Pleasant Valley Properties of WI, LLC v. Michelle Nelson

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 15, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2227 Cir. Ct. No. 2023SC559

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

PLEASANT VALLEY PROPERTIES OF WI, LLC,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

MICHELLE NELSON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Juneau County:
STACY A. SMITH, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.
No. 2023AP2227

¶1 NASHOLD, J.1 Michelle Nelson appeals a judgment for eviction.
Nelson challenges the circuit court’s conclusion that the lease protections for
rentals of manufactured home sites in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m) do not apply and
that Nelson was therefore a periodic tenant whose tenancy could be terminated
with a 28-day notice. Because we agree with Nelson and conclude that
§ 710.15(1m) applies, we reverse the judgment for eviction and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Pleasant Valley Properties of WI, LLC (“Pleasant Valley”) is the
owner and operator of a manufactured home community.2 Prior to her eviction,

1
This appeal was converted from a one-judge appeal to a three-judge appeal under WIS.
STAT. § 752.31(3) and WIS. STAT. RULE 809.41(1) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

As the parties have been made aware, due to a clerical error in the clerk’s office, this case
was not transmitted to this court until over seven months after the final brief was filed.
2
In its respondent’s brief, Pleasant Valley refers to its property as a “trailer park” and to
Nelson’s rented home as a “mobile home.” In the circuit court proceedings, Nelson and the court
also referred to Nelson’s home as a “mobile home.” However, Pleasant Valley does not dispute
Nelson’s characterization in her appellant’s brief of Pleasant Valley’s property as a
“manufactured home community” or her characterization of her rented home as a “manufactured
home.” A “manufactured home” under WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1)(am) is defined by WIS. STAT.
§ 101.91(2) as any of the following:

(am) A structure that is designed to be used as a dwelling with or
without a permanent foundation and that is certified by the
federal department of housing and urban development as
complying with the standards established under 42 USC 5401 to
5425.

(c) A mobile home, unless a mobile home is specifically
excluded under the applicable statute.

A “mobile home” under § 710.15(1)(b) is defined to exclude recreational vehicles and is further
defined by § 101.91(10) as

(continued)

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No. 2023AP2227

Nelson rented both a manufactured home and the plot of land on which the home
sits. When Nelson’s one-year lease with a prior owner of the manufactured home
community expired on March 31, 2023, Pleasant Valley did not offer Nelson a
new one-year lease. However, Nelson continued to live at the property and make
monthly rent payments.

¶3 On August 28, 2023, Pleasant Valley sent Nelson a “28 Day Notice
of Non-Renewal of Lease.” When Nelson did not vacate the property by the end
of the 28-day period, Pleasant Valley brought an eviction action in small claims
court on October 3, 2023. Nelson filed an answer, which alleged as an affirmative
defense that any month-to-month rental agreement was invalid because WIS. STAT.
§ 710.15(1m) requires that a rental agreement for a manufactured home site be by
lease and for a term of at least one year unless the resident and operator agree to a
shorter term. She also alleged that Pleasant Valley produced no evidence showing

a vehicle manufactured or assembled before June 15, 1976,
designed to be towed as a single unit or in sections upon a
highway by a motor vehicle and equipped and used, or intended
to be used, primarily for human habitation, with walls of rigid
uncollapsible construction, which has an overall length in excess
of 45 feet. “Mobile home” includes the mobile home structure,
its plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems,
and all appliances and all other equipment carrying a
manufacturer’s warranty.

The parties do not draw any distinction between a manufactured home or a mobile home for
purposes of the issues on appeal, nor do we discern any relevant distinctions. Thus, when the
phrase “mobile home” appears in quoted material, that phrase may also encompass a
“manufactured home.”

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No. 2023AP2227

that Nelson had agreed to a month-to-month lease for the site.3 Nelson further
alleged that, because the rental of a site required a lease for a term of at least one
year, the 28-day notice was invalid.

