Francis G. Graef v. Applied Underwriters, Inc.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 8, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP512 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2017CV73
2018CV127
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

FRANCIS G. GRAEF,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC.,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

------------------------------------------------------------

FRANCIS G. GRAEF,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC.,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
No. 2024AP512

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Marinette County:
JANE M. SEQUIN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

¶1 GILL, J. This case concerns whether a circuit court erred by taxing
as a disbursement under WIS. STAT. § 814.05 (2023-24)1 the surety bond premium
paid pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 618.47(1) and 601.72(1)(c) by Applied
Underwriters, Inc. (AUI), the prevailing party in this lawsuit. This appeal presents
two issues of first impression: (1) whether a paid surety bond premium under
§ 814.05 is a disbursement under WIS. STAT. § 814.04 that is required to be taxed,
if so requested by a prevailing party, to the extent a circuit court finds that that the
premium was “necessary”; and (2) if so, whether the circuit court in this case
erroneously exercised its discretion by concluding that the entire sum of the paid
premium was “necessary.”

¶2 Here, AUI posted a surety bond under WIS. STAT. §§ 618.47(1) and
601.72(1)(c) in the amount of $2,500,000, purchased with a $75,000 premium.
The circuit court ultimately granted AUI’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit. AUI
then filed a bill of costs and notice of taxation with supporting affidavits, which
included the $75,000 disbursement it made for the surety bond premium. The
circuit court approved the bill of costs. Francis Graef argues that the circuit court
erred by taxing the entire surety bond premium as a disbursement because the cost
was extravagant and unnecessary insomuch as the bond was required due to AUI’s

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP512

alleged misconduct and to ensure the financial responsibility of AUI if it were
found to be culpable in the lawsuit.

¶3 WISCONSIN STAT. § 814.05 provides that “[a]ny party entitled to
recover costs or disbursements in an action or special proceeding may include in
such disbursements the lawful premium paid to an authorized insurer for a
suretyship obligation.” A successful party “is entitled to ‘[a]ll the necessary
disbursements and fees allowed by law’ in addition to those enumerated in” WIS.
STAT. § 814.04(2). Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶18,
303 Wis. 2d 258, 735 N.W.2d 93 (alteration in original) (quoting § 814.04(2)). As
explained in more detail below, binding precedent establishes that a circuit court
must impose all disbursements and fees allowed by law and requested by a
prevailing party to the extent that the court determines, within its discretion, that a
particular disbursement was “necessary.” See § 814.04(2).

¶4 When reading the statutes together, it is clear that a paid surety bond
premium under WIS. STAT. § 814.05 is required to be taxed, if a prevailing party
chooses to include the paid premium in its bill of costs, to the extent that a circuit
court determines that the premium was “necessary.” See WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2).
We therefore conclude that a surety bond premium is a disbursement allowed by
law under § 814.04(2), and AUI was permitted to include it in its bill of costs.
Once the bond premium was included as a disbursement in AUI’s bill of costs, the
circuit court was required to order that Graef pay that disbursement to the extent
the court found, in its discretion, that the disbursement was “necessary.”
See § 814.04(2).

¶5 Moreover, under the facts of this case, we agree with AUI that the
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by finding that the entire

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No. 2024AP512

sum of AUI’s paid surety bond premium—made pursuant to a stipulation between
the parties—was “necessary” under WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2). Without the surety
bond, AUI would have been unable to litigate this case further, and a default
judgment likely would have been entered in Graef’s favor. See WIS. STAT.
§§ 618.47(1), 601.72(1)(c). Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶6 The operative facts of this appeal have largely been outlined
previously in Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co., 2021 WI 45, 397 Wis. 2d 75,
959 N.W.2d 628, and Graef v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., No. 2023AP420,
unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 9, 2024), review denied, 2024 WI 40, 15
N.W.2d 39. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b). For purposes of this appeal, it is
sufficient to note that Graef received worker’s compensation benefits following a
workplace injury in 2012. Graef, No. 2023AP420, ¶4. Graef sued his employer’s
worker’s compensation carrier, Continental Indemnity Company, in 2017
following Continental’s refusal to cover the cost of his depression medication in
June 2015. Id. Graef alleged that Continental negligently refused the medication
refill, which resulted in worsening depression symptoms, culminating in a
self-inflicted, nonfatal gunshot wound to the head in August 2015. Id., ¶¶4-5.

