Program). Be that as it
may, it does not establish that the court erroneously exercised its discretion by
imposing a consecutive sentence on Count 11. Again, the court implicitly
determined that the sentences imposed were necessary to protect the public by
ensuring that Christopher received adequate treatment in prison before being
released. For all of the reasons explained above, the court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in that regard.

6
Relatedly, Christopher asserts that the circuit court’s implicit reasoning that a longer
aggregate sentence would ensure that he received adequate treatment in prison was flawed. He
contends, “[S]ince Wisconsin sex offender treatment does not begin until the end of an offender’s
sentence, a longer sentence means that an offender must wait longer for treatment to begin if he
receives a longer sentence—he must remain mentally ‘broken’ for longer.” Christopher cites no
authority in support of this proposition. Additionally, we note that he did not raise this argument
at sentencing. See State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 827, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995).

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No. 2023AP812-CR

II. Inaccurate Information

¶24 Christopher also renews his argument on appeal that he was
sentenced based on inaccurate information. “A defendant has a constitutionally
protected due process right to be sentenced upon accurate information.” State v.
Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. Whether a
defendant has been denied this right is a constitutional issue that this court reviews
de novo. Id.

¶25 A defendant seeking resentencing based on inaccurate information
must show both that the information in question was inaccurate and that the circuit
court actually relied on the inaccurate information when imposing sentence. Id.,
¶26. If the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the State to prove
that the error was harmless. Id. Here, we conclude Christopher has failed his
initial burden because he has not shown that the information in question was
inaccurate—that is, that the information was “materially untrue” or “extensively
and materially false.”7 See State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶¶17-18, 347 Wis. 2d
142, 832 N.W.2d 491.

¶26 Christopher argues that the circuit court relied on inaccurate
information when it stated: “The things that he was viewing also—and the state
mentioned it in this report—went beyond though just simply viewing children in
pornographic situations but, rather, included bestiality and teen rape.” The court

7
Because we reject Christopher’s inaccurate information claim on this basis, we need
not address the State’s alternative argument that Christopher forfeited the claim by failing to
object to or correct the allegedly inaccurate information at sentencing. See Turner v. Taylor,
2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (explaining that the court of appeals
need not address all issues raised by the parties if one is dispositive).

12
No. 2023AP812-CR

further stated that “the public needs to be protected from people who are interested
in this type of activity, that being interested in seeing children engaged in
bestiality or teen rape or again child pornography.” Christopher contends that
these statements were inaccurate because there is no evidence that he ever
downloaded any videos depicting “teen rape.”

¶27 Christopher concedes, however, that he searched for pornography
depicting “teen rape.” The PSI author cited those searches as evidence that
Christopher “clearly has a deviant sexual interest in children.”8 The PSI author
further opined that it was “imperative” that Christopher “obtain treatment in a
confined setting to properly address his deviant sexual interest in children.” Like
the PSI author, the circuit court cited Christopher’s interest in teen rape as
evidence of a “deviant sexual interest in children” that necessitated treatment
before Christopher could safely be released to the public. Based on Christopher’s
admission to searching for “teen rape” videos, the court’s belief that Christopher
had an interest in teen rape was not inaccurate.

¶28 Christopher asserts that, although he “entered the words teen rape
into the search box,” he “chose not to download anything from the results.” We
agree with the State, however, that “[t]he minor leap between searching for and
downloading [videos depicting teen rape]—in a situation where Christopher

8
Christopher claims that the PSI author, who was “a probation officer, not a
psychologist,” had no basis to opine that he has “a deviant sexual interest in children.” However,
Christopher has admitted downloading child pornography, and he concedes that he searched for
“teen rape.” In addition, the complaint and PSI both recounted that two of the videos Christopher
downloaded showed acts of bestiality involving children. The PSI also noted that, in addition to
the 10 videos that formed the basis for the charges against Christopher, a detective “located an
additional 23 videos of child pornography” on Christopher’s laptop. Under these circumstances,
there was an ample basis for the PSI author’s assertion that Christopher has “a deviant sexual
interest in children.”

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No. 2023AP812-CR

admitted to possessing 10 [child sex abuse] videos—is insignificant in this
context.” Under these circumstances, Christopher has failed to show that the
circuit court’s statements about his interest in teen rape were “materially untrue”
or “extensively and materially false.” See Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶17-18.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2023-24).

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