¶4 The circuit court held an eviction hearing on November 7, 2023. At
the hearing, Pleasant Valley argued that Nelson became a periodic tenant after her
one-year lease expired; that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 704.19(3), Pleasant Valley
was only required to provide a 28-day notice terminating tenancy; and that
Pleasant Valley could terminate Nelson’s tenancy for any reason. In response,
Nelson argued, consistent with what she alleged in her answer, that pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m), any rental agreement for a manufactured home site was
required to be by lease for a term of at least one year, unless the resident and
operator agreed to a shorter term.

¶5 The circuit court ruled in favor of Pleasant Valley, concluding that
the protections afforded to renters of a manufactured home “site” in WIS. STAT.
§ 710.15(1m) apply only to tenants who own the manufactured home but rent the
plot of land underneath the home, and not to tenants such as Nelson, who rented
both the home and the plot. Specifically, the court concluded that, because Nelson

3
Pleasant Valley attached to its eviction complaint a document titled, “Residential
Rental Agreement” that appears to be filled out as a month-to-month lease for Nelson beginning
June 1, 2023. However, as Nelson pointed out in her answer, the document contains no
signatures. At the hearing held in this matter, Pleasant Valley did not rely on this document and
instead represented that after the one-year lease expired, “there was no new rental agreement
entered into” but Nelson “held over” and “continued to pay rent and became a periodic tenant
under [WIS. STAT. §] 704.01(2).” Pleasant Valley reiterates on appeal that Nelson “did not have a
valid lease” upon expiration of the prior one-year lease but was instead a periodic tenant, and
Pleasant Valley does not rely on the Residential Rental Agreement. For her part, Nelson states in
her appellant’s brief that she “never elected to rent the manufactured home site for a term of less
than a year,” thereby agreeing with Pleasant Valley’s representation that the parties did not enter
into a written lease.

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No. 2023AP2227

rented both the manufactured home and the associated plot, she was not the renter
of a “site” for purposes of § 710.15(1m). In support of this conclusion, the court
first relied on its view of the legislature’s intent. According to the court, due to the
expense of moving a manufactured home, individuals who own a manufactured
home have a greater interest in not being evicted from the rented plot of land than
those who rent their homes. The court also relied on WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ ATCP 125.01(7)(b), which defines “site” to specifically exclude a plot of land
rented for the accommodation of a manufactured home that is “[o]wned by the
operator and occupied as a residence.”4 Because Pleasant Valley owned both the
plot and the manufactured home that Nelson rented, the court concluded that
Nelson did not rent a “site” for purposes of the rental protections afforded by
§ 710.15(1m). The court entered a judgment for eviction on November 7, 2023.

¶6 Nelson filed a motion for reconsideration, which also included a
request to stay the judgment for eviction pending appeal. The circuit court denied
both requests. Nelson appeals the eviction judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶7 This case requires us to interpret statutory and administrative code
provisions. We do so de novo, using the same canons of statutory construction.
Orion Flight Services, Inc. v. Basler Flight Service, 2006 WI 51, ¶¶16, 18, 290
Wis. 2d 421, 714 N.W.2d 130. Statutory interpretation begins with the language
of the statute, which is generally given its common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning. Id., ¶16. In addition, “statutory language is interpreted in the context in

4
All references to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP are to the November 2024 register unless
otherwise noted.

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No. 2023AP2227

which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related
statutes, and interpreted to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id.

¶8 In issuing its eviction judgment, the circuit court agreed with
Pleasant Valley that, upon the expiration of Nelson’s final one-year written lease,
Nelson became a periodic tenant and was therefore subject to a month-to-month
lease that Pleasant Valley was permitted to terminate through a 28-day notice of
eviction. See WIS. STAT. §§ 704.01(2); 704.25(2)(b) and (c); and 704.19(3).5 For
purposes of this appeal, Nelson does not dispute that, if she were a periodic tenant,
the 28-day notice requirement would apply, nor does she dispute that she received
such notice. However, Nelson argues that she was not a periodic tenant at the time
she received the 28-day notice because, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m),
rental of a site must be pursuant to a lease for a term of not less than one year,
meaning that any month-to-month rental agreement would be invalid.
Section 710.15(1m) provides:

REQUIREMENT AND TERM OF LEASE. Every agreement for
the rental of a mobile home site or manufactured home site
shall be by lease. Every lease shall be for a term of at least
one year unless the resident or occupant requests a shorter
term and the operator agrees to the shorter term.