Thereafter, Continental moved for summary judgment,
claiming that Graef brought his claim in the wrong forum
because the [Wisconsin Worker’s Compensation Act (the
Act)] provided his exclusive remedy. The circuit court
denied Continental’s motion, but we reversed—on the basis
that Graef’s right to recovery existed under the Act and was
the exclusive remedy—and directed the court to grant
summary judgment in favor of Continental. Graef v.
Continental Indem. Co., No. 2018AP1782, unpublished
slip op. ¶¶2, 39 (WI App Feb. 4, 2020). Our supreme court
affirmed. Graef, 397 Wis. 2d 75, ¶3. On remand, the
circuit court dismissed Graef’s complaint against
Continental.

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No. 2024AP512

During this time, however, Graef also filed a separate
lawsuit against [AUI] in Marinette County Case
No. 2018CV127. That lawsuit was subsequently
consolidated with the suit against Continental in Marinette
County Case No. 2017CV73.

Graef, No. 2023AP420, ¶¶5-6 (footnotes omitted).

¶7 Graef was granted leave to file an amended complaint, wherein he
alleged that AUI was “associated with” Continental “insofar as [AUI] either
owned” Continental “or owned the stock in a corporation that owned” Continental.
Moreover, Graef alleged that AUI “is an insurance company but is not licensed by
the State of Wisconsin or authorized to conduct or do any insurance business in
this state.” In his briefing supporting the motion to amend the complaint, Graef
argued that AUI “operated as an unauthorized insurer and WIS. STAT. §§ 618.47,
610.11, and 618.02(2) forbids its defense (and Motion to Dismiss) because
unauthorized people conducting an insurance business may not participate in
litigation in Wisconsin Courts.”

¶8 Graef argued that AUI should be prohibited from answering the
second amended complaint unless or until AUI posted a $5 million surety bond
because AUI had failed to show it had “substantial assets … ‘available’ to satisfy a
judgment” as required under WIS. STAT. § 618.47(1)(a). Furthermore, Graef
alleged that AUI had engaged in misconduct by practicing as an unlicensed
insurer, and Graef referenced instances where AUI was reportedly fined by
various state governments across the country for “violating multiple insurance
laws.” AUI responded, asserting that it was not required to post a surety bond
because § 618.47 did not apply and that Graef was attempting to use the bond
requirement to secure a default judgment.

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No. 2024AP512

¶9 Ultimately, AUI agreed to post a surety bond “to avoid getting
embroiled in irrelevant litigation.” AUI expressly stated, however, that it “does
not concede that it did anything wrong, practiced insurance without a license, or
acted as an unlicensed insurer in Wisconsin.” The parties stipulated that AUI
would post a surety bond in the amount of $2.5 million.2

¶10 The circuit court held a hearing on the surety bond issue in February
2022, at which it entered a scheduling order requiring AUI to file a surety bond
within 2 weeks and, if it desired, a motion to dismiss within 45 days. AUI then
purchased a surety bond in the agreed amount from an insurance company for
$75,000.

¶11 In lieu of answering Graef’s amended complaint, AUI filed a motion
to dismiss, which the circuit court granted. We affirmed the court’s decision in
April 2024, and our supreme court denied Graef’s petition for review. See Graef,
No. 2023AP420, ¶¶3, 7.

¶12 Following the circuit court’s dismissal of Graef’s claims, AUI filed a
bill of costs and notice of taxation with supporting affidavits. AUI argued that it
was entitled to recover, among other costs, $75,000 for the “lawful premium paid
to an authorized insurer for a suretyship obligation.” See WIS. STAT. § 814.05.
Graef objected to AUI’s request for $75,000 in the bill of costs, asserting that the
circuit court’s ability to impose costs is discretionary, see WIS. STAT. § 814.04,
and that § 814.05 recognizes the court’s discretionary authority by “stating that
such costs ‘may’ be included among disbursements.” Moreover, Graef argued that

2
The record does not contain a written stipulation, but it appears the parties placed an
oral stipulation on the record during a February 2022 hearing. See infra note 5.

