State v. George Maurice Reel

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 28, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2024AP233-CR Cir. Ct. Nos. 2021CF32
2020CF2731
2024AP234-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGE MAURICE REEL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from judgments and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: DAVID L. BOROWSKI and DAVID C. SWANSON,
Judges. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Geenen, and Colón, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. George Maurice Reel appeals from judgments
entered following guilty pleas to fleeing or eluding an officer, homicide by
intoxicated use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance, and second-
degree recklessly endangering safety. Reel also appeals from an order of the
circuit court denying Reel’s postconviction motion for plea withdrawal.1 Upon
review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Reel on August 10, 2020, with fleeing or eluding
an officer and second-degree recklessly endangering safety in Milwaukee County
Circuit Court Case No. 2020CF2731. The charges arose from an incident where
police observed a vehicle traveling approximately 60 miles per hour on a city
street with a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. The driver refused to pull
over, and when police caught up with the vehicle, the driver fled on foot. The
driver, later identified as Reel, was taken into custody after a brief foot chase.

¶3 The State subsequently charged Reel on January 5, 2021, with
several additional offenses, including second-degree reckless homicide, in
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case No. 2021CF32. The charges arose from
allegations that Reel drove a vehicle at 60 to 80 miles per hour on a city street with
a posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour, ran a red light, and caused an accident
that left a pedestrian dead and multiple people injured, including a two-year-old
child passenger who was in the backseat of Reel’s vehicle without a child safety

1
The Honorable David L. Borowski entered the judgments of conviction, and the
Honorable David C. Swanson entered the order denying Reel’s postconviction motion for plea
withdrawal. For ease of reference, we refer to each as the circuit court.

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

seat. Following the accident, police officers spoke with Reel at the hospital where
Reel’s passengers had been transported for treatment of their injuries. Reel
admitted to the officers that he had smoked marijuana earlier that day, and police
recovered marijuana from Reel’s person.

¶4 The criminal complaint further alleged that Reel was out on bail for
Case No. 2020CF2731 with conditions that included “absolutely no driving” and
do not commit any new crimes. The criminal complaint also indicated that Reel’s
license was revoked for five years beginning in 2020 as a result of a prior incident.
Thus, at the time of the incidents underlying both Case No. 2020CF2731 and Case
No. 2021CF32, Reel’s license was revoked. Reel admitted to police officers when
he spoke to them at the hospital that he was aware of the status of his license, as
well as his conditions of bail imposed in Case No. 2020CF2731.

¶5 On November 1, 2021, Reel pled guilty to the charge of fleeing or
eluding an officer in Case No. 2020CF2731 and two amended charges of homicide
by intoxicated use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance and second-
degree recklessly endangering safety in Case No. 2021CF32. Pursuant to the plea
agreement with the State, the State moved to dismiss and read in the remaining
charges. The circuit court conducted a plea colloquy with Reel and accepted
Reel’s pleas. As it related to the factual basis for the pleas, the parties stipulated to
the facts as stated in the criminal complaint, and the circuit court found a factual
basis “based on the stipulation, based on my reading of the complaint, [and] based
on what’s been indicated in court by counsel and the defendant.”

¶6 The circuit court subsequently sentenced Reel to a total of 35 years
of imprisonment composed of 20 years of initial confinement followed by 15 years
of extended supervision.

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

¶7 On August 1, 2023, Reel filed a motion for plea withdrawal.
Specifically, Reel argued that the circuit court failed to establish a factual basis to
support the amount of THC in his blood for his plea to the charge of homicide by
intoxicated use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance. In responding
to Reel’s motion, the State provided a lab report referenced at the plea hearing.
The lab report stated that Reel’s blood sample was positive for cannabinoids, and
it further stated that Reel’s blood contained “Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)”
in the amount of 4.4 ug/L and “Carboxy-THC” in the amount of 42 ug/L.

¶8 The circuit court found that “the entirety of the record” and the
“totality of the circumstances” demonstrated that a factual basis existed and denied
Reel’s motion. Reel now appeals. Additional relevant facts will be noted below
as necessary.

DISCUSSION

¶9 On appeal, Reel renews his argument that he is entitled to withdraw
his pleas because the circuit court failed to establish a factual basis for his plea to
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance.
We disagree, and we conclude that, in reviewing the record in its entirety, the
totality of the circumstances demonstrate a factual basis for Reel’s plea to the
charge. Therefore, we further conclude that Reel is not entitled to plea withdrawal

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied
Reel’s motion.2

¶10 A defendant who seeks plea withdrawal after sentencing must show,
by clear and convincing evidence, “that allowing the withdrawal of the plea ‘is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.’” State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85, ¶32, 394
Wis. 2d 238, 951 N.W.2d 404 (citation omitted). “[O]ne type of manifest injustice
is the failure of the [circuit] court to establish a sufficient factual basis that the
defendant committed the offense to which he or she pleads.” State v. Smith, 202
Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996). “The determination of the existence of a
sufficient factual basis lies within the discretion of the [circuit] court and will not
be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. We also review the circuit
court’s denial of a postconviction motion for plea withdrawal for an erroneous
exercise of discretion. State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶20, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816
N.W.2d 177.