5
WISCONSIN STAT. § 704.01(2) defines “periodic tenant” as “a tenant who holds
possession without a valid lease and pays rent on a periodic basis.” WISCONSIN STAT.
§ 704.25(2)(b) and (c) provide, as pertinent here, that when a tenant “holds over after expiration
of the lease, the landlord may elect to hold the tenant on a month-to-month basis” and that
“[a]cceptance of rent for any period after expiration of a lease or other conduct manifesting the
landlord’s intent to allow the tenant to remain in possession after the expiration date constitutes
an election by the landlord under this section unless the landlord has already commenced
proceedings to remove the tenant.” WISCONSIN STAT. § 704.19(3) provides that when rent is
payable on a monthly basis, at least 28 days’ notice must be given to terminate the periodic
tenancy.

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No. 2023AP2227

See also § 710.15(1)(ag) (defining “lease” as “a written agreement” between an
operator and a resident). Nelson further argues that, because she was not a
periodic tenant but was instead subject to a lease for her site of at least one year,
she had additional statutory protections from termination of her tenancy pursuant
to WIS. STAT. §§ 704.17(2) and 710.15(5m), which limit the circumstances under
which a landlord may terminate tenancy or refuse to renew a lease.

¶9 The parties agree that resolution of this appeal turns on the meaning
of the term “site” as used in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m). As stated, the circuit court
concluded that the term “site” in § 710.15(1m) has the same meaning as “site” as
defined in WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 125.01(7). Under § ATCP 125.01(7),
“site” is defined as “any plot of land that is rented or offered for rental for the
accommodation of a manufactured home” but “does not include a plot of land
rented for the accommodation of a manufactured home that is … [o]wned by the
operator and occupied as a residence.”

¶10 Nelson argues that there is no basis to conclude that the definition of
“site” in WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 125.01(7) should be applied to WIS. STAT.
§ 710.15(1m). Instead, Nelson argues, the statutory term “site” is unambiguous
and may therefore be defined by reference to a dictionary definition. See Kalal v.
Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110
(“[S]tatutory interpretation ‘begins with the language of the statute. If the
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.’” (quoted source
omitted)); id. (“Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given
their technical or special definitional meaning.”); id., ¶53 (stating that when the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, its “common and accepted
meaning [is] ascertainable by reference to the dictionary definition.”). Although

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No. 2023AP2227

we discuss the applicability of § ATCP 125.01(7) in greater detail below, we note
here that neither the circuit court nor Pleasant Valley has directed us to any
language in § 710.15(1m), § ATCP 125.01(7), or any other statutory or
administrative code provision that suggests that the definition of “site” in § ATCP
125.01(7) is incorporated into the meaning of that term in § 710.15(1m).6

¶11 We agree with Nelson that there is nothing in the statutory language
itself or surrounding statutes that suggests the type of limitation to the term “site”
that appears in WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 125.01(7), i.e., that “site” excludes a
plot of land rented for the accommodation of a manufactured home that is “owned
by the operator” and occupied as a residence by a tenant. Rather, the text of WIS.
STAT. § 710.15(1m) is broad and appears to contemplate all mobile and
manufactured home sites, regardless of the ownership status of the homes situated
on the sites. See § 710.15(1m) (applying to “[e]very agreement for the rental of a
mobile home site or manufactured home site.”).