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No. 2024AP512

AUI “incurred that fee solely because it was an unlicensed insurer,” AUI was
required to purchase the surety bond to retain its “ability to defend this action,”
and AUI had engaged in misconduct necessitating the need for a bond.

¶13 After additional briefing by the parties, the circuit court granted
AUI’s request to include the $75,000 spent on the surety bond as a necessary
disbursement. The court interpreted WIS. STAT. § 814.05 as stating that a party
“may” include in a bill of costs the lawful premium paid for a suretyship
obligation, not that a court has discretion in granting those costs. The court agreed
with Graef, however, that it could consider whether the paid premium was
“excessive or unreasonable” when determining whether the premium was
“necessary.” See WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2). The court found that it was
indisputable that AUI incurred $75,000 in expenses to obtain the surety bond and
that the costs were necessary pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. At the time of
the stipulation, neither party “indicate[d] that the actual premium paid was
excessive or inflated.” Thus, the court concluded that it did not have the
“authority to deny” AUI’s “claim in this case” even if the cost “may not seem
fair,” and it entered judgment in favor of AUI, which included the $75,000 paid
premium as a disbursement.

¶14 Graef now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶15 In accordance with our previous statement, this appeal presents two
issues, the first being whether a paid surety bond premium under WIS. STAT.
§ 814.05 is a disbursement under WIS. STAT. § 814.04 that is required to be taxed,
if requested by a prevailing party, to the extent a circuit court finds that the
premium was “necessary,” and, if so, whether the circuit court in this case

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No. 2024AP512

erroneously exercised its discretion by concluding that the entire sum paid for the
premium was “necessary.”

¶16 Graef argues that “[t]he statutory scheme shows that bond premiums
are not mandatory, but rather discretionary,” because the only “mandatory taxable
items” are those which are explicitly enumerated under WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2).3
Graef further argues that the expense AUI paid for the surety bond was
unnecessary for AUI to defend the lawsuit in court because the bond “had nothing
to do with helping [AUI] make its case in court.” According to Graef, the surety
bond was required because AUI was “untrustworth[y],” as it made allegedly
untruthful statements regarding its license status in Wisconsin and has a record of
being fined by other states.

I. Taxable cost

¶17 This case requires us to interpret and apply WIS. STAT. §§ 814.04
and 814.05. “The interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set of
facts are questions of law that we review independently.” McNeil v. Hansen,
2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273. “[S]tatutory interpretation

3
Graef’s precise arguments on appeal are somewhat confusing. In his brief-in-chief,
Graef concedes that WIS. STAT. § 814.05 “allows [AUI] to include bond premiums,” but he
argues that this conclusion “does not mean the Court must enforce the inclusion if the cost is not
‘necessary.’” (Formatting altered.) Graef further states that “bond premiums are not mandatory,
but rather discretionary.” In his reply brief, however, Graef asserts that “the circuit court’s use of
discretion does not need to be considered” on appeal.

We have done our best to interpret and explain Graef’s arguments. To the extent we do
not address any arguments that Graef intended to make, we deem such arguments as either
insufficiently developed or without merit, and we reject them accordingly. See State v. Pettit,
171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (declining to address undeveloped
arguments); see also State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147
(1978), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550,
556, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1998).

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No. 2024AP512

‘begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we
ordinarily stop the inquiry.’ Statutory language is given its common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases
are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” State ex rel. Kalal v.
Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110
(citation omitted). “[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46. Because both §§ 814.04 and 814.05 “deal with
the taxation of costs, we must read the two statutes in harmonious fashion.”
See Soletski v. Krueger Int’l, Inc., 2019 WI App 7, ¶38, 385 Wis. 2d 787, 924
N.W.2d 207; Kolupar, 303 Wis. 2d 258, ¶28 (“[W]hen multiple statutes address
the same subject area, we read the statutes in pari materia such that both statutes
will be operative.”).