¶11 Returning to Reel’s argument, Reel argues more specifically that the
allegations in the criminal complaint to which he stipulated failed to establish a
factual basis for his plea when it merely made reference to “a detectable amount of

2
As noted, Reel moved for withdrawal of all of his pleas. However, because his claim
for withdrawal of his other pleas is derivative of his argument for withdrawal of his plea to
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance, we conclude that
his argument for withdrawal of his other pleas fails, and we do not address his additional
argument for withdrawal of his other pleas any further. See State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688,
703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[C]ases should be decided on the narrowest possible
ground[.]”).

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
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a restricted controlled substance in his blood.”3 He further contends that the
State’s representation at the plea hearing that Reel’s charge was “based on blood
work that shows the defendant had Delta 9 THC in his blood at the time of the
crash which I provided to the defense” failed to establish a factual basis for his
plea when no specific blood concentration was alleged in the complaint and the
lab report, even though it was provided to the defense, was not in the record.

¶12 “[A] court may look at the totality of the circumstances when
reviewing a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether a
defendant has agreed to the factual basis underlying the guilty plea.” State v.
Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. “The totality of the
circumstances includes the plea hearing record, the sentencing hearing record, as
well [as] the defense counsel’s statements concerning the factual basis presented
by the [S]tate, among other portions of the record.” Id. In other words, “[t]he
reviewing court looks at the entirety of the record to determine whether,
considered as a whole, the record supports the assertion that manifest injustice will
occur if the plea is not withdrawn.” Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31.

¶13 Reviewing Reel’s motion under the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Reel fails to meet his burden to show that manifest injustice will
occur if his pleas are not withdrawn. Rather, the entirety of the record considered

3
We note that this language is taken directly from the charging statute, defining the
crime as “[c]auses the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person
has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.” WIS. STAT.
§ 940.09(1)(am) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
We note that no relevant changes have been made to the applicable statutes since the time of
Reel’s offense.

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

as a whole demonstrates a factual basis for Reel’s plea to homicide by intoxicated
use of a vehicle with a restricted controlled substance.

¶14 Indeed, while the specific amount of the restricted controlled
substance—in this case THC—in his blood may not have been included in the
allegations in the criminal complaint, Reel did in fact stipulate to the wording in
the criminal complaint that he had a detectable amount of a restricted controlled
substance in his blood, as the offense is defined in the statute. See WIS. STAT.
§ 940.09(1)(am). Then, at the plea hearing, the State further informed the circuit
court that the charges were based on a lab report with the specific amount of THC
detected in Reel’s blood, and the State indicated that this lab report had been
provided to Reel. Importantly, the State’s comment at the plea hearing provides
evidence on the record at the plea hearing of the existence of the lab report with
the specific amount of THC in Reel’s blood and Reel’s knowledge of it. Reel
raised no objection to this report at the time of the plea hearing, nor did he
contradict the State’s representation that this lab report with the specific amount of
THC found in his blood had been provided to him.

¶15 Nevertheless, Reel compares his case to State v. Harrington, 181
Wis. 2d 985, 512 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994), where we concluded that plea
withdrawal was necessary because of the circuit court’s failure to establish a
factual basis for the defendant’s plea to felony theft of property over $1,000 in
value. Id. at 987. In Harrington, we concluded that plea withdrawal was
necessary because the record was completely devoid of the required facts to
support that the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000. Id. at 988-89, 991.

¶16 By contrast, in Reel’s case, the State informed the circuit court at the
plea hearing that the defense had been provided with a lab report to support the

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
2024AP234-CR

amount of THC in Reel’s blood. Additionally, in response to Reel’s motion to
withdraw his pleas, the State provided this same lab report to the circuit court and
admitted this report into the record. While this lab report preferably should have
been admitted at the plea hearing, we nonetheless consider Reel’s case
distinguishable from Harrington. The plea hearing record reflects that Reel was
provided with a lab report containing the precise amount of THC in his blood.
Moreover, while in receipt of this report, Reel stipulated to the facts as presented
in the allegations of the criminal complaint and presented by the State at the plea
hearing, and he entered a guilty plea to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle
with a restricted controlled substance. This report is further contained in the
record as a result of the postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, the record here
is not devoid of facts as it was in Harrington.

¶17 Still, Reel takes issue with the results as stated in the lab report and
contends that the lab report cannot provide a factual basis for his plea because the
report fails to specify precursors and metabolites of Delta-9, which he contends
are not a restricted controlled substance. However, as the State correctly asserts,
the lab report specifically states the amount of “Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC),” the relevant restricted controlled substance at issue. See WIS. STAT.
§ 340.01(50m)(e) (defining “restricted controlled substance” as “Delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol, excluding its precursors and metabolites, at a concentration
of one or more nanograms per milliliter of a person’s blood”). Furthermore, the
lab report here does list “Carboxy-THC,” a Delta-9 metabolite. Given the
substance of the report, there is no basis or reason to believe that “Delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)” stands for anything other than the relevant restricted
controlled substance at issue, namely “Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC),” as
opposed to any precursors or metabolites.

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Nos. 2024AP233-CR
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¶18 Moreover, we observe that Reel failed to object to the lab report
below and failed to raise an argument about precursors and metabolites at the time
that he was provided with this report. Consequently, we may also consider his
argument on this point to be forfeited for failing to raise any objection to the lab
report below. See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Reel is not entitled
to plea withdrawal and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion
when it denied Reel’s motion. Therefore, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgments and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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