¶12 As Nelson notes, when a term is not statutorily defined, we may
consult a dictionary to determine its common and accepted meaning. See Kalal,
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶53-54. Using a dictionary definition, the term “site” refers to
the “spatial location of an actual or planned structure or set of structures” or a
“space of ground occupied or to be occupied by a building,”
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/site (last visited May 8, 2025).
Applying that definition here, the term “site” as used in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m)
refers to the “spatial location” or “space of ground occupied” by the manufactured

6
We likewise have not been directed to any legislative or administrative history that
would suggest that the definition of WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 125.01 applies, nor has our
independent research uncovered any.

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No. 2023AP2227

home that Nelson rented, namely, the plot of land Nelson rented from Pleasant
Valley. Thus, the protections afforded by § 710.15(1m) apply to Nelson’s rental
of the manufactured home site.

¶13 Pleasant Valley’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
Significantly, although Pleasant Valley purports to rely on a “plain meaning”
interpretation of the term “site” in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m), its interpretation
consists solely of the assertion that the definition in WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ ATCP 125.01(7) applies. Further, all Pleasant Valley offers in support of its
contention that the definition of “site” in § ATCP 125.01(7) applies is an April 20,
2022 publication by the Tenant Resource Center, titled, “Mobile Home Basics.”
See Laura Dixson-Kruijf, Mobile Home Basics, TENANT RESOURCE CENTER
(Apr. 20, 2022), https://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/mobile_home_basics. We
will assume for purposes of this opinion that we may consider such extrinsic
sources in discerning the meaning of the statutory term “site.” 7 However, as
Nelson points out, this publication, including one of the excerpts that Pleasant
Valley quotes, actually supports Nelson’s position that WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch.
ATCP 125 does not apply to Nelson’s situation and that it instead applies only
when the tenant owns the manufactured home but rents the accompanying plot of
land. For example, the publication states:

The most basic information to have about mobile homes is
to figure out which category you are in, and the laws that
apply to you:

1. Do you own your mobile home (you have the title), but
you rent the lot (the piece of land)? Then ATCP 125 and

7
Pleasant Valley includes this publication in its appendix, and Nelson does not dispute
that we may consider this publication to the extent that we may consider sources outside the
language of WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m) itself.

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No. 2023AP2227

WIS. STAT. [§] 710.15 protect you as a mobile home owner.
Your rights as a tenant of the lot are protected by WIS.
STAT. [§] 704, ATCP 134, and WIS. STAT. [§] 799, but
these only apply to the lot, and not inside the mobile home,
where you have sole ownership.

2. Do you rent both the mobile home and the lot? Then
ATCP 125 does NOT apply to you. Your rights as a tenant
(of both the home and the lot) are protected by WIS. STAT.
[§] 710.15, WIS. STAT. [§] 704, ATCP 134, and WIS. STAT.
[§] 799.

Id. (Italics added, bolding omitted). This excerpt supports not only the view that
ch. ATCP 125 is inapplicable to tenants like Nelson who rent both the
manufactured home and the associated plot of land but also that the protections of
§ 710.15 apply in such circumstances (i.e., “Your rights a tenant (of both the home
and the lot) are protected by [§] 710.15.”). Pleasant Valley does not point to any
other language from this publication that supports a conclusion that a definition
from ch. ATCP 125 must be applied when interpreting “site” in § 710.15(1m).

¶14 Nelson also provides other sources in support of her position that
WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 125.01(7) does not apply here. First, she relies on the
“Analysis” of amendments to WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. ATCP 125 that was
conducted by the Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection, the
agency that promulgated the chapter. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. Ag 125 (Register,
February 1987, No. 374).8 This analysis explicitly states that the amendments
“clarify that [ch. ATCP] 125 does not apply to rental transactions in which the
mobile home occupant rents both the mobile [or manufactured] home and the
mobile home site from the park operator.” Id. at 2. Instead, ch. ATCP 125

8
WISCONSIN ADMIN. CODE ch. Ag 125 was renumbered WIS. ADMIN. CODE
ch. ATCP 125 under WIS. STAT. § 13.93(2m)(b)1. (1993-94).