¶18 WISCONSIN STAT. § 814.01(1) states, “Except as otherwise provided
in this chapter, costs shall be allowed of course to the plaintiff upon recovery.”
See also State v. Foster, 100 Wis. 2d 103, 106, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981) (stating
that the right to taxable costs “is statutory in nature, and to the extent that a statute
does not authorize the recovery of specific costs, they are not recoverable”). In
cases where the plaintiff is not entitled to costs, “the defendant shall be allowed
costs to be computed on the basis of the demands of the complaint.” WIS. STAT.
§ 814.03(1).

¶19 “The term ‘costs’ has been defined as the usual and ordinary taxable
court costs. They are awarded to reimburse the prevailing party, to some extent at
least, for expenses necessarily incurred in assertion of a litigant’s rights in court.”
Thomas v. Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 132 Wis. 2d 18, 23, 390 N.W.2d 572 (Ct.

9
No. 2024AP512

App. 1986). WISCONSIN STAT. § 814.04 sets forth the disbursements that “shall”
be awarded to a prevailing party in a civil lawsuit. These include, for example, “a
reasonable disbursement for the service of process or other papers in an action
when the same are served by a person authorized by law other than an officer” and
“amounts actually paid out for certified and other copies of papers and records in
any public office.” Sec. 814.04(2). Notably, § 814.04(2) further provides that a
successful party is entitled to “[a]ll the necessary disbursements and fees allowed
by law” in addition to those enumerated in that section. See also Kolupar, 303
Wis. 2d 258, ¶18.

¶20 An award of taxed costs under WIS. STAT. § 814.04 to a successful
plaintiff under WIS. STAT. § 814.01 or a successful defendant under WIS. STAT.
§ 814.03 is mandatory, not discretionary. See Duesterbeck v. Town of
Koshkonong, 2000 WI App 6, ¶33, 232 Wis. 2d 16, 605 N.W.2d (addressing
§ 814.01); Taylor v. St. Croix Chippewa Indians, 229 Wis. 2d 688, 695-96, 599
N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1999) (addressing § 814.03); see also Weber v. Auto
Owners Ins. Co., No. 2014AP1953, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (WI App Feb. 24,
2015); WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

¶21 “While WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2) enumerates the types of
disbursements that may be taxed as costs, it ‘does not constrain the [circuit]
court’s exercise of discretion in determining the amount of costs.’” Weber,
No. 2014AP1953, ¶10 (quoting Aspen Servs., Inc. v. IT Corp., 220 Wis. 2d 491,
511, 583 N.W.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1998)). That is, a circuit court has discretion to
determine whether a particular disbursement was “necessary,” as required by
§ 814.04(2). See Alswager v. Roundy’s Inc., 2005 WI App 3, ¶9, 278 Wis. 2d
598, 692 N.W.2d 333 (2004); Weber, No. 2014AP1953, ¶10. “Unless the costs
proposed are obviously unauthorized, the burden should fall on the objecting party

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No. 2024AP512

to point out why they are not authorized or are improperly or inaccurately
determined.” Martell v. Klingman, 11 Wis. 2d 296, 312, 105 N.W.2d 446 (1960).

¶22 By its plain text, WIS. STAT. § 814.05 identifies “the lawful premium
paid to an authorized insurer for a suretyship obligation” as recoverable “costs or
disbursements.” It follows, then, that surety bond premiums fall within the
catch-all provision in WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2), permitting “[a]ll the necessary
disbursements and fees allowed by law” that “shall” be awarded. See § 814.04(2);
see also Kolupar, 303 Wis. 2d 258, ¶19 (“Among the ‘necessary disbursements
and fees allowed by law’ [pursuant to § 814.04(2)] are those authorized under
fee-shifting statutes.” (citation omitted)); Confidential Loan & Mortg. Co. v.
Hardgrove, 259 Wis. 346, 351-52, 48 N.W.2d 466 (1951) (reversing, under a
previous version of § 814.05, a circuit court’s decision “refusing to allow the
respondent to tax as a part of his disbursements the amount paid as the premium
on the surety bond”); Skelly Oil Co. v. Peterson, 257 Wis. 300, 308, 43 N.W.2d
449 (1950) (applying a previous version of § 814.05 in the same manner as
Hardgrove).

¶23 Nothing in WIS. STAT. ch. 814, including in WIS. STAT. § 814.05
itself, dictates that a circuit court’s decision whether to allow a necessary
disbursement under § 814.05 is discretionary or equitable. Cf. WIS. STAT.
§ 814.07 (stating that motion costs “may be allowed … in the discretion of the
court or judge”). Because a disbursement under § 814.05 is “allowed by law,”
WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2) requires a circuit court to award the disbursement to a
party who requests it pursuant to § 814.05 to the extent that the disbursement was
“necessary,” as provided by § 814.04(2). See Alswager, 278 Wis. 2d 598, ¶9.

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No. 2024AP512

¶24 When read together, the statutes clearly dictate that a disbursement
for a paid surety bond premium under WIS. STAT. § 814.05 is mandatory in the
sense that a circuit court must impose it if a prevailing party requests the premium
as a disbursement, to the extent that the circuit court determines the premium was
“necessary.” See WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2). Therefore, the circuit court was
required to tax the entirety of AUI’s paid bond premium to the extent that the
court determined that that sum was “necessary.” See id.

II. Necessity

¶25 “Our review of a circuit court’s valuation of an award of costs is
limited to whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.” Kolupar,
303 Wis. 2d 258, ¶15. “A proper exercise of discretion requires the circuit court to
employ a logical rationale based on the appropriate legal principles and facts of
record.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶26 As outlined above, the second dispute in this case is whether the
entire sum AUI paid for the surety bond premium was “necessary” for this
particular litigation. Citing Aspen Services, Graef argues that “Wisconsin courts
have used their discretion in determining what is a necessary cost or disbursement
in regard to misconduct.” In Aspen Services, a lease agreement provided that the
lessee “shall pay all costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees that may be
incurred or paid by” the lessor “in enforcing the covenants and agreements of” the
lease. Aspen Servs., 220 Wis. 2d at 493-94. Following judgment in favor of the
lessor for unpaid rent, the circuit court awarded the lessor a portion of its attorney
fees and costs of litigation but omitted from the costs more than $44,000. Id. The
court did not award the full amount of requested attorney fees and costs, stating

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No. 2024AP512

that the court was sanctioning that party’s attorneys in order to “promote civility in
litigation” due to “excessive litigation.” Id. at 495-97.

¶27 On appeal, we held that a circuit court has both the statutory and
inherent authority “to reduce” “for incivility” fees and costs for attorney fees. Id.
at 495, 498 (citing WIS. STAT. § 802.05). We concluded that the circuit court did
not erroneously exercise its discretion by sanctioning the prevailing party’s
attorneys because the court considered the excessive litigation involved, including
the lessor’s involvement in “needlessly increas[ing]” the cost of litigation. Id. at
496-97, 499.

¶28 The lessor also argued that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by not awarding it a fee charged by a referee appointed by the court to
resolve discovery disputes and videotape deposition fees. Id. at 510-11. The court
had imposed a fee for the referee on both parties as “a sanction … for the necessity
of appointing a referee to control the discovery process.” Id. at 511. Moreover,
the court found that it was “not necessary to utilize videotape depositions given
the nature of the case” and that the lessor was “in part to blame for creating an
atmosphere of untrustworthiness which prompted its decision to use videotape
proceedings.” Id. We upheld the circuit court’s discretionary determinations,
noting that WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2) “does not constrain the trial court’s exercise of
discretion in determining the amount of costs. That provision allows for the
recovery of ‘necessary’ disbursements and fees.” Aspen Servs., 220 Wis. 2d at
511.

¶29 Graef contends that this court in Aspen held that the “extravagant
nature of the attorney[] fees was a direct result of one party’s clear misconduct.”
He further argues that this court should “follow a similar analysis to the one in

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Aspen.” However, the attorney fees issue in Aspen was analyzed under the terms
of the lease, a circuit court’s inherent authority to sanction parties, and the
common law reasonableness considerations for attorney fees—none of which are
implicated in this case.