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No. 2023AP2227

“applies to mobile home parks in which mobile homes owned by tenants are
placed on rental sites owned by the park operator.” Id. Nelson also relies on a
chart set forth in the Wisconsin Landlord & Tenant Manual, which makes the
same point: ch. ATCP 125 does not apply to tenants who rent both the
manufactured home and the corresponding plot, but WIS. STAT. § 710.15 does:

Applicable State Statutes And Regulations Regarding Mobile Homes In Wisconsin

Wisconsin Statutes Wisconsin Administrative Code
Rent mobile home and lot WIS. STAT. ch. 704, § 710.15 WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. ATCP 134
Own mobile home, rent lot WIS. STAT. ch. 704, § 710.15 WIS. ADMIN. CODE chs. ATCP 125, 134
Rent to own Depends on contract Depends on contract

Kristin K. Beilke et al., Wisconsin Landlord & Tenant Manual 10-2 (1st ed. 2020).

¶15 We further observe that several provisions in WIS. ADMIN. CODE
ch. ATCP 125 also support the view that this chapter applies only to tenants who
own a manufactured home but rent the corresponding plot. For example,
§ ATCP 125.01(9) defines “tenant” as “any person residing in a manufactured
home and renting a site from an operator.” Notably, this definition does not refer
to an individual renting the manufactured home itself, only the site. Similarly,
§ ATCP 125.01(5) defines “rental agreement” as “an agreement between an
operator and a tenant for the rental of a site.” (Emphasis added.) Also,
§ ATCP 125.01(3) defines “operator” as “any person engaged in the business of
renting sites in a manufactured home community to tenants.” (Emphasis added.)

¶16 In contrast, definitions of the same or similar terms in WIS. STAT.
§ 710.15(1) contemplate rental of both the plot and the manufactured home. For
example, unlike the definition of “operator” in WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ ATCP 125.01(3) that includes only those who rent “sites,” “operator” is defined
in § 710.15(1)(d) as “a person engaged in the business of renting plots of ground

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No. 2023AP2227

or mobile homes or manufactured homes in a community to mobile home or
manufactured home owners or occupants.” (Emphasis added.). And unlike the
definition of “rental agreement” in § ATCP 125.01(5) that includes only the rental
of a “site,” § 710.15(1)(ag) defines “lease” to include rental of the home: i.e., “a
written agreement between an operator and a resident establishing the terms upon
which the mobile home or manufactured home may be located in the community
or the resident may occupy a mobile home or manufactured home in the
community.”9 (Emphasis added.). These contrasting definitions of the same or
similar terms in ch. ATCP 125 as compared to § 710.15 support the view that ch.
ATCP 125 applies only to tenants who own the manufactured home but rent the
plot of land, whereas § 710.15 applies more generally—to tenants who rent the
plot, rent the home, or rent both the plot and home.

¶17 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that WIS. ADMIN. CODE
ch. ATCP 125 does not apply to Nelson because she rents both the manufactured
home and the associated plot from Pleasant Valley. And because Pleasant View
has provided no other basis to contradict Nelson’s “plain meaning” interpretation
of the statutory term “site” discussed above, we adopt Nelson’s definition and
conclude that the protections afforded by WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m) apply to
Nelson’s rental of the manufactured home site. Accordingly, we reverse the
circuit court’s judgment for eviction that was based on its conclusion to the
contrary, and we remand this matter for further proceedings.

¶18 Finally, for purposes of remand, we note that the parties dispute
whether—assuming WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1m) applies—Nelson was in fact

9
“Lease” is not a defined term in WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. ATCP 125.

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No. 2023AP2227

afforded the statutory protections to which she was entitled prior to her eviction
and that, because of the circuit court’s dispositive ruling on other grounds, the
court did not make findings in this regard. Therefore, on remand, the court shall
determine whether, given the applicability of § 710.15(1m), Nelson was provided
the statutory protections to which she was entitled.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded with
directions.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

13