¶30 In addition, this appeal differs from Aspen in that the circuit court
found AUI’s paid surety bond premium under WIS. STAT. § 814.05 was
“necessary” under WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2), and it did not find that AUI had
engaged in misconduct or dishonesty necessitating a surety bond.4 Contrary to
Graef’s assertions on appeal, “the sole reason for the bond” was not AUI’s alleged
status as an “unlicensed insurer,” nor was the surety bond premium “incurred to
ensure [AUI’s] honest participation in the litigation.” Instead, the surety bond was
obtained based upon the parties’ stipulation from the February 2022 hearing.

¶31 Pursuant to that stipulation, AUI was required to pay the surety bond
premium in this case in order to respond to Graef’s amended complaint via a
motion to dismiss. See WIS. STAT. §§ 618.47(1), 601.72(1)(c). Thus, without
evidence or a finding that AUI acted in a fashion that made the expense of the
bond unnecessary, it was “necessary” for AUI to pay the bond premium prior to
continuing to litigate the case. See WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2); Thomas, 132 Wis. 2d
at 23. Without the surety bond, a default judgment may have been entered in
favor of Graef.

4
To the extent that AUI engaged in any misconduct or violated an insurance law, that
issue is for insurance regulators, not the circuit court or this court, to determine. A party cannot
use litigation—here, objecting to a surety bond premium as a disbursement—as a means to
punish a party for any such alleged insurance code violation.

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No. 2024AP512

¶32 Although the transcript of the February 2022 hearing is not in the
record, CCAP5 entries show that the circuit court entered a scheduling order at the
hearing requiring AUI to file a surety bond within 2 weeks and, presumably, if it
desired, a motion to dismiss within 45 days. Along with AUI’s submissions in the
circuit court stating that it was stipulating to posting a surety bond solely so that it
could continue with the litigation, the court’s scheduling order supports AUI’s
position on appeal that the surety bond was entered pursuant to a stipulation in
order to avoid unnecessary litigation costs. Graef’s citations to its allegations of
misconduct against AUI in the circuit court do not alter the purpose behind AUI’s
payment of the bond premium or change the plain purpose of WIS. STAT.
§§ 618.47(1) and 601.72(1)(c).

¶33 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by
determining that the entire $75,000 bond premium in this case was necessary, and
Graef failed to meet his burden to show why the costs were not authorized or were
improperly or inaccurately calculated. See Martell, 11 Wis. 2d at 296. For

5
CCAP, an acronym for Wisconsin’s Consolidated Court Automation Programs,
“provides public access online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit courts for those counties
that use CCAP.” State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133. We may
take judicial notice of CCAP records. Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App 32, ¶5 n.1,
346 Wis. 2d 635, 829 N.W.2d 522.

We reject any argument made by Graef that the February 2022 transcript demonstrates
the surety bond was obtained due to AUI’s alleged misconduct. “It is the appellant’s
responsibility to ensure completion of the appellate record and ‘when an appellate record is
incomplete in connection with an issue raised by the appellant, we must assume that the missing
material supports the trial court’s ruling.’” Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376
Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (citation omitted).

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No. 2024AP512

example, Graef did not allege, with any specificity, that the surety bond or
premium were too high.6

CONCLUSION

¶34 A prevailing party who pays a surety bond premium may include
that expense as a disbursement under WIS. STAT. § 814.05. If a party chooses to
include the paid premium as a disbursement, a circuit court must tax that expense
to the extent that the court determines, within its discretion, that the expense was
“necessary.” See WIS. STAT. § 814.04(2). Under the facts of this case, we agree
with AUI that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by
finding that the entire sum of AUI’s surety bond premium made pursuant to a
stipulation was a “necessary” disbursement under § 814.04(2). The stipulation
required that AUI file the surety bond in order to continue to litigate the lawsuit
and avoid a default judgment. Without evidence to the contrary, Graef failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating that the paid premium was unnecessary or
excessive. Therefore, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

6
Graef asks this court, for the first time in its reply brief, to “exercise its discretion to
sanction [AUI] for the blatantly false affidavit its general counsel gave under oath and its failure
to remedy this falsehood by withholding those costs.” The alleged filing of a false affidavit
occurred in the circuit court. Graef cites no authority, and this court is not aware of any such
authority, permitting us to sanction a party for filing a false affidavit in the circuit court.
See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646-47. Accordingly, we deny Graef’s invitation to impose sanctions
on AUI.

16